APORTE O PROPUESTA DE SOLUCIÓN Fundamentos del Aporte

Francophone Institution

Despite these controversies in Québec City, the main battleground for francophonisation in hockey was Montréal, where the Canadiens, particularly when juxtaposed with the Nordiques, were accused of undergoing a reverse francophonisation – an anglophonisation – by conducting a purge of their long-established Francophone players. Fittingly, the first article I encountered that charged the Canadiens with systematically having “forgotten” Québec appeared a mere week after Reggie Thomas‟ comments.65 Inspired both by Thomas‟ rant and by the Canadiens‟ release of two Francophone players, Gilles Lupien and Normand Dupont, Réjean Tremblay insisted in La Presse that the Canadiens, like the Nordiques, had a “moral obligation” to field the best Francophone players because of the linguistic domination suffered by Francophone players in the hockey workplace.66 This comment is fascinating: while there was no legal imperative to stock the team with Québec Francophone players, Tremblay still envisioned a moral obligation, demonstrating a strong desire for francophonisation. While he agreed that accusing the Canadiens of racism was ridiculous, one could certainly criticize the

team for “imprudence.” Tremblay finished the column with a call for the Canadiens to adopt the Nordiques‟ recruitment policy, which stipulated that Francophone players would be favoured over Anglophones if their talent levels were equal. In Tremblay‟s estimation therefore, the Canadiens‟ “imprudence” stemmed from their failure to pursue a Bill 1-style personnel policy that would overthrow Francophone subordination in the workplace.

While Tremblay hesitated to accuse the Canadiens of prejudice, his colleague at La Presse, Canadiens‟ beat writer Bernard Brisset, penned a blistering report where he argued that the team‟s “French fact” was quickly disappearing, and accused the

Canadiens specifically of causing this predicament in part through institutional anti- Francophone prejudice.67 Employing logic that recalled the gloomy forecasts of demographic and cultural armageddon that underpinned so much of neo-nationalist discourse, Brisset argued that Anglophones would very soon form a majority in the Canadiens‟ lineup if the Canadiens‟ drafting and recruitment policies continued to favour them: the „frogs‟ as Brisset pejoratively put it, were in danger. Brisset went on to ponder a question that would preoccupy Francophone sports journalists for the next few years. Half the Canadiens‟ roster, he noted, was composed of Francophones, while the other half was comprised of Anglophones: was this an acceptable proportion? Brisset began to answer this question by citing the Canadiens‟ historical importance in the province:

Évidemment, les Expos et les Alouettes n‟ont pas à se préoccuper de la division linguistique dans leur rangs. Mais les amateurs se reconnaissent dans leur équipe de hockey ce qui n‟est pas le cas avec les deux autres formées de joueurs

américains pour la plupart.68

Brisset, revealing a belief that the Canadiens should have an organic relationship with their populace, submitted an argument based on imperatives and “moral obligations.”

Like Tremblay, Brisset concluded that the Canadiens had the obligation to show a commitment to Québécois players like the Nordiques. So while a half Anglophone, half Francophone roster would fall short of the proportional representation urged in

documents such as the White Paper on the French Language, Brisset and Tremblay both argued in effect that anything less would constitute a breach of the Canadiens‟ “moral obligation” to work toward the emancipation and affirmation of Québec Francophones.

This is the context in which the Canadiens‟ personnel decisions were scrutinized by the French media. Despite the assurances that they, like the Nordiques, would choose a Francophone over an Anglophone if the players‟ talents were equal, the Canadiens were continually depicted as failing to work for the affirmation of Québec Francophones in the workplace.69 Every Francophone player‟s departure was met in the French media with a requiem for the Canadiens‟ status as a preeminent Québécois institution. The departure of Serge Savard in December, 1981 prompted Tremblay to lament that “d‟ici deux ou trois ans, le Canadien sera moins qu‟une équipe comme les autres.”70 Whereas the Canadiens previously symbolized Francophone empowerment, they risked losing their “âme” (soul) if they continued to purge the team of Francophones. Similar protestations followed the trade of Pierre Larouche a few weeks later.71 The departure of Guy

Lapointe prompted Brisset to lament that “le ménage des frogs se poursuit chez le Canadien,” the use of the epithet “frog” driving home the Canadiens‟ perceived hostility toward Québécois players;72 meanwhile, Le Journal de Montréal reminded its readers matter-of-factly that “il faut reconnaître que les Glorieux sont de moins en moins francophone” and that, after Lapointe‟s exit, “la liste s‟allonge.”73

Likewise, the appointment of Bob Gainey, an Ontarian who had learned French during his tenure in

Montréal, as team captain was presented as evidence of the erosion of Francophone players‟ influence at the club.74

The way that the French media most forcefully drove home the team‟s failure to conform to francophonisation was through unfavourable comparisons to the Montréal Maroons, the Canadiens‟ erstwhile Anglophone rivals from the 1920s and 1930s. Francophone journalists began calling the Canadiens “Les Maroons” beginning in December, 1981, and did so consistently for the better part of the next year.75 The rationale for using this epithet is obvious: it was meant to underscore graphically that the Canadiens were now representative of Montréal‟s Anglophone minority; similarly sarcastic references to the Canadiens as the “Glorious,” an English rendering of the team‟s traditional nickname Les Glorieux, served the same purpose.76

Tremblay made this explicitly clear:

On ne veut que traduire par cet article littéraire, une réalité qui prend forme beaucoup plus rapidement qu‟on l‟avait prévu. Le Canadien, tel qu‟on le

connaissait, le Canadien en lequel se reconnaissaient tant de Montréalais, tant de Québécois, se meurt. À sa place, on retrouve une bonne équipe ordinaire, comme il y en a une dizaine d‟autres dans la ligue Nationale, une équipe qui ne semble pas se préoccuper de cette tradition francophone que Sam Pollock avait réussi à preserver. Ce n‟est pas grave, on aimera les Maroons comme on aime les Expos ou les Alouettes...

Ce n‟est pas question d‟être raciste, ça na pas d‟importance en soi que les joueurs soient francos, anglos, suédois ou tchécos... C‟est tout juste que le hockey est le seul sport majeur où des athlètes de chez-nous ont une chance de se faire valoir, tout juste qu‟il existait une vieille tradition chez le Tricolore... et que la diréction du Canadien ne semble pas le réaliser...77

Here Tremblay touched on two narratives that emerged from the French media‟s coverage of the Canadiens in the early 1980s. First, that the Canadiens‟ relationship to Francophone Québec was weakened as a result of its anglophonisation; and second, that the Canadiens, as a Québec enterprise, had a political, moral, and cultral responsibility to

field a large number of Francophone players, both because of the historical subordination of Francophones in the world of sport, and because of an obligation to participate in the province‟s socio-political evolution.

The Canadiens‟ ethnic composition became a frequent press preoccupation, revealing an obsession with demographics and quotas. Francophone journalists

monitored the number of Francophones featured in the Canadiens‟ lineup, and routinely published head counts in their newspapers. For instance, the arrival of a player named Jeff Brubaker was commemorated in La Presse as the moment when Francophone players became a minority in Montréal.78 Games versus the Nordiques tended to prompt a head count, which usually proved uncomplimentary for the Canadiens.79 Comparisons with other Francophone-heavy teams further underlined the Canadiens‟ failure to fulfill their “moral obligation” to work toward francophonisation. A Canadian Press report from January, 1982, following a game that pitted the Canadiens against the Buffalo Sabres, demonstrated this. The Canadiens fielded five Francophones in that game, while the Sabres, coached by ex-Canadiens coach and presumed francophobe Scotty

Bowman,80 iced six; this fact was taken as evidence that the Canadiens needed to remake their image.81 Letters to the editor in French language newspapers also engaged in these cultural headcounts, while linking events at the Forum more explicitly to wider socio- political contexts than the stories that prompted them. Case in point was a letter that was published in all three of Montréal‟s daily French language newspapers, La Presse, Le Devoir, and Le Journal de Montréal. It began: “actuellement, à l‟heure de la francisation, l‟équipe qui représente la deuxième ville française au monde compte 12 joueurs

francophones contre 14 anglophones.”82

demographic composition to the neo-nationalist francisation project. After criticizing the Canadiens for not fielding enough Francophone players, the reader submitted his ideal solution:

Il ne s‟agit pas d‟éliminer les Anglais de Montréal... mais simplement de respecter les proportions demographiques de la Metropole... par example, nous pourrions avoir au sein du Tricolore au moins 14 joueurs francophones sur un total de 21, puisque Montréal est majoritairement française à 70%.83

The solution proposed was a strict program of francophonisation, complete with

affirmative action quotas, as suggested in Bill 1 and its associated White Paper: according to this view, the Canadiens‟ demography should correspond exactly to the percentages in Montréal.