Apreciación general del neo-populismo Chavista

74. Although the world has seen few inter-State wars over the past 60 years, the threat of inter-State war has not vanished. Unresolved regional disputes in South Asia, North-East Asia and the Middle East continue to threaten interna- tional peace and security. These disputes may unravel 40 years of efforts to pre- vent the proliferation of nuclear weapons and more than 75 years of efforts to banish the scourge of biological and chemical weapons. In turn, inter-State rivalry in some regions fuels and exacerbates internal wars, making them more difficult to bring to a close. Such rivalry, by promoting conventional weapons build-ups, diverts scarce resources that could be used to reduce poverty, improve health and increase education.

75. War and ongoing instability in Iraq and Palestine have fuelled extremism in parts of the Muslim world and the West. This issue is complex and multidi- mensional and defies any simplistic categorization. Nonetheless, one cannot ignore the ability of extremist groups to foster perceptions within the West and within the Muslim world of cultural and religious antagonism between them, the dangers of which, if left unchecked, are profound.

76. In the past, the United Nations helped to reduce the threat of inter-State con- flicts through the Secretary-General’s “good offices”, or quiet diplomacy aimed at defusing crises and providing hostile parties the opportunity to talk freely and test intentions. Successive Secretaries-General have played this role despite little capacity within the Organization to support it.

77. With the end of the cold war, the Security Council became increasingly active in addressing international threats. The average annual number of resolutions it passed increased from 15 to 60, or from one resolution a month to one a week.63

sanctions 14 times64_{and for an increasingly diverse range of stated purposes,}

including to reverse aggression, restore democratic Governments, protect human rights, end wars, combat terrorism and support peace agreements. 78. Several of these sanctions regimes were at least partially effective. In some cases,

they helped to produce negotiated agreements. In others, they combined with military pressure to weaken and isolate rebel groups and States in flagrant vio- lation of Security Council resolutions.

79. Sanctions failed when they were not effectively targeted and when the Security Council failed to enforce them. Weak enforcement results from the strategic interests of powerful States; a lack of clar- ity about the purpose of sanctions; “sanctions fatigue” brought about by concern over their humanitarian impact; insufficient support from the respective sanctions commit- tees; and insufficient State capacity to implement sanctions. 80. As a result of growing concern over the humanitarian impact of comprehensive

sanctions, the Security Council stopped imposing them after the cases of Iraq, for- mer Yugoslavia and Haiti, and turned exclusively to the use of financial, diplo- matic, arms, aviation, travel and commodity sanctions, targeting the belligerents and policy makers most directly responsible for reprehensible policies.

81. Increased activity does not necessarily produce increased results. Not all situa- tions that justified Security Council attention received it and not all its resolu- tions were followed by effective enforcement action. Yet two trends of the 1990s indicate increasing effectiveness in regulating international conflict. First, with the Council increasingly active and willing to use its powers under Chapter VII of the Charter of the United Nations, the balance between unilateral use of force and collectively authorized force has shifted dramatically. Collectively author- ized use of force may not be the rule today, but it is no longer an exception. Second, and perhaps the most striking indicator of the growing importance of the role of the United Nations in regulating international conflict, is the recent expectation that the Security Council should be the arbiter of the use of force. 82. Many people assumed it was quite natural that the United States should seek

Security Council support for going to war against Iraq in 2003. Superpowers, however, have rarely sought Security Council approval for their actions. That all States should seek Security Council authorization to use force is not a time- honoured principle; if this were the case, our faith in it would be much stronger. Our analysis suggests quite the opposite - that what is at stake is a rel- atively new emerging norm, one that is precious but not yet deep-rooted. 83. The case of Iraq prompted much difference of opinion. Some contend that the

Security Council was ineffective because it could not produce Iraqi compliance

Sanctions failed when they were not effectively targeted and when the Security Council failed to enforce them.

with its resolutions. Others argue Security Council irrelevance because the Council did not deter the United States and its coalition partners from waging war. Still others suggest that the refusal of the Security Council to bow to United States pressure to legitimate the war is proof of its relevance and indispens- ability: although the Security Council did not deter war, it provided a clear and principled standard with which to assess the decision to go to war. The flood of Foreign Ministers into the Security Council chambers during the debates, and widespread public attention, suggest that the United States decision to bring the question of force to the Security Council reaffirmed not just the relevance but the centrality of the Charter of the United Nations.

B. The threat of internal conflict