también aprenderás esto: cómo es necesario que admita la existencia de las apariencias quien en todos los sentidos indaga todo.

Māori attempts to deal with the government have been based on “finding a space to advance group interests within an imposed individualist framework” (Cheyne et al.

2008, p.140). Something that is important to understand however, is that group interests are not easily defined and nor is the ‘Māori group’. One thing however,

does remain certain; Māori individuals and organisations should be at the forefront of institutional attempts to give effect to changes over what constitutes Māoriness

(Kukutai 2004).

Throughout the term of every New Zealand government in at least the last three

decades, there has been a consistent call by many in the Māori community for tino

rangatiratanga or self-determination (Ringold 2005). What exactly this means is

difficult to say in an age where the Māori population is possibly more diverse than it ever has been, but concepts that are commonly associated with tino rangatiratanga include sovereignty and self-determination (Durie 1998; O’Regan and Mahuika

1993) and autonomy, active control and the right to exercise authority over Māori

resources and destinies (Maaka & Fleras 2000). Looking at the evolution of Māori policy over the years it would seem that the nation has been incrementally moving

toward a point where Māori are essentially driving the direction of Māori policy.

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contemporary Māori society and according to Duncan (2008) any political system can only be legitimate in Māori eyes if it recognises and promotes self- determination. Furthermore, international convention now recognises self- determination as a right of indigenous peoples in Articles three and four of the United Nations Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples (2007) lending more weight to national arguments for tino rangatiratanga.

Whether Māori interests are best served within or independent of the national

political system is arguable and finding a balance between Māori autonomy and national cohesion has been a challenge faced by successive generations of Māori and

successive governments (Cheyne et al. 2008). Over at least the past two decades,

Māori participation in government has increased. This is not merely a token

participation but has led to a more decisive influence on policy and institutions. As well as a number of positive outcomes, the increased level of Māori participation in governance has led to a new set of tensions. The potential for conflict has increased,

centred particularly on whether the best way to achieve Māori aspirations is through

integration or independence (Durie 2003a).

Within this debate, Te Puni Kōkiri, the Ministry of Māori Development occupies an

interesting position within the public sector as it is tasked with representing Māori

interests from within the government, a complicated position at best. Developing

Māori capacity to provide social services has been and is advocated for on both sides

of the political spectrum (Cheyne et al. 2008). The motivation behind this advocacy however depends upon the political and social ideology that frames the actions of those involved. While the intended outcome is generally the same; the approach

taken will tend to lend itself to effectiveness or otherwise. Although Māori

advancement is important, groups in power tend to be primarily led by the idea of

Māori advancement on their terms rather than Māori advancement on Māori terms (Durie 1998). While Te Puni Kōkiri is in a sense an organisation that advocates for Māori advancement, it is still a State organisation that is responsible to the executive

and thus influenced by the politics of the day. It stands to reason then, to question the

ability or appropriateness of Te Puni Kōkiri as a lead organisation in advocating for tino rangatiratanga, rather placing this role in the realm of dedicated Māori, non- government organisations.

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Furthermore, iwi organisations, attempting to favour a Māori model of provision

must still enter into a purchaser-provider relationship by “demonstrating their respective capacity to supply the required quantity and quality of services to New Zealanders in need as defined by government assessment criteria (Puketapu 2000). Even under newer capacity based models of policy this is still the case. However, although this situation seems to be diminishing tino rangatiratanga, it would be unwise to refuse government resources altogether. According to Durie (2003b), no one group can be absolutely autonomous in New Zealand, nor would it be a wise

aspiration. Positive Māori development is not something that can be fully wrought

within the bounds of the State or the social service sector but rather requires Māori responsibility for Māori advancement in partnership with the State but not in debt to

it.

In conclusion there is a large and complex web of ideology, theory and debate that

forms the foundation of Māori policy development. Māori development has grown

through a number of changing and circulating ideas and their respective manifestations in policy. Some such as assimilation, integration and deficit policy models have been to the detriment of Māori advancement where as others such as

capacity policy models, tino rangatiratanga discourse and more emphasis on a Māori

world view in the public sector have provided significant benefits. Regardless of their immediate outcome however, developments in both the theory and practice of

Māori policy have taught Māori, the government and New Zealand society some

important lessons that should place us in a better position to continue to facilitate

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Chapter three