Aprendizaje de los gestores

The level of monopolisation taking place in a particular social field depends on a set of factors including: (1) level of cultural homogeneity of a social field; (2) regime nature and formation; and (3) economic resources available for a regime. These factors will

accordingly affect how a state responds to systemic forces. Let’s look in turn at these factors and the relation that governs them.

As argued in Chapter Three, the extent to which a social field is culturally homogeneous affects the political dynamics taking place within it. Although in the early phases of state formation, political struggles take place regardless of the cultural make- up of a field, a culturally heterogeneous social field makes monopolisation difficult. A cultural heterogeneity provides elements that can be politicised creating new social boundaries (see Chapter Three) and makes political incorporation more difficult. Accordingly, ceteris paribus, the higher the cultural heterogeneity a field is, the harder (and usually bloodier) the monopolisation process and vice-versa, the higher the cultural homogeneity of a field, the easier the monopolisation process.

As we shall see in the Saudi Arabia case below, the cultural and religious homogeneity of most parts of what is now Saudi Arabia facilitated political centralisation there and made possible the articulation of a universal idea (Islam). We observe the opposite in the case of Iraq, where ethnic and sectarian divisions challenged attempts at power monopolisation and, eventually, the cultural structure shaped the political dynamics with increased saliency. However, why, although sharing similar divisions to Iraq (and Syria for that matter), is Lebanon’s political trajectory different from Iraq?

This brings us to the second variable—regime formation. In Lebanon a particular social power’s—the Maronites—interest coincided with external powers attempting to establish borders in the region. This (as the case of Ibn Saud and the British will also show) contributed to regime formation in Lebanon. In this formation social (sectarian) boundaries were drawn from the beginning, setting a path-dependent trajectory. State institutions and major positions were distributed along sectarian lines. At the political level a Sunni-Maronite consensus maintained Lebanon’s fragile ‘consociational democracy’ (el Khazen 2000). In Iraq and Syria the absence—with some exceptions—of a domestic power with an interest to maintain the emerging borders saw a rise of universal ideologies aiming to reverse the imposed borders (Mufti 1995). Regime formation set the path for a different trajectory. Sectarian and ethnic boundaries took longer to develop in Iraq and Syria as opposed to Lebanon.

The way a regime is formed affects the prospects of power monopolisation. Regime formation does not only set a path that may explain the foreign policy prospects of a regime but it also figures the nature of responsesa regime incurs from revisionists

internally as well as externally. Tilly argues that “identities becomepolitical identities when governments become parties to them” (2005, 210; emphasis original). One argument presented here is that although some regimes in culturally heterogeneous societies resort to a universal idea to go beyond existing divisions, security dilemmas and inter-elite conflicts agitate cultural divisions leading regimes to become parties to them.

Finally, the available economic resources for a regime determine the prospects of power monopolisation. Ceteris paribus, the more the economic resources available for a regime, the higher the potential it has to monopolise power. Economic means contribute, as we saw above, to a regime’s ability to sustain coercive forces, which in turn reinforce the monopoly over the economic power. These means provide a regime with the ability to project power internally as well as externally making it a relatively stronger and distinct organisation within a social field. Saudi Arabia provides a clear example of a monarchy having the economic means to monopolise power and to socially and economically integrate a social field.

Like Saudi Arabia in its early stages, Yemen is a case of a weak regime unable to go beyond other social organisations—particularly tribes—due to weak economic base. Economic resources provide only a contributing factor to regime and state survival and without appreciating other variables, we can lose sight of other causes of state survival as the cases of Jordan, Morocco, or Oman indicate. For example, what should we expect if a regime is rich but operating in a culturally heterogeneous field? While the presence of economic resources might strengthen a state in a culturally homogeneous society by consolidating its cultural and economic ties, the presence of similar resources in heterogeneous society coupled with low political incorporation would strengthen the regime but weaken the state.11 This is especially true if resources are unequally distributed.

The cases of Sudan and Iraq provide examples of how regime behaviour was shaped by the presence of oil in regions where certain ethnic or sectarian groups are present and able to monopolise. In Sudan, successive Khartoum governments sought to redraw the boundaries of oil-rich southern regions such as Upper Nile and Bahr El Ghazal (Alier 1992) in attempts to deter separatist movements in the south. In Iraq, Saddam Hussein attempted to ‘Arabise’ the oil-rich Kirkuk to alter its demographic balance, a move that

is identical with Saudi attempts to employ thousands of state servants from Najd and Hejaz in the Eastern Province.

The above constitute important factors that account for variation among different cases in the Middle East states. Another factor may be added to the above which is the level of political incorporation. However, as most states in the Middle East, as shown above, figure low in political incorporation the examining of this variable might not be very useful for this population of cases. One can argue that Lebanon may score high in political incorporation given that its sectarian regime aims to incorporate all factions in state institutions. However, this raises the question as to the extent to which state institutions in Lebanon are independent from the social powers that constitute them.