Capítulo I Las competencias.
ÍNDICE CAPÍTULO
B. Aproximación funcional: la tradición británica.
See INA 101(a)(13)(C), 8 U.S.C. 1101(a)(13)(C).
2
See Section 350(b) of the Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act of 1996, Pub.L.
104-208, Division C, 110 Stat. 3009-546. 3
See Matter of Winter, 12 I&N Dec. 638 (BIA 1967, 1968); Matter of C.Y.C., 3 I&N Dec. 623 (BIA 1950); Matter of G, 1 I&N Dec. 96 (BIA 1941, AG 1942); but see Matter of I, 4 I&N Dec. 159 (BIA, AG 1950)
(independent admission of offense involving moral turpitude supports inadmissibility charge even though noncitizen only convicted of lesser offense not involving moral turpitude).
5
See INA 240A(a)(1); 8 U.S.C. 1229b(a)(1).
6
See INA 240A(a)(2) ); 8 U.S.C. 1229b(a)(2).
7
See INA 240A(d)(1); 8 U.S.C. 1229b(d)(1).
8
Id.; see Matter of Campos-Torres, 22 I&N Dec. 1289 (BIA 2000).
9
See In re C-V-T-, 22 I&N Dec. 7 (BIA 1998).
10
See INA 240A(a)(3) 8 U.S.C. 1229b(a)(3).
11
See INA 212(h); 8 U.S.C. 1182(h).
12
See id.
13
See INA 212(h); 8 U.S.C. 1182(h). In contrast, a non-LPR may be able to obtain 212(h) relief to waive a
crime involving moral turpitude even if it is an aggravated felony (see section 3.4). 14
Id.
15
See 8 C.F.R. 212.7(d).
16
See Immigration Act of 1990, Pub.L. No. 101–649, 104 Stat. 4978; Miscellaneous and Technical
Immigration and Naturalization Amendments of 1991, Pub.L. No. 102–232, 105 Stat. 1733. 17
See INA 209(a); 8 U.S.C. 1159(a); 8 C.F.R. 209.1(a)(1).
18 See 8 C.F.R 209.1(e). 19 See, supra, n. 3. 20 See, supra, n. 4. 21
See INA 208(c)(2)(B)&(c)(3); 8 U.S.C. 1158(c)(2)(B)&(c)(3); 8 C.F.R. 208.24.
22
See INA 208(b)(2)(B)(i); 8 U.S.C. 1158(b)(2)(B)(i).
23
See Matter of Frentescu, 18 I&N Dec. 244 (BIA 1982), modified, Matter of C-, 20 I&N Dec. 529 (BIA
1992), Matter of Gonzalez, 19 I&N Dec. 682 (BIA 1988)).
24
See INA 209; 8 U.S.C. 1159.
25
See INA 209(c); 8 U.S.C. 1159(c).
26
Seeid.
27
See Matter of Jean, 23 I&N Dec. 373 (A.G. 2002).
28
See INA 241(b)(3), 8 U.S.C. 1231(b)(3).
29
See INS v. Stevic, 467 U.S. 407 (1984).
30
See INS v. Cardoza-Fonseca, 480 U.S. 421 (1987).
31
See INA 241(b)(3)(B), 8 U.S.C. 1231(b)(3)(B)).
32
See Matter of Y-L, A-G, R-S-R, 23 I&N Dec. 270 (A.G. 2002), and note 64 infra.
33
See Matter of S-S-, 22 I&N Dec. 458 (BIA 1999), overruled in part, Matter of Y-L, A-G-, R-S-R, 23 I&N
Dec. 270 (A.G. 2002). 34
See Matter of Frentescu, 18 I&N Dec. 244 (BIA 1982), modified, Matter of C-, 20 I&N Dec. 529 (BIA
1992), Matter of Gonzalez, 19 I&N Dec. 682 (BIA 1988)).
35 Foreign Affairs and Restructuring Act of 1998, § 2242(c). 36 See 8 C.F.R. 208.16(c). 37 See 8 C.F.R. 208.17. 38 See, supra, n. 3. 39 See, supra, n. 4. 40
See INA 201(b)(2)(A)(i) & 203(a)(2)&(d), 8 U.S.C. 1151(b)(2)(A)(i) & 1153(a)(2)&(d).
41
See INA 201(b)(2)(A)(i) & 203(a)(1)(2)&(3)&(d), 8 U.S.C. 1151(b)(2)(A)(i) & 1153(a)(1),(2),&(3)
&(d). 42
See INA 201(b)(2)(A)(i), 8 U.S.C. 1151(b)(2)(A)(i).
43
See INA 203(a)(4), 8 U.S.C. 1153(a)(4).
44
See INA 203(b)(1), 8 U.S.C. 1153(b)(1).
45
See INA 203(b)(2), 8 U.S.C. 1153(b)(2).
46
See INA 203(b)(3), 8 U.S.C. 1153(b)(3).
47
See INA 203(b)(4), 8 U.S.C. 1153(b)(4)) and INA 101(a)(27), 8 U.S.C. 1101(a)(27).
48
See INA 203(b)(5), 8 U.S.C. 1153(b)(5).
49
50
See INA 212(h); 8 U.S.C. 1182(h).
51
See 8 C.F.R. 212.7(d).
52
See INA 204(a)(1)(A)(iii),(iv), &(B)(ii),(iii), 8 U.S.C. 1154 (a)(1)(A)(iii),(iv), &(B)(ii),(iii).
53
See 8 C.F.R. 204.2(c)(1)(vii).
54
See INA 245(h)(2)(B), 8 U.S.C. 1255(h)(2)(B)).
55
See INA 208(b)(1); 8 U.S.C. 1158(b)(1), and 101(a)(42)(A), 8 U.S.C. 1101(a)(42)(A).
56
See INA 208(a)(2)(B),(C), & (D); 8 U.S.C. 1158(a)(12)(B), (C), & (D).
57
See INA 208(b)(2)(A)(ii); 8 U.S.C. 1158(b)(2)(A)(ii); 8 C.F.R. 208.14(d)(1).
58
See INA 208(b)(2)(B)(i); 8 U.S.C. 1158(b)(2)(B)(i).
59
See Matter of Frentescu, 18 I&N Dec. 244 (BIA 1982), modified, Matter of C-, 20 I&N Dec. 529 (BIA
1992), Matter of Gonzalez, 19 I&N Dec. 682 (BIA 1988)).
60
See Matter of Jean, 23 I&N Dec. 373 (A.G. 2002).
61
See INA 241(b)(3)(A), 8 U.S.C. 1231(b)(3)(A); see also INS v. Stevic, 467 U.S. 407 (1984) (establishing
“clear probability” standard). 62
See INS v. Cardoza-Fonseca, 480 U.S. 421 (1987).
63
See INA 241(b)(3)(B)(ii), 8 U.S.C. 1231(b)(3)(B)(ii).
64
See INA 241(b)(3)(B), 8 U.S.C. 1231(b)(3)(B).
65
See Matter of Y-L, A-G, R-S-R, 23 I&N Dec. 270 (A.G. 2002). To overcome that presumption, an
individual would have to demonstrate the most extenuating circumstances that are both extraordinary and compelling. Those circumstances must include, at a minimum: (1) a very small quantity of controlled
substance; (2) a very modest amount of money paid for the drugs in the offending transaction; (3) merely peripheral involvement by the individual in the criminal activity, transaction, or conspiracy; (4) the absence of any violence or threat of violence, implicit or otherwise, associated with the offense; (5) the absence of any organized crime or terrorist organization involvement, direct or indirect, in relation to the offending activity; and (6) the absence of any adverse or harmful effect of the activity or transaction on juveniles. Only if the individual demonstrates all of these criteria would it be deemed appropriate to consider whether
other, more unusual circumstance—for example, the prospective distribution was solely for social purposes, rather than profit—might justify departure from the default interpretation that drug trafficking felonies are particularly serious crimes. See id.
66
See Matter of S-S-, 22 I&N Dec. 458 (BIA 1999), overruled in part, Matter of Y-L, A-G, R-S-R, 23 I&N
Dec. 270 (A.G. 2002). 67
See Matter of Frentescu, 18 I&N Dec. 244 (BIA 1982), modified, Matter of C-, 20 I&N Dec. 529 (BIA
1992), Matter of Gonzalez, 19 I&N Dec. 682 (BIA 1988)).
68
See INA 244(c)(2)(B)(i), 8 U.S.C. 1254a(c)(2)(B)(i); and 8 C.F.R. 244.4(a). The Board of Immigration
Appeals has found that an adjudication of a violation that is not deemed a criminal conviction under state law may not be deemed a conviction for immigration purposes where the adjudication involved a standard of proof less than the criminal “beyond a reasonable doubt” standard; however, the decision leaves open the possibility that a state violation that does involve this standard would be found a criminal conviction for immigration purposes. See Matter of Eslamizar, 23 I&N Dec. 684 (BIA 2004). In fact, the DHS has found
individuals ineligible for Temporary Protected Status in at least one state (New York) based on state violations not deemed crimes under state law.
69
See INA 244(c)(2)(A)(iii), 8 U.S.C. 1254a(c)(2)(A)(iii); and 8 C.F.R. 244.3(c)(1).
70
See INA 244(c)(1)(A)(iii), 8 U.S.C. 1254a(c)(1)(A)(iii); and 8 C.F.R. 244.2(d).
71
See INA 244(c)(2)(A)(ii), 8 U.S.C. 1254a(c)(2)(A)(ii); and 8 C.F.R. 244.3(b).
72
See INA 212(h), 8 U.S.C. 1182(h); for waiver of non-immigrant inadmissibility, see INA 212(d)(3).
73
See Matter of Rico, 16 I&N Dec. 181 (BIA 1977).
74
See INA 212(h), 8 U.S.C. 1182(h).
75
See INA 212(a)(9)(A), 8 U.S.C. 1182(a)(9)(A).
76
See INA 240B(a)(1), 8 U.S.C. 1229c(a)(1).
77
See INA 240B(b)(1), 8 U.S.C. 1229c(b)(1).
78
See INA 276(b)(2), 8 U.S.C. 1326(b)(2).
79
NOTESCHAPTER 4
1 INA 101(a)(48)(A), 8 U.S.C. 1101(a)(48)(A). The statutory definition of conviction applies to “convictions and sentences entered before, on, or after the date of enactment of the 1996 IIRIRA.” See IIRIRA §§ 322(c), 304(a)(3). IIRIRA is the Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act, Division C of the Omnibus Appropriations Act of 1996 (H.R. 3610), Pub. L. No. 104-208, 110 Stat. 3009 (September 30, 1996).
2 22 I&N Dec. 512 (BIA 1999). 3
Compare Renteria-Gonzalez v. INS, 322 F.3d 804 (5th Cir.2002) (rejecting Lujan and construing statutory
definition of conviction strictly); Mugalli v. Ashcroft, 258 F.3d 52 (2d Cir. 2001) (construing statutory
definition to hold that non-drug offense was a conviction despite New York State Certificate of Relief for Disabilities); Fernandez-Bernal v. Attorney General, 257 F.3d 1304 (11th Cir. 2001) (holding that state
expungement for controlled substance offense was a conviction); withLujan-Armendariz v INS, 222 F.3d
728 (9th Cir. 2000) (recognizing that dismissal under rehabilitative scheme analogous to 18 U.S.C. § 3607 is not a conviction for immigration purposes where defendant has no priors).
4
Lujan-Armendariz v INS, 222 F.3d 728 (9th Cir. 2000) (possession); Cardenas- Uriarte v. INS, 227 F.3d
1132 (9th Cir. 2000) (less serious offenses with no federal analogue); and see 21 USC §841(b)(4) providing that distributing a small amount of marijuana without remuneration is treatable under the Federal First Offender Act..
5
Murillo-Espinoza v INS, 261 F.3d 771 (9th Cir. 2001) (determining that expunged non-drug offense was a
conviction for immigration purposes). 6
Matter of Salazar, 23 I&N Dec. 223 (BIA 2002).
7
Matter of Devison-Charles, 22 I&N Dec. 1362 (BIA 2000, INS motion for reconsideration denied 2001)
(“We have consistently held that juvenile delinquency proceedings are not criminal proceedings, that acts of juvenile delinquency are not crimes, and that findings of juvenile delinquency are not convictions for immigration purposes . . . We concur with the established view that juvenile delinquency adjudications are not criminal proceedings, but are adjudications that are civil in nature”); see also Matter of Ramirez-Rivero,
18 I&N Dec. 135 (BIA 1981) (“It is settled that an act of juvenile delinquency is not a conviction for a crime within the meaning of our immigration laws”); Matter of CM, 5 I&N Dec. 327 (BIA 1953).
8
See NYCPL Article 720. New York law provides: “Upon determining that an eligible youth is a youthful
offender, the court must direct that the conviction be deemed vacated and replaced by a youthful offender finding. . . . A youthful offender adjudication is not a judgment of conviction for a crime or any other offense . . . and all official records and papers . . . are confidential and may not be made available to any person or public agency. . . .” See NYCPL 720.10(2).
9
Matter of Devison-Charles, 22 I&N Dec. 1362 (BIA 2000).
10
Id.
11 A juvenile delinquency disposition should not, however, qualify as an “admission” for purposes of triggering the controlled substance or moral turpitude grounds of inadmissibility. Matter of F, 4 I&N Dec.
726 (BIA 1972). Those grounds allow for a finding of inadmissibility where a noncitizen “admits” the essential elements of a controlled substance or of a crime involving moral turpitude. 8 U.S.C. §
1182(a)(2)(A)(i)(I), INA § 1182(a)(2)(A)(i)(I); 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(2)(A)(i)(II), INA § 1182(a)(2)(A)(i)(II). 12 Specifically, Family Unity protection is barred to such an individual if s/he “has committed an act of juvenile delinquency which if committed by an adult would be classified as—(A) a felony crime of violence that has as an element the use or attempted use of physical force against another individual, or (B) a felony offense that by its nature involves a substantial risk that physical force against another individual may be used in the course of committing the offense.” See IIRIRA Section 383.
13
Griffiths v. INS, 243 F.3d 45 (1st Cir. 2001)(deferred adjudication type of disposition did not require
finality even though the right to appeal was still possible at a later date); Pino v. Landon, 349 U.S. 901
(1955) (holding that an “on file” system in Massachusetts did not constitute sufficient finality to be a basis for deportation under the Act).
14
Garcia-Maldonado v. Gonzales, 491 F.3d 284 (5th Cir. 2007); Renteria-Gonzalez v. INS, 322 F.3d 804
(5th Cir.2002). See also Moosa v. INS, 171 F.3d 994 (5th Cir. 1999)(“deferred adjudication by guilt” under
15 Montenegro v. Ashcroft, 355 F.3d 1035, 1037 (7th Cir. 2004) (petition for certiorari to Supreme Court was still pending as well as an appeal of post conviction relief decision noncitizen ordered removed even though a writ of certiorari to the United States Supreme Court and appeal from a denial of a post-conviction relief petition (neither of which were an “appeal of right,” were both still pending).
16 These cases eroding the finality requirement can be distinguished, in that they deal with a complex Texas deferred adjudication statute that had limited appeal rights (and even so, this decision has been heavily criticized), and situations where it has long been accepted that a conviction is final: petitions for certiorari, and appeals of request for post-conviction relief. The First, Fifth and Seventh Circuits have not yet ruled on a case where there is a clear appeal of right.
17
Matter Polanco, 20 I&N Dec. 894 (BIA 1994).
18
Matter of Rodriguez-Ruiz, 22 I&N Dec. 1378 (BIA 2000).
19
Matter of Pickering, 23 I&N 621 (BIA 2003). See also Beltran-Leon v INS, 134 F.3d 1379 (9th Cir.
1998).
20 See discussion of
Lujan-Armendariz v Ashcroft, supra at 4.1.A, supra.
21
U
Matter of EslamizarU, 23 I. & N. Dec. 684, 687-88 (BIA 2004).
22
U
Id.U at 687.
23 Oregon Revised Statutes § 153.076.
24 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(48)(B), INA §101(a)(48)(B). 25
See 8 U.S.C. §1101(a)(48)(B), INA § 101(a)(48)(B), which treats a suspended sentence as a sentence
regardless of whether the court suspends imposition or execution of the sentence. 26
SeeUnited States v. Ayala-Gomez, 255 F.3d 1314 (11th Cir. 2001)
27
Matter of Song, 23 I & N Dec. 173 (BIA 2001) (respecting court order reducing sentence); Matter of Martin, 18 I &N Dec. 226 (BIA 1982) (same); Matter of C-P, 8 I&N Dec. 504 (BIA 1959) (treating
increased sentence court ordered after probation violation as sentence for immigration purposes). 28
Matter of D, 20 I&N Dec. 827 (BIA 1994); Matter of Chen, 10 I&N Dec. 671 (BIA 1964).
29
See INA §101(a)(43), 8 USC § 1101(a)(43), subsections (F), (G), (P), (R), and (S).
30
Matter of Song, 23 I & N Dec. 173 (BIA 2001).
31
Matter of M, 8 I&N Dec. 256 (BIA 1959).
32
Matter of N, 8 I&N Dec. 660 (BIA 1960).
33
Gonzales v. Duenas-Alvarez, 127 S.Ct. 815 (2007).
34 495 U.S. 575 (1990). 35
See, e.g., Matter of Sweetser, 22 I&N Dec. 709 (BIA 1990) (interpreting whether conviction constituted a
crime of violence under the aggravated felony definition); Matter of Perez, 22 I&N Dec. 1325 (BIA 2000)
(interpreting whether conviction constituted a burglary under the aggravated felony definition). 36 495 U.S. 575 (1990)
37 U.S. v. Taylor 495, U.S. 575, 601 (1990). 38 161 L.Ed.2d 205 (2005).
39
Shepard v. U.S., 161 L.Ed.2d at 216
40 See, e.g.,
Flores v. Ashcroft, 350 F.3d 666 (7th Cir. 2003) (testimony of petitioner before immigration
judge can be used to show domestic violence; however, offense held not to constitute a crime of violence). 41 Compare, e.g.,
Sutherland v. Reno, 228 F.3d 171 (2d Cir. 2000); Flores v. Ashcroft, 350 F.3d 666 (7th
Cir. 2003) (in dictum) with Tokatly v Ashcroft. 371 F.3d 613 (9th Cir. 2004) .
42
Lara-Ruiz v. INS, 241 F.3d 934 (7th Cir. 2001) (BIA used unidentified material to determine that the
victim was a minor and therefore the conviction was for sexual abuse of a minor); Ali v. Mukasey, 521 F.3d
737 (7th Cir. 2008) (moral turpitude). 43
Matter of Gertsenshtyn, 24 I&N Dec. 111 (BIA 2007)
44
Matter of Babaisakov, 24 I. & N. Dec. 306, 2007 WL 2842400 (B.I.A. 2007).
45 545 U.S. 967, 125 S. Ct. 2688, 162 L. Ed. 2d 820 (2005). 46
Matter of Babaisakov, 24 I. & N. Dec. 306, 2007 WL 2842400 (B.I.A. 2007).
47 467 U.S. 837, 104 S. Ct. 2778, 81 L. Ed. 2d 694 (1984). 48
National Cable & Telecommunications Ass'n v. Brand X Internet Services, 545 U.S. 967, 982, 125 S. Ct.
2688, 162 L. Ed. 2d 820 (2005). Among the cases that the BIA would be attempting to trump are: Martinez v. Mukasey, 508 F.3d 255 (5th Cir. 2007) (limiting to record of conviction identification of loss amounts in
Homeland Sec., 501 F.3d 116 (2d Cir. 2007) (permitting loss amount to be shown only through record of
conviction) Obasohan v. U.S. Atty. Gen., 479 F.3d 785 (11th Cir. 2007) (same); Conteh v. Gonzales, 461
F.3d 45 (1st Cir. 2006), cert. denied, 127 S. Ct. 3003, 168 L. Ed. 2d 732 (U.S. 2007) (same); Alaka v. Attorney General of U.S., 456 F.3d 88 (3d Cir. 2006), as amended, (Aug. 23, 2006) (same); Knutsen v. Gonzales, 429 F.3d 733 (7th Cir. 2005) Chang v. I.N.S., 307 F.3d 1185 (9th Cir. 2002) (same).
49
Matter of Velazquez-Herrera,49 24 I. & N. Dec. 503 (BIA 2008),
50
Matter of Velazquez-Herrera, 24 I. & N. Dec. 503 (BIA 2008).
51
Navarro-Lopez v. Gonzales, 503 F.3d 1063 (9th Cir. 2007) (en banc).
52
Ali v. Mukasey, 521 F.3d 737 (7th Cir. 2008).
53
Conteh v. Gonzales, 461 F.3d 45 (1st Cir. 2006).
54
See, e.g., Nijhawan v. A.G. of U.S., 523 F.3d 387(3d Cir. 2008) (discussing Third Circuit cases).
55 As the Supreme Court explained in
Taylor, “[The practical difficulties and potential unfairness of a
factual [as opposed to categorical] approach are daunting. In all cases where the Government alleges that the defendant's actual conduct would fit the generic definition of burglary, the trial court would have to determine what that conduct was. In some cases, the indictment or other charging paper might reveal the theory or theories of the case presented to the jury. In other cases, however, only the Government's actual proof at trial would indicate whether the defendant's conduct constituted generic burglary. Would the Government be permitted to introduce the trial transcript before the sentencing court, or if no transcript is available, present the testimony of available witnesses? Could the defense present witnesses of its own and argue that the jury might have returned a guilty verdict on some theory that did not require a finding that the defendant committed generic burglary?" 495 U.S. at 601.
56
U.S. v Baron-Medina, 187 F.3d 1144, 1146 (9th Cir. 1999)(citation omitted). The BIA has long
followed this rule in determining what constitutes a crime involving moral turpitude and also applies to aggravated felonies and other areas. See, e.g., Matter of Palacios, 22 I&N Dec 434 (BIA 1998); Matter of Alcantar, 20 I&N 801 (BIA 1994); and cases cited below.
57
See, e.g., Gonzalez-Martinez v Landon, 203 F.2d 196, 197 and n.1 (9th Cir), cert. denied 345 U.S. 990
(1953), holding that bigamy under Calif. P.C. §281 involves moral turpitude because case law has established a defense of reasonable good-faith mistake of fact.)
58
U.S. v Rivera-Sanchez, 247 F.3d 905, 908 (9th Cir. 2001) (en banc), quoting from Taylor v. United
States, 495 U.S. 575 (1990). Chang v INS, 307 F.3d 1185 (9th Cir. 2002); Matter of Sweetser22 I&N Dec.
709 (BIA 1999); Matter of Short, 20 I&N Dec. 136 (BIA 1989).
59
See, e.g., Taylor v U.S 495 U.S. 575, (1990). This doctrine applies across the board in immigration
cases and has been upheld regarding moral turpitude (see e.g., Matter of Mena, 17 I&N 38 (BIA 1979), Matter of Short, 20 I&N Dec. 136 (BIA 1989)(co-defendant’s conviction is not included in reviewable
record of conviction); Matter of Y, 1 I& N 137 (BIA 1941) (report of a probation officer is not included), Matter of Cassissi, 20 I&N 136 (BIA 1963) (statement of state’ attorney at sentencing is not included);
firearms (see e.g., Matter of Madrigal-Calvo, 21 I&N Dec.323 (BIA 1996) (transcript of plea and
sentence hearing is included), Matter of Teixeira, 21 I&N Dec. 316 (BIA 1996)(police report is not
included), Matter of Pichardo, 21 I&N Dec. 330 (BIA 1996)(admission by respondent in immigration court
is not included) and aggravated felonies (see, e.g., Matter of Sweetser, 22 I&N Dec. 709 (BIA 1990). See also Abreu-Reyes v INS, 350 F.3d 966 (9th Cir. 2003) withdrawing and reversing292 F.3d 1029 (9th Cir.
2002) to reaffirm that probation report is not part of the record of conviction for this purpose, accord with ruling in United States v. Corona-Sanchez, supra
60
Matter of Short, 20 I&N Dec. 136 (BIA 1989).
61
Matter of Perez-Contreras, 20 I&N Dec. 615 (BIA 1992)
62
See, e.g., Lara-Ruiz v. INS, 241 F.3d 934 (7th Cir. 2001) (offense of sexual intercourse where the victim
was not able to understand the nature of the act or give knowing consent, which has no age component, held to be sexual abuse of a minor, when evidence apparently from outside the record of conviction indicated that the victim was a young child).
63
U.S. v Corona-Sanchez, 291 F.3d 1201, 1211 (9th Cir. 2002) (en banc)(emphasis added).
64
U.S. v. Velasco-Medina, 305 F.3d 839, 852 (emphasis in original).
65
See, e.g., Chang v INS, 307 F.3d 1185 (9th Cir. 2002). There the Ninth Circuit held that where a
defendant made a written plea agreement that the “loss to the victim” in the Count he pled to was $600, the fact that he was ordered to pay restitution of over $10,000 based on dismissed counts did not make the conviction an aggravated felony as a fraud conviction with loss to the victim of $10,000 or more.
66
See,.e.g., Matter of Vargas-Sarmiento, 23 I&N 651 (BIA 2004) (relying on New York rule that limited
factual allegations to the facts in the initial charge). 67
See, e.g., Matter of Ghunaim, 15 I&N 269 (BIA 1975); Matter of Sanchez-Marin, 11 I&N 264 (BIA
1965). 68
Montero-Ubri v. INS, 229 F.3d 319 (1st Cir. 2000) (examining related charge to conclude that defendant
used document under statute punishing use or possession of a false document). 69 For example, as discussed above, the Ninth Circuit en banc in
U.S. v Corona-Sanchez recently stated:
“[I]f a defendant enters a guilty plea, the sentencing court may consider the charging documents in conjunction with the plea agreement, the transcript of a plea proceeding, or the judgment to determine whether the defendant pled guilty to the elements of the generic crime. Charging papers alone are never sufficient.”
70
Matter of Espinosa, 10 I&N 90, 98 (BIA 1962).
71
Malta-Espinoza v. Gonzales, 478 F. 3d 1080, 1083 and n.3 (9th Cir. 2007); U.S. v Hirsch, 308 F.2d 562,
567 (9th Cir. 1962) (regarding the same statute, a plea to the charge stated in the conjunctive does not establish guilt under each element); United States v. Bonanno, 852 F.2d 434, 441 (9th Cir. 1988). See also Valansi v Aschroft, 278 F.3d 203, 216-217 (3d Cir. 2002).
72
See, e.g. U.S. v Rivera-Sanchez, 247 F.3d 905, 908 (9th Cir. 2002) (en banc).
73 See discussion of “modified categorical approach”, supra, at subsection 4.3.A. 74 18 U.S.C. § 4.
75
Matter of Espinoza-Gonzalez, 21 I & N Dec. 291 (BIA 1999).
76
Matter of Danesh, 19 I & N Dec. 669 (BIA 1988); Matter of Velasco, 16 I & N Dec. 281 (BIA 1977);
77.
Castaneda De Esper v. INS, 557 F.2d 79 (6th Cir. 1977) (holding that conviction under 18 U.S.C. § 4 for
misprision of conspiracy to possess heroin is not conviction relating to possession or traffic in narcotic drugs under former 8 U.S.C. § 1251(a)(11))
78
In re Robles-Urrea, 24 I. & N. Dec. 22 (BIA 2006)
79
Itani v. Ashcroft, 298 F.3d 1213 (11th Cir. 2002).
80
Matter of Velasco, 16 I & N Dec. 281 (BIA 1977); Matter of Espinoza-Gonzalez, 21 I & N Dec. 291
(BIA 1999).
81 See 8 USC § 1181(a)(2)(C). 82
Matterof Batista-Hernandez, 21 I. & N. Dec. 955 (BIA 1997)
83 In
Matter of Batista-Hernandez, 21 I. & N. Dec. 955 (BIA 1997),
84
Cabral v. INS, 15 F.3d 193 (1st Cir. 1994).
85
Navarro-Lopez v. Gonzales, 503 F.3d 1063, 1072 (9th Cir. 2007) (en banc).
86
Matter of Beltran, 20 I&N Dec. 521 (BIA 1992).
87
Gattem v. Gonzalez, 412 F.3d 758 (7th Cir. 2005)