Arqueobacterias metanogénicas

‘The Yellow Revolution’ and the Andijan massacre have been the two latest significant political events in Central Asia. The outcomes of the participation of the ethnic Uzbek in ‘the Yellow Revolution’ and the reaction of the Kyrgyz to the Andijan massacre have indicated that the interethnic relationships between these two ethnic groups are delicate. ‘The Yellow Revolution’ was comprised of a series of events that do not fit the theories of democratic revolution of Paynton and Blackey which have been the benchmark for analysing the two political events, ‘the Yellow Revolution’ in Kyrgyzstan and the Andijan

episode in Uzbekistan. So far, at best ‘the Yellow Revolution’ could be described as an unfinished democratic revolution allowing for an electoral process, but lacking parties and leaders with democratic credentials. Both events had exhibited a continuation of the incomplete democracy building since 1991 that had taken a place in both countries. .

However, Kamenka’s theory of revolution has demonstrated that the collapse of the Akaev government and ‘the Yellow Revolution’ are examples of a political revolution. Regarding democratic revolution, Colin Barkers and Colin Mooers (1994) have advanced the theory of democratic revolution. However, even these more recent theories could not seriously characterise the complete series of events comprising ‘the Yellow Revolution’ as a democratic revolution. Therefore, ‘the Yellow Revolution’ is seen as an incomplete revolution in this study and this explains why the people in Kyrgyzstan are still struggling in moving towards democratic liberty. Despite “the Yellow Revolution” being an unfinished revolution, there are several reasons why Kyrgyzstan is the first country to have this kind of political transition in Central Asia. The reasons are simple: the former president Akaev held an anti-communist view, while he allowed international agencies to assist Kyrgyzstan to support civil society; and the opposition was allowed to function as well. The collapse of the Akaev regime underlined waning public trust in Akaev and his democratic veneer. During ‘the Yellow Revolution’, the Uzbeks were concerned about the opposition’s attitudes towards ethnic minorities because of the influence of rising ethno- Kyrgyz nationalism among the opposition captured by its own chauvinist rhetoric. The opposition forces did not foster trust from the Uzbeks and Russians. The current political and social reality in Kyrgyzstan shows that the revolution has changed nothing in people’s lives. The limited involvement of the ethnic Uzbeks in ‘the Yellow Revolution’ and distrust from the ethnic Kyrgyz towards the ethnic Uzbeks have proved that the ethnic Kyrgyz, as a marginally looser ethnic group in Kyrgyzstan, feared being politically dominated by other ethnicities, particularly by the ethnic Uzbeks; on the other hand, the ethnic Uzbeks, as the economically stronger ethnic group in Kyrgyzstan, would have been willing to play a greater role, thus an opportunity to build a more plural democratic society was missed during the Revolution.

Chua’s (2003) ethnic conflict theory has helped to understand the political status of the economically and numerically dominant Uzbeks in the south of the country. The ethno-

political reality in Kyrgyzstan shows that the Uzbeks’ and the Russians’ desire for democracy is much stronger than that of the ethnic Kyrgyz, who are content with their political dominance. Despite the ethnic Kyrgyz’s anti-minority nationalist view, the Uzbek community in south was one of the key issue during ‘the Yellow Revolution’, although their political interests were ultimately neglected as a result of Akaev’s ‘big family’-state building policy finishing with his demise. As a result, Kyrgyzstan’s new post-revolution democratic order has continued to omit positive consideration of the basic rights of minorities in the country.

Despite the exclusion of the ethnic Uzbek during ‘the Yellow Revolution’, there is a certain level of economic integration in the south, which leads the ethnic Uzbeks and Kyrgyz to share their common socio-economic interests in the regional areas. The analyses in this chapter had shown that the conflict between these two ethnic groups in the south is always latent, with theUzbeks resistant to the ‘pure Kyrgyz’ based nationalist view and while the ethnic Kyrgyz maintain a strong resistance to the Uzbek cultural trends and political claims, they do not seek to end to manipulate the economic dominance of the ethnic Uzbek in the south from which all ethnic groups derive some benefit.

The Andijan events as the second case study in this chapter have identified the sensitivity of the inter-ethnic relationship between the ethnic Uzbeks and Kyrgyz on the cross-border zone on the eastern edge of the Ferghana Valley. The Andijan massacre demonstrated that the Uzbek government’s authoritarian regime had not only inhibited the development of democracy on the Uzbek side of the Ferghana Valley, but also strained traditionally harmonious ethnic relations on both sides of the border.

The Uzbek refugees were initially welcomed by the local Kyrgyz in the beginning, but resistance against the refugees emerged. The reasons were clear: on the one hand, the Uzbek government propaganda was effective in sowing seeds of distrust amongst Kyrgyz towards the refugees, but in addition the ethnic Kyrgyz were economically threatened, because they thought that the Uzbek refugees might never leave their land, compete for jobs, and bring hardship to their lives. Despite pressure from international organisations

towards the Kyrgyz government and their comprehensive humanitarian assistance to the Uzbek refugees, neither relieved the tension between the Uzbek refugees and the Kyrgyz community. The new Kyrgyz government worried about its own border security and initially ignored refugee rights as it did not want to upset its belligerent neighbour. After the Uzbek refugees were air lifted out of Kyrgyzstan, the tensions seemed to disappear, but the potential for regional upsets remains.

The evidence from both case studies has shown that the interethnic relationships between the ethnic Uzbeks and Kyrgyz are only sensitive on the eastern edge of the Ferghana Valley in the Uzbekistan and in the Kyrgyzstan portions of the Valley. The linguistic and cultural links between these two Turkic ethnic groups did not influence Kyrgyz localist chauvinism. Regarding democracy in Uzbekistan and Kyrgyzstan, without accepting equal political and economic rights of majority and minority ethnic groups in both Uzbekistan and Kyrgyzstan, it is unlikely that democracy will take root in either country.

CHAPTER 3:

Interethnic Relationships during the New Nation-

building Phase

This chapter will explore the dynamics of interethnic relationships since 1991. Therefore, it is useful to look at the socio-economic and political status of these two ethnicities on both sides of the Uzbek-Kyrgyz border, on the eastern edge of the Ferghana Valley, during the two different political and economic transition paths, namely the gradualist approach and “shock therapy,” as mentioned in Chapter One. Therefore, this chapter has been divided into three different parts: the first part explores theories of nationalism and ethnic conflict; the second part concentrates on the political and socio-economic situation of the ethnic Kyrgyz and Uzbek on both sides of the Uzbek-Kyrgyz border zone on the eastern edge of the Ferghana Valley under the two different political paths—quasi- democratic and authoritarian; and the third part of the chapter concentrates on the role of clan ideology as one of the oldest social patterns impinging upon the new era emerging democracy from the civil society perspective.