Arquitectura IoT

It is obvious that the entirety of migrant policy in Thailand is considerably dynamic. The constant shift in policies reflects how the country coped with the changes in its contextual environment and political dynamics over time. As proposed by Leichter (1979) exogenous factors, namely: (1) situation factors, (2) structural factors, (3) cultural factors and (4) international factors, always play a vital role in policy formulation and implementation. The evolution of migrant policies in Thailand is conspicuous proof of Leichter's proposal. Going beyond that, the researcher discovered that some exogenous factors were not always 'exogenous'. In contrast, they might become embedded in, and part of, Thai politics. For instance, the first Nationality Act employed the jus soli principle(birth-right citizenship), but due to a fear of communism during the cold war, the subsequent Nationality Acts were amended in a way that opposed this principle.

Based on the researcher's own synthesis, migrant policies in Thailand can be divided into four phases/eras. The first era place took place from the early 1900s to the 1990s, as the sense of nationalism grew in response to the entrance of colonialism in Southeast Asia, and became more pronounced in 1970s in the light of fear of the communist regime. This point is mirrored by the special law (Por Wor 337), which revoked the Thai nationality of a person born to non-Thai parents. Nationalism was prioritised over health rights and economic prosperity. In other words, the international factor became part of the cultural values and the structure of migrant policies in Thailand.

151 The second phase began in the early 1990s. The country was aiming to industrialise its economy but the shortage of low-skilled labour was intense. A huge influx of (illegal) Burmese migrants, fleeing from political violence in Myanmar, was on one hand perceived as a security threat, but on the other hand, was a solution to the country's labour shortage. In this regard, 'economics' was used as a legitimate reason to turn a blind eye to the illegal status of migrants, and has been exercised by all governments.

The third phase commenced after 2004, where the '00' card was an important milestone.

The health insurance scheme and the system for health screening for migrants were set up nationwide. A period between 2004 and 2013 was the time when the health security concept permeated national migrant policies, as evidenced by the introduction of the 365-Baht card for a migrant child, and the expansion of the benefit package to cover ART. One may claim that the openness of the card policy in 2013 reflected an effort of the Thai government to provide health protection to all people in Thailand, and this point was supported by the fact that the ex-minister at that time raised the idea of providing health protection to 'all' populations in Thailand, including foreign expatriates and tourists (see Chapter 3). However, evidence to support this claim was merely suggestive as none of the interviewees explicitly mentioned this. Moreover, it is difficult to claim that this change was due to a genuine intention of policy makers to promote humanitarian values. As a matter of fact, pressure from civil society and international actors, particularly the allegation of human trafficking in Thailand, strongly pushed the country in this direction. In other words, health protection for migrants was used as a tool to avoid this accusation.

The fourth era, which continues to the present time, began in mid-2014 immediately after the coup against the elected government. The nationalist perspective has reclaimed its dominant position again. Upholding the 'nation' is currently a core value of Thai citizens, as declared by the junta (Areerat, 2014). Summary of the evolution of migrant policies is presented in Figure 20 below.

152 Figure 20 Evolution of migrant policies in Thailand (synthesised by the author)

Source: Author's synthesis

Note: The ovals next to the central arrow refer to the external environment at a particular time.

153 The introduction of the OSS, from one angle, is the attempt of the government to 'sweep and clean' problems of illegal migrants. Yet, from another angle, whether it is true or not that migrants are engaged in the political movement, it is noticeable that migrant issues are dragged into Thai politics. Immigration has been framed as a vital policy topic, which can easily grasp public interest.

This has happened not only in Thailand, but also in other regions. An immigration crisis in Europe in 2015 caused a series of public debates between both political wings (Sanandaji, 2015). In 2015 the Conservative Party in the UK made a commitment during the election campaign that it would cap net migration in the UK and restrict migrant rights in order to protect the benefits of UK taxpayers. The party gained strong support from the public despite sparse evidence to support the claim that migrants undermine the benefits of the UK citizens (Partos, 2015).

Interestingly, none of the recent changes in the Thai policy have tackled the problem of migrants at the structural level. Key changes in the past were about amendments to the card price and a re-opening of the registration period. The OSS is an attempt to overhaul the whole sphere of migrant policies by requiring all relevant authorities to work 'simultaneously' in the 'same' venue, and this tactic seemed to be successful (at least superficially). By the end of October 2014, the number of registered migrants reached its highest point (about 1.7 million) in the history of Thailand's migrant policies (one might argue that this success is not due to the OSS per se but because of the fear of the military government). However, it is difficult to claim that the policies of different ministries are truly integrated.

Furthermore, the root cause of irregular migration starting at the border has not been addressed. The only measure that seems to be an innovation in preventing further illegal crossing is the MOU policy, which still demands much further work in operational details. Without this effort, the MOU measure cannot work effectively, as evidenced by the fact that the number of (regular/legal) migrant workers recruited through the MOU increased very slowly compared to other types of illegal migrants (Office of Foreign Workers Administration, 2015).

154 Besides, policy makers at times act like street-level bureaucrats in the way that they adapt or change policies within their discretion without tackling the root cause of the problems. One instance is the restriction of permitted jobs for migrants. In spite of amending laws and regulations on job restrictions and imposing a long term recruitment plan, previous governments always used Cabinet Resolutions as a quick measure to tackle this matter. Resolutions were much easier to achieve than an amendment to the Act, but do not tackle the root of migrant problems.

The policy making process in Thailand is congruent with what Lindblom (1979) referred to as the 'incrementalist model', that is, policy makers often explore a small number of alternatives in dealing with problems and tend to select options that differ minimally from existing policies. Once migrant insurance was assigned to the MOPH, it became politically difficult to overhaul this system or think of alternatives, such as delegating responsibility to the NHSO or to the SSS, let alone deal with challenges in harmonising the three major insurance schemes (the UCS, the SSS, and the CSMBS) for Thai citizens (Evans et al., 2012).

This situation made the management of health insurance for migrants in Thailand different from other developed countries. In the literature review (Chapter 2), it is clear that, in many countries, once undocumented/illegal migrants are registered by the state authority, they will be enrolled into the mainstream public insurance scheme(s) of the host country. In contrast, in Thailand, after registration, undocumented/illegal migrants cannot be insured by the UCS like Thai nationals. This creates a huge burden on the MOPH, whose capacity is quite limited, as discussed subsequently.