The case of Punata is the most emblematic in terms of development and empowerment of local organizations. This empowerment began after the land reform, when several communities assumed the management of dam systems by "committees" organized by themselves. Later, starting in the 1960s, various irrigation “improvement projects” (construction of irrigation infrastructure) were implemented. Some were directly demanded by the irrigation committees to the central government (Ministry of Agriculture) at that moment. These projects, and especially the experience from the “Inter- Valleys Irrigation Project” (PRIV), unveiled Punata communities’ organizational and self-management capacity.
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Gandarillas et al. (1993) recount in great detail the experience of the Punata Inter-Valley Irrigation Project (PRIV). This experience has been a very important contribution to understanding irrigation in Bolivia and the Andes, by exposing or uncovering what previous engineering approaches had treated as a "black box". Among the aspects that stand out is the clash between technocratic approaches adopted at the start of interventions versus peasant organizational and irrigation practices. Gradually, mutual learning has developed new capabilities in organizations, as a result of ongoing negotiations, conflicts and confrontations with new experiences, resulting from interaction between different groups of irrigators and the project’s technical staff. Within this, the main issue has proven to be the process of defining “water rights”, their different forms of creation, expressions, content and operational implications. This definition mainly applies to subsequent irrigation infrastructure re-designs and construction and water distribution in practice, all immersed in what Coward (1990), Gerbrandy and Hoogendam (1998) and Boelens and Vos (2014) call “creating hydraulic property” (see summary in Box 4.1).
Table 4-1 summarizes some important milestones in irrigation interventions and the different organizational adjustments and strategies employed by Punata’s irrigators. Some interventions by the state, development agencies or irrigation organizations, pursued strategies initially based on social mobilization. These mobilizations were demands and protests against projects that violated water rights, hampered organizational and irrigation practices, or in other cases limited the flexibility required to handle the infrastructure to manage several systems simultaneously. The undeniable presence of large numbers of peasants when providing labor input, building and reaffirming their water rights during the works, was also important.
Table 4-1. Main irrigation interventions and organizational adaptations and strategies
Year Description of
interventions Organizational development/adaptation Collective strategies during interventions
1952 Land reform Agrarian unions formed Social alliances with labor unions
and other social sectors 1968-
1970 Construction of Llusk’a Khocha dam 10 Communities organized around a new water source Collective work for creating new water rights 1982-
1988 Improvement (expansion) of Laguna Robada and Llusk’a Khocha dams (Punata Project phase I)
Autonomous irrigation committees structured for each reservoir system
Mobilization, Organization and execution of collective work
1989-
1991 Execution of Totora Khocha project (Construction of the dam, and main channels (Punata Project phase II)
Punata Irrigation and Services
Association conformed (ARSP) Collective work, Mobilization (demonstrations of “social force”), Protests against water rights definition and main infrastructure’s design)
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1992-
1994 Operation and maintenance and support to on farm irrigation
Internal adjustments to ARSP’s
operational structure Collective work, Organizational adaptations (internal tensions in the ARSP)
1994 - 1997
Projects’ turnover to ARSP
Self management of dams systems
Crisis within ARSP: unbalance in power relations among the three dam systems
New restructuring of ARSP: Council of Committees conformed
- Organizational adaptation: Laguna Robada and Llusk’a Khocha committees threatened to quit ARSP
- Lluska Khocha and Laguna Robada transformed themselves into new Associations
- Rotation of ARSP’s leading positions by committees 1997-
2004 Negotiations and execution of new projects by ARSP: Mora Mora and Warmi Waqana Projects New projects of drilling wells
New tube wells committees and tube wells association formed
Demands and new projects negotiations with regional and national authorities, lobbying
2004-
2006 Improvement of tertiary channels (“Project Punata”, implemented in various phases)
Association of “Communities
without irrigation” formed Demands, Project management,
Political alliances with regional government
2007-
2010 Design of Vandiola Project (expansion of Totora Khocha system)
Vandiola steering committee in Punata formed. Tensions between Punata and Tiraque to negotiate new distribution of water shares.
Demands, mobilization and protests. Conflicts and negotiations of agreements (with Tiraque and Koari , Irrigators federation - FRIA)
Aliances with other irrigation organizations
2010 - Irrigation projects under MI AGUA and MI RIEGO Programs
New tube wells systems formed and lining of secondary/tertiary channels
Demands to municipal and regional government (lobbying)
Elaboration of project profiles
Source: Prepared by the author
The Punata Irrigation and Services Association (ARSP) was formed to support the management of all Punata dam systems (Laguna Robada, Lluska Khocha and Totora Khocha) although during the early years, its tasks were mainly (only) focused to support Totora Khocha’s operation.
Initially, the ARSP was formed under a typical corporate structure, plus traits of the union structure predominant in the Cochabamba valleys (see figure 4-5). The directorate (directorio) had a president, vice president, and various technical and administrative functions or portfolios. The highest decision-making level was the General Assembly of Members, although this was not in the original design. Additionally, an intermediate function between the assembly and the
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directorate was occupied by representatives of each community in what was called a Junta
Directiva (board of directors). After a few years of operation, now without the Project’s
intervention, the organization took its own form after an internal crisis in 1997.
Figure 4-5. The initial organization structure of the ARSP
(Source: Prepared by the author based on Montaño, 1995)
The Laguna Robada and Llusk’a Khocha irrigation committees that existed years before ARSP’s birth, threatened to retreat from that organization and to set up their own associations, because they neither received the benefits to which they were entitled by belonging to ARSP, nor occupied the expected position on the decision making and power structure within that organization. Some examples of the conflicts or the complaints of these organizations were about the difficulties to receive actual support (transportation or other facilities) from ARSP for inspections or the operation of the dams, but also because in successive elections of the ARSP’s directorate, main positions were always chosen to Totora Khocha’s leaders and not to people from the other two systems.
At the beginning of this organizational crisis, the irrigation committees changed their names, also becoming associations of irrigators for each dam. That is to say, at one point there were two "associations" that were part of the ARSP. Then, after long rounds of negotiations, they implemented the following settings as depicted in figure 4-6:
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Figure 4-6 Current organizational structure of ARSP
(Source: Prepared by the author based on Ampuero, 2007 and Saldías, 2009)
1. Some functions within the Directorate structure disappeared, because of their reduced, unclear or not functional tasks.
2. The general assembly is recognized as the highest decision-making body, although at the beginning it was not clear how this body might work because of the number of affiliates (more than 3000). Ultimately, the Assembly is an important representation mechanism for raising demands from both communities and individual users to the Association’s board, and also as a mechanism of accountability to the communities for actions by the ARSP Directorate. In this case, it was agreed that the assembly has one representative out of each ten community members. Each community is responsible for exercising this right.
3. The Board of Directors, consisting of representatives from all user communities plus the ARSP officers, was replaced by a "Council of Committees." This was because of
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the apparent duplication or confusion of roles between the assembly and the board of directors and the very limited participation of committees from Laguna Robada and Llusk’a Khocha in making ARSP decisions. The board, created from the ARSP’s start, was one of the first adjustments proposed by farmers, as a social control instrument, to "monitor" leaders’ work. Its role was crucial, especially at the ARSP formation stage, seen as a new way of organizing and uniting farmers and other peasant organizations. Being responsible for managing systems that were being intervened was an important role, too, which later became less crucial. Currently, the Council of Committees comprises representatives of the three irrigation dams’ committees, which was an important step to balance the benefits and obligations they owe to the association, as well as to achieve equity among ARPS member organizations and to balance power in decision making.
This shows that the organizational model influenced (or promoted) by the project was not consistent with the irrigators’ organizational logic. They sought equal support for all three committees, besides balancing these organizations’ status, with none subordinate to another, all having the same rank: A question of image, hierarchy and equity.
It is interesting to see, in this case, that irrigation organizations in Punata (Laguna Robada and Llusk'a Khocha Committees), used the model or icon of an “irrigation association” as promoted also by the project as a “stronger” organization. So, they changed the status of their own organization from a committee to an association, as a strategy to improve their political position and try to balance power relations within ARSP.
After completing the main interventions in Punata and transferring management to users, the latter started searching for government and international donor support to implement more projects, to improve their systems or to build new ones. Some strategies also involved political alliances with the Cochabamba regional government (at that time, the Prefecture), to meet their demands. Between 2004 and 2007, several projects improved channels, with funds from the prefecture and directly managed by the ARSP as the “executing entity”. Riding electoral situations or other political confrontations in the country and the region, irrigators in Punata and the Cochabamba Upper Valley were continuously demanding even more ambitious and expensive projects. These included the Yungas de Vandiola project, to cover the Totora Khocha system water deficit. This project especially reveals the management and negotiation skills developed by the Tiraque and Punata associations. These associations are directly related to other organizations in the basin, to the central government, the provincial government and even international donors’ representatives. Other examples are the Kewiña Khocha project, or the Lope Mendoza project, to transfer and regulate flow from other basins to irrigate different areas of the Upper Valley. In all these cases, project approval, design and implementation go through many negotiation stages and cycles. The first stage is negotiations between potential users and then between different, mainly peasant organizations, claiming territorial rights over water in the watershed.
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Later, negotiations with the central government and international cooperation, to channel the required funding. Further, negotiations, pressuring and lobbying the regional government through peasant representatives in the departmental legislative assembly or direct negotiation with departmental authorities for project approval.
Box 4-1. Synthesis of the experience gained while implementing the Programme and Inter-Valley Irrigation Project (Prav and PRIV) in Punata*.
In 1977, Prav (Highland and Valleys Irrigation Program) started, based on an agreement between the Governments of Bolivia and Germany. In the Valleys, it included building dams in Tiraque, to irrigate Punata and Tiraque.
The project started with an ambitious plan to integrate all the river basin’s sources into a single system, with the following objectives:
• Reduce migration to urban centers • Promote food security
• Raise peasants’ standard of living • Create new jobs
• Increase agricultural production and productivity (Source: PRIV final report, 1996). Timeline:
• In 1978, reconstruction of the Laguna Robada dam • Construction of the Koari dam
• Since 1982, construction of Lluska Khocha / Muyu Laguna Loma dams and expanding Laguna Robada • From 1985 Khocha Totora design, starting construction in 1988
• In 1988, a specific project began (called Proyecto MAYOR) to provide technical assistance in agriculture and field irrigation
• In 1990 main works were completed. Khocha Totora started operating in 1991.
• In 1990, and due to gradual restructuring of the Ministry of Agriculture and its relationship with German cooperation, the PRIV (Inter Valley Irrigation Project) began, to complete all works from previous phases and "... prepare and support system operation and maintenance by users organized into water-user associations. Through its extension service, the project seeks to improve the economic and productive use of irrigation ..." (Gandarillas et al. 1993: 22).
• The program concluded in 1994, with final transfer of infrastructure and management to users. Major disagreements, re-encounters and reversals along interventions
• Difficulties with the works design. Farmers "did not allow engineers to work."
• Several works in the irrigation area had to be re-designed and rebuilt as being inappropriate to socio-territorial demarcations or constituting obstacles to current practices: breaking communal boundaries and avoiding “traditional irrigation practices” such as “lameo” (land recovery near river banks).
• Long conflicts and negotiations between projected water users and the supposed "water owners" (Punata and Tiraque). • Repeated failures in agricultural extension services (new crops) and technical assistance in farm irrigation: The engineers believed that peasants did not know how to irrigate and farmers thought that engineers did know. After some time, both changed their minds.
• A first project turning point was to “promote” their activities more, organize more meetings, newsletters, media, new communication strategies. The results appear to be the same.
• A new project turn-around: try to listen and understand what was happening in the field.
• The final stage was changing the engineers’ role, from “development promoters” to "companions of peasant projects”. Finding organizations’ progressive empowerment.
Some lessons learned from this experience:
• The highly responsive capabilities of farmers to address problems, redefinitions or decisions to be made in designing and implementing works.
• The need to first understand their practices and the context in which they take place before implementing extension programs or technical assistance.
• The need for flexibility in project implementation time.
• Engineers need to be prepared for understanding “farmers co-design”.
• Despite being an eminently infrastructural engineering project, its dynamics showed that, in this case, it was more important to define water rights’ many dimensions: practical or concrete but also symbolic and political. ---
* This experience is discussed in detail in the PRIV 1992 publication: "God gives water – What do projects do?" (Gandarillas et al. 1993).
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4.3.4 Organizational requirements for operational/technical water control in reservoir