China’s foreign policy under President Jiang (1993-2003) came with a heavy burden of international isolation due to the Tiananmen Square Incident. Following in the footsteps of Deng’s low profile foreign policy, President Jiang was rather prudent and non-confrontational, resulting in a foreign policy lacking in splendour. However, already during his reign the importance of economic development was increased, resulting in the 1999 implementation of the “Go Out Strategy” and the subsequent overseas expansion of Chinese MNCs. President
95 Jiangs’ successor, President Hu (1993 – 2008 and 2008 – 2013) on the other hand left a different foreign policy legacy, one that is marked by increasing assertiveness in defence of the so-called national interests (Zhao, 2012). While never openly abandoning the low profile foreign policy, Hu reacted vociferously to all perceived threats to China’s national pride and sovereignty, which at his departure in 2013 left China in tension with both Western powers and Asian neighbours, making it “one of the loneliest rising powers in world history” (Lee, 2011).
In relations with its Asian neighbours, Hu continued a mulin zhengce (good neighbour) policy with the aims of creating an environment conducive to economic development (Zhao, 2012). However, when China overtook Japan as the world’s second largest economy in 2011 (McCurry and Kollewe, 2011); Hu’s administration made a strident turn in making its foreign policy more assertive. China’s rise in economic status gave it an inflated sense of empowerment, making the Hu administration more willing to play to the popular nationalist fractions in society. However, with that came the responsibility of delivering public goods to keep the legitimacy of the government and the Party itself. Juggling its (economic) emerging great powers status with its narrow-minded core interests, left China exasperated, as it was never “psychologically prepared to play a full ‘great-power’ leadership role in confronting problems” Schell (2009).
The appointments of Xi as the Party’s general secretary and President, and Li as Premier of the State Council in 2013, symbolized the beginning of China’s new political era, not only in foreign policy aims but also in the governing style and assertiveness79. Moreover, rising nationalistic sentiment (a legacy of the Hu administration) and a humble attitude of open- mindedness and willingness to learn from others, is a challenging task for the Xi-Li administration (Wang, 2014).
Differences in leadership from one president to the next are not based on personal style, but are rather tied to historical/time differences (Elite Interview F, March 2016). Although economic motives are pivotal, President Xi emphasises political and historical relations more than his predecessor, as is seen in the launch of the 21st century maritime Silk Road and silk
79 This assertiveness also rests on the notion that new Chinese elites are less constrained by history and more focused on future ambitions. Given that, both President Xi and Premier Li are the first “post-49” generation of leaders in China, their views on China’s place in the world and their developmental trajectories differ from previous generations.
96 economic belt (One Belt One Road (OBOR)). While highly profitable and market oriented in its core, the use of historical wording and the inclusion of numerous countries in its outline, make the OBOR initiative a political and cultural unicorn for China’s partners, and an economic Eldorado for both the Chinese government and Chinese MNCs.
Furthermore, Elite Interview G (March 2016) says that there are numerous differences between President Xi and former President Hu, claiming: “Xi is much broader, he is more resolute and much less sophisticated and prudent than Hu. Xi in ideological terms believes in China’s national mission, superiority of the Chinese system under party leadership and has more confidence about Chinese entitlements/rights to play a bigger role internationally”. It can be said that President Xi’s foreign policy is driven by the historical notion of China’s exceptionalism; and thus, the perceived pivotal position that China is deemed to hold in world affairs. At the same time, however, it is driven by a personal need to see China rise to that occasion under his leadership, so to leave a personal legacy. Similarly, this can be said about former President Lula of Brazil in chapter four.
However, Elite Interview G (March 2016) continues on a careful note: “He [President Xi] does not pay attention to the central gravity principle, he wants everything everywhere at the same time, he wants a lot of launched projects at the same time but if he should encounter problems he is not equipped to deal with them systematically. He is slow in adjusting to new realities and difficulties in comparison to Hu and Jiang”. This leaves a rather ambiguous situation, one in which President Xi’s assertiveness and drive leads to major foreign policy initiatives, such as OBOR and the establishment of the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank, as well as prolonged and further aggravated territorial disputes with neighbouring countries. The above mentioned can be seen even clearer in the list of shifts80 in the conceptual and practical focus
of China’s foreign policy since the Xi-Li administration take-over (2013), such as maritime power aspirations, great power responsibility, and the integrated destiny of China and Africa. While all aspects are equally important, this study will only in detail focus on the integrated destiny aspect of China-Africa relations, as a wider array of countries and regions cannot be covered in one study.
80 Conceptual and practical focus of China’s foreign policy: “China Dream”; maritime power aspirations; “China- US new type of great power relations”; periphery diplomacy (focus on neighbouring countries); setting the goal of the two “Silk Roads”; “integrated destiny” of China and Africa; great power responsibility; and leadership style: “carrot and stick” approach Wang (2014).
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