Artefactos

The Community does not restrict its activity to the issuing of rules. It also provides a wide range of funds in support of those objectives which are considered worthy of financial assistance within the framework of Community policy. This is done mainly through the so called ‘structural funds’, such as the European Social Fund (ESF) and the European Agricultural Guidance and Guarantee Fund (EAGGF). However, it was also considered appropriate to establish a financial institution which could provide loans on easy repayment terms for projects which contribute towards the development of the Community. This institution is called the European Investment Bank (EIB).

The EIB has its own legal personality. Its members are the Community Member States (Article 266 (ex Art 198d) EC Treaty). Its task is to contribute to the ‘steady and balanced development of the common market in the interest of the Community’, and for this purpose it uses both the capital markets to which it has access and its own resources (Article 267 (ex Art 198e) EC Treaty). The following projects are eligible for loans and guarantees from the EIB:

• projects for the development of less-developed regions;

• projects aimed at modernising or converting businesses or for developing fresh activities required for the progressive establishment of the common market;

• projects of common interest to several Member States which are of a size or nature which would make it impossible for them to be financed by the means available to Member States (Article 267 (ex Art 198e) EC Treaty).

18 General Report 2000, p 13.

XI Conclusion

It has become a cliché to maintain that the Community institutions are currently in a fluid state, but even the most hackneyed expressions contain an element of truth. The one thing that characterises the current institutional structure of the EU is the uncertainty of its future development. Even the changes to be introduced by the ToN, described earlier (above, p 20 et seq) have failed to dispel this aura of uncertainty.

The Council remains the most powerful body within the Community, yet it has to contend with greater involvement on the part of the European Parliament than before. The Commission remains very firmly the Community executive, yet there are question marks over its future role, particularly if the European Parliament assumes greater legislative powers. Will it become closely integrated with the Parliament, as is the case with executives at the national level in many states? And will it succeed in maintaining its independence and its position of

‘guardian of the Treaty’ in such circumstances?

All this assumes that the European Parliament will actually increase its involvement in the legislative process. Yet this cannot be taken for granted. The Parliament remains a body which is remote from the everyday experience of the Community citizen, as can be seen from the low electoral turn-out in those countries where voting is not compulsory. Also, such voters as make an effort to participate in the European elections very often express their sovereign will on the basis of domestic, rather than European, issues.

Finally, the Court. It has the express brief of ensuring uniformity of application and interpretation of Community law, yet cannot compel the national courts to follow its rulings (except for the court making a reference).

Accusations of judicial policy based on political rather than judicial considerations, however unjustified, may prompt a reassessment of its role as guardian of Community law. Quite apart from the above considerations, it is clear that any significant geographical extension of the Community will involve reforming an institutional set-up which has essentially remained the same as that which applied when the Community was but six nations strong.

The European Council at Nice laid down a timetable for a working programme on the future of the European institutions.¹⁸ One of the areas of study to be featured in this programme is the demarcation of powers between the EU and the Member States, in accordance with the subsidiarity principle. In addition, Article 2 of the Enlargement Protocol to the ToA states that, at least one year before EU membership reaches 20, a conference will be held to carry out a comprehensive review of the composition and functioning of the

institutions. Both occasions could be used to remedy some of the faultlines which currently handicap the institutional set-up of the Union – provided there is the political will to do so.

I Introduction

The most charitable qualification of the Community’s decision-making procedures is that they are ‘byzantine’. Less kind are those who state that the Ancient Britons had a clearer system of rule-making, or who simply refer to Dante’s Inferno – more particularly the passage which cries out Lasciate ogni speranza voi ch’entrate (‘Abandon all hope all ye who enter this place’).

Even before the TEU, the decision-making procedures of the Community tested the memory of all but the most diligent of swots. Post-Maastricht, however, even the keenest scholar is tempted to throw up his or her hands in undisguised horror. Attempts to involve the European Parliament more deeply in the rule-making process have produced a somewhat cumbersome legislative machinery which is almost unwieldy in its complexity. In this chapter, an attempt is made at shedding some light on this procedural maze. It is intended to proceed from the general to the particular. This means commencing with the policy-making stage, and ending with the enactment of delegated legislation.

The bulk of its contents, however, will be taken up by the various legislative procedures, more particularly those which dominate present-day Community legislation, to wit the co-operation and co-decision procedures. In addition, some space will be devoted to the budgetary procedure, which is also highly complex and technical.

One aspect of the decision-making process which is not dealt with in this chapter is the judicial supervision of Community legislation. In order to ensure that the Community institutions do not exceed their constitutional brief when exercising their legislative powers, the Treaties have laid down a number of safeguards in the shape of judicial review by the Court of Justice. This aspect will be dealt with in Chapter 6 below.