El asesor comercial

institutions

It is worth noting that whilst respondents from the central government, local government, the World Bank and ALAT believed that TASAF has promoted decentralisation to the local communities, the communities surveyed indicated that although local government has been decentralised to some degree, it continues to be subject to interference by the central government. In contrast, TASAF officials claimed that even though their project has been deconcentrated to LGAs, it has successfully championed decentralisation agenda at the grassroots level (TMU official 14.05.2014), and it was stated that ‘Although LGAs claim more devolution, they do not take it down to the grassroots as we do’ (TMU official 14.05.2014). Ministry officials also conceded that ‘TASAF committees might have a significant contribution in reinforcing decentralisation, although in a deconcentrated style’ (Ministry official02 11.06.2014). World Bank officials too, stated

that TASAF has supported decentralisation by opting to not directly implement projects at the community level, but rather to engage the LGAs and communities to do it on their

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behalf (World Bank official 23.03.2015). Councillors interviewed agreed that ‘TASAF has helped to further decentralisation and to truly transfer authority and resources to the community members for implementation of projects’ (Councillor Tanga 14.04.2014; Councillor Lindi 19.06.2014).

To establish whether the hybrid model has effectively deepened decentralisation, ordinary citizens surveyed in the local communities were asked how they perceived the degree of decentralisation and local autonomy. The survey results in Table 6.1 below indicate that in both urban and rural settings, an insignificant proportion of respondents (<10%) perceived local government to be fully decentralised and autonomous. The majority of citizens in the urban authority of Tanga (66%) and the rural authorities of Lindi (82%) and Morogoro (76%), however, said that local governments are decentralised but that they are faced with either minor or severe interference from central government.

Figure 6.1: Opinions on the degree of decentralisation and local autonomy (N=400)

Source: Author's field survey, 2014

TASAF officials, however, believed that assigning responsibility and authority for sub- project management to local government bodies and community structures was a way of reducing this interference. They stated that TASAF assigned decision-making authority to CMTs and councils’ finance committees for the management of TASAF functions at the council level. The CMTs are empowered to make technical decisions on TASAF

22 10 16 31 50 34 35 32 42 6 2 6 6 6 2 0 10 20 30 40 50 60

Tanga Lindi Morogoro

P ercen ta g e Municipalities

Neither decentralised nor autonomous

Decentralised but with severe interferences by Central Government Decentralised but with minor interferences by Central Government Full decentralised and autonomous

Don't know

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investments in the LGAs’ area of jurisdiction. The CMTs facilitate participatory planning processes at the community level, do feasibility assessments and manage TASAF transactions at the LGA with technical support from TASAF officials attached to the local councils (TMU official 14.05.2014). Finance committees, which are also councils’ political decision-making bodies, have been empowered to scrutinise the proposals of the CMTs and to inform TASAF which ones their councils would support for TASAF funding (World Bank official 23.03.2015). They also oversee the implementation of sub- projects within the councils (TMU official 14.05.2014).

While the majority of the councillors interviewed stated that the TASAF guidelines formally recognised finance committees as the main decision-making body for Fund activities at the local level, some felt that the role of finance committees has been reduced to merely receiving information about the projects’ progress. It was stated that they have little power to question or change anything since they are not fully involved in the management of sub-projects, which is the responsibility of TASAF district officials, CMTs and CMCs (Councillor Tanga 14.04.2014; Councillor Lindi 19.06.2014). According to these councillors, when TASAF funds are received, the finance committees receive a receipt statement but have no say over how funds are expended. They cannot alter TASAF decisions or even the proposals made by communities or council administrators (Councillor Tanga 14.04.2014; Councillor Lindi 19.06.2014; Councillor Morogoro 11.07.2014). In this context, it was stated, finance committees only served as a rubber stamp (Councillor Tanga 14.04.2014). The view of TASAF district officials that councillors and finance committees have no power to change anything in TASAF sub- projects seems to confirm the concerns of councillors discussed above (TASAF Tanga 03.07.2014 & 02.04.2015; TASAF Morogoro 10.07.2014; TASAF Lindi 02.05.2014). This suggests that although TASAF acknowledges the finance committees as decision- making bodies, little space has been provided for them to have any say in the Fund’s socio-economic investments at the community level.

Although not all councillors are members of finance committees, under normal circumstances, they would be expected to exercise some oversight over development projects (such as those implemented by TASAF) in their wards and their absence has been noted by their constituents. Councillors in fact complained that some council administrators and TASAF officials have been deceiving the members of the beneficiary groups and CMCs by telling them that councillors are not interested in their projects

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(Councillor Morogoro 11.07.2014; Councillor Tanga, 14.04.2014). Because of this misrepresentation, it was claimed, ‘When you, as an individual councillor, visit those projects to assess implementation, those people will just look at you as if you are a visiting stranger and they will not cooperate’ (Councillor Tanga 14.04.2014). As a consequence of this state of affairs, it was stated, councillors become voiceless, powerless and demotivated to follow up on the progress of projects (Councillor Tanga 14.04.2014). This suggests that the power to oversee TASAF activities at the local council level is vested in the finance committees as collective rather than in individual councillors. As a consequence of this, a councillor in Tanga asserted that the deconcentration model of TASAF is an impediment to effective devolution (Councillor Tanga 21.03.2014)

The ward officials also claimed that the TASAF model does not strengthen local government because it bypasses ward administrators when assigning responsibility for the implementation of sub-projects (WEO Lindi 03.05.2014). Evidence from TASAF officials indicates that the ward administration is indeed skipped, but this is intended to reduce the levels of decision-making in the implementation process. However, research by Tenga (2013, p. 33) indicated that ‘Ownership of created assets at ward level such as constructed secondary schools infrastructures is not clear, as the ward government was not directly involved in the institutional structure for the implementation of TASAF II supported sub-projects’. This suggests a need to take on board local technocrats at all levels, based on their scope of influence in the success and sustainability of TASAF interventions.

Village administrators stated that even though TASAF claims to have conferred power and authority over sub-project management to the village councils, in many cases such power proved to be non-existent (VEO Lindi 03.05.2014). As a consequence, the village leadership is often unhappy with the privileges given to the CMC to control a sub- project’s finances as well as its role in contracting, managing, and paying contractors (Mtaa Chairman Tanga 15.08.2014; Village Chairman Lindi 03.05.2014; FGD Mikese Morogoro 11.07.2014). According to a World Bank official, the establishment of CMCs with so much authority was unusual in a social action fund:

In some countries like Ethiopia, you won’t see this kind of temporary committee. There are temporary committees from the community and from the [village] council who will be managing the projects; but the committee that actually make payments! It is not there (World Bank official 23.03.2015).

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As a consequence of the responsibilities assigned to the CMCs, a ward administrator maintained, ‘The village government has been reduced to a rubber stamp, if even the signatories of the village project account are the CMC committee leaders’ (WEO Lindi 03.05.2014). TASAF district officials, to the contrary, believed that village councils have substantive power over the CMC and TASAF sub-projects in the village (TASAF Tanga 03.07.2014; TASAF Morogoro 10.07.2014). To illustrate this, a TASAF district official in Morogoro stated that ‘The Village Council can terminate any CMC member for misconduct and inform the village assembly of its decision’ (TASAF Morogoro 10.07.2014). This was confirmed by a grassroots administrator in Tanga, who stated that ‘the CMCs are only sub-committees of the village council, and in case they misbehave the village chairmen should be held accountable too because they are supposed to supervise them’ (MEO Tanga 19.03.2014). This appears to counter the view that ‘TASAF committees are undermining the authority of village councils’ (Mtaa Chairman Tanga 15.08.2014; Councillor Lindi 19.06.2014; MEO Tanga 12.02.2014).

It is interesting to note that ordinary people interviewed differed from grassroots administrators and politicians in their understanding of the powers exercised by CMCs and village councils. Thus, people who had voted in both the village council and the CMC understood that the former is accountable for the conduct of the CMC and for overall delivery of the TASAF sub-projects in their communities (MEO Tanga 19.03.2014; VEO Lindi 03.05.2014). In some places, this was evident in the forced resignation or blocked re-election of the village leadership due to the poor performance of TASAF sub-projects in their communities. In Lindi district, for instance, respondents said that the leadership of Mandawa village:

was held accountable by the people and forced to resign over the market building project which went astray within the hands of the committee, simply because the only authority the people know with regard to their local development was the village government (VEO Lindi 03.05.2014).

A similar account was given by the mtaa administrator in Tanga, who observed:

A village chairman at my previous work station was held accountable by the people for the embezzlement of TASAFs fund even though he was not at all involved in the project. The people refused to re-elect him simply because of the embezzled TASAF funds and substandard construction of the intended project (MEO Tanga 19.03.2014).

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