Much of the US literature concerning urban analysis initially focused upon power relations between different groups (see Dahl, 1961). These power relation paradigms have since been enhanced to incorporate economic and political discussions in the US and more recently the UK. Two theories in particular have been developed to illustrate this progression. The first model, growth coalition theory, described a relatively simplistic, ‘static’ alliance between the so-called ‘urban elite’ in the pursuit of ‘growth’. The second model, urban regime theory, was more dynamic in nature from the first, and progressed by recognising that a diversity of actors and variation in interests often led to multiple objectives and conflicts.
US growth coalition theory provided a starting point for the literature describing the shifting alliance between the private sector and local government in the UK (Lloyd and Newlands, 1988). One of the key UK analysts of US theory, Harding (1991), explained growth coalition theory in a more logical relationship-type manner. He transferred US thinking on growth coalitions to the UK. Initially, he traced the recent changes in urban partnerships. “The process of public and private sector interests and actors forming alliances on the basis of a common economic growth agenda that has been of growing importance in the United Kingdom since the mid-1980’s and has increasingly displaced an earlier paradigm of urban economic policy which was more dominated by the local public sector” (p295).
Logan and Molotch were perhaps the most important commentators on the workings of local coalition and US proponents. They suggested that urban development in many US cities was dominated by business interests. “The activism of entrepreneurs is, and always
has been, a critical force in shaping the urban system” (1987, p52). Wiewel (1990) confirmed that private sector decisions, national and federal policy and international trends affected economic change far more than at the local level. He noted that whilst local government could create a local business environment that may defy imitation it didn’t always succeed in steering development into the preferred direction. Since the mid-1980’s there appears to have been an increase in the UK of organisations similar to the urban growth coalitions developed in the US literature. The term urban growth coalition was developed by Molotch: “a city and, more generally, any locality, is conceived as the areal expression of the interests of some land-based elite. Such an elite is seen to profit through the increasing intensification of the land use of the area in which its members hold a common interest” (1976, p309).
Whilst US growth coalition theory offered a useful picture of public-private alliances a number of observers have made several qualifications to the model (Cooke 1993; Lloyd and Newlands, 1988; Harding, 1991; Shaw, 1993; Valler, 1995). A few aspects of the model emerge as contentious and are incorporated into later sections of this chapter: the nature of the private sector (Section 6.4); the role of local government (Section 6.5); the distinction between the public and private sector (Section 6.5); an over-reliance on growth and ‘coalescence without conflicts of interest’ (Section 6.6); and the involvement of ‘minor elites’ (Section 6.8).
Urban regime theory constituted the second principal paradigm of power relation theory in the US. Dahl (1981), Di-Gaetano and Klemanski (1994), Elkin (1985), (1987), Fainstein and Fainstein (1986), Gurr and King (1987), Kantor and Savitch (1993), Judd (1979), Lindblom(1977), and, Stone (1987), (1989) offered valuable contributions here. Regime theory, like coalition theory, recognised the inevitability of a partnership between the public and private sector. Similarly, regimists agreed with the potential of a so-called urban elite. Regime theory differed from growth coalition theory as it attempted to explain the dynamic structural alliance between public and private sector players and how these actors affect the decision making process. Regime ideology discarded the concept of unitary collusion in favour of ‘multiple imperatives’ which lead to a variety of policy responses. Valler explains that “developments in regime theory have approached the diversity of interests and political agenda in the city, which form the context for significant conflict over local economic policy” (1995, p36).
A thorough, if dated, account of how democratic urban environments were administered in the US was offered by Dahl’s (1961) “Who Governs?”. His pluralist ideas which clearly later influenced urban regimists emphasised the relative autonomy of the various
interest groups in the urban policy arena. Dahl examined the distribution of influence in the urban environment and, for instance, noted that the development administrator from the city planning department “negotiated with potential developers to induce them to come into projects on terms acceptable to the city” (pl29). He found that elected officials, particularly the mayor have had a major influence over local decision making. Stone developed these earlier ideas using a social-production model of power to explain regime theory. As different institutions have varying influences, the ability to govern these became the task of a regime. Thus he defined a regime as “the informal arrangements by which public bodies and private interests function together in order to make and carry out governing decisions” (1989, p6). He chose the case study of Atlanta to apply his theory. Here, he asserted “the very capacity for strong governance is dependent on active business collaboration” (p234). The power and influence of business elites was attractive to public sector employees who attempted to gain resources for community projects.
The following section used regime theory and growth coalition theory as a framework for examining public/private alliances in the City Challenge process in the case study areas. This is done by applying key aspects common to both theories to experiences in Sheffield and the Deame Valley. As both growth coalitions and urban regimes rely on key players or elites to influence decision-making it begins by examining the existence of
elitism in the City Challenge process (Section 6.3) and assessing levels of business involvement (Section 6.4). It continues to explore the “structural” nature of public/private alliances (Section 6.5). This chapter also examines the limitations of private sector involvement (Section 6.6) and the ability of regimes/coalitions to attract wealth (Section 6.7). The final aspect of regime/coalition ideology which is scrutinised
is the existence of formal and informal public-private networks (section 6.8).