C. Viuda de Ordoveza v. Raymundo Case No. 91
G.R. No. L-45155 (July 31, 1936)
Chapter VII, Page 327, Footnote No. 189 FACTS:
Petitioner is the Respondent in another case and she contends that the opposing party failed to file her brief within the 15-day period which makes her appeal ipso facto dismissed and the CA had no authority to grant additional 5 days to file her brief.
ISSUE:
W/N the CA had authority to reinstate the appeal and to grant the Appellant an additional 3 days with which to file her brief.
HELD:
Yes. Under the Rules of Court “the court may, on motion to the Appellee and notice the Appellant or on its own motion dismiss the bill of exceptions or the appeal.” The word “may” implies that the matter of dismissing the appeal or not rests within the sound discretion of the court.
LATIN MAXIM:
9d
Javellana v. Mirasol and Nuñez Case No. 65
G.R. No. 14881 (February 5, 1920) Chapter VII, Page 328, Footnote No. 192 FACTS:
A redemption of property from an execution sale, which had been effected in behalf of a brother of the execution debtor (Julio Javellana), was attacked in this case as void because of a supposed collusive agreement between the redemptioner (Luis Mirasol) and sheriff (Geronimo Nuñez) whereby the latter agreed to withhold the redemption money from the creditor and to return it to the redemptioner if the latter should finally succeed in establishing his title to the same property in other litigation.
ISSUE:
W/N the redemption has been effected in good faith and in accordance with the requirements of law.
HELD:
A liberal construction will be given to statutes governing the redemption of property, to the end that the property of the debtor may be made to satisfy as many liabilities as possible. Redemption of property sold under execution is not rendered invalid by reason of the fact that the payment to the sheriff for the purpose of redemption is effected by means of a check for the amount due. Any ordinary creditor, or assignee as such, having a judgment subsequent to that under which the property was sold may exercise the right of redemption. The act of the redemptioner in redeeming the property pending the decision of those appeals was not an officious act in any sense. It was on the contrary necessary to the reasonable protection of his right as a subsequent judgment-creditor of Maximino Mirasol.
LATIN MAXIM:
38b, 41
Del Rosario v. Equitable Ins. and Casualty Co., Inc.
Case No. 34
G.R. No. L-16215 (June 29, 1963)
Chapter VII, Page 328, Footnote No. 192 FACTS:
Defendant company issued Personal Accident Policy No. 7136 on the life of Francisco del Rosario, binding itself to pay the sum of P1,000 to P3,000, as indemnity for the death of the insured. Petitioner, father of the insured, filed a claim for payment with Defendant company when his son died of drowning after being forced to jump off the motor launch “ISLAMA” on account of fire. Defendant company refused to pay more than P1,000 since they alleged that their liability was only said amount pursuant to Sec. 1, Part I of the provisions of the policy.
ISSUE:
How much the Defendant company should pay in indemnity for the death of Francisco del Rosario.
HELD:
The policy does not positively state any definite amount that may be recovered in case of death by drowning. There is an ambiguity in this respect in the policy, which ambiguity must be interpreted in favor of the insured and strictly against the insurer so as to allow a greater indemnity. Petitioner is entitled to recover P3,000.
The insurance company has already paid the amount of P1,000 to Petitioner so that there still remains a balance of P2,000 of the amount to which he is entitled to recover.
LATIN MAXIM:
11a, 38
De la Cruz v. Capital Ins. & Surety Co.
Case No. 156
G.R. No. L-16138 (April 29, 1961)
Chapter VII, Page 328, Footnote No. 192 FACTS:
Eduardo de la Cruz was the holder of an accident insurance policy underwritten by the Capital Insurance & Surety Co., Inc. In a boxing contest participated into by the insured, Eduardo slipped and was hit by his opponent on the left part of the back of the head, causing Eduardo to fall, with his head hitting the rope of the ring. The cause of death was reported as hemorrhage, intracranial, left.
Simon de la Cruz, the father of the insured, filed a claim with the insurance company for payment of the indemnity under the insurance policy. Defendant company set up the defense that the death of the insured, caused by his participation in a boxing contest, was not accidental and, therefore, not covered by insurance.
ISSUE:
W/N Eduardo’s death falls under the definition of the policy “against death or disability caused by accidental means.”
HELD:
The terms “accident” and “accidental”, as used in insurance contracts, have not acquired any technical meaning, and are construed by the courts in their ordinary and common acceptation. There is no accident when a deliberate act is performed unless some additional, unexpected, independent and unforeseen happening occurs which produces or brings about the result of injury or death. The failure of the Defendant company to include death resulting from a boxing match or other sports among the prohibitive risks leads to the conclusion that it did not intend to limit or exempt itself from the liability for such death.
LATIN MAXIM:
3, 25a, 30a
Ty Vs. First National Surety & Assurance Co., Inc.
Case No. 156
G.R. No. L-16138 (April 29, 1961)
Chapter VII, Page 328, Footnote No. 192 FACTS:
Plaintiff Diosdado C. Ty insured himself in 18 local insurance companies, among which being the eight above named Defendants, which issued to him personal accident policies. On December 24, 1953, a fire broke out which totally destroyed the Broadway Cotton Factory. Fighting his way out of the factory, Plaintiff was injured on the left hand by a heavy object which caused temporary total disability of his left hand. Plaintiff filed the corresponding notice of accident and notice of claim with all of the Defendants to recover indemnity under Part II of the policy but the Defendants rejected plaintiff's claim for indemnity for the reason that there being no severance of amputation of the left hand, the disability suffered by him was not covered by his policy.
ISSUE:
W/N it is necessary that there should be an amputation of the left hand of the Plaintiff before he can recover on the insurance policies.
HELD:
The clear and express conditions of the insurance policies define partial disability as loss of either hand by amputation through the bones of the wrist. There was no such amputation in the case at bar. All that was found by the trial court, which is not disputed on appeal, was that the physical injuries "caused temporary total disability of plaintiff's left hand." In addition, the agreement contained in the insurance policies is the law between the parties. As the terms of the policies are clear, express and specific that only amputation of the left hand should be considered as a loss thereof, an interpretation that would include the mere fracture or other temporary disability not covered by the policies would certainly be unwarranted.
LATIN MAXIM:
6b, 7a, 9c
Capati v. Ocampo Case No. 46
G.R. No. L-28742 (April 30, 1982) Chapter VIII, Page 330, Footnote No. 8 FACTS:
Plaintiff, a resident of Pampanga, entered into a sub-contract with the Defendant, a resident of Naga City. The Defendant completed a construction job for the Plaintiff. However, the construction was completed on a date later than what was agreed in their contract. Hence, Plaintiff filed in the CFI of Pampanga an action for recovery of consequential damages due to the delay. Defendant filed a motion to dismiss the complaint on the ground that venue of action was improperly laid. The CFI of Pampanga dismissed the Plaintiff's complaint on ground of improper venue.
ISSUE:
W/N the dismissal of the complaint on the ground of improper venue was correct.
HELD:
No. The rule on venue of personal actions cognizable by the CFI is found in Sec. 2(b), Rule 4 of the Rules of Court, which provides that such "actions may be commenced and tried where the Defendant or any of the Defendants resides or may be found, or where the Plaintiff or any of the Plaintiffs resides, at the election of the Plaintiff." The word "may" is merely permissive and operates to confer discretion upon a party. Under ordinary circumstances, the term "may be" connotes possibility;
it does not connote certainty. "May" is an auxillary verb indicating liberty, opportunity, permission or possibility.
LATIN MAXIM:
6c, 25a, b
Chartered Bank v. National Government Auditing Office Case No. 58
G.R. No. L-38513 (March 31, 1987) Chapter VIII, Page 331, Footnote No. 10 FACTS:
Iloilo city branch of Petitioner bank was accepting postal money order from the general public since 1946. These orders were presented to the Iloilo city office for payment and if said office could not pay in full, they would issue receipts for their remaining balance. On 1968, the Bureau of Posts issued an unnumbered circular:
"Memorandum of Understanding Covering Cashing and Clearing of Money Orders,"
effective October 1, 1968, involving the installation of a new postal money order system which requires that all commercial banks, regardless of location, must clear all postal money orders they have received and paid with the Central Bank at Manila.
Petitioner bank continued its transactions with the post office under the old practice through the latter's Acting Cashier beyond October 1, 1968. The post office said that the arrangements made by the acting cashier and the Petitioner bank were private, unauthorized arrangements and any claim for settlement of any unpaid money orders should be directed against the said cashier.
ISSUE:
W/N the unnumbered circular and the undated memorandum of understanding are directory and permissive in nature.
HELD:
Respondents are correct by saying that the purposes of the new postal money order system negate the contention that said circular and memorandum are not mandatory in nature and that they are for the convenience of commercial banks operating in the Manila area only.
LATIN MAXIM:
7a, 9a, 36a, 36b
Guiao v. Figueroa Case No. 121
G.R. No. L-6481 (May 17, 1954)
Chapter VIII, Page 333, Footnote No. 17 FACTS:
In the trial of People v. Gopez, the provincial fiscal introduced Porfirio Dizon and Emiliano Manalo as witnesses for the State. After the reinvestigation, an amended information was filed, and two new accused were included, namely, Jesus Guiao and Eulogio Serrano. But Dizon and Manalo were not included. In view of the failure of the provincial fiscal to include these two persons, the action for mandamus was filed by Jesus Guiao to compel the fiscal to include Dizon and Manalo as accused in his information.
ISSUE:
W/N a fiscal may be compelled by mandamus to include in an information persons who appear to be responsible for the crime charged therein.
HELD:
Yes. Sec. 1 of Rule 106 of the Rules of Court taken from Act No. 2709 states that, “Every prosecution for a crime shall be in the name of the United States against all persons who appear to be responsible therefor, except in the cases determined in Sec. 2 of this Act.” A perusal of Act No. 2709 discloses the legislative intent to require that all persons who appear to be responsible for an offense should be included in the information. The use of the word "shall" and of the phrase "except in cases determined" shows Sec. 1 is mandatory, not merely directory.
LATIN MAXIM:
6c, 9a, 25a
Loyola Grand Villas Homeowners (South) Association, Inc. v. Court of Appeals Case No. 153
G.R. No. 117188 (August 7, 1997) Chapter VIII, Page 334, Footnote No. 22 FACTS:
The Loyola Grand Villas Homeowners Association Inc. (LGVHAI) was registered with Respondent Home Insurance and Guaranty Corporation (HIGC) as the sole homeowners’ organization in the said subdivision but it did not file its corporate by-laws. Later, it was discovered that there were two other organizations within the subdivision: the North and South Associations. Respondent HIGC then informed the president of LGVHAI that the latter has been automatically dissolved because of non-submission of its by-laws as required by the Corporation Code. This resulted in the registration of Petitioner association. LGVHAI complained and got a favorable result from Respondent HIGC declaring the registration of Petitioner association cancelled and Respondent CA subsequently affirmed the said decision. Hence, Petitioner association filed a petition for certiorari.
ISSUE:
W/N the failure of a corporation to file its by-laws within one month from the date of its incorporation results in its automatic dissolution.
HELD:
No. The legislature’s intent is not to automatically dissolve a corporation for its failure to pass its by-laws. The word “must” in a statute is not always imperative but it may be consistent with an exercise of discretion. The language of the statute should be considered as a whole while ascertaining the intent of the legislature in using the word “must” or “shall”.
LATIN MAXIM:
9c, 25a, 36a, 38b, b
Director of Lands v. Court of Appeals Case No. 95
G.R. No. 102858 (July 28, 1997)
Chapter VIII, Page 334, Footnote No. 23 FACTS:
Private Respondent Teodoro Abistado filed a petition for original registration of a land title. During the pendency of the said petition, he died and his heirs were represented by Josefa Abistado as a guardian ad litem in order to continue the petition. The trial court dismissed the petition “for want of jurisdiction”. However, it was found that the applicant had been in open, continuous and exclusive possession of the subject land since 1938. The reason for the dismissal is that the applicant failed to publish the notice of Initial Hearing in a newspaper of general circulation pursuant to a law. The CA set aside the decision of the trial court. Thus, Petitioner brought the case to the Supreme Court.
ISSUE:
Whether the newspaper publication of the notice of initial hearing in an original land registration case is mandatory or directory.
HELD:
It is mandatory. The law used the term "shall" in prescribing the work to be done by the Commissioner of Land Registration upon the latter's receipt of the court order setting the time for initial hearing. The said word denotes an imperative and thus indicates the mandatory character of a statute. While such literal mandate is not an absolute rule in statutory construction, as its import ultimately depends upon its context in the entire provision, it is held that in the present case the term must be understood in its normal mandatory meaning in order to uphold the norms of due process.
LATIN MAXIM:
6c, 9a
Bersabal v. Salvador Case No. 34
G.R. No. L-35910 (July 21, 1978)
Chapter VIII, Page 335, Footnote No. 25 FACTS:
Private Respondents filed an ejectment suit against the Petitioner. The subsequent decision was appealed by the Petitioner and during its pendency, the court issued an order stating that “…counsels for both parties are given 30 days from receipt of this order within which to file their memoranda in order for this case to be submitted for decision by the court.” After receipt, Petitioner filed a motion ex parte to submit memorandum within 30 days from receipt of notice of submission of the transcript of stenographic notes taken during the hearing of the case which was granted by the court. But the Respondent judge issued an order dismissing the case for failure to prosecute Petitioner’s appeal. Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration citing the submitted ex parte motion but the court denied it.
ISSUE:
W/N the mere failure of an Appellant to submit the mentioned memorandum would empower the CFI to dismiss the appeal on the ground of failure to prosecute.
HELD:
The court is not empowered by law to dismiss the appeal on the mere failure of an Appellant to submit his memorandum. The law provides that “Courts… shall decide… cases on the basis of the evidence and records transmitted from the city…
courts: Provided… parties may submit memoranda… if so requested…” It cannot be interpreted otherwise than that the submission of memoranda is optional.
LATIN MAXIM:
6c
Republic Planers Bank v. Agana Sr.
Case No. 133
G. R. No. 51765 (March 3, 1997)
FACTS:
Private Respondents filed in court a quo, an action for specific performance to compel petitioner to redeem 800 preferred shares of stock with a face value of P8,000.00 and to pay 1% quarterly interest thereon as quarterly dividend owing them under the terms and conditions of the certificates of stock. The court a quo rendered judgment in favor of Private Respondents.
ISSUE:
W/N Respondent Judge committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to excess or lack of jurisdiction in compelling Petitioner bank to redeem Private Respondents’ preferred shares
HELD:
Yes. Respondent Judge, in ruling that Petitioner must redeem the shares in question, stated that, “On the question of the redemption by the Defendant of said preferred shares of stock, the very wordings of the terms and conditions in said stock certificates clearly allows the same.” What Respondent Judge failed to recognize was that while the stock certificate does allow redemption, the option to do so was clearly vested in the Petitioner Bank. The redemption therefore is clearly the type known as "optional". Furthermore, the terms and conditions set forth therein use the word "may". It is a settled doctrine in statutory construction that the word "may"
denotes discretion, and cannot be construed as having a mandatory effect.
LATIN MAXIM:
6c, 6b, 7a, 30b, 36a
Phil. Consumers Foundation , Inc. v. Nat’l Telecommunications Commission Case No. 121
G.R. No. L-63318 (November 25, 1983)
FACTS:
Respondent Commission approved a revised schedule for Subscriber Investment Plan (SIP) filed by Private Respondent. Petitioner states that SIP schedule presented by the Private Respondent is pre-mature and, therefore, illegal and baseless, because the Respondent Commission has not yet promulgated the required rules and regulations implementing Sec. 2 of P.D. 217 which provides, “The Department of Public Works, Transportation and Communications through its Board of Communications and/or appropriate agency shall see to it that the herein declared policies for the telephone industry are immediately implemented and for this purpose pertinent rules and regulations may be promulgated ...”
ISSUE:
W/N Respondent Commission acted with grave abuse of discretion.
HELD:
Yes. P.D. 217 deals with matters so alien, innovative and untested such that existing substantive and procedural laws would not be applicable. Thus, the SIP was so set up precisely to ensure the financial viability of public telecommunications companies which in turn assures the enjoyment of the population at minimum cost the benefits of a telephone facility. Without promulgation of rules and regulation there would be confusion among the rights of Private Respondent, the consumers and the government itself. The plan to expand the company program and/or improve its service is laudable, but the expenses should not be shouldered by the telephone subscribers. Considering the multi-million profits of the company, the cost of expansion and/or improvement should come from part of its huge profits.
LATIN MAXIM:
8b, 9d, 11b, 12a
Phil. Consumers Foundation, Inc. v. NTC and PLDT (Resolution) Case No. 94
G.R. No. L-63318 (August 18, 1984)
FACTS:
Respondent Commission filed a manifestation that it is joining Private Respondent in its second motion for reconsideration and adopting it as its own. The decision promulgated interprets the rule-making authority delegated in Section 2 of P.D. 217 to the then Department of Public Works, Transportation and
Respondent Commission filed a manifestation that it is joining Private Respondent in its second motion for reconsideration and adopting it as its own. The decision promulgated interprets the rule-making authority delegated in Section 2 of P.D. 217 to the then Department of Public Works, Transportation and