Aspectos materiales

There are various approaches by which a public opinion survey can be used to ascertain the level of regime support by citizens. Regime is described by Haerpfer, Bernhagen, Inglehart and Welzel (2009) as a set of institutions by which political authority is exercised by the state. Rose (2009, p. 12) adds that usually regimes come and go while the state remains. Regime support therefore refers to the extent to which citizens agree with and approve existing institutions. Popular participation, in turn, refers not only to citizens having equal opportunities for expressing their preferences (Bernhagen, 2009, p. 31) but to the activities of citizens intended to influence state structures and authorities and making collectively binding decisions regarding the allocation of public goods, for example, by means of political actions such as voting and protesting. Therefore, in this part I discuss the kinds of explanations that have been put forward to explain regime support and popular political participation, and support for democracy in particular, in relation to demand and supply of democracy.

Five possible explanations were presented to explain regime support and popular participation (Bratton et al, 2005, p. 35). These include (1) the sociological approach, which locates the source of public opinion in the structure of the society measured by the demographic profile of surveyed respondents; (2) the cultural approach, in which opinions

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emanate from acquired or inherited norms and values; (3) the institutional approach, which involves studying the superstructure of legal rules, association membership and formal activities as conditions that shape people’s preferences; (4) the cognitive awareness of respondents in terms of their level of political and economic knowledge and ability to attribute meaning to the term ‘democracy’; and (5) performance evaluations, which anticipates that people form their attitude towards democracy on the basis of their experiences and perceptions of the performance of the political system. By studying these dimensions, the survey seeks to answer the question ‘why do Africans think and act as they do about democracy?’. In the following sections I will discuss briefly how each of these explanatory dimensions is conceptualised and operationalised in terms of different independent variables for the purpose of survey research.

3.5.1 Social structures and attitudes towards democracy

Social structures can be defined as characteristic divisions or factors within a society which are acknowledged as significant in enabling or constraining action. The term ‘social structures’ is frequently used to refer to enduring relationships and bonds between individuals or groups of individuals in a society; as people within a culture are organised into smaller groups with each smaller group having its own particular tasks. Heywood (1992, p. 339) indicates that these divisions are mostly shared by people with similar social-economic positions. While economic factors are mostly based on income (i.e. rich/poor; have/have- nots; employed/unemployed), social factors22 involve advantages one has in society like age, head of family, gender, and political position (to have elders/youth; male/female; ruler/ruled; urban/rural dwellers). In the Afrobarometer survey, various sociological features of respondents are recorded including gender, residential location, class, lived poverty, and race. Bratton et al (2005, p. 36) propose that demographic structure as measured by qualities like gender, age and residential locations shapes the way in which an individual reasons and behaves. Thus, for instance, age is considered to have an impact on how change is received, as the younger generation is typically more open to change than the older one. There is also typically a negative relationship between rural origin and reformism. Part of my study will be to test the extent to which sociological factors can explain differences in the support for democracy among students.

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E.g. in Africa, males and elders/traditional rulers enjoy the privileged position from family level to community level. They present the most benefited social classes that enjoy privileges over others in the community/family.

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Of special interest for this study is the prior finding that the level of education as a factor does not seem to discriminate between supporters and opponents of the existing regime, although age itself can be an effective predicator for support of democracy (Bratton et al, 2005, p. 36; Mattes and Bratton, 2007, p. 196). Moreover, as has been noted in the previous chapter, in a recent study, Mattes and Mughogho (2009) argue that there were diminishing democracy returns for higher levels of education in Africa. Provided that I only aim to study students in higher education, the findings and conclusions of this study give more specific insights into higher education and democracy in Africa.

3.5.2 The impact of cultural values

The culturalist approach proposes that individuals have rights to choose; whether they are, or not included in a certain group (like youth, women, elders etc). This approach usually takes a humanistic look at what goes on in individuals’ environments or institutions. Cultural values can be defined as general enduring standards that are central to belief systems in a way that more transient attitudes are not (Kinder and Sears, 1985, p. 690). These can also be shared values and norms in a society. The Afrobarometer survey includes interpersonal trust; individual responsibility; and tolerance for risk as measures for cultural values. Bratton et al (2005, p. 38) argue that opinions towards democracy in Africa are being shaped by indigenous cultures insofar as deeply embedded values invest social situations with meanings that regulate individual attitudes and behaviours. Similarly, Welzel and Inglehart (2009, p. 129) say that different societies are characterised by durable cultural orientations that have major political and economic consequences. Cultural values (which include interpersonal trust, life satisfaction and support for the existing social order) are strongly linked to the number of years that democratic institutions have functioned in a given society. Thus, for instance, a culture of civic engagement is reflected in interest in politics and values of political equality and compromise.

3.5.3 Institutional influences on attitudes towards democracy

An institution is defined as rules and organisations; in this study these rules and organisations are those that influence the supply of democracy in a society (Bratton et al, 2005, p. 39). While Welzel (2009, p. 76) argues that institutional theory assumes that people learn to appreciate democracy only if they have gathered enough experience, through practices of freedoms in institutions, which encourages/prefers inclusive civic freedoms and wide-spread access to basic resources Mattes and Bratton (2007, p. 196) indicate that Africa is

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characterised by generally underdeveloped and informal institutions which are often more pervasive than formal ones (also in Bratton et al, 2005, p. 250). It is therefore suggested that Africans form their opinions beyond the reach and control of formal institutions e.g. by means of social participation and social/family gatherings. Thus, Bratton et al (2005) agrees that the more people are involved in everyday political procedures, the deeper their commitment to democracy (Bratton et al, 2005, p. 40). Active membership in associations is also seen as a gateway to democratic commitment (Mattes and Bratton, 2007). In the Afrobarometer survey, institutional influences on respondents’ attitudes towards democracy are therefore measured by collecting data on respondents’ participation in and identification with politics, their memberships of political parties, religious or recreational groups, and voluntary organisations etc. (Bratton et al, 2005, p. 39). This explanatory dimension for support for democracy is particularly important in my analysis, where I will compare the attitudes of SL i.e. students who are closely involved in political institutions at university level, with the attitudes of students who are not in leadership position (SNL).

3.5.4 Cognitive awareness of democracy

Bratton et al (2005, p. 40) argue that public opinion has a cognitive element and that democracy operates best when people are well informed. A lack of popular awareness about public affairs can constitute an obstacle to democratisation and consolidation. It is here where formal education seems to have its greatest impact on political attitudes (compare chapter two above). Formal education increases a wide range of relevant skills like the ability to read and write, calculate, and how to critically evaluate information such as that provided by mass media. It is also that education increases popular knowledge on a range of relevant topics, and helps to dispel superstition and fatalism, thus boosting the confidence of ordinary people that they can influence an event.

Beyond education, effective citizenship requires cognitive engagement in public affairs. This includes that people demonstrate an interest in politics and engage in discussions of current events and political issues. The extent of cognitive engagement with public affairs is therefore studied in the Afrobarometer. According to Bratton et al (2005), a good citizen is concerned about public affairs and political life, well informed about issues, and engages with fellow citizens in deliberations on public matters (also see Westheimer and Kahne, 2004). In sum, cognitive political awareness refers to the extent to which an individual pays attention to politics and understands what s/he encounters (Bratton et al, 2005, p. 41).

54 3.5.5 Performance evaluations and democracy

Performance evaluations are based on rational choice as people consider existing arrangements as to whether they best serve their interests. According to Bratton et al (2005, p. 42) performance evaluations cover two baskets of public goods. They are: economic goods like jobs, income, assets, consumer products and an array of basic social services; and political goods which include political order, civil liberties, electoral rights, human dignity and equality before the law. It is easier for governments to provide political goods which are immediate, while economic goods are more difficult to provide and typically involve long- terms projects. The Afrobarometer survey encourages respondents to evaluate the performance of government against a range of political and economic goods (Mattes and Bratton, 2007). Bratton et al (2005, p. 49) argue that if average citizens believe that politicians deliver on their campaign promises of peace and prosperity, then regime support increases.

On the one hand, Bratton et al (2005) argue that complete models to explain support for democracy require both economic and political predicators; on the other hand, they find that politics matters more.

For the purpose of my study, I focus deliberately on the political attitudes and behaviours of students in order to understand the support of students for democracy and further democratisation in Tanzania (rather than on economic liberalisation). In the following section I therefore show how the theoretical framework underpinning the Afrobarometer surveys, as outlined and used by Bratton et al (2005) and Mattes and Bratton (2007), has been adapted to this study.