The next writer whose theory recognisably offers a combination of deontological and utilitarian principles is W.D. Ross. Ross was a deontological intuitionist, whose moral theory – mainly presented in The Right and the Good (1930) and Foundations of
Ethics (1939) - specifically includes elements of the two concepts thought to
represent the opposing priorities of utilitarian and non-utilitarian positions, ‘good’ and ‘right’ respectively104. He is a true intuitionist, believing capturing the essence of our
moral impulses to be more important than their systemisation, as, say, Henry Sidgwick would have argued105. Ross rejected both ideal utilitarianism (the doctrine
of G.E. Moore) because it holds that what makes a right act right is purely that it maximises good, and Kantianism universalizability, because it oversimplifies the reality of the moral life, and fails to take into account the salient fact that acts often have more than one motive (not simply the motive of what one thinks one ‘ought’ to do)106. For Ross, ‘common-sense morality’ – the moral perceptions of ordinary,
103 As I have mentioned above, the authors of these theories do actually reference Sidgwick – one of them extensively. These theories are therefore important to where this current works fits in the field of Sidgwick studies. However, as it is the remit of the literature review to assess how and where
Sidgwick has been read, the particular relevance of Sidgwick to these theorists is covered there. Here, the theories are assessed in terms what they offer in comparison to Rational Benevolence 104 See Ross, The Right and the Good (Oxford: Oxford University Press: 1930), and, The Foundations of Ethics (Oxford: Oxford University Press: 1939)
105 See The Right and the Good, p.19; Foundations, p.83 106 The Right and the Good, pp.19-20
thoughtful, educated individuals - is the main source of what he termed ‘the data of ethics’. In basic terms, this ‘data’ is intuitively perceived principles that we consider to be right, or duties in some form. With wonderful directness, Ross points out that we do have these duties, but there are clearly cases in which the circumstances require that a certain duty is broken107. In this way, Ross too – like Hare – deals with
conflicts between moral duties. Using the example of breaking a promise to meet a friend in order to bring relief to victims of an accident, Ross’ presents his innovative view of what is happening morally in this situation. Ross does not concede that we are merely looking to what will secure the best outcome – he maintains focus on the nature of the duties themselves, arguing that they remain duties, but in the case of promise breaking vs distress relieving, we are recognising that in those
circumstance, relieving distress is at that time more of a duty108. On Ross’ view, this
type of duty has a morally significant value, even though it is not a ‘duty proper’; he refers to them as prima facie duties (or ‘conditional duties’)109. That is, they can be
overridden, and they can be overridden on the basis that in particular circumstances, where duties conflict, one duty will reveal itself to be more urgent than another110. In
concluding what right acts are, Ross states, in parallel with my observation about dual reasonableness given at the beginning of this introduction, that every act is prima facie right and prima facie wrong, and the right acts are those which have the greatest balance of prima facie rightness111. Whereas there is no fixed principle that
can tell us how these intuitive duties are to operate/override each other, there are
107 Ibid, p.19
108 Ibid, p.18. Ross thus specifically rejects the idea that what is right is right because it is productive of the most good. But he also rejects Kant’s view that duties admit of no exceptions in favour of ‘imperfect obligations’, such as relieving distress.
109 Ross lists six divisions of duties that are revealed by our common moral convictions – duties of fidelity/reparation, duties of gratitude, duties of justice, duties of beneficence, and duties of self- improvement (The Right and the Good, p.71).
110 Ross states: “When I am in a situation, as perhaps I always am, in which more than one of these prima facie duties is incumbent on me, what I have to do is to study the situation as fully as I can until I form the considered opinion (it is never more) that in the circumstances one of them is more
incumbent than any other; then I am bound to think that to do this prima facie duty is my duty sans phrase in the situation’ (The Right and the Good, p.19). These duties are also duties at different times for different reasons, according to the circumstances (ibid, p.24). Ross argues that they are not actually different from Kant’s absolute duties, that require us to do ‘one particular act in particular circumstances’ (ibid, p.28), and that we know this because in cases where one duty has overridden another (for example, if we have had to break a promise) we still recognise a prima facie duty to keep the promise, and we feel compunction for having not done so. Hare also recognises the role of compunction and remorse at the intuitive level (Moral Thinking, pp. 28-31), but does not afford it nearly so much moral significance as Ross.
four things that are intrinsically good – justice, pleasure, knowledge and virtue - that inform our ‘all things considered’ decisions when deciding on prima facie duties112.
Ross’ prima facie duties presented a pioneering idea. Instead of replicating the sorts of attempts to affix one primary principle to human morality, Ross’s distinct moral philosophy is to allow for both a variety of moral requirements, or obligations,
and the presence of intrinsic goods. In Ross’s system both the right and the good are
the result of independent intuitions: Moral requirements therefore cannot be reduced to some other ultimate, fundamental principle (such as the principle of utility, or testing by the categorical imperative), and nor can goods be found to be second to some ultimate good113. As Antony Skelton pointed out, such a system seems to
escape the insufficiencies of utilitarianism, and the excesses of deontology114.
The Right and the Good is still held up as one of the most important works of
twentieth century moral philosophy, and it accords well with many peoples’
experiences. But it has not gone without criticism. Ross himself predicted the likely objections. He admits that as a moral theory it is unsystematic, although it is not
112 Ibid, p.134
113 Ibid, p.115, p.118; Foundations, p.19, p.180, p.278
114 Antony Skelton, ‘On Henry Sidgwick’s ‘My Station and its Duties’, in, Ethics, Vol.125 (2014) 586- 591.It has since been maintained by many that Ross’s idea of prima facie duties is one of the most important contributions to modern moral philosophy (see C.D. Broad, ‘Critical Notice of W.D. Ross, Foundations of Ethics’, in, Mind, Vol.49 (1940) 228-239 ; A.C. Ewing, Second Thoughts in Moral Philosophy (New York: Macmillan:1959), and Phillip Stratton-Lake (ed.), The Right and the Good (Oxford: Oxford University Press: 2002) p. xxxvii), and that Ross specifically overwrote Sidgwick’s argument against self-evident moral principles in such a way that it did not simply collapse back into utilitarianism (see Lazeri-Radek and Singer, Point of View of the Universe, p. 87), as Sidgwick’s was perceived to have done. It could then possibly be argued that Ross’s system does in fact achieve something very like that which this thesis claims only Sidgwick achieved, which is the uniting of a degree of absolute moral obligation with a natural consideration for outcomes. After all, Ross describes goodness as ‘a salient element in the ground of [the act’s] rightness’ (Right and the Good, p. 47). But the opinion on Ross’s success is by no means unanimous. Lazari-Radek and Singer, for example, argue that whereas Ross’s system overcame problems such as the firm Kantian limitation on lying when a life might be saved as a result of that lie, and did so without simply looking to pure consequences, it could not adequately meet Sidgwick’s challenge that some promises are made, or some truths told or kept erroneously, and as the result of inadequate thought. They draw on W.A Pickard-Cambridge’s critique of Ross, in which Pickard-Cambridge presented a series of promises that had been made in such circumstances. Although Ross responded to each example, Lazeri- Radek and Singer argue that he only showed how much room there was for disagreement, over precisely what these prima facie duties were to be (Point of View of the Universe: pp. 85-87). It is this confusion that is generally thought to considerably weaken Ross’s argument (see Shelley Kagan, The Limits of Morality (Oxford: Clarendon Press: 1989) p.17, specifically Kagan’s argument that Ross should perhaps have used the terminology of ‘pro tanto’, rather than ‘prima facie’). Whereas the general principles (from which Ross derives the prima facie duties) are meant to be self-evident, how we should go about deciding which duty is to be obeyed in which circumstance is not. Reflection, Ross says, is our best chance of acting rightly – but as Lazari-Radek and Singer also point out, Ross does not suggest how we might go about this reflection, and ultimately Ross is thrown back on a heavy reliance on simple intuition, rather than a robust normative or meta-ethic.
claiming to be anything else: It works primarily from self-evidence and intuitionism. But it is in that intuitionism that further weakness lies. Intuitionism was – and is – roundly criticised for almost always failing to provide any actual, solid answers, and for doing little more than telling us what we already know115. The problem in Ross’
system has always been that there is little ground on which Ross can propound these duties as duties, and actually propound them as right116.
Like Ross, Sidgwick also aimed to give some kind of systemisation to a common sense morality, and his theory is of course also comprised of self-evidence and intuitionism. But given Sidgwick’s heavy use of Reason to defend even his intuitionist principles, Ross emerges as more of a pure intuitionist than Sidgwick. This is where I believe Sidgwick’s approach to the two moral properties can hold up where Ross’ may not. Sidgwick’s system specifically demonstrates that both deontological and utilitarian properties are rational, and establishes a logical connection between them on this basis. This rescues Sidgwick’s epistemology from being entirely dependent on intuitionism, and grounds it in something more substantially objective. If we reject Ross’ theory that we do just see these duties, then we must reject Ross altogether. Ross’ system gives a plausible argument for a plurality of duties, but it is still just that – a plurality, of which we are already all too aware117.