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unenforceable as it was not reduced into writing.

2. The Court adopts the RTC’s and CA’s finding that between Esperanza and the respondents, there was a clear intention for a return of the amounts which the respondents spent for the acquisition, transfer and renovation of the subject property. The respondents then reasonably expected to get their money back from Esperanza. Esperanza’s claim that the expenses and payments in her behalf were purely gratuitous remained unsupported by records.

The absence of intention to be reimbursed is negated by the facts of this case. The respondents’

conduct never at any time intimated any intention to donate in favor of Esperanza and Jazer. A donation is a simple act of liberality where a person gives freely of a thing or right in favor of another, who accepts it (Article 725, New Civil Code, as amended). But when a large amount of money is involved, as in this case, this court is constrained to take Esperanza and Jazer’s claim of generosity by the respondents with more than a grain of salt.

Esperanza’s refusal to pay back would likewise result in unjust enrichment, to the clear disadvantage of the respondents. “The main objective of the principle against unjust enrichment is to prevent one from enriching himself at the expense of another without just cause or consideration.”²¹ While Esperanza claims that her brother’s generosity was the consideration for the respondents’

payment of her obligations, this was not sufficiently established, that even the respondents vehemently denied the allegation.

In order to sufficiently substantiate her claim that the money paid by the respondents was actually a donation, Esperanza should have also submitted in court a copy of their written contract evincing such agreement. Article 748 of the New Civil Code (NCC), which applies to donations of money, is explicit on this point as it reads:

Art. 748. The donation of a movable may be made orally or in writing.

An oral donation requires the simultaneous delivery of the thing or of the document representing the right donated.

If the value of the personal property donated exceeds five thousand pesos, the donation and the acceptance shall be made in writing. Otherwise, the donation shall be void.

A donation must comply with the mandatory formal requirements set forth by law for its validity.

When the subject of donation is purchase money, Article 748 of the NCC is applicable. Accordingly, the donation of money as well as its acceptance should be in writing. Otherwise, the donation is invalid for non-compliance with the formal requisites prescribed by law.

Although the Court affirms the trial and appellate courts’ Held that, first, there was no donation in this case and, second, the respondents are entitled to a return of the amounts which they spent for the subject property, it still cannot sustain the respondents’ plea for Esperanza’s full conveyance of the subject property. To impose the property’s transfer to the respondents’ names would totally

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disregard Esperanza’s interest and the payments which she made for the property’s purchase. Thus, the principal amount to be returned to the respondents shall only pertain to the amounts that they actually paid or spent. The Court finds no cogent reason to disturb the trial court’s resolve to require in its Decision dated December 15, 2009, around four years after the sums were paid for the subject property’s acquisition and renovation, the immediate return of the borrowed amounts.

By: GARCIA , NIKKI A.

ELIZA ZUÑIGA-SANTOS,* REPRESENTED BY HER ATTORNEY-IN FACT, NYMPHA Z. SALES, v. MARIA DIVINA GRACIA SANTOS-GRAN** AND REGISTER OF DEEDS OF MARIKINA CITY.

G.R. No. 197380, 08 October 2014 PERLAS-BERNABE, J.

Facts: In 2006, petitioner through her authorized representative, Sales, filed a Complaint for annulment of sale and revocation of title against respondents Gran and the Register of Deeds of Marikina City before the RTC.

In her Complaint, petitioner alleged, among others, that: (a) she was the registered owner of three (3) parcels of land prior to their transfer in the name of private respondent Gran; (b) she has a second husband by the name of , with whom she did not have any children; (c) she was forced to take care of Lamberto’s alleged daughter, Gran, whose birth certificate was forged to make it appear that the latter was petitioner’s daughter; (d) pursuant to void and voidable documents, i.e., a Deed of Sale, Lamberto succeeded in transferring the subject properties in favor of and in the name of Gran;

(e) despite diligent efforts, said Deed of Sale could not be located; and (f) she discovered that the subject properties were transferred to Gran sometime in November 2005. Accordingly, petitioner prayed, inter alia, that Gran surrender to her the subject properties and pay damages, including costs of suit.

For her part, Gran filed a Motion to Dismiss, contending that (a) the action filed by petitioner had prescribed since an action upon a written contract must be brought within ten (10) years from the time the cause of action accrues, or in this case, from the time of registration of the questioned documents before the Registry of Deeds; and (b) the Amended Complaint failed to state a cause of action as the void and voidable documents sought to be nullified were not properly identified nor the substance thereof set forth, thus, precluding the RTC from rendering a valid judgment in accordance with the prayer to surrender the subject properties.

The RTC granted Gran’s motion and dismissed the Amended Complaint for its failure to state a cause of action, considering that the deed of sale sought to be nullified was not attached. It likewise held that the certificates of title covering the subject properties cannot be collaterally attacked and that since the action was based on a written contract, the same had already prescribed under Article 1144 of the Civil Code.

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The CA sustained the dismissal of petitioner’s Amended Complaint but on the ground of insufficiency of factual basis.

It disagreed with the RTC’s finding that the said pleading failed to state a cause of action since it had averred that: (a) petitioner has a right over the subject properties being the registered owner thereof prior to their transfer in the name of Gran; (b) Lamberto succeeded in transferring the subject properties to his daughter, Gran, through void and voidable documents; and (c) the latter’s refusal and failure to surrender to her the subject properties despite demands violated petitioner’s rights over them. The CA likewise ruled that the action has not yet prescribed since an action for nullity of void deeds of conveyance is imprescriptible. Nonetheless, it held that since the Deed of Sale sought to be annulled was not attached to the Amended Complaint, it was impossible for the court to determine whether petitioner’s signature therein was a forgery and thus, would have no basis to order the surrender or reconveyance of the subject properties.

Issue: Whether or not the dismissal of petitioners complaint should be sustained.

Held: The Court finds the Complaint’s dismissal to be in order considering that petitioner’s cause of action had already prescribed.

It is evident that petitioner ultimately seeks for the reconveyance to her of the subject properties through the nullification of their supposed sale to Gran. An action for reconveyance is one that seeks to transfer property, wrongfully registered by another, to its rightful and legal owner.

Having alleged the commission of fraud by Gran in the transfer and registration of the subject properties in her name, there was, in effect, an implied trust created by operation of law pursuant to Article 1456 of the Civil Code which provides:

Art. 1456. If property is acquired through mistake or fraud, the person obtaining it is, by force of law, considered a trustee of an implied trust for the benefit of the person from whom the property comes.

To determine when the prescriptive period commenced in an action for reconveyance, the plaintiff’s possession of the disputed property is material. If there is an actual need to reconvey the property as when the plaintiff is not in possession, the action for reconveyance based on implied trust prescribes in ten (10) years, the reference point being the date of registration of the deed or the issuance of the title. On the other hand, if the real owner of the property remains in possession of the property, the prescriptive period to recover title and possession of the property does not run against him and in such case, the action for reconveyance would be in the nature of a suit for quieting of title which is imprescriptible.

In the case at bar, a reading of the allegations of the Complaint failed to show that petitioner remained in possession of the subject properties in dispute. On the contrary, it can be reasonably deduced that it was Gran who was in possession of the subject properties, there being an admission by the petitioner that the property covered was being used by Gran’s mother-in-law. In fact, petitioner’s relief in the Amended Complaint for the “surrender” of three (3) properties to her bolsters such stance. And since the new titles to the subject properties in the name of Gran were issued by

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the Registry of Deeds of Marikina on the following dates: TCT No. 224174 on July 27, 1992,44 TCT No. N-5500 on January 29, 1976,45 and TCT No. N-4234 on November 26, 1975,46 the filing of the petitioner’s complaint before the RTC on January 9, 2006 was obviously beyond the ten-year prescriptive period, warranting the Complaint’s dismissal all the same.

By: GARCIA , NIKKI A.

EXTRAORDINARY DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION, v. HERMINIA F. SAMSON-BICO AND ELY B. FLESTADOs.

G.R. No. 191090, 13 October 2014 PEREZ, J.

Facts: During his lifetime, Apolonio owned a parcel of land consisting of 29,748 square meters situated at Barangay Pantok, Binangonan, Rizal cover. When Apolonio and Maria died, the property was inherited by Juan and Irenea. When the latter died, the heirs of Juan and Irenea became co-owners of the property.

On 16 April 2002, the heirs of Juan, without the consent of respondents, the heirs of Irenea executed in favor of petitioner EDC a Deed of Absolute Sale⁴ covering the subject property for P2,974,800.00. EDC was able to cause the registration of the Deed of Absolute Sale with the Office of the Provincial Assessor Rizal and transfer the tax declaration over the subject property in its name. This prompted respondents to file the Complaint for Annulment of Contract and Reconveyance of Possession with Damages.

In its Answer, EDC alleged that it is a buyer in good faith and for value of the subject property because it was of the honest belief that the heirs of Juan are the only heirs of the late Apolonio. EDC counterclaimed for damages.On the other hand, the heirs of Juan asserted that respondents were aware of and were parties to the contract to sell entered into by them and EDC.

Issue: Would the sale by a co-owner of a physical portion of an undivided property held in common be valid?

Held: Yes. The fact that the agreement in question purported to sell a concrete portion of the hacienda does not render the sale void, for it is a well-established principle that the binding force of a contract must be recognized as far as it is legally possible to do so. “Quando res non valet ut ago, valeat quantum valere potest.” (When a thing is of no force as I do it, it shall have as much force as it can have.)

Applying this principle to the instant case, there can be no doubt that the transaction entered into by Salome and Soledad could be legally recognized in its entirety since the object of the sale did not even exceed the ideal shares held by the former in the co-ownership. As a matter of fact, the deed of sale executed between the parties expressly stipulated that the portion of Lot 162 sold to Soledad would be taken from Salome’s 4/16 undivided interest in said lot, which the latter could

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validly transfer in whole or in part even without the consent of the other co-owners. Salome’s right to sell part of her undivided interest in the co-owned property is absolute in accordance with the well-settled doctrine that a co-owner has full ownership of his pro-indiviso share and has the right to alienate, assign or mortgage it, and substitute another person in its enjoyment. Since Salome’s clear intention was to sell merely part of her aliquot share in Lot 162, in our view no valid objection can be made against it and the sale can be given effect to the full extent.

We are not unaware of the principle that a co-owner cannot rightfully dispose of a particular portion of a co-owned property prior to partition among all the co-owners. However, this should not signify that the vendee does not acquire anything at all in case a physically segregated area of the co-owned lot is in fact sold to him. Since the co-owner/vendor’s undivided interest could properly be the object of the contract of sale between the parties, what the vendee obtains by virtue of such a sale are the same rights as the vendor had as co-owner, in an ideal share equivalent to the consideration given under their transaction. In other words, the vendee steps into the shoes of the vendor as co-owner and acquires a proportionate abstract share in the property held in common.

By: RESMA, JOSE CRIS G.

SPOUSES DOMINADOR MARCOS AND GLORIA MARCOS, Petitioners, v. HEIRS OF ISIDRO BANGI AND GENOVEVA DICCION, REPRESENTED BY NOLITO SABIANOs.

G.R. No. 185745, 15 October 2014 REYES, J.

Facts: On June 26, 1998, respondents, filed with the RTC a complaint, for annulment of documents, cancellation of transfer certificates of titles, restoration of original certificate of title and recovery of ownership plus damages against spouses Dominador Marcos (Dominador) and Gloria Marcos (Gloria) petitioners.

In their complaint, the respondents averred that on November 5, 1943, their parents, Isidro and Genoveva, bought the one-third portion of a 2,138-square meter parcel of land situated in San Manuel, Pangasinan and) from Eusebio Bangi (Eusebio), as evidenced by a Deed of Absolute Sale executed by the latter. After the sale, the respondents claimed that Isidro and Genoveva took possession of the subject property until they passed away. Further, the respondents alleged that sometime in 1998, they learned that the title to the subject property, including the portion sold to Isidro and Genoveva, was transferred to herein petitioner.Thus, the respondents sought the nullification of the Deeds of Absolute Sale.

In their answer, herein petitioners, together with the spouses Jose and Pacita, Ceasaria and the spouses Emilio and Zenaida, denied the allegations of the respondents, claiming that they are the owners of the subject property, including the one-third portion thereof allegedly sold by Eusebio to the respondents’ parents Isidro and Genoveva. They averred that the subject property was originally owned by Alipio; that after his death, his children – Eusebio, Espedita and Jose Bangi – inherited the

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same. That on May 8, 1995, Espedita and Jose Bangi executed a deed of extrajudicial partition with quitclaim wherein they waived their rights over the subject property in favor of Eusebio’s children –

Ceasaria, Zenaida, Pacita and herein petitioner Gloria.

Issue: Whether the CA committed reversible error in affirming the RTC Decision which upheld the Deed of Absolute Sale dated November 5, 1943 over the one-third portion of the subject property executed by Eusebio in favor of the spouses Isidro and Genoveva?

Held: No. The evidence presented by the parties indubitably show that, after the death of Alipio, his heirs – Eusebio, Espedita and Jose Bangi – had orally partitioned his estate, including the subject property, which was assigned to Eusebio. On this score, the CA’s disquisition is instructive, viz:

Even so, We are of the considered view that in 1943, when Eusebio Bangi executed the deed of sale in favor of Isidro Bangi, Eusebio already had acquired interest in the property covered by OCT No. 22361 through succession from his father, Alipio Bangi, who died in 1918. Further, it appears that such interest extends to the entire property embraced by OCT No. 22361. This much can be gleaned from the testimony of appellant Gloria Marcos herself, who said that her father Eusebio owned the entire lot because his siblings Espedita and Jose already had their share from other properties.

That there was no written memorandum of the partition among Alipio Bangi’s heirs cannot detract from appellee’s cause. It has been ruled that oral partition is effective when the parties have consummated it by the taking of possession in severalty and the exercise of ownership of the respective portions set off to each. Here, it is obvious that Eusebio took possession of his share and exercised ownership over it. Thus, the preponderant evidence points to the validity of the sale executed between Eusebio Bangi and Isidro Bangi on November 5, 1943 over the one-third portion of the property covered by OCT No. 22361.

The foregoing circumstances cast doubt as to the petitioners’ insinuation that the estate of Alipio had only been partitioned in 1995, when Espedita and Jose Bangi executed the said Deed of Extrajudicial Partition with Quitclaim. As pointed out by the CA, the execution of the Deed of Extrajudicial Partition with Quitclaim is but a ruse to defeat the rights of the respondents over the one-third portion of the subject property. If at all, the Deed of Extrajudicial Partition with Quitclaim executed by Espedita and Jose Bangi merely confirms the partition of Alipio’s estate that was earlier had, albeit orally, in which the subject property was assigned to Eusebio.

Accordingly, considering that Eusebio already owned the subject property at the time he sold the one-third portion thereof to the spouses Isidro and Genoveva on November 5, 1943, having been assigned the same pursuant to the oral partition of the estate of Alipio effected by his heirs, the lower

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