AUMENTADA La chica de la derecha insiste en ir al

In site of arguments against it, I suspect that many if not most people will continue to believe that the human capacity for language, learning and culture so exceeds that of any other animal, that it is even obvious that we are special, at least in the descriptive sense. Even such a courageous defender of Darwin as Thomas Huxley played down the similarity between us and ‘the brutes’ saying, “…no one is more convinced than I am of the gulf between civilized man and the brutes.” (in Singer 1994/97, p 172)

No matter to what extent we share an almost identical genome with chimpanzees (closer than a horse and a donkey, and consider that they can cross breed!), the difference between their life and minds, and ours, appears vast. Yet there is research which shows them, at least with receptive language and sometimes with expressive language, demonstrating a very high degree of sophistication in understanding and/or communicating. I have heard that with sign language they have shown the ability to use it creatively by constructing from words they knew, some new concept or idea – for example by putting together the signs for water and bird – “waterbird” on an

25

A former editor of New Scientist magazine believes (though concedes he can’t prove it) that

even cockroaches and bees are conscious! (Alun Anderson in What We Believe but Cannot

42 occasion when a duck came into view. I believe that if they had the larynx, if they

could speak, they would, and I bet we could understand them too.26 There is so much that unites the myriad organisms of the earth. I believe we have enough in common to interpret the language of others no matter how different it may be from our own. Our senses and our needs are so similar; how could our consciousness be so different?

Darwin’s minimal principle, at least when thinking of our close mammalian relatives, is entirely convincing. The human brain has many similarities to brains of other mammals. Especially noteworthy, we mammals all have the ‘limbic system,’ which is the seat of emotions. (Lewis et al. p 40ff) All mammals almost certainly have

feelings, even if they don’t have ‘elevated’ or conceptual thoughts. The capacity to

feel is a principle reason that we are not special in any normative sense – the capacity to suffer and to feel satisfaction trumps special status or privileges of any one species.

Darwin’s principle of ‘degree-not-kind’ does not rule out large differences, but when it comes to our primate cousins, and especially our simian ‘brothers,’ I support views espoused by Peter Singer (e.g. in 1994/97, pp 159-63) that thinking of them as persons

is not at all far fetched. I do not mean to imply that ‘personhood’ bestows any special rights, privileges or status on any of us – rather my suggestion is that we are family – kin. If anyone has had eye contact with an ape, they will not doubt how close we are.27 If any one ape is special, all apes are!

It was a huge challenge to the traditional religious view that we are somehow related to apes. In the “Great Debate” that took place at a meeting of the British Association for the Advancement of Science in 1860, shortly after Darwin’s Origin of the Species

was published, a notable cleric by the name of Bishop Samuel Wilberforce took Darwin’s champion, T.H. Huxley, to task.28 After an eloquent but scathing attack on the perniciousness of the whole evolutionary idea, the Bishop turned to Huxley:

He enquired of Mr Huxley if he was descended from monkeys on his father’s side, his mother’s side, or both!? Hearing this, Huxley whispered to a companion: “The lord hath delivered him into mine hands.” To

26 _{Unlike Wittgenstein’s famous lion.}

27

I have had prolonged eye contact with an orang- utan in the Melbourne Zoo, and I can tell

you, without any doubt or hesitation whatever, there was apersonthere.

28

Wilberforce, he shot back, “I would rather be the offspring of two apes than to be a man and afraid to face the truth.” (in Rachels 1990, p 48)

It is odd how totally resistant to the close relationship with primates and especially

apes the traditional Christian view was and is. That view seems more shocked by the primate connection than if you’d said we were related to frogs! Perhaps this is because of the unmistakable and thus uneasy similarity. And, after all, apes are often perceived as ‘ugly.’ (Frogs meanwhile, are ‘exotic’) Plus, of course, it was lack of first hand knowledge or direct contact. Like much prejudice, it was largely based on ignorance. Bishop Wilberforce failed to distinguish monkeys from apes, almost willing himself to ignore the presence or absence of a tail, which obviously makes an ape so much more conspicuously like human beings. If a creature has a tail, it is obviously not like us.29. Primatologists can provide a long list of our similarities with apes. Jared Diamond in his 1991/2002 book, The Third Chimpanzee argues that the two types of chimpanzee should be included in our genus, Homo. Or perhaps we should be included in theirs, Pan! Genetically there is a strong argument for this.30

However, no matter how much apes are like us, and despite a 95–98% identity of our DNA with chimpanzees, we are still, arguably, very different. But then chihuahuas and great danes are extremely different, and they are even the same species! Nevertheless, some would argue, the difference between us and (other) apes is much more than appearances. Is it? And does this lead to a justified belief that human beings are completely separate and apart from our ape cousins?

As I see it, there are two main issues in understanding the apparent gulf between us and our closest biological kin. One is historical and the other I will call bio- philosophical. I will deal first with the historical issue, which is a very straightforward one. Then I will employ evolutionary reasoning, bio-philosophical reasoning, to explore and explain one possible ‘scenario’ for one difference with our close cousins.

29

… ignoring our ‘tailbone’ – a vestigial leftover.

30 _{Apparently the two species of gibbons, as well as some bird species we would be hard}

pressed to tell apart, are more genetically distant and diverged longer ago than humans and chimps. Diamond says, “On this basis, then, humans do not constitute a distinct family, nor even a distinct genus, but belong in the same genus as common and pygmy chimps.” (1991/2002, p 21)

44