La ausencia de IF3-NTD en diversos intermedios de la iniciación de la

The collapse of the Soviet Union resulted in the replacement of a centrally-planned economy based on socialist principles to a free market economy based on capitalist tenets, a system unfamiliar to the vast majority of Georgians (Gachechiladze, 2014). A deep recession occurred during transition which caused a dramatic decline in living standards (Scott, 2007; Shelley, 2007b). The transition had a devastating impact on Georgia:

[T]he anarchic disintegration of the USSR wrecked the [Georgian] economy, wiping out savings and pensions with inflation, closing factories, leaving farmland fallow; social cohesion disappeared, as the forces of law and order withdrew (Rayfield, 2012: 379).

In the Soviet era, well over 90% of Georgia’s trade was with other Soviet Republics, and primarily with Russia (T. de Waal, 2010). Due to the lack of trade elsewhere, economic collapse occurred once railways and borders began to shut in 1990 as the USSR collapsed (T. de Waal, 2010). Georgia descended from being one of the most prosperous regions in

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the USSR into dire poverty (T. de Waal, 2010; Machavariani, 2007). One of the only industries to thrive in the postsocialist era has been the beer industry. Georgian beer producers, such as the Kazbegi company, have aggressively carved out a dominant market share for its products which are produced in Georgia (Manning & Uplisashvili, 2007).

The Georgian Kupon was introduced in April 1993 to replace the Russian Ruble. Initially, they were circulated at par with the Ruble and the US dollar, but hyperinflation soon devalued the Kupon at an alarming rate (Gachechiladze, 2014). In September 1994, the unofficial exchange rate peaked at five million Kupon to one USD (Wang, 1999). Salaries, if paid, were critically small; government employees could expect to be paid approximately three USD per month which was insufficient to buy any goods or services. Georgian GDP plunged by 73% between 1991 and 1994 (T. de Waal, 2010). South Ossetia was impoverished and economically isolated during this period, with the economy entirely based on agriculture and smuggled goods (T. de Waal, 2010). The Kupon was replaced by the Lari in 1995, which was more successful at retaining its value.

The immediate post-Soviet economy in Georgia was plagued by widespread corruption, increasing poverty, and en-masse non-payment of taxes (Glinkina & Rosenberg, 2003; Pelkmans, 2006). Pervasive organised crime and corruption deterred foreign investment (Shelley, 2007a).The police force, which was tasked with protecting the political system rather than the populace in the Soviet era, was complicit in organized crime to such an extent that it was difficult to distinguish between policy, paramilitary groups, and criminals groups, the latter of which flourished as any semblance of law and order dissipated (Glinkina & Rosenberg, 2003; Kupatadze, Siradze, & Mitagvaria, 2007). It is estimated that between 30% and 90% of economic activity in Georgia during the period of transition occurred in the ‘shadow sphere’ consisting of informal, illegal, or criminal interactions, involving ‘shady’ entrepreneurship, racketeering, smuggling (most notably drugs and alcohol), illegal trade (such as arms trading), and other such activities (Chatwin, 1997; Gachechiladze, 2014; Glinkina & Rosenberg, 2003). The power vacuum allowed criminal gangs to infiltrate Georgia’s governing structures (Ramishvili & Chergoleishvili, 2014; Shelley, 2007b). A large proportion of the working population was pushed out of the formal economy (due to increasing unemployment, low, delayed, or non-payment of wages) into the informal economy, leading to reduced tax revenues and the deterioration

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of state services. Business development was at a standstill, with corrupt of civil servants identified as a major impediment (Machavariani, 2007). Due to the unavailability of a social safety net, citizens turned to extended family networks for social protection and support (Scott, 2007).

The transition had severe economic consequences for women in particular. In most post- Soviet states, unemployment rates increased more rapidly among women than men (Attwood, 1997; Bruno, 1997; Clements, 1994; Dudwick, 1997; Fuszara, 2000; Kay, 1997; Marody & Giza-Poleszczuk, 2000; Pavlychko, 1997; Tohidi, 2004; Werner, 2004), although trends differed by area to some extent (Buckley, 1997; Kovacs & Varadi, 2000; White, 1997) with men hit harder in some areas (Crate, 2004; Kiblitskaya, 2000a; Szalai, 2000). The rescinding of social programs like subsidized day-care may have further discouraged women with children from actively seeking employment (Bruno, 1997; Dudwick, 1997; Werner, 2004; White, 1997).

The widespread lack of employment led large numbers of Georgians to permanently or temporarily move abroad to work and improve their economic situation (Broers, 2008; Migration Policy Centre Team, 2013), a trend also observed in other post-Soviet states (Hartman, 2007). Exact figures of Georgians abroad vary widely from 198,904 registered migrants (Migration Policy Centre Team, 2013) to 1.5 million (Caucasus Research Resource Centres, 2007) (the latter estimate includes undocumented migrants). It is estimated that Georgia’s population decreased by a fifth in the years following the collapse of the Soviet Union (Rukhadze, 2013; Scott, 2007). A 2010 estimate quotes remittances sent from abroad to amounting to 24% of the Georgian GDP (Ferry, 2013). Migration has been strongly gendered, with Georgian women making up slightly over half of migrants outside the CIS (with Turkey a popular destination), yet only 36% of migrants in the CIS (Migration Policy Centre Team, 2013). Many of Georgia’s most distinguished cultural figures were among those who left to work and study abroad, representing a blow to the national pride (Scott, 2007). Minority groups also figured prominently in those who left Georgia, as large groups of Armenians, Azeris, Greeks, and Jews emigrated to their kin states (Sordia, 2009). While minority groups composed 28 percent of the population of Georgia in 1989, this dropped to 16 percent by 2002 (Sordia, 2009).

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Agricultural work underwent radical transition with the collapse of the USSR. The fate of large collective farms established during the Soviet era came into question in the late 1980s. A strong push toward private farming emerged, with the reorganisation and liquidation of former collective farms. As part of the reorganization, former collective farm workers were given the option of buying shares in farms. For many, this option was viewed as risky and few bought in. Rather, rural Georgian families started to increasingly depend on their private garden allotments to provide food for the family, selling the excess at a profit (European Union, 2013). A 2012 estimate states that approximately half a million farmers became self-employed as a result of the land privatisation process of the 1990s, 95% of which are classified as ‘small farmers’ with approximately 1.2 hectares and 2 cows per family (European Union, 2013). The low income yielded by rural agricultural families is sometimes supplemented by remittances sent by family members working abroad (European Union, 2013).

A reliance on small-scale subsistence agriculture has been noted in other post-Soviet states during transition; fully two-thirds of Russia’s potatoes and a third of its meat and vegetables came from such allotments in the last three years of the USSR (Bridger, 1997). Rural women in particular took on the task of growing food for the family, as they had long been responsible for growing produce in allotments (see section 4.2.2) and tending to livestock during the Soviet era (Bridger, 1997). The overt reliance on such allotments has been referred to a ‘cows-and-kin’ system of household production (Crate, 2004).

4.3.3.1 Cows-and-kin

Crate (2004) argues that households in post-Soviet areas have transitioned from dependence on socialist infrastructure (such as state farms) for employment and goods to a dependence on a household production system called ‘cows –and-kin.’ This system is characterized by families investing in domestic animals, such as cows and chickens, and sharing the labour and foodstuffs such as meat and milk. Within the cows-and-kin framework some households produce goods in excess to their needs, in order to sell products in local markets and bazars (Crate, 2004). Traditional specialty foods are also produced in excess, such as foods associated with certain holidays or festivals. Profit is generally shared among extended family members.

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Crate (2004) notes that the turn toward subsistence agriculture represented a common survival strategy across the post-Soviet states, in the wake of the dissolution of the USSR. She observed that rural households in Sahka Republic (a district in eastern Russia) previously employed by state farms now grow vegetables, keep cows and other domestic animals, forage, hunt, and fish to provide their own food needs. A reliance on subsistence farming has been noted in rural locations in other post-Soviet states such as Armenia (Dudwick, 1997).