Western theories of trade unions
In the West, the trade union is ‘a continuous association of wage-earners for the purpose of maintaining or improving the conditions of their employment’.137
The Webbs concluded, in an inductive approach, that Western trade unions, in maintaining and improving their members’ interests, rely on two approaches, namely the Device of Common Rule, and the Device of Restriction of Numbers.138
The device of the Common Rule of setting the minimum level of the working conditions that is applicable to all its members has been the core principle in contemporary trade unionism.139
The Webbs also defined three main methods used by trade unions to attain the regulation of the common rule, the Method of Mutual Insurance, the Method of Collective Bargaining, and the Method of Legal Enactment. In the essay Trade
Unions and Politics, Flanders elaborated two similar conceptions of the industrial
method and the political method, as the two principal methods. The idea of the political method is similar to that in Industrial Democracy, both referring to unions’ participation in legislation, the formation of political machinery and in some cases working through the Labour Party. The tripartite negotiation involving government participation can also be classified in this category. Union’s political action can provide the union with the means of access to decision-making by providing legal assurance of the union’s status, especially its industrial role of collective bargaining with management.140
137 Webb, S. and Webb, B. (1894), the History of Trade Unionism, p. 1, London: Longmans. 138 Webb, S. and Webb, B. (1902), Industrial Democracy: new edition in two volumes bound
in one, p. 560, London: Longmans.
139 Webb, S. and Webb, B. (1902), Industrial Democracy: new edition in two volumes bound
in one, p. 715-716, London: Longmans.
140 Flanders, A. (1961), ‘Trade unions and politics -an evening talk to the TUC officers’, in
Management and Unions: The Theory and Reform of Industrial Relations (1970), London: Faber and Faber.
Trade unions in the general sense elaborated above should be separated from the communist unions owing to their different function. In the Leninist ‘transmission belt’ conception, the trade union is a two-way channel between the state and the masses. This conception explicitly reflects its difference in function from the western counterparts. The comparisons between the Western and the Communist trade unions deserve caution with regard to the fundamental components.
Firstly the western unions exist as the representative of particular interest groups in a society of divergent interests. But in China, the labour relations between the workers and managers at the workplace have been inherited from the socialism of the command economy, ‘on the assumption that socialist interest consensus already exists’. This assumption of unitary interests in labour relations was the basis for the introduction of trade unionism in contrast with a pluralist regulatory framework of labour relations from the West. Secondly, when the unions in capitalist countries operate as interface between the managers and workers, the state is a minor actor in this relationship; their communist counterparts, as inferred from their dualist nature, have to mainly deal with the relations between the state and the workers. And this dualist-function was underpinned by the state corporatist approaches. Thirdly, although some functions of the two sorts of trade unions have the same names, they may be the same in name only. The ultimate goal of the western idea of a union differs from the unitarist views in the communist states; whereas the western unions seek to maximise their members’ interests by whatever means, the communist unions have to attempt to create a balance between their dualist roles while prioritising the state’s interests. As globalisation imposes more pressures on workers and their organisations in the developing states, the state-led trade union in China is certain to be further restrained in its representative function, with the associated negative economic implications.
Bearing this in mind, a comparison between the capitalist and communist unions is of necessity for two main reasons. Firstly, despite the fact that the mobilisation role for the sake of the state in practice outweighs the protector role for the sake of their members, the latter is an integral part of the communist union’s dualist functions. It is
of significance in comparing the protection and welfare functions of the communist union and of the capitalist unions. Secondly, bias in the dualist function is commonly intertwined with the external and internal factors of the communist trade unions. Variations in the dualist functioning of unionism are introduced by differences in enterprise, sector, and state. The evident strains of the dualist functions reflect the changes in the macro economic and political environments in which the trade unions operate the functions.141
‘Classic Dualist’ trade unions in China
As the first person who conceptualised the communist trade union as a ‘transmission belt’ between the state and the workers, Lenin saw the need for a union to defend workers’ interests by maintaining the two functions: the mobilisation of labour and the protection of member’s rights. Coming under the Stalin’s dominance, the function of the trade unions had ‘an almost wholly production and labor mobilization orientation’. This new orthodoxy, named as ‘Classic Dualism’, was contextualised in the state socialism of the command economy, ‘on the assumption that socialist interest consensus already exists’. The party-union relationship is one of total organisational domination rather than the party’s political leadership over the union. 142
The book Trade Unions in Communist States, edited by Pravda and Ruble, provides an outstanding contribution to the understanding of communist trade unions. It examines the role of trade unions in eight communist states. The Introduction Chapter conceptualises the Leninist model of trade unionism as classic dualism with analysis of the union’s organisational structure, relations with the party, the management, the workers, and policies as well as of the barriers to performing the dualist function. And it argues that there are political and economic barriers preventing these trade unions making a fundamental departure from this model, given the absence of the ‘general
141 Pravda, Pravda, A. and Ruble, B. A. (1986), ‘Communist Trade Unions: Varieties of
Dualism’, p. ix-x,15, in Pravda, A. and Ruble, B. A. (eds.), (1986), Trade Union in Communist States, London: Allen & Unwin Press.
142 Pravda, A. and Ruble, B. A. (1986), ‘Communist Trade Unions: Varieties of Dualism’, p.
2, 4, in Pravda, A. and Ruble, B. A. (eds.), (1986), Trade Union in Communist States, London: Allen & Unwin Press.
systemic crises’ such as the radical upheaval in Hungary in 1956 and in Poland in 1956 and 1980-1981.143
An earlier study by Harper examined the Chinese trade union’s three crises - in 1951, in 1957 and in the Cultural Revolution. Harper contended their function as a transmission belt places the union officials in the same dilemma, because when they try to support the workers, the party may seek to halt the union’s transmission belt operation between the party and workers, as happened in the three crises.144
Similarly, Zhang reviewed five severe conflicts between the union and the state, concluding that ‘at these crucial points, the trade union is consciously inclined to represent the workers.’145
In Chan’s arguments, the party state granted the ACFTU a certain degree of power after the economic reform to protect workers’ rights from being violated by the party-state itself. The trade union can play an important ‘revolutionary’ role against the state in the state corporatist model.146
Jiang witnessed the tensions between the union and the party during the process of trade union reforms in the fifteen years since the implementation of the economic reform. 147
Focusing on the economic aspects, he argued that the pressure from the workers and the union’s own self- interest is the motivation for the union to confront the authoritarian political structure. But Jiang also admitted the unlikelihood of fundamental reform of the trade union in the near future unless industrial disputes increase or the leadership of the party-state splits.
These researches have probed into the interactions between the trade union and the Party, the strain in the union’s dualist functions, the dynamic external environments
143 Pravda, A. and Ruble, B. A. (1986), ‘Communist Trade Unions: Varieties of Dualism’, p.
10, in Pravda, A. and Ruble, B. A. (eds.), (1986), Trade Union in Communist States, London: Allen & Unwin Press.
144 Harper, P. (1968), ‘The Party and the Unions in Communist China’, p. 119, in The China
Quarterly, No. 37 (Jan. – Mar. 1969), pp. 84-119.
145 Zhang, Y. M. (2003), ‘Labour Movements in the time of Reform in China’, in Twenty-
First Century, (Apr. 2003) No.76, online,
http://www.cuhk.edu.hk/ics/21c/issue/articles/076_0210017.pdf, (Accessed 14/01/22). In Chinese.
146 Chan, A. (1993), ‘Revolution or Corporatism? Workers and Trade Unions in Post-Mao
China’, in The Australian Journal of Chinese Affairs, 29, pp. 31-61.
147 Jiang, K. W. (1996), ‘The Conflict between Trade Unions and the Party-State –the Reform
of Chinese Trade Unions in the Eighties’, in Hong Kong Journal of Social Sciences, No. 8, Autumn 1996, pp. 121-158. In Chinese.
and the union’s potential to confront the party. Other scholars stressed the constrained factors of the party’s supreme authority in the ‘Classic Dualist’ model. They drew particular attention to the union’s structural constraints.
Clarke analysed contradictions of dualist functioning unions in the post-socialist transition. He argued that trade unions in both Russia and China had retained their traditional dualist functions in the transformed industrial relations, owing to the ‘severe structural constraints to which they are subject’.148
He outlined the key principles of trade unionism in a socialist market economy. The trade unions are still supposed to represent the interests of the enterprise as a whole, under the assumption of ‘non-adversarial industrial relations’. The emerging pluralist interests in these societies place the unions in a dilemma. To secure their status and role, the unions have to be effective in representing the members, but if they do this, they will risk undermining their underlying legitimacy from the administration.
Some scholars have a sceptical attitude towards the adaptation of Classic Dualism to the Chinese trade unions. They contend the constraints are decisively influential on the trade union’s autonomy, rendering its passivity of acting as a government instrument. Interestingly, such an argument is advocated by a number of union academics and officials.149
‘Is the ACFTU a Union’ is the title of the article by Taylor and Li, in which the answer is the ACFTU does not have the essence of a trade union. From three tests of unionism, standardised by Western norms, they argue that, firstly its constitutional role is defined as both to protect workers and to protect the national interest. But when the national interest involves the development of capitalism and the promotion of employer interests, the Chinese trade union normally does not hesitate to give up its worker protection role. Secondly, the trade union can hardly be seen as a
148 Clarke, S. (2005), ‘Post-socialist trade unions: China and Russia’, p. 4, in Industrial
Relations Journal, 36(1), pp. 2-18.
149 Chen, B. Q. (1996), Reform and Construction of the Chinese Trade Unions (1984-1993) ,
Beijing: Chinese Workers Press; Chen, J. (1999), The Trade Unions in Reforms and the Reforms of the Trade Unions, Beijing: Chinese Workers Press; Wen, X. Y. (2012), Corporatism without Workers Participation – Analysis on Trade Union Operation in Transition, PhD Thesis, Renmin University. All in Chinese.
representative of workers because there is no effective electoral system for union office holders. Thirdly, workers lack independence in unionisation, because the fact that the Chinese trade union is the only legal union that is permitted, denies any legitimacy in claiming independence. Unions are organised as part of the state structure, while their judicial, executive and administrative functions are monopolized by the party.150
In similar tones, Xu and Wu disapproved of the use of Classic Dualism in that the Chinese union was not a workers’ organisation in essence. The leverage of the union confronting the state in union-party crises does not arise from associational power stemming from workers.151
You reviewed the reform programmes of the trade union since its establishment. He argued that the union had no intention either to touch its fundamental relations with the Party, or to face its internal democratisation. Instead it would attempt to reinforce its organisational capability in dealing with complex labour relations. The West mistakenly viewed an emphasis on the union’s representative function, that stems from the Party’s initiations and demands, as the trade union’s own. This exaggerated the different interests between the trade union and the Party.152
Scholars found that the recent union reforms are characterised by ‘high politisation’, ‘more activity out of the enterprise’ and ‘socialisation’.153
Chen articulated that the union has been embedded into the layers of government, while its bureaucracy’s power and its operation are critically reliant upon their formal government status. The union’s protection functions are consequently constrained because ‘their governmental status prevents them from operating through the
150 Taylor, B. and Li, Q. (2007), ‘Is the ACFTU a Union and Does it Matter?’, in Journal of
Industrial Relations, 49(5), pp. 701-715.
151 Xu, X. J. and Wu, Q. J. (2011), ‘An Academic Differentiation and Analysis on the Chinese
Trade Union’s Nature Characteristics and Core Function – an perspective based on the trade union’s social activities in the state institutional framework’ in The Journal of Humanity, 2011(5) pp. 165-172. In Chinese.
152 You, Z. L. (2010), ‘Three Major Reforms of Chinese Trade Union from 1960s’, in
Sociological Studies, 2010(4), pp. 76-105. In Chinese.
153 Xu, X. J. and Wu, Q. J. (2011), ‘An Academic Differentiation and Analysis on the Chinese
Trade Union’s Nature Characteristics and Core Function – an perspective based on the trade union’s social activities in the state institutional framework’, in The Journal of Humanity, 2011(5) pp. 165-172; China Labour Bulletin (2009), Protecting Workers’ Rights or Serving the Party: The way forward for China’s trade unions, p.18
http://www.clb.org.hk/en/files/share/File/research_reports/acftu_report.pdf (assessed 14/08/18). Both in Chinese.
mobilising of grassroots or exerting their influence by empowering their grassroots branches.’154
In the further study that analyses different patterns of the union’s role, Chen points out that the main explanation for it manifesting diversity is the incompatibility between its ‘double institutional identities’. He sets apart the mediating role played by the union in collective action from two other roles, a mitigating role – the union’s representation in legal contention - and a more intrusive role – the union’s pre-empting of independent organising.155
Three indications of Chinese union’s distinctiveness can be drawn from the academic literature. Firstly, relations between the union and the party-state are of prime importance in analysing different aspects of the trade union. Secondly, the trade unions are ideologically and institutionally intricately intertwined with state- government bureaucracies. Thirdly, the transformation of industrial relations will contribute to fundamental changes of Chinese unions. Scholars study the ‘Classic Dualist’ trade union in China from different perspectives and approaches. Disagreements reveal different perspectives and emphases on contemporary Chinese trade unions. Most Chinese scholars stressed the factual evidence of the conspicuous influence of the party-state over the trade union, while most western colleagues, though acknowledging the party’s supreme authority, emphasise particularly the union’s potential to confront the party.