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The internal debate between sanctioning China or engaging with it which

confronted the Parliament and the Commission fell within the EU’s internal

debate over a more strategic projection toward the whole Asian continent which

began in the early 1990s. Once again the discussion was led by only some

member states, in particular Germany and France.23 These countries were also

supported by the Trade Commissioner, Leon Brittan. The growing interest in

Asia was eventually translated into the EU’s publication of its first Asia Policy

titled Towards a New Asia Policy, which was endorsed by the Council meeting

in Essen.

22

Interview 7. 23

In that same year Germany published its first Asien Konzept, which will be discussed in Chapter 5.

Accordingly, notwithstanding the tension between the Commission and the

Parliament over the best way to deal with China, the Commission, instructed by

the Council, began to propose building a more coherent political framework in

its relations with the PRC, which could somehow synthesise the different

approaches and interests. This new orientation was formalised in 1994 with the

creation of a framework for institutional and political exchanges and the

publication of the first Commission’s Communication on China titled A Long

Term Policy for China-European Relations, which was adopted by the

Council’s Conclusions of the same year and has since remained the reference

policy paper for the subsequent Communications.

The Communication occurred in the year of the tenth anniversary of the

signing of the first Trade and Cooperation Agreement between the EU and

China and it coincided with the 20th anniversary of the establishment of formal

diplomatic relations. The Communication recognised that “China’s rise was

unmatched among national experiences since the Second World War”. Hence

the need for Europe to “develop a long-term relationship with China” based on a

“constructive engagement” and a “result-oriented approach”, which would

“encourage China to become fully integrated in the international community”,

“contribute to reform inside China” and “intensify ties [mostly in the business

sectors] between the European Union and China”.

Several authors have underlined that the 1995 Communication was mostly

centred on the prioritisation of commercial relations and the development of

“business-to-business links”.24 Such dimensions in the Communication appear

natural considering the developments occurred in the early 1990s. In that period,

24

following easing of the Tiananmen sanctions, Shambaugh noted that

“commerce has taken priority in Europe’s relations with the PRC”.25

In the Commission Communication China was represented as a growing

powerhouse, manufacturing enormous amounts of goods, becoming an

important base for investments and offering opportunities to European

businesses. Portraying China as an opportunity that European companies were

losing both in terms of exports and investments led to a tougher and more

narrowly-focused European approach.

As Brittan emphatically stated when presenting the Commission Paper “the

aim of the new policy is to give European industry more access to the Chinese

economy and to nudge Beijing along on its political reforms through public

pressure, formal private discussions and practical cooperation”.26 He then went

on to say “I am convinced that it is in Europe’s vital interest to steer China into

the world economic and political mainstream away from isolation”.27

The prioritisation of commercial issues also represented the accomplishment

of the Commission’s strategy to emphasise the economic dimension of China’s

growth and relegate its domestic political development. The Communication

suggested that the integration of China within the international economic system

would lock its reform process, making it irreversible. Similarly, the PRC’s

opening to external influences could give rise to a dynamic and reformist

middle class, thus improving respect for human rights.

Besides the economic dimension, the Communication should also be

considered for its strategic scope as for the first time it attempted to establish a

wide framework for Europe’s China relations. Several authors have underlined

25

David Shambaugh, China and Europe, 1949-1995, p. 15. 26

Leon Brittan, ‘Europe, China and East Asia: Growing Closer through Trade’, International Herald Tribune, 28 February 1994.

27 Ibid.

the broadening of EU-China relations in concurrence with the 1995

Commission Communication. 28 Since 1995 several topics, spanning

international terrorism and arms non-proliferation, UN architecture and so forth,

have entered the EU agenda. These issues were also discussed and to some

extent institutionalised in several technical dialogues.

However, only little improvement occurred in these new areas, with most of

the meetings concluding with great rhetorical emphasis but producing little

concrete progress.29 For these reasons it is possible to argue that the EU has

remained a distant neighbour for China on broadly-defined strategic and

security matters. The lack of an EU military presence in the Asian region and its

several divisions in multilateral regimes has further hindered such

developments. For example the security dimension has remained mostly

bilateral and national in nature and only those member states which have

significant stakes and capabilities in the security field have achieved meaningful

bilateral relations with China on these issues.