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As we have seen, Indian theorists of reflection raised several possibilities regarding the ontological status of a reflected image (pratibimba). The following possibilities have been suggested:

2. The reflected image is a property of the reflecting substance (Śaṅkara’s anonymous opponent).

3. The reflected image is a property of a new entity born from the contact between the prototype and the reflecting substance (the Buddhist opponent mentioned in the YD). 4. The reflected image is not real, and thus is not a property of anything (Śaṅkara,

Prabhākara, yuktidīpikakāra).

The paradoxical nature of reflected image is found in the fact that the properties that appear in the mirror (the features of my face) really belong to the prototype but illusorily appear to be found somewhere else. What is the ontological status of a real property illusorily appearing where it is not?

The full account of the ontology of reflection must necessarily involve real and illusory components. We must distinguish between the real properties of the prototype and the illusory properties of the reflected image. The latter are illusory not because they are non-existent. A non- existent entity such as the hare’s horn is different ontologically from the perceived illusion of my face in the mirror. Illusory properties are negatively defined as properties which are neither real nor non-existent (according to Advaita, they are inexpressible or indeterminable, anirvacanīya), because they share with real properties the fact that they appear or are experienced, whereas simply non-existent entities do not appear at all.

The real properties of the prototype and the illusory properties of the reflected image are necessarily related, since the reflected image does not appear without the prototype present. On the other hand, the reflected image is necessarily related to the reflecting substance, as the latter is another necessary condition for reflection. The illusory properties appear to be identical with the

real properties of the prototype, but in reality they are not, because they have different ontological statuses (the one is real, the other is not). Furthermore, no reflected image will appear without the perceiving subject, for whom the illusion of reflection appears. The relations involved in the appearance of the reflected image thus also involve subjective and objective ontological statuses.

As the prototype, the subject, the reflecting substance and the reflected image are interrelated, this relation which involves entities and properties with distinct ontological statuses must be a relation of a special kind. It is neither fully real nor fully unreal, neither fully subjective, nor fully objective, but rather is found in between these categories and thus must be of a distinct ontological kind (following Advaita, let us call its ontological status “indeterminate”). This relation can be called a “reflection.”

Although reflection involves several relata, including the prototype, the mirror, the reflected image, and the perceiving subject (who can be the prototype or not), I will focus on a particular relation between the prototype (bimba) and the reflected image (pratibimba) as it is the main subject of discussion of theories of reflection. Reflection is an asymmetric relational property, in that the relation between the prototype x to its reflected image y (x is a prototype in respect to y) is not the same as the relation of the reflected image y to its prototype x (y is a reflected image in respect to x). There is much that points towards characterizing reflection as a causal relation, as no reflected image y appears without there being a prototype x, while it is not necessary that x is present only when y appears.

However, as we have seen, some theorists of reflection (especially Śaṅkara) deny that the illusory reflected image has any real cause. Real causes result in real effects; illusory phenomena are unreal and thus have no cause. There seems to be an ontological gap between the real factor

(such as my face) and the unreal effect (the properties of my face in the mirror). However, precisely the fact that the two are, nevertheless, causally related (as shown in the previous passage), leads us to postulate reflection as a relation of a distinct ontological nature – neither real nor unreal, but an intermediate state between the two, which allows for causal efficacy of a real cause in respect to an unreal effect.

On the other hand, the relation between the prototype and its reflected image involves not only efficient, but also formal causation, because the result of reflection is the appearance of the form of the prototype in the reflected image. Let us return here to the Vedic general condition of phenomenal formation (GCPF), which I have formulated in Chapter 1. This principle describes the four necessary factors responsible for the appearance of forms in the phenomenal realm: the formal cause (rūpa), the formal effect (pratirūpa), the persisting relation between the two (nidāna), and the efficient cause of formation (rūpaṇa). In the Vedic context this schema describes the relation between the forms of the noumenal reality and counter-forms in the phenomenal reality. The same schema can, however, be applied to reflection as relation between the prototype and the reflected image. Thus, the formal cause is the prototype, the formal effect is the reflected image, the persisting relation between the two is that of identity, and the efficient cause is the combination of factors responsible for the arising of the illusion (the presence of the prototype, the perceiving subject, the mirror, the rays, etc.).

It can be noticed that reflection, in addition to its being the efficient and formal causal relation, is at the same time the relation of identity of form between the prototype and its reflected image. This identity of form has lead Padmapāda to postulate that the reflected image is the property of the prototype and thus is as real as the prototype. I would like to point, however, to the ambivalent ontological status of reflection, which is in action here. Yes, in so far as the reflected

image is identical in form with its prototype it is real. But Śaṅkara is also right: in so far as the properties of the prototype appear where the prototype is not, it is unreal.

Reflection is thus an inter-ontological formal and efficient causal relation, which involves identity of form between ontologically distinct relata. So far I have considered a relation between prototype and reflected image which takes place in all cases of reflection, whether the prototype is an inanimate object witnessed by someone in the mirror or the witness’s own face. Now I would like to consider the specific kind of reflection pertaining between the properties belonging to conscious subject (e.g., one’s face) and their reflected image. The subject does not see itself in the mirror as a subject (one cannot see in the mirror one’s subjective properties, such as one’s consciousness, etc.). One sees only the reflection of one’s objective properties, such as one’s face. However, one condition of the appearance of the image in the mirror is the presence of the perceiving subject, without whom the illusion cannot arise. Moreover, the subject recognizes him or herself as the object in the mirror. In this sense, reflection is responsible for the imagined unity between the objective and the subjective perceptions of oneself. My previous postulation of reflection as an inter-ontological category is thus useful not only in respect to the interaction between ontologically distinct categories of reality and unreality, but also to the interaction between ontologically distinct categories of subject and object.