AVISO AL PUBLICO

The research of the human rights organisations and the Settlement Watch Project is often used to inform the legal actions that continued to be used by all three components in this phase. This is not a

new method of confrontation, with ACRI usi g legal ta ti s f o its i eptio i to set p e ede ts,

raise issues of principle, and affect broad- ased poli ha ge AC‘I, [no date]). In 1987 they dealt with

issues of deportation of Palestinians considered a threat to Israel (HCJ, 785/87); in the first Intifada they offered legal assistance to those involved in nonviolent actions (Bardin, 2012:13) and throughout the 2000s they have petitioned the Supreme Court on issues that cover their three goals, with ACRI citing

ele e la d a k ases et ee a d AC‘I, 2013). Other human rights groups followed their

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p essu e du i g i te ogatio s of Palesti ia s HCJ / ; B Tsele and ‘ofi l Z huyot Ada , along

with five other human rights organisations, petitioned for state authorities to explain the use of

Palesti ia s as hu a shields du i g ilita ope atio s i the West Ba k HCJ / ; Shalom

Achshav lodged a Supreme Court appeal against the Migron settlement outpost, with evidence of Palestinian land ownership (HCJ, 8887/06); and Gisha has a legal centre to assist Palestinians from Gaza who need to travel outside of Gaza. They provide lawyers to sign affidavits and if that does not work, they take the case to court (Hary, 2013). One of the biggest successes of using legal action was the

Supreme Court order for the route of the planned separation barrier in Bil i to be moved so that it did

not separate Palestinians from their land (HCJ 8414/05). However, Michael Sfard, the lawyer for the case, notes that it was not the legal petition alone that achieved this but a combination of the legal route and the demonstrations (Sfard in Surrusco, 2013c), with legal work and the grassroots activism on the ground often used in strategic collaboration (Vardi, 2013).

The use of legal challenges by more groups against the occupation in this phase can be linked to the decision made by the International Court of Justice in 2004 to declare the building of the barrier on Palesti ia la d illegal u de the Legal Co se ue es for the Construction of a Wall in the Occupied Palesti ia Te ito ies ICJ, 2004) and the attention that the case brought to the situation. This gives the activists some weight when taking related cases to the Israeli Supreme Court.

Legal means have also continued to be a necessity for those activists in the radical component, both Israeli and Palestinian, who are arrested during actions in the West Bank, with legal representation

provided to both Palestinians and Israelis by some of the human rights groups.37 Similar legal

representation was provided to Palestinians by Israeli groups in the first Intifada (Cohen in Kaufman- Lacusta, 2010:38).

There is significant debate over the effectiveness of using legal means to challenge the occupation. According to some, if a principled petition is brought to the High Court and the case fails, then it legitimises and legalises certain practices under the Law of Occupation (Hary, 2013; Sheizaf, 2012a). Some therefore tend to avoid the more principled cases for fear of rubber stamping elements of the occupation by the High Court of Justice (Hary, 2013) and argue the goal is to focus on individual cases. Others argue that the High Court should not be used at all as a means of challenging the occupation

since it is just o e of the a hes that i stitutio alises it [the o upatio ] , as the High Court of Justice

e e uestio s o stops Is aeli poli ies. At est, it asks fo so e adjust e ts to e ade “heizaf, 2011a). According to this argument, even when a petition is successful the rulings can actually make it easier for certain practices to be carried out. For example, ACRI took a case to the High Court over a segregated road in the West Bank and won. However, the decision actually enabled the IDF to legally

continue as they had been, si e the Justi es uled that, the ilita o a de does t ha e the

authority to completely – highlight completely – a the oad to Palesti ia t affi El-Ad in Surrusco,

“ee fo e a ple, “hul a s 007) account during early years of the second Intifada and the arrest of Ta ayush activist Ezra Nawi (Ha a etz, 2012).

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2013a). The Commander did not completely close the road, thus following the ruling but, only on rare occasions allowed Palestinians to use the road.

However, whilst acknowledging legal tactics will not end the occupation, others argue that appealing to the High Court of Justice is worthwhile, despite some negative consequences (Kretzmer, 2012; Wiener,

2012). K etz e s e ie of the o t i utio of the High Cou t of Justi e i the la of ellige e t

occupation in dealing with petitions relating to the occupied territories argues that in bringing these cases to Court, often the authorities will reconsider their actions in the face of a judicial review. Wiener (2012) argues that cases that assist individuals, such as preventing the demolition of a house are

worthwhile in and of themselves because even if not su essful, the p o ide a additio al oi e to the

i ti of the o upatio . Fu the o e, it helps i gi i g atte tio to these issues, hi h a e ofte ot dealt with in the Israeli public sphere.

3 EVOLUTION: DISRUPTIVE NON-VIOLENT ACTION

From the early days of the second Intifada, an evolution in the tactical repertoire available to the radical component can be identified. This is reflective of and connected to the shifts in collective action frames of the radical component, which made available more confrontational modes of

operation. Building on the initial developments in the tactics of the radical component in the late 1990s, the central tactics shifted from nonviolent demonstrations in Israeli towns to nonviolent direct action in the West Bank. Israeli activists use the term nonviolent direct action (NVDA) to describe those tactics that Sharp (1973a, 1973b) would define as nonviolent intervention, which is where the opponents are more directly challenged by the activists physically seeking to change a situation in the present through certain actions, rather than demonstrating for the authorities to make a change.

This started in the form of humanitarian action with the aim, similar to the emerging activities of the human rights component in the first Intifada, of alleviating the suffering of the Palestinians in the short- term and evolved into nonviolent direct action, aimed at directly changing the realities on the ground. Although the activists continued to label their activities as nonviolent direct action, it has become more accurate to describe most of the tactics employed since the early days of the separation barrier as nonviolent resistance (NVR), which have elements of both direct action and demonstrations. Israeli activists make a distinction between nonviolent direct action and nonviolent resistance to denote the difference between actively changing a situation in the present and protesting against a situation. These

ould oth fall u de “ha p s defi itio of o iole t i te e tio , 1973b). Whilst these

demonstrations still continue on a weekly basis, the next step in this evolution of tactical repertoires has been towards nonviolent non-cooperation, which affects the ability of the authorities to maintain normalcy in the system (Sharp, 1973a, 1973b), through efforts based on boycott, divestment and sanctions. It should be noted that this evolution was not a linear, chronological shift; the different actions sometimes occurred simultaneously and one did not fully replace the other. However, the influence of one tactic on another can be identified in the order outlined.

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Activism in the West Bank was not a new phenomenon. Activists from the radical component had consistently developed contacts with Palestinians living in the West Bank and Gaza from as early as the 1970s (Warschawski, 2002) and individuals from the liberal Zionist component began conducting dialogue activities in the West Bank during the first Intifada (Bardin, 2012). As Shalom Achshav became closer to the Palestinian cause in the late 1980s, they also developed contacts with Palestinians (Hermann, 2009). However, on most occasions the liberal Zionist component would respect any restrictions placed on the meetings and avoided confrontation with the IDF (Hermann, 2009), unlike the radical activists who were willing to confront the authorities if necessary. There were members of Shalom Achshav who organised demonstrations at checkpoints or by settlements in the West Bank during the mid-to-late 90s (Hermann, 2009) however, these activities were not the core of Shalom A hsha s tactical repertoire and were often conducted by their youth wing and core activists.38

As explained to the author, the liberal Zionist component halted all such activities in the wake of the second Intifada (Golan, 2014b), leaving the radical and human rights components to pursue these forms of activism. Given the decline of activities held within Israel proper, a re-balancing of where the main forms of activism were held in this phase can be clearly identified, with much greater attention than before on acting where the occupation is taking place.

The evolution in the tactical repertoire identified in Israeli peace activism is mainly observed in the radical component and clearly led by them. The human rights and liberal Zionist components have employed some of these tactics at times and locations that are felt appropriate and often with specific limitations on the use of some of these tactics, such as a stricter limit on what can be considered non-

violent. This fits ell ith M Ada , Ta o a d Till s : elief that epe toi es a e li ited to

hat is o side feasi le a d i telligi le to a pa ti ula set of a to s, suggesti g that ta ti s a e di e tl connected to the ways in which the activists frame themselves, the prevailing problems and the solutions to the conflict.