AYUDAS A LA CONTRATACIÓN
7 Ayudas para la contratación de personas con discapacidad
From an analysis of the continually evolving literature on Estonian-EU relations and more specifically Estonian Euroscepticism, this study proposed that opposition to the EU in Estonia can be placed into a typology of three forms.
The first was the pro-communist/Russian bloc, which saw EU membership as a further disintegration of the country’s links with Russia. Their supporters were a small minority of the ethnic Russian population made up mostly of pensioners. Indeed the most interesting aspect of minority-based Euroscepticism in Estonia was how it was not effective in either visibility, votes or at the party political level. This section will seek to understand why ethnic Russians did not form on the EU issue in Estonia as examples of non-EPM formation were just as relevant to this study as are EPMs themselves.
The second group was hard-line Estonian nationalists, based around the Independence Party, which was based on anti-Russian, quasi-fascist rhetoric but received only 0.4% of the vote in the 2011 parliamentary elections.373 Another element of this
372 Interview with Igor Gräzin, co-director Research Centre Free Europe and Reformikund MP and MEP 13th October, 2008. Interview with Prof. Ivar Räig, founder and Chairman Research Centre Free Europe, 13th October, 2008. Interview with Uno Silberg, founder and Chairman of the No to the EU Movement, 5th November, 2008.
373 Mikkel and Kasekamp. ‘Emerging Party Based Euroscepticism in Estonia’, pp. 309-10.
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was nationalist members of mainstream political parties who broke party ranks to oppose the referendum. The Yes vote in the referendum and subsequent surge in support for the EU amongst the Estonian electorate forced nationalist Eurosceptics to accept EU membership as an irrevocable part of Estonia’s political future, lest they ended up “in the political wilderness like the Independence Party”.374
Finally, the third form of Euroscepticism was that of economic liberalism. In the immediate post-soviet period the Estonian government, directed by Prime Minister Maart Laar, specifically followed policies diametrically opposed to communism, which were strongly influenced by those policies of Ronald Reagan and Margaret Thatcher as they had taken the lead in calling for the end of Soviet domination of the Baltic states.375 Thus, the intellectual direction of independent Estonian political culture has been towards increased liberalisation in economic, and to a lesser degree social and political life. The arguments of the most prominent Estonian Eurosceptics were based on economic liberalism, specifically the negative impact of the acquis communautaire on Estonia’s liberal economic policies.
4.7.1 The Dominance of Economically Liberal Euroscepticism
Euroscepticism based on economic liberalism existed several years before the accession referendum and was still active up to the 2011 parliamentary elections. The most high-profile anti-accession campaigners were Professors Ivar Räig and Igor Gräzin of the EPM; the Research Centre Free Europe.376 They were given a high profile by the media as Räig was a former minister and Department of Foreign Affairs civil servant, and Gräzin was an academic and MP for the Reform Party.377 Similarly to the other case studies, Euroscepticism became associated with several individuals and the ideological basis of their opposition to European integration became the default arguments against the EU in Estonia. This high media and public profile played a significant role in encouraging these two individuals to form an EPM. Despite the personality clashes and
374 Interview with Uno Silberg, founder and Chairman of the No to the EU Movement, 5th November, 2008.
375 Mikkel and Kasekamp , ‘Emerging Party Based Euroscepticism in Estonia’, pp. 298-9.
376 Ibid, p. 313.
377 Gräzin was elected an MEP for the Reform Party in 2004 and was drawn into controversy as he was listed by Declan Ganley as a signature in the registration of his Libertas Party for the 2009 EP elections.
Gräzin denied this until the document with this signature on it was shown to him and he subsequently withdrew his support causing him to lose significant political standing in Estonia.
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differing attitudes to the desired extent of Estonian participation in European integration, cooperation between them was possible due to their shared libertarian values and recognition of some form of EU membership for Estonia.378 This gave them a significant advantage over the nationalists and pro-Russians who opposed membership outright and were portrayed as isolationists who were damaging Estonia’s chance of joining NATO and the EU to the benefit of Russia.379 This element of Estonian Euroscepticism was soft, as in the Szcerbiak and Taggart model, in that its opposition to European integration was to the protectionist sections of the acquis communitaire but it accepted the principle of membership as an important bulwark against Russian influence in Estonia.
The particular nature of Estonian Euroscepticism and the relative failure of more typical forms of Euroscepticism, based on national sovereignty and socialist critiques of the single market, were based on the recent history of Estonian independence. Estonia engaged in the ‘shock’ therapy of economic liberalisation almost immediately after seceding from the Soviet Union and the independence movement of the country was framed in terms of moving as far away as ideologically possible from the communist system. Thus Estonians began to see themselves and their national identity as liberal and embracing of modern telecommunications, specifically the internet.380 The immediate post-Soviet period saw intense economic hardship as the economy shifted to a capitalist model and inefficient industries and farmers were left to fail by the laissez faire policies of the government. After these six to seven years of hardship the economy adapted successfully to capitalism and the early governmental investment in internet and telecommunications technology created the foundations for soaring economic growth of an average of 8.3% from 2000-2004.381 During this period the government initiated accession talks with the EU after being turned down amongst the first group of applicants in 1998. As discussed earlier, the Estonian government coalition of centre right parties under Juhan Parts was anxious to accede to the EU as quickly as possible for two reasons.
378 Räig, Ivar. ‘Freedom Yes, Europe No’, These Tides, Winter 2004/5 (These Tides was a magazine produced by David Wilkinson in conjunction with Research Centre Free Europe seeking to communicate pan-European Euroscepticism).
379 Interview with Erkki Behovski, international affairs columnist with Postimees newspaper, 7th November, 2008.
380 Runnel, Pille et. al. (2009). ‘The Estonian Tiger Leap From Post-Communism to the Information Society: From Policy to Practice’, Journal of Baltic Studies, 40: 1, pp. 29-30.
381 From Estonian Government statistics office http://www.stat.ee/29958, accessed 25 November, 2008.
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Firstly, it did not want to be left behind as Latvia and Lithuania were also beginning negotiations to join. Secondly it sought to use EU membership as a step on the ladder towards their ultimate goal of NATO membership. Negotiations were not, however, going well by 2002.382 The thinking of the government of Parts at the time was that if the
‘hard’ geopolitical security of NATO was not attainable for the foreseeable future then the ‘soft’ security of the EU would have to suffice to protect Estonia from Russian influence.383
Thus, the dynamics of the Estonian-EU debate prior to membership are apparent.
On the one hand, the Estonian public was starting to benefit after several years of extreme hardship from a dynamic, independent Estonian economy, and on the other hand, the Estonian government was anxious to secure the country’s long term geo-political security by firmly allying the country to EU institutions. The EU accession referendum would create tensions between the belief that Estonia was doing fine on its own, as justified by the booming liberalised economy and stagnant over-regulated EU economy, and the concern of the country’s political elite that Estonia needed to join the EU immediately lest it be drawn into the Russian sphere of influence yet again. How these international- and domestic-level factors combined to influence EPM formation will be discussed in the next section as well as how civil society based Euroscepticism in Estonia came to be so effective compared to party-based Euroscepticism in other EU accession states.
Examining such a question is important in explaining EPM formation, as in this case it provides interesting conclusions on the importance of the open policy process and media propositions in this regard, as well as to the wider area of civil society development in former Soviet states.
4.8 Two Dominant EPMs: the Research Centre Free Europe and Movement No to the