Heinkel definitely profited as an aviation business from the early use of slave labor and from the subsequent increased productivity of the Oranienburg complex. Slave labor also solved several problems associated with the German workforce. While in early 1942 the firm lost 15 percent of the normal work hours due to authorized leaves, sick leaves, air-raid alarms and absenteeism, the average lost time in 1943 sunk to only 6.9 percent. Higher pay- ment levels in the area around Berlin also motivated Heinkel to increase the number of its slave workers and thus cut expenses on higher-than-average salaries. Furthermore, since no overtime was paid for slave labor, the amount of budget the firm spent on extra hours also decreased drastically.210At the end of 1942 manager Karl Hayn viewed the massive use of
concentration camp inmates as a magic solution to most manpower and productivity prob- lems of the aviation industry and as one possible answer to the challenge posed by the enor- mous production capacity of the American aircraft industry.211
As Heinkel made its experiments with slave labor, other firms sought to solve the same problems using different strategies. Some of them tried to find the missing extra capacity outside Germany. Focke-Wulf was the leading firm in this regard, but Junkers, Dornier and Messerschmitt also sought to expand their outsourcing and foreign contracting. Even Heinkel outsourced the development and production of its He 274 heavy bomber — a development of the troubled He 177 — to the French firm Farman.212Focke-Wulf initially sought to solve
its manpower and capacity shortage by contracting French firms and outsourcing to them some of its parts production, aircraft production and even development work. On the long term this initiative largely failed due to different factors described previously. As a result Focke-Wulf gained little from its 1941–1943 ventures and enterprises in France. Despite relying heavily on outsourcing, Focke-Wulf employed foreigners in increasing numbers in its factories, but it was done in a different way than by Heinkel. By the end of 1942 some 1,395 of the 2,370 workers at the Posen factory were foreigners. They included Italians, Danes, Poles, Frenchmen (including POWs), Spaniards, Russians and Ukrainians. This high percentage of foreigners is easily explainable by the location of this plant on former
Polish territory annexed to the Reich. Of the 1,395 foreigners, 1,175 were Poles — mostly locals. The percentage of foreigners in Focke-Wulf ’s other plants, located in Germany, was much lower. In its Marienburg plant, for example, only 32 of the 574 workers were foreig ners.213
Therefore the Posen factory can be viewed as sort of an eastwards outsourcing, which pro- vided a solution to the manpower problem by relying on a salaried local Polish workforce.
As we saw, Focke-Wulf also turned to Italy in early 1944. This move was a continuation of its business strategy of outsourcing production tasks to firms outside Germany. Focke- Wulf was therefore persistent with its own way of trying to solve the lack of manpower. Focke-Wulf was one of three firms which had tried repeatedly since late 1943 to recruit Italian workers, particularly skilled, and recruit them for work in its German factories. Focke-Wulf, Arado and Messerschmitt sent their own representatives to Italy in January 1944 to try to solve the problems associated with the recruitment of Italian workers. This initiative formed yet another approach to solving the manpower shortage, which indicates the difficulties encountered with workforce recruitment through other agencies, especially the GBA. Up to that point recruitment of Italian workers had largely failed because the Germans failed to offer local workers an agreed-upon and unified contract, providing them satisfactory payment, housing, and feeding, and regulating other issues affecting their employment conditions. The GBA never bothered to achieve a similar settlement, so the three firms took the initiative and sought to offer their own contracts in order to attract Italian workers.214It was too late, and few — if any — Italians were recruited in this way.
The generally positive experience gained during the early employment of inmates at Heinkel’s factories soon spilled over to other places. Firstly, the use of inmates was constantly expanded within the Heinkel organization; inmates were soon allocated to the Vienna- Schwechat branch, and then to the main Rostock plant. The number of slave workers employed in these factories never reached the magnitude of Oranienburg and the “Block Budzyn” complexes, but inmates increasingly replaced German workers — even specialists — on the production lines.215During 1943 more Heinkel factories, including minor ones, were
turned into concentration camp factories. One of them was the Barth factory, not far from Rostock, which manufactured fighter wings under license.216
Towards the end of 1943 the ratio of Germans and foreigners on the production lines tipped decisively towards the foreigners. Even though their number within the entire work- force — around 30.5 percent out of 1,852,000— was relatively low, since many Germans filled clerical, administrative and professional positions, the share of foreigners and inmates on the production lines was significant. As a result, in firms like BMW, foreigners of all sorts formed 85 percent of the productive workforce. In October 1943 Milch brought the series production of the Ju 52 transport plane in Bernburg, which was done by 6 German foremen and around 2,000 foreigners, as an extreme example of this trend.217Foreigners of
32 different nationalities218also rapidly replaced Germans in various other functions within
the aviation factories. By 1944 foreigners even served as auxiliary firemen with the factories’ fire brigade units. This assignment required the issue of special regulations concerning their status and rewards for this work. The main reward for western foreigners was an exemption from carrying the special badge signifying foreign worker status. The Germans did not trust these foreign firemen and some firm managements recommended that they should not form more than 50 percent of the fire brigade force in any factory. In any case, their supervisors were instructed to closely watch them and to be extremely strict with them.219
Increasing numbers of inmates were also allocated to the aero-engine sector. Since the early negotiations between the RLM and the SS, BMW figured as the main potential employer of slave labor. In late 1942 inmates from Dachau were allocated to the Allach plant and worked on the construction site of a new bombproof production hall. These slave construction workers were not employed immediately afterwards in the production of the BMW 801 engine, as was originally intended. Plans to use inmates in the production of the BMW 003 jet engine also came to nothing at this stage, mainly because of severe delays in its development. Therefore, BMW’s factory in Allach never produced the 003 engine, and when its series production finally started in summer 1944, most of it was carried out in var- ious dispersal factories. As a result, Allach continued to be the main production center of the BMW 801 engine, which powered the FW 190 fighter as well as other aircraft. Allach was a large factory, covering an area of 235 acres and with 457,200 square meters of floor space.220
Employment of inmates from Dachau on its production lines started in February 1943. A labor camp was constructed next to the factory to accommodate the inmates — most of them
Two aerial photos of BMW’s Allach aero-engine factory. The photograph above was taken in early 1943. The photograph on the opposite page was taken on 6 September 1943. Clearly visible on this photograph are the foundations of two new large production halls and a labor camp on left (courtesy U.S. National Archives and Records Administration).
selected specifically because they possessed one or another technical skill. This strategy proved to be quite efficient and BMW noticed improved productivity in Allach.221The use
of slave labor increased in the following months and by March 1944 the share of non– German workers in Allach reached its peak at 71 percent. This was an exceptionally high percentage when compared to the rest of the aero-engine industry. At that time the foreigners’ share within the entire aero-engine sector was 41.4 percent — which in turn was almost four times higher than their share in January 1942 (10.6 percent).222
Just as corporate interests motivated Heinkel to use slave workers, Messerschmitt started using slave labor as its scheme of using large numbers of women shattered in late 1942. Absenteeism of women increased as war dragged on and it became obvious that a dramatic increase of production was impossible with this workforce. Foreign workers were viewed as an unsatisfactory replacement for women, and as a result Messerschmitt’s board of directors decided to make use of concentration camp inmates. From October 1942 the firm tried to obtain inmates for the production of its large transport gliders at Leipheim. First contingents of inmates from the Dachau concentration camp near Munich arrived, though, only in March 1943 — right at the time when the firm started preparing for the production of the Me 262. Thus most of the inmates were allocated instead to the central Augsburg plant and by July 1943 some 2,299 inmates worked in this factory.223In the same way as in Oranien-
burg, the use of inmates proved to be quite effective and the management noticed an increase of productivity. On 20 July 1943, Willy Messerschmitt wrote directly to the commander of Sturmbannführer Martin Gottfried Weiss, and informed him about the significant increase of productivity following the introduction of slave workers. He therefore asked him to pro- vide additional inmates for work at the Augsburg plant and expressed his sincere hope that
this initial direct contact will lead to “larger mutual successes in the future.”224 It was the
beginning of a close association of Dachau and its inmates with the production of Messer- schmitt aircraft. This cooperation ultimately resulted with Dachau’s providing work detach- ments to around eighteen Messerschmitt factories and workshops.225
In most cases the SS and the firm established sub-camps right next to the factories or close to them. A sub-camp of Dachau was constructed at Haunstetten, just south of the Augsburg factory,226and a con-
tingent of inmates with an SS guard detachment was dispatched there. The inmates worked initially at Messerschmitt’s Augsburg plant and in component production workshops located at Haunstetten, sometimes referred to as Werk I. Messerschmitt not only paid the SS for the workers, but also paid special premiums at irregular intervals to the SS men guarding them.227A second concentration camp was later constructed near the 12,800-square-meter
Kottern machinery factory, where jigs and other production fixtures were produced. An American air raid heavily damaged this factory on 19 June 1944, and as a result its production was largely dispersed to other locations.228
At the same time, Messerschmitt’s Regensburg plant started a close association with two more concentration camps. After fully grasping the business potential of slave labor in the war industry, the SS started converting its own DESt quarry industry around the Flossen- bürg concentration camp into a manpower reservoir for the armaments industry in Saxony and northern Bavaria. The same DESt business operated in and around the Mauthausen concentration camp in Austria also gradually converted to armaments production. For the SS this conversion was a major shift in the functionality of the camp system and its business orientation. The conversion of Flossenbürg was particularly significant because at that time it was the most profitable DESt operation. Among the most prominent firms expressing interest in using former DESt slave workers was Messerschmitt. It started negotiations with DESt through Rüstungskommando Regensburg at the end of 1942. In mid–January 1943 Messerschmitt offered DESt the opportunity to open workshops in the camp and to provide equipment, tooling, raw materials and training personnel at its own costs. The deal was that DESt would manufacture parts and sell them to Messerschmitt for a much reduced price than they would have cost to manufacture in the normal way. DESt keenly accepted the offer and production had started as early as 5 February.229 This business model soon
proved to be profitable for both parties. Messerschmitt significantly reduced its spending on wages and reduced the cost of the parts. The firm paid DESt only 3 RM a day for a skilled worker and 1.5 RM for an unskilled worker. DESt also reduced its operational expenses and functioned from this point more as a manpower agency and less as an industrial enterprise.230The number of inmates working in these workshops grew slowly and by July
it had reached 300. This cooperation picked up pace following the bombing of the Regens- burg factory in August 1943, and more workshops were relocated to the vicinity of the camp. At the same time Messerschmitt concluded a similar arrangement with the Mau- thausen camp, and production of Me 109 parts started in the camp during late autumn. By the end of 1943 the number of Flossenbürg inmates working for Messerschmitt increased to 1,375, and in Mauthausen 140 inmates worked for the firm.231
Earlier, Erla, another licensed Me 109 producer, also decided to introduce slave labor. In March a sub-camp of the Buchenwald concentration camp code named “Emil” was constructed in Leipzig, and in April its inmates started working in Erla’s three factories in and around Leipzig. Later more sub-camps were constructed next to these factories to accommodate
the increasing number of inmates arriving from Buchenwald.232In December Erla relocated
workshops to a new sub-camp of Flossenbürg in Johangeorgenstadt, which produced Me 109 tailplanes. In January 1944 a sub-camp was established next to a wings factory in Mülsen–St. Micheln and in March at a dispersal location at Flöha, which manufactured fuselages. A total of around 2,650 inmates worked in these factories in early 1944.233 All
firms using slave labor found out that it helped to cut the large amounts spent on wages. Heinkel paid the SS a monthly sum of 132 RM (4.4 RM a day) per inmate.234Erla paid 6
RM a day (10 daily work hours in 1943) for a skilled worker and 4 RM for an unskilled worker. These sums formed only 60 percent and 40 percent, respectively of the normal pay- ment of skilled and unskilled German workers.235When taken into account that Erla and
other firms saved other expenses related to each employee, the amount of money spared was even higher.
By February 1944 Flossenbürg and its sub-camps became an important parts supplier for the Me 109 production and formed a central component in the dispersal system that saved the fighter’s production following “Big Week.” Around 2,000 inmates working in Flossenbürg alone produced 900 engine cowlings and radiator fairings for the Me 109, as well as other smaller parts. After “Big Week” 700 of the 1,300 Soviet POWs working in Regensburg were deported to Flossenbürg to continue their production for Messerschmitt there while the Regensburg factory was repaired.236Pohl estimated in mid–June 1944 that
at that time the former DESt facilities in Flossenbürg and Mauthausen contributed 35 per- cent of Regensburg’s output.237
The widespread dispersal of the aviation industry also caused a significant expansion of the Flossenbürg camp system. Among the new partners of this camp were Weser, which constructed an underground factory at Rabstein and Arado. Arado became one of the main “customers” of the Flossenbürg system. Initially male inmates were allocated to its Rathenow factory, which produced parts for the Ar 234 jet bomber. Later more than 1,000 inmates, mostly Jewish women and girls, were transported to Arado’s factories in Wittenberg and Freiberg.238
Towards the end of 1943 the use of slave labor in the aviation industry became wide- spread and extensive. It continued to change the composition and character of the workforce of this industry, a trend that had started with the introduction of POWs and foreigners. The statistics of Messerschmitt at the end of December 1943 are particularly revealing. Of all the men and women working at Messerschmitt’s factories in Augsburg, Oberammergau, Kottern, and Leipheim, 8,364 were German men and 2,977 were German women. Besides them there were 3,607 foreign men, 1,285 foreign women and 207 POWs. Perhaps most revealing is the fact that of the total of 20,042 workers only 4,411 were listed as skilled work- ers. The figures for inmates were included in the foreign workers category, but we can learn about the magnitude of their share by the fact that at the end of 1943 a total of 3,882 male inmates worked for Messerschmitt in Augsburg and at Kottern.239 These statistics portray
the transformation of the aviation industry from a high-tech industry demanding highly skilled workers into a branch using mostly unskilled non–Germans. In 1944 this trend became even stronger.
Other projects and firms who drew on Heinkel’s experience decided in 1943 to select the slave labor option. The best-documented and arguably the most dramatic example is the early conception of the A-4 ballistic missile’s production. As it was looking into the SS
proposal to use slave labor for its production, a team led by production expert Arthur Rudolph visited the Oranienburg plant on 12 April 1943 in order to observe how this model worked. The visitors were hosted by Mr. Hänsslein of Heinkel, who showed them around the plant. Soon afterwards Rudolph submitted a detailed report about the visit:
The Heinkel Works at Oranienburg has largely used foreign workforce made of Ostarbeiter, Frenchmen, Dutchmen, etc., in its production. Due to frequent rotations within these groups production has suffered. The Heinkel Works have made contact with SS Oberstürmführer Mau- rer and requested the assignment of prisoners from the concentration camps. The request was granted and the action began as an experiment in a single hall in August 1942. At first 300 men were put into action. The best experience has been obtained.... This system has proved itself, and generally the use of inmates offered considerable advantages in contrast to the earlier employment of foreigners. Especially useful was the take over by the SS of all tasks which have nothing to do with the work itself, and the higher level of security and secrecy offered by the use of inmates.240
Rudolph’s recommendations were fully implemented and the projected A-4 production was based on a model similar to that of Heinkel at Oranienburg. At that time Milch became assured again that slave labor represented part of the solution to his production capacity problem. One day after Rudolph and his group visited Oranienburg, Milch wrote to the same Maurer, the SS officer responsible for inmate allocation to industrial work, and pointed out the importance of using inmates supplied by the SS in the aviation industry. He also remarked that: “An adequate supply of manpower for the Luftwaffe industry is of crucial importance for the successful outcome of the present war.”241
Another case where Oranienburg served as an example is related directly to the aviation industry. In mid–August 1943, Staff Engineer Helmuth Schelp, of department GL/C-B 3 of the Technical Office, dealing with experimental engines,242and engineer Schaller, who