A unique aspect of the wartime German aviation industry, which has hardly been dealt with by researchers, is aviation production for the Germans in the occupied and Axis
Production line of the Jumo 004 jet engine, probably at the Zittau factory. The rails, on which the engine trolleys traveled along the production line, are visible on the floor to the right (cour- tesy U.S. National Archives and Records Administration).
countries. Different local firms outside Germany carried out a surprisingly large number of production and development programs for several leading German aviation firms and under the supervision of the RLM. Outsourcing of aviation production reached its peak rather late, even though it started early. Through outsourcing the Germans were not only able to increase total output and save their own capacity for priority projects; they also used out- sourcing as an alternative business model in order to solve some of the structural problems of their aviation industry.
The quick succession of victories in Western Europe in 1940 improved Germany’s strategic situation among other nations by allowing it access to a larger supply of raw mate- rials (particularly tungsten and iron ores) and by offering additional industrial capacity. New manpower also became available in the form of occupied populations and hundreds of thousands of POWs. Overconfidence in Blitzkrieg strategy, however, influenced large parts of the Reich’s political and military leadership, which generally thought that Germany would shortly win the war with current production rates. The failure to fully exploit the new gains was aggravated by the fact that the Germans generally chose to loot captured armament factories instead of reopening them under their control. This policy initially affected in particular the large and modern French aviation industry. Although a detailed survey of the French aviation industry was conducted as early as late June 1940 by the RLM, the Germans failed to take advantage of this largely intact industry.119The Germans closed most of the French factories and transferred to Germany a large proportion of their machine tools, where they were mostly stored because the Germans lacked the manpower needed to operate them.120
This inefficient policy changed, however, in late 1940–early 1941 when the RLM rec- ognized the potential offered by the French aviation industry. In January 1941 Milch visited Paris and attended a conference of representatives and executives of the local aviation indus- try. In his keynote speech he called on them to accept German contracts and to cooperate with the Germans for their own and for their workers’ benefit. He assured them that since the Vichy government approved such cooperation there should be no legal or moral obstacles for such mutually beneficial cooperation.121In order to promote and administer cooperation with foreign firms the RLM established liasion offices (Verbindungsstelle) within the GL (Generalluftzeugmeister). Each of them supervised the aviation industry of a single country. An RLM engineer directed each liaison office and was responsible for establishing contact with local producers and connecting them with relevant German firms or with the RLM.122 Besides dealing with outsourcing, the liaison offices also negotiated the production of Ger- man aircraft under license by some Axis countries for their own use.
Generally, three models of industrial cooperation developed over the next few years. First and less common was that of German firms opening new branches in the occupied countries using existing factory complexes and local manpower. The second and the most widespread model was to outsource production of items to foreign firms under restrictive contracts. Such items ranged from minor parts to complete aircraft. The third model was outsourcing complete development and production projects to foreign firms. This type of outsourcing was more widespread than can be imagined and French firms were even con- tracted to develop several large and complicated aircraft.
German firms usually refrained from opening new branches in the occupied countries, although a cheap and readily available local workforce made such enterprises a logical option.
Foreseen difficulties in operating branches far from the well-established centers in Germany were probably the main reason for this neglect. However, business opportunities motivated a few aero-engine manufacturers to open factories in the occupied countries. One of them was Jumo — the aero-engine division of Junkers. Only a few months after the conquest of France, Jumo opened an engine factory near Strasbourg in Alsace. Junkers established the plant with its own equipment and machinery in a deserted Matford Ford car factory. The new factory soon reached a monthly output of 500 overhauled engines and 250 newly built engines. This factory relied entirely on local Alsatian manpower, which was regarded as friendly towards the Germans. Later, Soviet POWs were also employed in the factory under German and Alsatian supervision.123Jumo and BMW also opened several factories in the Czechoslovak Protectorate, taking advantage of the highly developed industrial infrastructure and skilled workforce in this country.124
Airframe firms used mostly the second business model in the occupied countries: con- tracting local businesses and firms to produce specific items. The focal point of aviation production for Germany was France, with its large aviation industry. Milch’s speech in Paris in January 1941 signified a shift in Germany’s policy towards the French aviation industry. From lukewarm interest the Germans now turned to full industrial cooperation — of course under German dominance. In spring 1941 the German and the Vichy government generally agreed to renew aviation production in France. France was allowed to keep one-sixth of the output for its own use, although this portion was composed entirely of French designs.125 Large parts of the still existing French aviation industry were thus reactivated by the Germans in spring 1941 and orders from the RLM and from German firms started flowing to different French firms. By 30 June 1941, French aviation firms received from the Germans contracts worth 765,000,000 RM. These contracts provided work for some 62,800 Frenchmen.126 Some factories continued for a while to produce French aircraft and engines, mainly using parts and components manufactured before the German occupation and still available in stores and depots. The Germans took over most of these aircraft and used some of them in second-line duties. They delivered other planes to their Axis allies, especially to Vichy France. French engines, especially the Gnôme et Rhône types, were used in some German designs, like the Me 323 six-engine transporter and the Hs 129 two-engine ground attack aircraft.
German firms mostly contracted French firms as parts and component manufacturers. French firms were initially contracted to produce only specific components. The German firms provided them the required blueprints and raw materials. The French were given only the minimum needed for the manufacture of their allocated product, therefore blocking further independent development by the contractor.
This type of cooperation was not restricted only to manufacture. Several German firms chose to hire French design offices and their staffs in order to expand their own design capacity. By November 1941 Focke-Wulf, Junkers, Messerschmitt, Fieseler and Heinkel opened design offices in France. Most of the employees working in these offices were French designers and draftsmen. There was more than enough work for them. As Focke-Wulf ’s representative in Paris reported at the end of November 1941, “According to our own obser- vations, there are no more unemployed aircraft designers in France.” Soon a competition developed between the German firms, as each sought to attract designers by offering higher wages and better contracts.127
In fewer cases French firms were licensed to produce complete German aircraft or large components for them. Messerschmitt was one of the first firms to contract a French firm for the production of complete planes. In early 1941 it licensed the firm SNCAN in Les Mureaux to produce its Me 108 liaison plane. Following the deal, Messerschmitt terminated the production of this aircraft at Regensburg, thus freeing the plant for increased production of the Me 109 and for the production of the new Me 210 heavy fighter.128
The German firm that used to the utmost the opportunity to use French capacity in order to expand its production of complete aircraft was probably Focke-Wulf. As early as late 1940 it helped the French aviation company Technique de Chatillon, based in Chatillon sur Bagneux, a suburb of Paris, to refurbish its facilities. After a short while Focke-Wulf fully acknowledged the capabilities of this firm and counted it as equivalent in any respect to similar German firms. It soon began transferring to the French firm the design work and production of some of its projects, and was fully satisfied with the results. Among others, Focke-Wulf planned to subcontract to Technique de Chatillon the design of its FW 206 mid-range airliner and of the FW 300 long-range airliner/maritime patrol aircraft. Focke- Wulf also planned to contract another French firm, Société Nationale de Constructions Aéronautiques du Sud Ouest (SNCASO), to produce them. It is important to note that this industrial cooperation was meant foremost to fulfill the German firm’s postwar plans. Focke-Wulf developed these aircraft in cooperation with national airliner Lufthansa for commercial use in the postwar world. Because Focke-Wulf ’s highest priority during the war was military aircraft production, it was convenient to let French firms work on civilian projects for the postwar era. Focke-Wulf ’s long-term planning was typical of large portions of the German armaments industry. During the war, firms engaged in military production tended to look over the horizon and take into account long-term profitability in their cor- porate strategic planning.129
In order to enable SNCASO to produce the FW 206, Focke-Wulf arranged the rein- stitution of its Paris factory, which was confiscated by the German military administration after the occupation of France.130When Udet ordered in early August 1941 to stop working on this civilian aircraft, he also approved a contract Focke-Wulf gave Technique de Chatillon concerning the production of parts for its new FW 190 fighter.131The French firm’s initial production of these parts fully satisfied the German customer. This positive experience led Focke-Wulf ’s chief executive Kurt Tank to warmly recommend at the end of 1941 further contracting with this and other French firms in order to fully exploit the extra capacity they offered.132In the meanwhile Focke-Wulf tightened its cooperation with SNCASO in the field of military production. In February 1941 a German delegation settled down in SNCASO’s main factory in Bordeaux. Soon afterwards SNCASO received an order for 419 (later reduced to 334) FW 189 tactical reconnaissance aircraft. The delivery of these aircraft was completed in April 1943. SNCASO’s plants in Bordeaux and in Paris also produced some parts for the FW 200 maritime reconnaissance aircraft.
Focke-Wulf contracted SNCASO again in 1943 to produce more parts for the FW 190 fighter and to perform some of the development and design work of its further development, the Ta 152 high-altitude fighter.133Production in SNCASO’s factories proceeded slowly, however. In May 1943 the USAAF heavily bombed its Bordeaux plant, which had just delivered the last FW 189 it produced and was gearing up for the FW 190 production. Fol- lowing this setback the Germans and the French decided to move most of the production
facilities of the bombed factory to a nearby underground factory at St. Astier. This move proved to be a time-consuming operation and it dragged on well into 1944.134In the mean- while SNCASO’s Chatillon factory suffered from other difficulties typical to occupied France. On 13 December 1943, for example, workers of the factory went on strike and demanded increased salaries. The French management was able to resume work after only 25 minutes, but in the meantime a German SS and police detachment appeared at the factory and detained 18 workers. Although Focke-Wulf ’s representative in Paris thought that this was a successful action which improved discipline in the factory, overall French output indicates otherwise.135
Messerschmitt’s experience with its partner SNCAN was generally similar. As revealed in the correspondence of Messerschmitt’s Paris office and the French firm, inefficiency, passive resistance and sabotage caused difficulties and delays in the production of the quite simple Me 108 in France.136
Despite the difficulties encountered in France, production of complete German aircraft was increased after several German factories were damaged or destroyed by Allied air raids in the second half of 1943 and in early 1944. Focke-Wulf, for example, outsourced final assembly of FW 190 fighters to the French firm Morane-Saulnier in early 1944. Production was slow and largely ineffective, so practically no aircraft were completed by this firm before the liberation of France.137
In contrast to Focke-Wulf and other firms, Milch and Karl Otto Saur, head of the
General director, designer and test pilot Kurt Tank is congratulated by coworkers upon com- pletion of a successful test flight in one of the aircraft he designed for Focke-Wulf (courtesy National Air and Space Museum, Smithsonian Institution, SI 80-2397).
Jägerstab, were not impressed by the French industry. Milch remarked on 1 June 1944 that once the Allies invaded France the French would cease working. He said that when that hap - pened, French workers should be forcefully brought to work in Germany. Plans were made to evacuate as many as possible production machines and workers from France after the begin- ning of the invasion.138Massive Allied air interdiction of the French transportation network before and after the invasion was the main reason that this plan was never fully implemented. Focke-Wulf, however, remained fixated on French production, especially when it was involved in long-term projects, like the FW 300 and its derivatives. Its story demonstrates the ups and downs of industrial cooperation with French firms. The FW 300 project began in 1941 and was initially proposed as an improved and enlarged civilian and military version of the FW 200 Condor maritime patrol aircraft.139In 1943 the original idea was abandoned and the project evolved into a much larger and completely new aircraft. It was renamed FW 300A or Ta 400, in honor of its designer Kurt Tank. Focke-Wulf and the RLM hoped to fly a prototype of the aircraft in early 1945 and to commence operational service in 1946. At least until April 1942 Focke-Wulf hoped to develop in parallel a large civilian airliner from the FW 300A for use in postwar long-range civilian aviation. SNCASO was supposed to begin development of the airliner in August 1942.140
Focke-Wulf planned from the outset to use French design capacity to design the FW 300 and to release German designers for work on main core projects, especially the FW 190 fighter and its derivatives. As the aircraft evolved into the more complicated FW 300A, some 80 percent of the work involved in its design and development was contracted to Technique de Chatillon. Later SNCASO was hired as the main FW 300A contractor. In this framework Focke-Wulf conceived in early 1943, in concert with SNCASO, a scheme to bring some of the French design staff working on the project to Germany and let them work there independently in their own design bureaus. The RLM approved this scheme on 14 August 1943 after negotiations with the French Ministry of Production and the Reich Plenipotentiary for Labor Mobilization (GBA) regarding the employment arrangements and conditions for the French workers.141 French designers first settled in Focke-Wulf ’s main design center in Bad Eilsen, but later the German firm allocated them separate offices in Lage.142The significant involvement of foreigners in the design work raised security concerns and Focke-Wulf directed the Germans involved in the project to keep a watchful eye on their French colleagues.143
Work on the FW 300A/Ta 400 and other projects dragged on due to Germany’s wors- ening war situation. In July 1943 the Technical Office noted that due to difficulties with the design work in France and due to lack of capacity, the program had suffered delays, and further recommended its termination.144The RLM decided, however, to allow Focke-Wulf to continue the development of the aircraft.
By the time the Allies landed in Normandy there was not even a prototype at the works. However, even during these desperate times Focke-Wulf kept working on the project. Its representatives even traveled to France on 10 June 1944 to discuss this and other projects with their French partners. The representatives met SNCASO engineers in Paris to discuss the progress of the FW 300A/Ta 400 project. The main topic of the meeting was the design and manufacture of the fuel tanks for the aircraft.145At the same time, and not very far from Paris, Allied troops had already established a beachhead in Normandy. Not a single FW 300A/Ta 400 was completed.
Further indication of the unrealistic approach of considering the prospect of further work in France after the invasion is the fact that on 20 June 1944 Focke-Wulf submitted a detailed plan for the production of wings for its new Ta 152 fighter by SNCASO’s factory in Chatillon. The German firm decided to subcontract Chatillon for this purpose in May 1944, but going ahead with this scheme under the new situation seems to reflect a bad flow of information at the higher levels, or a loss of touch with reality by Focke-Wulf ’s execu- tives.146This sort of over-optimism and detachment from the urgency of the military situ- ation in the West is also strongly reflected by a remark Saur made during a Jägerstab meeting on 3 July. Answering a question regarding the prospects of producing the Ju 388 medium bomber in Hungary, he replied that he would like to move its production “partially to France and to produce there substantial numbers” of this plane.147
From 1942 the Germans outsourced other minor aviation research and development projects to French firms. Among them was the development of several light aircraft and trainers, but also of larger and complicated aircraft, like the He 274 and Ju 488 heavy bombers. None of these aircraft was ever completed, but after the liberation the French assembled two He 274 prototypes and used them for research and development of pressure cabins. There were other far-fetched programs outsourced to French firms. In August 1942 Blohm & Voss contracted the Breguet firm to produce two prototypes of its variable incidence wing BV 144 civilian transporter — another aircraft designed for the postwar
Outsourcing. A poor quality but unique photograph of the Ju 488 V401 heavy bomber prototype during assembly at the Latécoère factory in Toulouse (courtesy U.S. National Archives and Records Administration).
aviation market. The Germans supplied some of the jigs and production tools, and Breguet manufactured the rest. This aircraft also never went into series production as the RLM gradually forced firms to halt all civilian projects. Only one prototype of the plane was