CONECULTA 10 DANZA FOLKLORIKA
H. AYUNTAMIENTO DE TUXTLA GUTIERREZ
For the first three years of the conflict, US policy on Bosnia was often vacillating between two competing policies favoured by different groups of the Clinton administration members.177 The default policy of the administration was “detachment” from the conflict on the grounds that Bosnia was a European problem which Europe should assume responsibility for its mediation. The detachment policy also included a containment component as the administration was trying to
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The most effective pressure US exerted was upon the Croatian government by indicating the possibility of imposing international sanctions on Croatia if it continued to support the Bosnian Croats and kept some of 30,000 its own troops within Bosnia (Silber and Little 1995, 335-336; Rudman 1996, 539). Also, at least one journalist has reported that the Bosnian Muslims agreed to form a federation with the Croats only after the US threatened to withdraw its support to the Muslim controlled Bosnian government (Burg and Shoup 1999, 299).
176 During the last four days of February 1994, at the State Department in Washington, US Ambassadors Redman and Galbraith conducted proximity talks between a Croatian delegation led by Foreign
Minister Mate Granic and a Bosnian delegation led by Prime Minister Haris Silajdzic. Although the
agreement would also be signed by a Bosnian Croat representative, the negotiations were conducted by the Croatian government delegation (Rudman 1996).
177
This section mostly draws on the US Department of State’s (1997) Dayton History Project Papers and the two monographs on US policy in Bosnia which are based on those papers authored by Ivo Daalder (2000) and Derek Chollet (2005). The Dayton History Project Papers are now unclassified and released in part, see “The Dayton History Project Papers (1997) - The Road to Dayton: U.S. Diplomacy and the Bosnia Peace Process, May-December 1995”, accessible online at:
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limit Bosnia’s effect on its wider foreign policy and relations with its European allies. Another policy which occasionally gained momentum, as the conflict deepened, was “lift and strike”. The “lift and strike” policy essentially meant lifting the arms embargo and helping the Muslims acquire weapons and at the same time protecting the UN declared safe havens through airstrikes at the Bosnian Serb targets by the NATO forces. But the “lift and strike” policy often run into European opposition, as the Europeans, particularly the British and the French who had their troops as UN peacekeepers on the ground, argued that this would only deteriorate the conflict and put their troops at the risk of being attacked or kidnapped by the Serbs (Daalder 2000, 11-19).
Even as late as 1994, the Clinton administration officials were still divided over the course of US policy despite the fact that there were two successful American initiatives in mediating the conflict in early 1994. In February, after a Bosnian Serb mortar attack that killed 68 people, the US managed to convince its NATO allies to issue a strong ultimatum, threatening use of airpower, which led the Bosnian Serbs withdrew their heavy weapons from the vicinity of the city.178 And in March, as discussed above, the US successfully mediated between the Croats and the Muslims. However, according to Daalder (2000, 85), it was only in early 1995 that Anthony Lake, Clinton’s NSC chief, concluded that a “workable” US strategy for Bosnia was needed. By early August 1995, the US strategy was agreed within the Clinton administration and Lake then set off to Europe to visit the Contact Group countries and a few other crucial allies, such as Italy and Turkey.
The main plan was that there would be all-out negotiations to reach a comprehensive settlement in Bosnia which would be based on the Contact Group but also taking into account the recent territorial changes. The sanctions on Yugoslavia would be suspended once agreement reached, and completely lifted when the agreement had been implemented; there would be three-way recognition between Croatia, Bosnia, and Yugoslavia; and a solution for eastern Slavonia, a Croatian Serb controlled part of Croatia bordering Serbia. In short, the primary goal was to tackle all the former Yugoslav conflicts within a comprehensive settlement which would be attained through sustained pressure, particularly on the Serbs. There was also an alternative strategic action plan in the event that no settlement was reached at the end of the all-out negotiations. According to this alternative plan, if the negotiations were to fail, the UNPROFOR would be withdrawn and the arms embargo lifted; and military support would be provided to the Bosnians Muslims, while the no-fly zone would still be maintained. However, if the Bosnians were
178
E. Sciolino (1994b), “Conflict in the Balkans; U.S. Said to Plan Bosnia Ultimatum Urging Air Strikes”, The
New York Times, 9 Feb., http://www.nytimes.com/1994/02/09/world/conflict-in-the-balkans-us-said-to- plan-bosnia-ultimatum-urging-air-strikes.html (accessed 28/8/12); and Silber and Little (1995, 343-353).
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deemed to be as uncooperative during the all-out-negotiations, the US would simply lift the arms embargo and leave.179 The US strategy was widely welcomed in Europe, though not every aspect of the US strategy was liked (Daalder 2000, 114). The US strategy was essentially based on coercive measures: there would be severe consequences for the party or the parties which did not show cooperative behaviour during the negotiations.