B ASES TEÓRICAS

Rise of religious cults in the 1960s captivated the interest of researchers to study the growing phenomenon of religious conversion. Although social or psychological influences were the primary focus, investigators recognized particularities of belief as descriptive of distinctive religious paradigms. They affirmed the ultimate claims of religious belief as an inescapable aspect of conversion. Lofland and Stark (1965, p. 862) described conversion as ‘when a person gives up one perspective or ordered view of the world for another’. Similarly, Seggar and Kunz (1972, p. 178) defined religious conversion as ‘a process by which a person comes to accept the ideology of a group.’ Greil (1977, p. 188) characterized conversion as incorporating a changed worldview perspective, ‘coming to accept the opinions of one’s significant others.’ Similarly, Heirich (1977, pp. 654, 655, 675) defined conversion as ‘accepting a belief system and behaviors strongly at odds with one’s previous cognitive structure and actions’ or returning to the same worldview ‘to a set of beliefs and

conversion as ‘fairly radical reorientation of religious understandings and a continuing religious quest’ for the convert, including a ‘major examination of the claims of root reality’.

These definitions of conversion implied varying levels of substantive belief for the convert – from mere acceptance or professed belief of others’ opinions to a radical shift in religious orientation and root reality (Stark, 1965, Greil, 1977).23 _{Gartrell and Shannon} (1985) affirmed cognitive evaluation of the new belief system must occur if the convert is to move from mere participation to belief of the new ideology prior to or during the conversion process.24 _{Snow and Machalek (1984, pp. 169-171)also distinguished between radical} change in conversion (regeneration) and more superficial change (adhesion or alternation) which does not disrupt an existing world view. Their view affirmed the substantive

component as foundational, seeing conversion as radical change in beliefs, values, behaviors, identity, and interpersonal loyalties. For them, religious conversion is a fundamental

alteration in one’s ‘sense of ultimate grounding’ or ‘root reality’ with ‘displacement of one universe of discourse by another.’ Nominal, peripheral or previously unheld beliefs become true and central, informing life. For Straus (1979, pp. 163-164), ‘the most intriguing aspect of the conversion phenomenon is how material communicated to the seeker as concepts comes to be experiences as actuality’ and how ‘the grounds of meaning and collective reality of a social world which the person initially accepts become a belief for which the person may willingly suffer and die a martyr’. He maintained that an active seeker pursues, accepts, and commits to a new world by participating in new experiences, mastering new practices, forming a new identity thereby establishing a new reality. Converts are active in the

construction and reconstruction of their social and phenomenological realities as they work to

23 _{STARK, J. L. A. R. 1965. Becoming a World-Saver: A Theory of Conversion to a Deviant Perspective. American} Sociological Review, 30, 862-875. Lofland and Stark differentiated two degrees of conversion: (1) verbal converts –

professed belief but not active in new convert role; and, (2) total converts – change in belief as exhibited in word and action. GREIL, A. L. 1977. Previous Dispositions and Conversion to Perspectives of Social and Religious Movements. Sociological

Analysis, 38, 115-125. Greil differentiates between ‘conversion’ (incorporating changed worldview) from ‘recruitment’

(changed action and involvement but not necessarily altered perspective).

24 _{SHANNON, C. D. G. A. Z. K. 1985. Contacts, Cognitions, and Conversions: A Rational Choice Approach. Review of}

Religious Research, 27, 32-48. Their Rational Choice Approach to religious conversion in which the ‘pieces of the

conversion puzzle’ include social-emotional and/or cognitive rewards. They assert that a convert is motivated based upon probable outcome of their action towards or against conversion, p. 39.

make conversion behaviorally and experientially real to self and others. When the convert encounters unqualified belief, conversion becomes tenuous and the convert often defects from the new belief system. However, Straus’s use of the term ‘unqualified belief’ begs the question of whether conversion reaches beyond mere active participation and construction of a new social reality to the need for intellectual grounding.

The literature also suggests that cognitive sense-making plays a role in religious conversion through an individual’s desire to understand reality in a novel way. When a person’s presumed worldview becomes challenged, felt cognitive dissonance can prompt seeking after another perspective to provide an answer (Lofland and Stark, 1965, Greil, 1977, Gartrell and Shannon, 1985, Pitt, 1991, Rambo, 1993, 1999). Lofland and Stark (1965) proposed that a perceived discrepancy between an individual’s beliefs and the reality of life’s experiences creates an open disposition towards active searching for a new view of the world that makes sense.25 _{For Greil (1977, p. 119), ‘man is a meaning-seeking animal who cannot} endure the sense of being bereft of a viable worldview’ and if disillusioned searches for a perspective that can restore meaning to the world within social referents.26 _{Gartrell and} Shannon (1985) similarly viewed conversion as a means of ridding oneself of the unpleasant state of cognitive imbalance and obtaining social rewards from others as a conscious

deliberation of alternative choices. Rambo (1999) called this view an ‘intellectualist theory’ of conversion which promotes humans as active agents who seek to understand, explain, predict, and control their world through cognitive activities. Pitt (1991, p. 174) perceived conversion as facilitated through the cognitive states of individuals as converts seek

25 _{STARK, J. L. A. R. 1965. Becoming a World-Saver: A Theory of Conversion to a Deviant Perspective. American}

Sociological Review, 30, 862-875. Lofland and Stark’s examples of tension-producing circumstances as: unrealized wealth,

knowledge, fame, prestige; hallucinatory activity, frustrated sexual and marital relations, homosexual guilt, acute fear of face-to-face interaction, disabling and disfiguring physical conditions, a frustrated desire for a significant, heroic, religious status…to be a famous agent for divine purposes.

26 _{GREIL, A. L. 1977. Previous Dispositions and Conversion to Perspectives of Social and Religious Movements.}

Sociological Analysis, 38, 115-125. For Greil, an individual’s knowledge is utilitarian and will generally remain unevaluated

and unaltered as long as it sufficiently navigates presenting situations and adequately interprets past experiences. If a person encounters a new situation for which their stock of knowledge is inept to resolve the issue at hand, he/she will be pressed to ‘learn something new’ or ‘work out the answer’ or realize that ‘what he thought was true has been wrong all along’. Greil presumes worldview shift is based upon tension between reality and perceived ideal whereby an individual looks for answers to a presenting problem to/through social reference groups.

resolution of cognitive dissonance. Converts seek after cognitive consistency to achieve balance through social belonging and subsequent belief. However, his theory differs from Gartrell and Shannon in that resolution of cognitive state is not conscious, rational

deliberation but rather ‘a reflexive reaction to a psychologically stressful state’. These researchers agreed that when an individual’s worldview is intellectually challenged, he/she may be compelled to seek a more satisfying explanation, driving an active search for answers, meaning and change towards a set of religious beliefs.

Further, as converts seek a new perspective, intellectual congruence between two ideologies plays a role in religious conversion. Individuals willing to explore alternative explanations may be limited by intellectual congruity between their existing worldview and the new religious perspective. An individual’s base knowledge guides their religious search and their presuppositions restrict the range of plausible religious options. Individuals are more likely to seek after certain kinds of statements, arguments or positions that are within a familiar explanatory system (Heirich, 1977, Greil, 1977, Richardson, 1985). However, ideological congruence is not always necessary. Greil (1977) argued prior dispositions do not determine conversion. In circumstances where the felt need for a new viable perspective was urgent (such as life crisis), presuppositions played a less restricting role. Due to social interaction, the range of exposure to new perspectives is virtually unlimited. Individuals could convert from any worldview to any other as long as they encountered persons who share that new perspective. When ideological congruence exists, it serves as a facilitative rather than a necessary role in conversion.

While researchers acknowledge the role of intellectual sense-making in religious conversion, it has often been in the context of relationship to sociological factors. First, some researchers deem social influence as the major variable in conversion rather than viewing converts as intentional seekers after a change in perspective (Seggar and Kunz 1972; Austin 1977; Greil 1977). In their study of Mormon converts, Seggar and Kunz (1972) found positive, intensive interaction with the new group as fostering conversion. Many of their

converts are unaware of Mormon beliefs before conversion, reinforcing the dominant role of social over cognitive influences. Snow and Phillips (1980) elevated social interaction as essential in conversion, declaring religious conversion as highly improbable without the situational conditions of affective, intensive interaction between the potential convert and the new religious group. Through an 18-month immersion into an American Buddhist movement, they interviewed 15 converts and examining 504 testimonies from 1966-1974. Their research showed that 82% of potential converts developed affective bonds with the recruiting religious group before conversion. This bond bridged the information gap between the potential convert’s existing and new ideology, increasing not only the new worldview’s credibility but also the social pressure to conform. Without such affective bond, the likelihood of religious conversion decreased. Neither ideological congruence nor active questing were necessary components in their view.

Secondly, researchers contend that positive or negative social interaction with the religious group influences acceptance or rejection of religious belief (Greil, 1977, Gartrell and Shannon, 1985). Greil (1977) maintained strong affective bonds increased the chance of conversion and openness to the adoption of and belief in a new worldview. Conversely, social or emotional absence weakened affective bonds and discredited potential convert belief. For Gartrell and Shannon (1985) conversion is motivated by expected social and cognitive rewards, although social rewards hold priority. Strong social contacts within a new religious group increased the likelihood of belief and conversion, whereas strong social contacts outside of the group decreased the likelihood of conversion to the new group. They advocated a Rational Choice Approach balancing social relationships, participation in religious activities, and religious content in the conversion process.

Finally, while social, affective bonds are necessary towards conversion, they may not be sufficient to effect or sustain conversion in all cases. Heirich (1977) appreciates a more integrated view of the process and implications of religious conversion. After reviewing 50 empirical studies of religious conversion, he reported the trend in research favoring

conversion as a functional, experiential phenomenon. He (1977, p. 674) argued social influence is not enough to show how a person comes to shift one’s sense of root reality, stating, ‘Conversion involves a conscious shift in one’s sense of grounding…involves

examination of core sense of reality, identifying aspects which must be responded to with the whole being and which presumably will affect action choices for the convert thereafter.’ In his view, functional motivations (e.g., psychological need due to personal or societal stress; to the impact of prior social, gender, and educational conditioning; and/or, due to the influence from social, interpersonal interactions) are often attributed as primary reasons for conversion even though substantive causes (discovering truth of the new worldview and/or reporting a spiritual experience) may be significant. Heirich (1977, p. 656) clarified, ‘Believers usually develop a series of causal arguments about how God works, whereas social scientists have tended to explain the phenomenon as a subset of psychological or social processes observable more generally.’27 _{He concluded that functionally-driven explanations} are inadequate to account for the reason(s) individuals’ shift in ‘root reality’ and limit the range of causes and circumstances precipitating conversion. Therefore, he advocated for including substantive belief content for showing how converts shift their understanding of the world under the influence of others. _{Heirich claimed, ‘To be convincing, any causal}

argument should have to show links between content and experience.’ Further, he (Heirich, 1977, pp. 673-675) encouraged a greater understanding of the circumstances which ‘destroy clarity about root reality,’ ‘prompts a person’s sense of ultimate reality shifting,’ and

‘encourages reexamination of the most basic assumptions’.

Heirich (1977) tested religious conversion motivations through conducting 310 interviews evaluating the influence of stress, socialization, and social influence on

27 _{HEIRICH, M. 1977. Change of Heart: A Test of Some Widely Held Theories about Religious Conversion. American}

Journal of Sociology, 12, 653-680. Comparison between converts and non-converts regarding the same influences was

notably lacking in the literature. Per Heirich, for those studies which included a control sample (Kildahl 1965; Allison 1968) or deconversion sample (Kotre 1971), no significant differences in unusual or stressful personality styles,

conversion.28 _{He defined conversion as ‘a fairly radical reorientation of religious}

understandings of God, personal behavior, and challenges of accepting new belief as well as a continuing religious quest for the majority of converts’ (Heirich, p. 661). Social influences showed ‘the route of the religious seeker’, but they were not adequate to explain how or what motivates a person towards a religious quest or a religious response. His results also

suggested contact alone is not enough to produce a conscious shift in a core sense of reality and subsequent life choices. New converts ‘usually make a major examination of the claims or encounters which underlie the symbols and activities involved’. In response, Heirich suggested a systematic approach to determine social, psychological and divine influencesas mutual interacting forces moving a person towards conversion. Heirich’s admonition opened the door towards broadening the scope of potential integrative causes and fostering a ‘thicker’ conception of religious conversion. Lofland and Skonovd (1981) acknowledged that belief is deemphasized within relativistic cultures in which ‘all systems of social knowledge and beliefs are sustained by an underlying sentimental order’…when ‘Truth is a function of what is defined as such in the individual’s social and emotional milieu making it common for people to participate actively in their new roles as converts in advance of their cognitive assent to its theological implications.’ As an example, Rambo (1993, p. 1), religious

conversion and its associated beliefs are primarily a socially constructed phenomenon, mediated through people, institutions, communities, and groups.

[It is] what a group or person says it is. The process of conversion is a product of the interactions among the convert’s aspirations, needs, and orientations, the nature of the group in which she or he is being converted, and the particular social matrix in which these processes are taking place.

28 _{Ibid. Heirich evaluated the influence of stress (e.g., pre-conversion stressful circumstances, major role shifts, parental} education), socialization (e.g., religious roles, parochial education, birth order, prior religious practice), and immediate social influence (e.g., person who introduced the new religious paradigm, friendship history with religious adherents, frequency of worship attendance). Findings revealed the roles of stress and prior socialization had little bearing on religious conversion; however, the impact of social influence bore greater influence upon a potential convert than one’s psychological state or prior socialization, particularly if such individual was actively seeking towards a change in religious perspective. Immediate personal relationships also influenced persons who were not actively seeking; however, contact alone was insufficient to produce a change of heart.

Religious conversion demands intellectual assent as well as social conformity, existential trust, and radical life transformation within a lived reality. While some

researchers value sociological variables as primary in changing ‘root reality’, others deem cognitive dissonance, intellectual congruence, and grounded belief as key factors in the conversion process. The question remains as to what role belief plays as the convert discovers and resolves life’s mysteries through conversion. If religion answers profound explanations for ultimate reality, it begs the question as to whether or not belief content is a viable and verifiable part of religion and religious conversion or instead merely illusory, psychologically or socially motivated. Further, what, if any, is the role does transcendent experience play, if any, in conversion?