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There have been a number of studies that have attempted to evaluate New Labour’s welfare reforms. A minority have been generally positive towards the outputs and outcomes of these reforms.

Those who advance its success argue that programmes such as the New Deal 25+ represents a great leap forward in terms of tackling joblessness amongst groups who would otherwise rapidly lose touch with the job market (Lindsay, 2002). Lindsay argues that the long-term unemployed face complex and multi-dimensional barriers to work. The New Deal interventions for job seekers provided basic learning and training opportunities whilst supporting them as they sought to secure employment through low-skilled entry-level positions. However, despite these advances, Lindsay claims New Labour had no coherent strategy in place to ensure continued opportunities for skills development and lifelong learning. Thus former New Deal participants were likely to be susceptible to repeated spells of unemployment without gaining the skills which might allow for long-term mobility in the labour market. This would appear to be an important failure, given New Labour’s rhetoric of joined up government and lifelong learning. Arguably it failed due to a narrow focus during policy development with a move away from the human capital model they had previously adopted. It would appear that New Labour failed to take an holistic approach to improving the employability and welfare of individuals and families.

It has also been argued that the New Deals did much to help ethnic minorities (Fieldhouse, Kalra & Alam, 2002). Fieldhouse, Kalra & Alam claim that there was an overall positive perception by ethnic minority participants who were interviewed. This was especially true of the subsidised placements which gave them jobs they might not have previously thought open to them. Furthermore, many NDYP participants felt that the NDYP provided the right opportunity at the right time; participants mentioned an improvement in skills, confidence and motivation, helping them to overcome previous barriers to employment. 41,700 or 12% of NDYP leavers had dropped out prior to the initial interview since its inception, the figure for ethnic minorities was a very similar 11%. Reported reasons for leaving the NDYP included domestic responsibilities, deliberate avoidance and finding alternative employment. It was also found that the

48 experiences of young Asians in Oldham appeared similar to those of white unemployed people elsewhere with no evidence of direct racism in the delivery of the programme. Fieldhouse, Kalra & Alam point to a number of other studies conducted around the same time which also examined the NDYP and which corroborated their findings (Bonjour et al, 2001; Bryson et al, 2000; Hasluck, 2000a; 2000b; Legard & Ritchie, 1999). These studies are important as they show no significant differences between ethnic groups.

The New Deal, the Working Families Tax Credit, National Childcare Strategy and other innovations have proved effective in increasing employment rates amongst single parent households (Giddens, 2002). Attempts to improve the employment rate of single parents by reducing benefits and increasing opportunities and job training via the New Deal were encouraging, although the UK still fell far short of the 90% employment rate for single parents in Denmark. It could be argued that many lone parents who found work were easy to place ‘low-hanging fruit’ in that they were already well qualified, had recent work experience and were therefore much closer to the labour market, perhaps having only taken a short career-break before returning to work once their children went into childcare. In pursuing the goal of higher employment rates in single parent households, however, Giddens argues state agencies are unable to deliver public services efficiently and equitably without working collaboratively with non-state agencies such as non-profit, third sector organisations and private companies. However, this argument and those which are positive about New Labour’s reforms appear to rest on an implicit assumption that state-funded and state-led efforts to improve employability and find work are always necessary, and were the only possible factor in contributing to falling unemployment. The importance of strong economic growth and favourable macro-economic conditions has not been widely discussed or given the prominence that empirical evidence would suggest it might deserve12_.

Finally, it has been argued that targets set out in New Labour’s 1997 manifesto pledges were being met by the end of the first term (Powell, 2002). Using a balanced

12 _{Chapter 4 includes an examination of the relationship between rates of economic growth and}

49 scorecard approach for each social policy area, each was assessed by New Labour in their annual reports, and, seemingly arbitrarily, assigned a score out of 10. The results were as follows:

Table 2.2.: Progress against Manifesto/Annual Report targets for social security

Pledge New Labour’s Assessment Score/10 27: 10p starting rate for

income tax

Done 10

28: Cut VAT on fuel to 5% Done 10

46: Introduce NMW Done 5

47: Get 250,000 long-term unemployed young people back to work

On course 8

48: Tackle long-term unemployment

On course 7

50: Help single parents back to work

Kept 5

52: Crack down on benefit fraud

On course 2

83: National Childcare Strategy

On course 8

85: Retain universal child benefit

Done 7

94: Protect BSP Done 7

95: Help poorest pensioners Done 7

96: Retain SERPS Kept 6

97: Produce framework for stakeholder pension

On course 5

98: Create citizenship pensions for carers

On course 4

(Source: Powell, 2002, p. 198)

Across the board Powell concludes that “from an ‘intrinsic’ viewpoint, it is possible to credit government reforms with a degree of success” (Powell, 2002. p. 199). Analysis of New Labour’s welfare reform record to 2002 shows that “existing verdicts give a mixed but generally positive evaluation on New Labour’s welfare reforms [...] however, the exaggerated promises, the two-year spending freeze and the obsession with meeting ‘targets’ is viewed as ‘poor or indifferent’ policy, ” (ibid. p. 231).

Although Powell’s work was a seemingly systematic analysis, he acknowledges the limitations of using a balanced scorecard approach: “Clearly, on one level this is a crude and impressionistic exercise to be regarded ‘just for fun’ like the famous swingometer on election nights. However, on another level, it is no less crude and impressionistic than the verdicts provided by the civil servants in the Annual Reports”

50 (2002. p. 239). This is possibly an oblique reference to New Public Management’s use by the UK Civil Service. The results of his balanced scorecards, like many previous works in this field, contribute to the debate, but ultimately rely upon a somewhat shallow and subjective judgement of the success or otherwise of New Labour’s reforms.

The creation of Jobcentre Plus has also been praised as representing the culmination of the New Labour’s policy solutions. It was seen as enhancing the capacity of the working-age population to take advantage of new technological and economic developments, and expanding the effective supply of labour (Wiggan, 2007). By combining the Employment Service and the Benefits Agency, their separate individual objectives and targets no longer hinder each other but instead provide for effective joint working towards the new socio-economic goals underpinning New Labour’s welfare-to-work policy (Wiggan, 2007). Nevertheless, there remained shortcomings of New Labour’s welfare reforms. For instance, the active labour market policies put in place to encourage individuals into the labour market have failed to raise skill levels successfully and simply pushed people into insecure contingent employment (Peck & Theodore, 2000. cited in Wiggan, 2007). Welfare-to-work programmes also emphasised the improvement of basic soft skills, and yet large numbers of the working population continue to lack basic literacy, numeracy and job ready communication skills (Work and Pensions Committee, 2002a; Leitch, 2006, cited in Wiggan, 2007; Hill, 2012).

Very few evaluations have attempted to provide an holistic evaluation of New Labour’s record with the exception of Toynbee & Walker (2001; 2005; 2011) and Diamond & Kenny (eds.) (2011). While these works attempt to cover a considerable amount of ground, they fail to offer the depth of critical analysis and are generally sympathetic. They focus instead on headline social statistics which they take at face value and lack the curiosity which would have yielded more constructive conclusions.

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