Mubarak opted for what could be called ‘the third way’ in Egyptian foreign policy. While maintaining Sadat’s legacy—US alliance, peace with Israel—, Mubarak succeeded in reintegrating Egypt into the Arab world. The 1980s saw the gradual cessation of the Arab boycott of Egypt, which had been initiated as a result of Egypt’s separate peace with Israel. With Mubarak’s assumption of power in 1981, the Egyptian press immediately ended its hostile campaigns against Arab states, particularly Libya and Syria, who were among the strongest critics of the Egypt-Israel peace accord. Mubarak’s conciliatory move contrasted with the hostile discourse favoured by Sadat in defending the Camp David Treaty. Mubarak’s conciliatory gesture in ending media hostility was appreciated by the Arab regimes concerned. Furthermore, such moves were welcomed by nationalist and Islamist forces inside Egypt, who were largely opposed to relations with Israel, while rejecting hostility towards Arab countries (Al-Awadi 2003, p.76). The Iran-Iraq war, which followed closely on from the 1979 Iranian Revolution, also provided an opportunity for Egypt to reassert its role as a leading Arab power. Egypt’s stance during the war was instrumental in restoring Egypt’s relations with the Arab Gulf states. Mubarak opted to support Iraq- incidentally the biggest Arab state to oppose Sadat’s Western policy- largely on the basis of Iraq being an ‘Arab country’. Indeed, this approach to regional politics “hit a chord among most Egyptians and certainly boosted the populist legitimacy of the new regime” (Al-Awadi 2003, p.76). Resultantly, in the 1980s Egypt had managed to bolster its credentials as a crucial power in the Arab Middle East, returning back in to the Arab concert. Additionally, Egypt’s contribution during the 1991 Gulf war had been substantial. Mubarak’s tactical manoeuvre in making Egypt the lead Arab state in the coalition against Saddam Hussein, lent legitimacy to the US and Western campaign to liberate Kuwait. However, and in spite of wide opposition to Egypt’s participation in that campaign, it also helped to ideationally legitimise the regime in relation to influential circles in the business and middle classes, who supported Sadat’s approach of distancing Egypt from populist policies, instead drawing closer to the West. The
economic benefits accrued by Egypt due to participation in the Gulf War were also considerable. By the end of the 1980s and in to the early 1990s, Egypt could once again claim Arab leadership (Doran 2006, p.117).
The ‘moderate’ foreign policy of Mubarak is apparent when considering relations with the two most crucial states to Egypt: the US and Israel. Mubarak maintained a moderate, middle path when dealing with them. While abiding by the strategic partnership that Sadat established with the USA, Mubarak was eager to present himself to Egyptians as defending the country’s independence. For example, in 1983 he refused to accept $500 million in U.S. aid to develop Egypt's Ras Binas naval military base (Al-Awadi 2003, p.75). Egypt also refused to support President Reagan’s 1985 bombing of Libya. In the second half of the 1990s, Mubarak opposed Clinton’s tough sanctions against Saddam Hussein’s regime in Iraq. With regard to Israel, continuing the steady progress in foreign policy achieved in the 1980s, Mubarak managed to position Egypt as a mediator at the heart of the Middle East peace process in the 1990s. The Mubarak regime consistently emphasised their apparently unique situation in mediating the Arab-Israeli conflict, due to its alliance with the USA and established diplomatic relations with Israel. Mubarak perceived that the resolution of the conflict peaceably, with a preeminent role played by Egypt, would enhance its position as a powerful actor in the region. Egypt’s defence of the Camp David accords and consequent moves to normalise relations with Israel, was redeemed when Syria, Jordan and even the PLO sought similar peaceful resolutions to conflict with Israel (Karawan 2002, pp.166–167). The preserve of Egypt’s foreign policy had been the Palestinian-Israeli question, first as a mediator between Israel and the Palestinians, then between the different Palestinian factions (Pioppi et al. 2011).
However, being the peace process mediator did not prevent Mubarak from establishing a solid path of ‘cold peace’, which stood the test of time. While emphasising the regime’s commitment to the peace accords, full normalisation of relations might well have jeopardised Mubarak’s legitimacy. A prime example of cold peace in action was Mubarak’s refusal to visit Israel, which he adhered to bar the attendance of Prime Minister Yitzak Rabin’s funeral in 1995. He also refused, due to Prime Minister Netanyahu’s intransigence over implementing the Oslo Peace Accords, to participate in the Multilateral Economic Conference in Doha, despite US requests. Egypt had protested that they were pressured by the USA to become party to the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty, despite the exceptional position allowed to Israel over its non-signing. The regime clearly championed the Palestinian cause and denounced Israeli violence in the Occupied Territories, reflected in diplomatic moves such as the withdrawal of its ambassador to Israel in November 2000 against the backdrop of the second Palestinian intifada (Karawan 2002, p.166).
Political Arabism was also invoked by the Mubarak regime, with the adoption of Arabist rhetoric in an overt manner. Karawan (2002, p.166) noted the eminence of Arabist rhetoric in the regime’s approach to the Arab-Israeli conflict, emphatically tying further rehabilitation of Israel to the resolution of various disputes. Indeed, the revival of Nasserist ideology in certain circumstances, although largely symbolic, was intended to satisfy the domestic audience, capturing the popular critical sentiment toward Israel. That was clear in the performance of the Foreign Minister Amr Moussa, whose personal charisma significantly enhanced the regime’s ideational legitimacy in the 1990s. Moussa’s consistent and vocal willingness to speak out over Israel’s actions in the Palestinian territories, furthermore contrasting with US administrations’ biased perspectives, garnered the support of a vast swathe of Egyptians. His positive reputation in Egypt and across the region was only aided by the Israeli media’s repeated ad hominem attacks (Stacher 2007, p.110). Amr Moussa’s tremendous reverence in the public eye largely stemmed from his consistent, vocal and disdainful condemnation of Israel’s activities. Resultantly, he caused waves in the US administration, due to his unusually outspoken and uncompliant attitude. He entered cultural memory during the second Palestinian Intifada, with the song, ‘I hate Israel and love Amr Moussa’ by mainstream artist Sh’aban ‘abd al-Rahim.
The words of a Nasserite middle class Egyptian citizen, who was politically inactive since Sadat visited Jerusalem in 1977, summarises how Mubarak’s foreign policy at this period managed to enhance the level of ideological legitimacy, compared to Sadat:
“This man is good. He has to do what he is doing. He does not visit Israel as his predecessor did for no good reasons. He believes in the Arab world and attempts to help. However, his hands are tied by what Sadat has done to him and to us. He even named his younger son, Gamal, after Gamal Abdel Nasser!” (Shahin 2012).