cf Baruch de Spinoza, Etica , op cit libro II, prop VII.

America’s entry into World War I spurred on existing nativist sentiment, especially against German-Americans who were erroneously deemed spies or traitors despite their support for the war effort.For a while, the war drew attention away from other immigrants from Southern and Eastern Europe whose home countries were resisting the Germans. Unfortunately, the end of the war did not do much to dampen American xenophobia. The Red Scare, labor strikes, and the economic depression from 1920 to 1921 all created social unrest, and such unrest historically breeds restrictive immigration policies.77 On cue, Congress debated new immigration restrictions from 1920 to 1921. With the 1921 Quota Act and the 1924 Johnson-Reed Act, Congress sought 75 Gyory, 258. 76 Jones, 222-224. 77 Ibid, 232-238.

to establish strict limits on how many immigrants could come to the country based on current immigrant residence in the U.S. The Quota Act only allowed immigration each year up to three percent of the current foreign-born population of the country in question, and the Johnson-Reed Act took the number down to two percent.78 These laws cut immigration levels down to fractions of what they had been in previous years.79 Because they were based on populations already residing in the U.S., immigration quotas heavily favored Northwestern Europe to the detriment of immigrants from Asia and Eastern Europe.80

The U.S. Border Patrol was also created by the 1924 Act to guard the southern and northern borders of the country. Compared to today, the original 1930 Border Patrol was miniscule—875 men on horseback covering roughly 2,000 miles. Because the quotas only applied to immigrants from the eastern hemisphere, patrol officers looked for Europeans and Asians trying to cross the border. They almost never detained Mexican crossers, and when they did, they simply took them to an entry checkpoint so they could pay fees and enter the U.S. legally.81

Given that economic troubles normally lead to more restrictive immigration laws, it is somewhat surprising that the Great Depression did not lead to any major immigration bills from Congress. There were certainly calls for more restriction, even for a suspension of immigration completely until the Depression lifted. For three reasons, no major restrictive bill passed in the Depression Congress. First, the Republicans were the main restrictionists, and Democrats took back the House of Representatives in 1930 and won both chambers and the presidency in 1932. 78 LeMay, 121-122. 79 Zolberg, 243; LeMay, 122. 80 Ibid. 81 Zolberg, 266-267.

A Republican government, such as that in the 1920s under Calvin Coolidge, probably would have passed strict legislation.82 Second, both Herbert Hoover and Franklin Roosevelt took administrative action to limit immigration. Specifically, they enforced a provision in the law that denied visas to people likely to become dependent on the government, so both administrations only allowed in the most prosperous immigrants. Finally, Europeans were not coming to

America in large numbers during the Depression. The United States was not so appealing with an economy in tatters, and many immigration quotas were not even being filled.83

The Depression and war era from in the 1930s and 1940s created a sense of crisis that did not bode well for either Jewish or Japanese communities. Despite little immigration during the Depression, Jewish refugees fleeing Nazi Germany were anxious for an American asylum from persecution in Europe. Unfortunately, the American government did almost nothing to help Jewish refugees get into the country at the time, partly because of the prevalent anti-Semitism among Americans and partly because they would become an economic burden for the

government.84 Some like Father Charles Coughlin even claimed that Jews orchestrated the Depression, and many American Jews, fearing immigration would result in increased anti- Semitism, did not advocate for increased quotas. Although Roosevelt took some administrative measures to increase the amount of Jewish immigrants under the 1924 quota law, overall very little red tape was removed to help ease immigration restrictions for Jewish refugees. There was simply no political will to do so, even given a Democratic Congress.85

82 Ibid, 268. 83 Jones, 240. 84

Davd M. Kennedy, Freedom from Fear: The American People in Depression and War, 1929-1945 (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1999), 413.

85

After Pearl Harbor, American antipathy and hostility also turned to Japanese

communities. The government, authorized by President Roosevelt, argued that the presence of Japanese-Americans on the west coast, 70,000 of whom were born in the U.S., represented a danger to the public. The war-time government forcibly moved 110,000 Japanese-Americans from their homes in the west into internment camps for the duration of the war. National security again became the justification for oppressing an entire community of people. Contemptuous feelings towards those of Japanese heritage did not spring up out of nowhere on December 7, 1941. The Japanese were stereotyped before the war as subversive and sneaky, a rogue “other.”86 Much like during the French Revolution and during World War I, the public believed that ideology, radicalism, and loyalty had been imported from overseas, and Pearl Harbor ignited those basic American fears to the detriment of an entire community of citizens.87

During the war, the United States faced labor shortages again, and the government created the Bracero Program in 1942 to fill the worker gap. The program was the result of the Bracero Treaty with Mexico and amounted to one of the most pro-immigrant labor agreements in U.S. history. Partially, American desire for a new workforce came from employers’ prejudice against hiring African-Americans or women.88 The program enabled temporary guest workers to come the U.S. for nine months out of the year, and the U.S. even paid for transportation and minimum wage benefits.89 Even after the war ended, the expanding U.S. economy enabled employers to keep hiring temporary guest workers, and with every new labor shortage, such as

86

Jones, 261.

87

Koven and Götske, 133-134.

88

Kennedy, 777.

89

Terri E. Givens, Garry P. Freeman, and David Leal, Immigration Policy and Security: U.S., European, and Commonwealth Perspectives (New York: Routledge, 2009), 17.

during the Korean War, Mexico was in a position to renegotiate the terms of labor contracts.90 On average, 200,000 guest workers were employed in the United States between 1948 and 1964.91

Major reform came right after the end of the Bracero program in 1964. Largely in

response to the Civil Rights movement of the 1960s, Congress passed the 1965 Immigration and Nationality Act (INA) to end the race-based discrimination that endured under the quota system. In its place, the INA allowed a maximum of 20,000 immigrants for any given country and was not based on the current makeup of the United States.92 The law also implemented an ordered preference system for immigrants that heavily favored family of citizens and current residents and skilled workers or people of “exceptional ability.”93 The shift away from national origin quotas changed the makeup of immigrant populations with the majority of immigrants now coming from Mexico or Central America. The new policy also had the side effect of increasing illegal immigration. The number of apprehensions at the border in 1965 was less than 100,000, but by 1985 it increased to over 1.2 million.94 Between the 60s and the 80s, this surge in illegal immigration completely changed the face of immigration policy.

90

LeMay, 4.

91

Koven and Götske, 134.

92

Jones, 267.

93

Koven and Götske, 137.

94