Base Teórica Nº 3

April 1988; The Nall Street Journal, Thursday 14 April The Daily Telegraph, _{Thursday 14 April 1988, p. 1.}

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organising the flight from Larnaca to A l gi ers .’*

The E m i r a t e ’s considerable trust in Algerian n e g o t i a t o r s ’ powers to resolve the crisis was demonstrated when the leader of the Kuwaiti delegation at Algiers arrived at the airport and in an unprecedented display of optimism spoke of a "happy ending" at what he hoped would be the "last stage" of the hij acking.’ * Such uncharacteristic confidence and outspokenness would have been based on an informed knowledge of the progress made in the dealings with the terrorists by Cypriot and PLO intermediaries, whose actions and decisions were subject to Kuwaiti consultations and constant sc rutiny,’* This policy could easily account for the frequency of n e g o t i a t o r s ’ journeys between the airport terminal and the aircraft at times of important negotiating development.

As the hijacking progressed, K u w a i t ’s implacable unwillingness to be seen to be involved with negotiations began to waver and a readiness to cooperate with all parties (including, ultimately, the terrorists) became increasingly apparent. In the early stages, while the aircraft was situated at Mashhad, Kuwait was insistent that it should remain grounded, even suggesting that some unspecified norm of international law obligated the Iranians to prevent take off if departure was opposed by the state of registration of the aircraft (in this case, Ku wait).’ ® Once the flight had left the jurisdiction of the Iranians, whom Kuwait clearly did not trust to resolve the incident in an acceptable manner, and the hijacking had moved location to Cyprus, the official Kuwaiti view moderated on this issue, first because of the overtly cooperative stance of the Cypriot government and the PLO and latterly on account of the introduction to the scenario of Algeria. Instead of issuing public pronouncements on the illegality of departure, Kuwaiti officials initially stated that some form of deal with the terrorists might be conceived of in which the o f f e n d e r s ’ flight from Larnaca would take place. The prior condition for the supply of fuel and the granting of departure rights was said to be the release of all h ost a g e s . ’ * In fact, the flight to Algiers was secured with only 12 hostages being liberated, leaving the way unimpeded for the compromise of one week later which ignored the articles of the Hague Convention and which was at least acquiesced to by both Cyprus and Kuwait, signatories to the agreement.

The Kuwaiti position on the bargaining which took place at Larnaca and Algiers may have been particularly ingenious as it guaranteed that

’ *Yasser Arafat remarked to journalists that the PLO and Kuwait had jointly approached Algeria with the proposal to relocate the aircraft at Algiers. U N , Channel 4 News, Tuesday 12 April 1988.

’*The International Herald Tribune, _{Thursday 14 April 1988, p. 7.}

’*See the remarks of Cypriot spokesman Akls Fantis. The Sunday Times, _{Sunday 10 April 1988,} p. A3.

’®The International Herald Tribune, _Friday 8 April 1988, p. 1; The Times, _Friday 8 April 1988, p. 1.

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press coverage of its activities would emphasise the image it endeavoured to present of deliberate unyieldingness and almost unrealsitic opposition to compromise on the te r r o r i s t s ’ demands, in turn leaving the impression that the Emirate was above reproach in its conduct of the hijacking. This assisted its officials in their efforts to supervise mediation and formulate the safe release of its citizens. While other states in the bargaining process received criticism for their activities from western governments or international organisations, Kuwait was showered with praise for its principled refusal to free the 17 prisoners in its jails, with lATA describing it as having behaved “impeccably."’ ? Kuwait seems to have allowed the incident to continue until the hijackers walked free and may have connived positively In the Cypriot/Algerian plan to do so. Evidence of Kuwaiti bargaining for a peaceful outcome is to be found

in a report published in 1989 which maintained that in Algiers: "The 31 remaining passengers were freed after Kuwait pledged give "early release* to a handful of Shia Muslim pr iso n e r s . “’* to Also note the jubilant reaction of Kuwaiti delegation members at Algiers after the liberation of the captives and captors. Al-Oseimi openly admitted that the conclusion had been engineered "in return for a safe conduct" and went further, implying that this did not constitute a concession to the terrorists.” He also thanked President Bendjedid of Algeria for his efforts, while the Kuwaiti cabinet expressed gratitude to Algeria, Arafat and the PLO. Despite its clear involvement in and satisfaction with the outcome of the hijacking, the Emirate escaped the high level criticism (discussed below) which was meted out to Algeria for encouraging the release of murder suspects.

It is both necessary and appropriate to note that the E m i r a t e ’s approach to the problems of the hijacking reflected neither state

support for the t err o r i s t s ’ cause nor any desire to placate those responsible for the incident in order to avoid future attacks. Rather, K u w a i t ’s understanding of its own vulnerability, its aim of avoiding conflict on board the large and well defended Boeing 747 - an aircraft never successfully stormed previously - and its general powerlessness to influence the hijackers into surrendering unconditionally, led to the s t ate ’s limitations being made apparent. These factors combined with the other vexing difficulties of the international crisis to reduce K u w a i t ’s potential for successful resolution, forcing it to downgrade its expectations. In place of its original position on the granting of concessions, it joined forces with its negotiating partners and attempted merely to minimise the

’?The International Herald Tribune, _{Thursday 21 April 1988,} p. 2.

’' E d i t o r ’s note contained in Carew-Jones, (1989) p. 51. Even during the course of the hijacking, a suggestion was made in the Abu Dhabi newspaper al-Itihad, _{that Kuwait and the PLO had agreed in Larnaca}

to a plan suggested by the hijackers that death sentences passed on three of the 17 prisoners should be commuted. The Independent,

Friday 15 April 1988, p. 8-

propaganda aims of the hijackers by taking advantage of the i nci d e n t ’s descent from intense media interest. The price acceptable to Kuwait for such negotiating success seems to have been the unavoidable failure of the Hague formula to secure the prosecution of suspected o f f e n d e r s .

3 ^3., 3, Irani an A u t hor i ties

It is understandable that the arrival at Mashhad of the hijacked aircraft was not met with enthusiasm by Iranian authorities which had at first refused to permit the flight to land.*** Not only was the Islamic Republic unwilling to become embroiled in a delicate and complex dispute between culpable radical S h i ’ites and the innocent Kuwaiti government with which it was suffering poor diplomatic relations, but the geographical locus and politically inappropriate timing of the events compounded their difficulties.

The t e a m ’s choice of Mashhad as a venue for the hijacking was ideal for its preparatory purposes of fomenting domestic Iranian support for its cause. As Shia Muslems and supporters of the radical S h i ’ ite terrorist groups of the Lebanon and Iraq, the hijackers would have been assured of large scale public support as well as the blessing of the large constituency of radical S h i ’ite clergy in Mashhad, many of whom had been exiled from Kuwait.*** In addition, the h i j a c k e r s ’ cause would have found favour with many individuals within militant political groupings seeking new ways of exporting the revolution at a time when the more moderate power base in Tehran was seeking diplomatic initiatives in the event of stalemate in the Gulf war. For these reasons, the hijackers played upon the dilemma faced by the ruling pragmatists in finding a solution which would simultaneously meet with domestic approbation and satisfy the demanding requirements of the Emirate.

As noted above, a key objective of the hijacking was to intimidate the government of Kuwait, which had been allied with Iraq against the Iranians throughout the war, into releasing 17 terrorists. Iran may have been selected as a possible landing place in the ill-advised belief that its authorities would support the actions of the gang being directed against the enemy state of Kuwait- In any case the h i j a c k e r s ’ early-voiced intention to leave Iran**? and their subsequent determination to land at Beirut*** implies at least the possibility of a more sophisticated, longer term plan having been developed to deal with possible non-cooperation from the Islamic Republic. The Iranian government must have understood that the h i j a c k e r s ’ very cause placed it in a difficult political position domestically. Moreover, the aircraft landed at Mashhad within three days of elections to the flajlis, _{the Iranian parliament, at which}

***The Daily Telegraph, _Wednesday 6 April 1988, p. 1. * * * The Times, _Wednesday 6 April 1988, p. 5.

* * ? The Daily Telegraph, _Wednesday 6 April 1988, p. 38.

***rhe Guardian, _{Saturday 9 April 1988, p. 1 ;} The Independent,

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extremists were viewed by many observers as standing to gain seats from the more moderate pragmatists who were losing credibility with the electorate following vital Iraqi advances in the war.*®* This suggests that the hijackers may have correctly identified that their actions could be made to exert considerable strain upon the ruling administration in Tehran and so catalyse a domestic crisis from which it would be difficult for the moderates to recover in the three days preceding polling.

In terms of crisis management there was little Iran could do either to foster meaningful levels of diplomatic cooperation between itself and the Emirate, which resolutely refused to become involved with Iranian bargaining,**® or to act against the hijackers. Not only would the use of force against overtly S h i ’ite hijackers have risked a new front of electoral support developing for militant candidates on the eve of national elections, but on a more practical level the 747 was almost universally regarded as being so near impossible to storm that any military action would have been virtually discounted from the outset as a final option only to have been attempted in the most critical of circumstances.*** In addition to the team being large, with passenger evidence suggesting that it was also well armed, its professionalism and ruthlessness became apparent before long.

I r a n ’s negotiating efforts were highly successful in view of the short time space involved. Initially, the Iranian ministers involved attempted to support Kuwaiti orders for the aircraft to remain grounded. Although a token amount of fuel was pumped aboard the jet to satisfy the h i j a c k e r s ’ opening demand, the aircraft was surrounded by armed guards and physically prevented from leaving for three days while Iranian negotiators successfully deflected requests for departure. The involvement of Deputy Prime Minister Moayeri at the site of the incident further corroborated I r a n ’s claims that it opposed the hijacking**? and may have been instrumental in facilitating the two releases of 24 and 32 passengers and crew at Mashhad.*** When Iran realised its need for external assistance in the crisis it was swift to request Kuwait to dispatch a delegation, despite the inescapable diplomatic friction which such a development was bound to ent ail .** ’ When a Kuwaiti presence was established, the authorities in Mashhad actively continued to refuse requests for fuel and departure rights despite the intimidation exercised by the gang and the undoubted jurisdictional benefits in having the aircraft leave the country.

Only when violence became visible and was directed against both

***r/?e Independent, _Wednesday 6 April 1988, p. 1. **®The Times, _{Thursday 7 April 1988, p. 1.}

*®*The Observer, Sunday 17 April 1988, p. 21. **?Tbe Guardian, _Wednesday 6 April 1988, p. 1. * * * The Scotsman, _Wednesday 6 April 1988, p. 1. **’ The Guardian, _{Thursday 7 April 1988, p. 1.}

hostages and Iranian personnel was the decision taken to allow take off. With crisis managers unable to solve the triangular dispute in which their government had been unwillingly placed, the Iranians justifiably elected to avoid bloodshed and to override the grounding demand of Kuwait. Crisis resolution virtually demanded that the hijackers be allowed to leave, if only because the extent of control able to be exercised over the hostages and the siege location could not be reduced by the Iranians without genuinely risking a great loss of life. Departure of the jet guaranteed an uncertain future but its continued presence would have threatened immediate and extreme violence on board the jet, which military force would not easily have contained and which could also have precipitated an electoral backlash in the polls of the day. Iranian authorities had few options but to permit departure, having endeavoured to seek a peaceful solution u p to

the point at which violence had erupted.

The Iranians showed signs of internal disagreement over their policies on dealing with the case, both while the aircraft stood on the ramp at Mashhad and after it had departed. From the time of the jet's arrival Iranian policy on departure was unclear. The first official announcement had stated that the aircraft would be refuelled and permitted to leave but this was soon overturned by the official Iranian news agency, IRNA.**® While officials were supporting the Kuwaiti views on departure (limiting fuel supplies and blocking the runway) in Tehran Parliamentary Speaker Rafsanjani said that failure in negotiations might necessitate allowing the hijackers to go elsewhere with their demands and hostages.*** Indeed, at one stage he suggested that stalemate in negotiations might result in Iranian authorities positively persuading the team to leave the territory.**? Once the incident had moved to Larnaca, the Speaker made a statement in which he claimed that any attempt by the hijackers to seek asylum in Iran would be rejected, the offenders instead being put on trial.**? Later, however, Rafsanjani stated, in contradiction to earlier assurances, that the hijackers might, in fact, be accorded political asylum were they to return to Iran.*** Other Iranian sources seemed equally uncertain. Note the press conference of Tuesday 12 April 1988 in the Iranian Embassy in London, at which Foreign Minister, Or Javid Larijani, categorically stated that Iran condemned the hijacking and would not permit the hijackers to return.**® Shortly before this, authorities in Tehran had announced that a complete release of hostages might enable the team to fly back to Iranian territory.***

***The Daily Telegraph, _Wednesday 6 April 1988, p. 38. * * * The Nall Street Journal, Wednesday 6 April 1988, p. 2. **?The Guardian, _{Thursday 7 April 1988, p. 23.}

**?The Observer, _{Sunday 10 April 1988, p. 21,}

* * * The Independent, _{Wednesday 13 April 1988,} p. 1.

**®The Financial Times, _{Wednesday 13 April 1988, p. 1.}

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The uncertainty of Iranian policy was accompanied by suggestions of positive complicity in the conduct of the hijacking. After I r a n ’s

involvement in the crisis had ended, accusations were made that its authorities had conspired with the hijackers to permit the infiltration of accomplices and explosives on board while the aircraft stood at Mashhad. Although impossible to prove these allegations, the Emirate claimed that passenger evidence demonstrated that active participation in the t e a m ’s activities increased during the Iranian stage of the siege and was matched by the substitution of heavier arms and explosives for those used throughout the initial stages of the hijacking.**? Had Iran permitted more open media activity at Mashhad it might have been able to have proved that no such passage of persons and equipment had taken place. With its strict limitation of journalistic output to I R N A ’s official press releases, suspicion lingers on the question and cannot fully be dispelled merely by Iranian claims of innocence, leaving the Iranian involvement in the hijacking uncertain in its nature and motivation.

Even if it is assumed, however, that the arms and reinforcements alleged to have entered the aircraft at Mashhad did so at the instigation of an extremist faction within Iran and not with the direct support of the pragmatists in power, Iranian authorities can certainly be criticised for operating appallingly pliable airside access security systems. In the absence of firmer evidence, it is impossible to conclude that Iran offered assistance to the hijackers. In any case, there is little doubt that the terrorists left Iranian airspace feeling that their grievances had not been addressed to their satisfaction. Equally, it Is reasonable to suggest that the power- wielding authorities were genuinely unable to solve the problem which they faced with the 747.

Had there been connivance at high levels to produce a three day publicity-seeking hijacking or else to engineer a conclusion beneficial to the h i j a c k e r s ’ cause, it is highly unlikely that the gang would have wished to culminate their performance by flying off empty handed and continuing their siege for almost another two weeks. A more mutually acceptable scenario would have involved a staged storming of the aircraft and a secret release of the hijackers. That such a managed climax to the episode failed to take place suggests not only that the terrorists were in earnest in their demands (a suggestion borne out by the events of Larnaca and the impasse of Algiers) but that Iranian negotiators, politicians and armed forces were truly powerless to bring an end to the hijacking on the ramp at Mashhad.

3,3,4, L e b a n e s e / S y r i a n .A u t h o r i H e s

The decision to close Beirut airport could not have been taken easily by the responsible authorities in the Lebanese capital, first because of the h i j a c k e r s ’ determination to land there and second on account of