I will characterize the science-policy gap using the analogy of a building. The occupants of this building (scientists, policymakers, interest groups) are naturally aware of the structure of the building as they use it day-to-day: Stuck windows, rattling doors, poor access, slippery floors, bad phones, jammed photocopiers, and the like. These structural factors that are encountered in the daily use of the building are like many of the factors of the science-policy gap described by the survey respondents (Table 4.1) and in the
conferences held between 2000 and 2005 (Tables 2.1 – 2.4).
In this sense, many of the factors are experienced as part of the process of fisheries management and contribute to the gap, but as process factors they are readily and often identified (as seen in the tables mentioned above and many of the papers referred to in Chapters 1 and 2). The factors fall into these types:
• Understanding; encompassing cultural differences, education and knowledge about policy and
• directions and priorities.’
• through institutional structures and
one is the existence or otherwise of ise in science that’s in a form that’s
ndicates that progress is slow.
tionality of the
uilding .
This is a
•
• Science leads policy; ‘Make science the basis of policy decisions (rather than economic).’
These types of causal factors of the gap have the great on the gap, as seen in the survey (Figs 4.1, 4.2, and 4.10, 4.11) and in the comments made by the interviewees. As the chair of the Stockholm
• Dialogue; ‘Creation of mechanisms to improve dialogue between scientific community and policy makers…’
science procedures.
Integration; ‘Closer links – especially in formulating research Independence; ‘Essential that one retains independence both by the scientific community.’
• Research lacking; ‘So there’s two, two holes in that direction; relevant science, and the other one is the existence or otherw understandable by policymakers.’
• Policy failure; ‘… Where the decision-making process is poorly defined and not transparent and the exact role of science is poorly enunciated the gap will remain.’
These types of disconnect between science and policy that contribute to the gap can be, and are being, addressed. Although the frequency at which they are still mentioned and how they featured prominently in
he survey response i t
he other feature of a building is its architecture. This is the shape, design, and func T
b and is influenced by the architects who have the final say in the built environment of the building nalogous to:
Interference; ‘The blatant political manipulation of science and policy to further economic and institutional factors.’
est influence
‘
implementation of research
nd many policy commitments to management that is sustainable and equitable. The rub is in actually plementing these policies as they were intended, when they are subject to interference that shapes and
icy intent (Rosenberg, 2007).
d )
od he e the fishing days allowed by two days and increase spection to reduce overfishing. The UK still found this compromise unacceptable.
he EU has proposed a ‘radical’ reform of the CFP; to bring in MSY catch limits, to ban some fishing and s
rator has a variety of measures to implement his policy objectives. In practice he is concerned not only with biological and economic factors but also with sociological and political considerations which
cy must translate information into action. This process requires that agency personnel measure the available information against applicable statutory and regulatory standards and decide what action, if any, to take. The concern here is one familiar to observers of the politics of the regulatory state – that the agency will undermine a statutory scheme by responding more to political pressures or the personal biases of agency personnel than to the evidence and the goals articulated by the legislature.
oremus noted that in the US, in 2004, there were 1,596 ‘Schedule C’ mid-level positions throughout the arious agencies. Schedule C are political appointments that are ‘policy-determining or … involve a close nd confidential working relationship with the head of an agency or other key appointed officials.’ It was ne such person who altered the management of the endangered Pacific salmon in the Columbia River
ichatowich and Williams, 2009).
Bridging the Gap’ conference observed, ‘The biggest gap exists between commitments and , not between research and commitments’ (Axell, 2001). There is a great deal a
im
molds the outcome of pol
These are usually built into the architecture of policy. International agreements (such as the CCAMLR an the IWC) generally have ‘objection clauses’ whereby a nation not agreeing to a management decision reached by the organization (either by consensus in the CCAMLR or by vote in the IWC, for example have a period of time in which they can object to that decision and then are not bound to the decision. In the CFP science and policy advice for management is subject to the decisions of the EU fisheries
ministers during political negotiations.
The EU, in 2004, wanted to close some fishing areas in the North Sea to allow severely depleted c populations to recover but was strongly opposed by the UK whose Scottish fishing fleets would be t most affected. The compromise was to reduc
in
The EU also wanted to close part of an anchovy fishery in the Bay of Biscay and reduce overall quota by 85%, which was opposed by France and Spain. The final decision was not to close the fishing area and reduce the 2005 quota by just 10% (Smith, 2004).
T
prohibit the dumping of lower value ‘trash fish’ at sea (Malakoff, 2011). However, the fishing industry opposes it because they say that it will cost thousands of jobs. Conservation groups oppose the reform because they say it keeps inefficient and destructive fishing techniques going.
Ecosystem integrity and sustainability are not the leading issues in decision-making about fisheries policy, as Sturman (1972) noted:
The administ
may take precedence over the former.
Worldwide there are many policy commitments to ensuring that policy follows the ‘best available science’ to maintain ‘sustainable fisheries’, observes the precautionary principle and protect and preserve species and ecosystems. Doremus (2008) commented that:
The second challenge arises primarily at the back end of the process, when the agen
D v a o (L
Industry is also an active player. Bluefin tuna populations in the Western Atlantic have collapsed and the CAT has consistently ignored their scientific committee’s advice on catch limits. In 1998, the scientific ommittee determined that a quota near zero was needed to restore the population of bluefin. U.S. tuna xporters hired a consultant to sit on the scientific committee. The consultant put forward a population odel that omitted and reinterpreted spawner population data. This model was chosen by the ICCAT ommission and catch quotas were raised, the bluefin is now at risk of extinction (Safina and Klinger, 008).
he political imperative can be seen at a national level. Norwegian whaling followed the advice of the C Scientific Committee when setting the Revised Management Procedure (RMP) tuning level of 0.72 to etermine their catch limits. When the RMP method indicated the catch should be reduced, Norway
wered the tuning to 0.66 to allow the catch to be maintained and then to 0.62 (Fig. 5.1). In 2004, the orwegian Parliament voted to adopt a tuning level of 0.60 and increase minke whale catch limits. Tuning e RMP to maintain or increase catches when the RMP indicated a reduction was needed is not
ustainable (Papastavrou and Cooke, 2006). IC c e m C 2 T IW d lo N th s
Year
Catch Limit
(nu mber o f mi nke )Fig. 5.1 Norwegian whaling catch limits. Whenever the tuning levels indicated that catch limits (circles)
should be reduced, Norwegian authorities changed the tuning to maintain the catch levels. 0.72 was the tuning level advised by the IWC under the RMP, a management procedure which was
adopted by Norway. (From; Papastavrou and Cooke, 2006).
his interference or difficulty going from ‘commitment to implementation’ was a problem keenly bserved by the interviewees.
B, the former Chief Scientist, noted:
… I think the whole discussion about the economy, and the way those discussions are framed, that will always, and it has always, and I hope it doesn’t always in the future, but at the moment the system that prevails mean that all of those arguments are privileged over anything lesser. That is to say anything to do with the community, anything to do with ah, you know, social good, anything to do with ah, education even, anything to do with the environment, sustainability, those are, those arguments about GDP, and about the economy and jobs, they will prevail at the moment. How do we do something about it? T o A
CD, a senior policy adviser with a Commonwealth science and policy organization:
A lot of policymakers are not prepared to make a decision which won’t generate a recognised, a positive benefit until the next decade. That’ll look like inaction and you know, lack of concern, even if in terms of the, say for the good of managing a fish stock, you know, you need to make a tough decision now, rather than a popular decision.
… the attitude that well one more season, or couple more seasons at this level isn’t going to change the overall outcome, so let’s live with that. You know, let’s leave it to my successor, dealing with the hard issues.… Well each level of the policymaker will have different constituents, but at the top level, you know, the policymakers want to basically, on the whole, they want to look after the fishing industry and ah, and so on, [my
emphasis]and that’s obviously got community benefits too, in terms of access to cheap resources, and so on. At other levels, the policymaker might be trying to appease other stakeholders who might be
environment groups, ah, or whatever. But the problem is the focus on a narrow constituency and trying to find a decision which will appease the most vocal constituency, rather than looking at a, a more global group across the broader community.
, the Australian marine project leader for an international conservation group:
… I would define, the gap is where, whether it be a binding process or a non-binding process, that science advice going into the policy or management decision framework is being ignored. So there’s a mismatch between, if science is saying, ‘You need to reduce a TAC for a resource’, and that doesn’t come through in the decision-making process. I think the main cause is that there’s a number of reasons. First would be that in many cases, it’s a little bit like how national legislation considers stakeholder consultation; it’s done on ‘we will consider stakeholder advice’, rather than ‘it has to consider’.
And it’s this whole problem, which I think is now a global problem within fisheries, which is about whether you take a non-binding or binding approach to decision-making. And more and more, within regional
agreements, and parti es, they are put into non-
binding arrangement , quite often resolutions or
s
out 5; Lawton, 2007; Cardinale and Svedäng, 2008; Polachek, 2012).
n IJ
cularly as they relate to bycatch or related species measur s within a convention, say, that for example, in an RFMO
decisions of the parties to a convention are non-binding, depending on the convention
So I think, back to the question about what’s the cause of this gap, firstly it’s this binding non-binding relationship; the other is that I think there’s a lack of willingness, well there’s a sense of moving towards a very well articulate, articulated management procedure framework, if you like, in some of these complex RFMOs, but in actual fact, which is meant to take away the political influence or decision-making, when you go from the science to policy bit, but no matter what, a lot of these conventions are either consensu agreements, or they’re a majority by three quarters or whatever, and it’s very difficult getting agreement, and that agreement is not a base about having a very clear procedure that’s only based on the science, it’s still about political will to do so.
The survey respondents clearly put political interference (1st) and economic interests (3rd) as the chief
reasons for the science-policy gap. Their second choice, ‘short decision times’, is also a factor in interference as it relates to the election cycle and the behaviours of policymaking, which is about responding to emerging issues quickly and sharply with, as CD noted, not much thought or concern ab long-term improvement or sustainability. The political/economic element has always been in the science- policy gap but in the last decade it has gained greater prominence (Rosenberg, 2003; Rayner, 2004; Daw
nd Gray, 200 a
This political and economic element is the main driver of the science-policy gap in marine capture fisheries. It is this deeper architectural level, one that shapes the management policies and actions that allows for overexploitation to continue as ‘business as usual’. There are many other factors, identified i Question 19 by the respondents, and also by the interviewees that contribute to the uneasy relationship between science and policy but these are structural and are within the process.
The same factors are found in the primary literature and they can be identified and if the will exists and eloped a conceptual graph that tracks the lationship between scientific research warnings, the state of the resource and management actions with
political urce
increase ncrease
the funding is there they can be addressed. Rosenberg (2003) dev re
resistance (Fig. 5.2). As the resource declines, scientific warnings about the status of the reso . Management is slow to act and as it does, political resistance to the management changes
i .
Fig. 5.2 The political and management responses to overfishing (From; Rosenberg, 2003).
Below, I develop a general map of the scienc olicy gap. This is based on Figures 4.1 – 4.3 and on the verall results for question D17 and A17: e-p
This was simply stated by Nobel Laureate (Medicine) Prof. Peter Doherty (2005): o
If the scientific results do not support a political agenda:
Most likely to be ignored, dismissed or marginalised: 86.8%
Least likely to be ignored, dismissed or marginalised: 13.2% If the scientific results do not support economic interests:
Most likely to be ignored, dismissed or marginalised: 85.3%
Least likely to be ignored, dismissed or marginalised: 14.7%
The ‘science spectrum’ is tied to the ‘policy spectrum’, in that as one moves along the policy spectrum from ‘low political or economic interest’ to ‘high political or economic interest’ the scientific results or advice is more likely to come into conflict with these interests and is so more likely to be disputed/ ignored/ dismissed or marginalised, even if the science is accepted within the scientific community (such as climate science).
In general, democratic governments from both the liberal and conservative ends of the political spectru have no philosophical problem with supporting medical research. Like everyone else, politicians gro and become increasingly aware of their own health and ultimate mortality. … The tension between sci
m w older
ence and government comes to the fore when the best advice that scientists can provide is seen by politicians as having acute, negative consequences on the economic (and thus the political) front.
Fig. 5.3 Conceptual map of the science-policy gap. As political or economic interest i
the science becomes more likely to be disputed/ignored/dismissed or marginalised. ncreases, the gap widens and
d management is; especially in the face of science-policy gap. Since
nal
oblems with dialogue, limited understanding, poor integration. Also the
instrument of choice. Nearly all the global high seas are under the management of an RFMO. Callis- Suzuki and Pauly (2010) assessed the performance of these RFMOs against 26 criteria that reflect RFMO best practices. The organisations performed poorly and Callis-Suzuki and Pauly suggest that the primary