According to Katan9 (1999: 12), the term ‘cultural mediator’ has been first mentioned in
9 Katan (1999: 1/11-15) calls for translators/interpreters to assume the cultural-mediator role for more
Bochner’s (1981a) The Mediating Person and Cultural Identity where the focus is on the cultural mediator in a variety of roles and functions such as an arbitrator, go-between, intermediary, moderator, referee, facilitator, negotiator, missionary, trader, diplomat, tourist guide, ombudsman, representative of ethnic minorities on a government board, etc. as well as the translator and interpreter (Bochner 1981c: 303; McLeod 1981: 38ff; Taft 1981: 54).
Bochner (1981a: 3) distinguishes between two types of cultural mediators: the ‘mediator- as-translator’ whose purpose is to ‘represent one culture to another faithfully and thereby contribute to mutual understanding and accurate cross-cultural knowledge’ and ‘mediator- as-synthesizer’ whose purpose is to ‘reconcile disparate cultural practices, this type of mediation having special relevance to exchanges from which action is to follow’. Thus, while the mediator-as-translator’s responsibilities involve the neutral, faithful and accurate representation of one culture to another and stop there (Bochner 1981b: 18), the mediator- as-synthesizer’s brief extends representation to taking actions and beyond (ibid: 19).
Bochner (1981b: 18) argues that if the mediator-as-translator is faced with two sets of ‘incompatible demands’ requiring an active response, ‘the translation of cultures breaks down’ because ‘the neutral, faithful representation of one culture’s stance to another is less likely to promote mutual understanding’, hence the need for the mediator-as-synthesizer role which can provide ‘creative reconciliation of the two opposing points of view’ (ibid).
Bochner (1981b: 18f) cites a hypothetical example on technology transfer from an industrial to agrarian society. Both parties commission native but bicultural representatives in the mediator-as-translator role. The Western mediator has been instructed to install an assembly line in rural Asia, but he/she knows that the proposed factory will break such local cultural traditions as religious practices, which forbid people to handle raw material without ritual purification; extended family obligations, which dictate that all physically able men, women and children participate in gathering the harvests when crops are ripe; the
example, Bochner’s (1981a: 3) concept of the mediator-as-translator (see below) in the sense that it does not contain any specific understanding or different definition of the interpreter’s role as intercultural mediator from Bochner’s concept. Even his call for a more active role for the translator as cultural mediator is defined in terms of obtaining or asking for more information (Katan ibid: 66f). He constantly refers to intercultural mediation in the business world (ibid: 7f/11/13/15), but this does not give any indication as to which specific interpreting setting (conference or non-conference) his views apply to. The main contribution of his book as far as the present argument is concerned is the type of cultural knowledge a cultural mediator should be cognizant of to be able to mediate between cultures as Katan himself mentions (ibid: 1).
allocation of jobs to different castes, which may lead to a shortage of local labour in certain sections of the manufacturing process besides the lack of infrastructure and suitable fuel to operate the machines. Bochner (ibid), argues that the ‘conscientious’ mediator-as-translator provides his/her employers with this cultural information and his/her responsibilities stop there as he/she considers it someone else’s job to address the problems indicated.
The Eastern mediator has been given instructions to travel to Detroit to place an order for an assembly line that must include a unit for ritual purification; can be operated at seasonal intervals in harmony with the gathering of harvests; provides most of the jobs for the most numerous caste in the area; can be operated by different fuels especially charcoal and cow dung; and can be maintained or repaired by the village’s bicycle mechanic. Again, the mediator who has a degree from the Massachusetts Institute of Technology is aware of the unlikelihood of finding a machine manufacturer in Detroit who is willing or able to supply this order. Being a conscientious mediator translator, he/she explains to his/her Eastern employers the theory and practice of assembly-line industry, but his/her responsibility stops here, and his/her job is done after representing one culture to the other.
Bochner (1981b: 19) argues that the precise interpretation of the mediator-as-translator’s role cuts off the process where it might have the strongest effect or action could be taken because the mediator-as-translator is excluded from action, but the mediator-as-synthesizer is more likely to see his/her role extend beyond mere cultural representation to taking action and beyond. According to Bochner, the mediator-as-synthesizer’s behaviour in this example might involve designing a factory that fits together the best features of both cultures based on the strengths of the existing social system and appropriate ingredients of modern technology. For the integration of the exogenous technical into the indigenous social system to take place, both culture and technology may have to undergo some type of modification. Bochner argues that the mediator-as-synthesizer’s responsibility is therefore to make sure that this integration takes into account the region’s cultural and material aspirations, and that the donor society finds the result rewarding.
However, it may be argued that although Bochner’s example is hypothetical, it helps spell out in strong terms why the mediator-as-synthesizer concept cannot be applied to CISs. First, it is doubtful whether conference delegates are willing to abandon their role (making
decisions, taking actions, accepting/refusing proposals, etc.) and commission interpreters to assume these responsibilities on their behalf; otherwise, the interpreter will become a conference delegate with the added task of interpretation.
Second, even if delegates were willing to abandon their role to interpreters, which is unlikely anyway, it is unlikely that interpreters would be willing to take this responsibility. Third, even if interpreters were willing to do so, it is doubtful whether they would actually be able to assume this role since interpreters are interlingual and intercultural communication specialists, not leaders, politicians, statesmen, scientists, etc. It is the lack of sufficient inside knowledge even in specialist interpreters let alone the majority of interpreters who are generalists that will make it difficult if not impossible for interpreters to accept the responsibility or be able to make decisions, take actions, accept or refuse proposals, or assume delegates’ roles. And if an interpreter possesses such abilities and sufficient inside knowledge that qualify him/her to assume a delegate’s role, the case will be the exception rather than the rule (see also Kondo 1990: 64).
It can therefore be safely argued that it is not the concept of the mediator-as-synthesizer, but mediator-as-translator that can fit well in conference interpreting.
Besides, although the mediator-as-translator’s role is limited to faithful cultural representation, the mediator-as-translator can still create mutual understanding between two or more (representatives of) cultures because if the interpreter merely represents the two cultures to each other faithfully, accurately and in a neutral manner, each side will have an understanding in the form of increased knowledge and awareness of the culture of the other as mediated by the interpreter. In this case, mutual understanding is established because without this mutual understanding neither side will be able to work out a compromise if conflicting goals, motives or differences surface between the two opposing sides. Indeed, McLeod (1981: 41) argues that ‘the presence and actions of a true mediator should have some positive influence on the general populations, or significant sectors of the populations’ of the cultures between which he/she mediates and that this positive influence should be measured in terms of ‘increased knowledge, respect, and empathy on the part of members of the two cultures for each other’.
Obviously, if the above hypothetical example was an instance of conference interpreting and the cultural information applicable to each side was relayed by a CCIr, the two sides, having been acquainted with the relevant cultural information of the other side, would be in a better position than the CCIr to judge the situation, that is, either reach a compromise to solve the problems they have encountered or decide not to proceed with the project and abolish it altogether because they are in possession of more inside/specialised knowledge of what can(not) be done and/or compromised than their CCIr. Nevertheless, their CCIr can still be considered a cultural mediator because the interpreter acting as a mediator does not necessarily mean working to eliminate political, economic or diplomatic differences inherent in the stances of the two clients because the purpose of his/her mediation, cultural or otherwise, is to achieve understanding by breaking the language and cultural barriers, which is in the interests of the two clients who, despite the interpreter’s mediation, might still not be able to solve their differences. Herbert anticipated this over 50 years ago:
The mission of the interpreter is to help individuals and communities to acquire a fuller knowledge and a deeper understanding of one another, and […] to come to an agreement if they should want to do so (1952: 3, emphasis in original).
In the example of ‘martyrdom operations’ discussed in 5.1.2 Identification with the client, if Meshal refuses to consider his organisation’s operations as suicide bombings or terrorist acts, and his western interviewer and all westerners equally refuse to believe that these operations are martyrdom operations, the interpreter cannot, rather is not expected to, do anything about this apart from clarifying each party’s position. If the two parties want to solve their differences, then they themselves can make up their differences or work out a compromise based on their understanding and perception of the situation and culture of the other as mediated by the interpreter. As mentioned earlier, conference interpreters cannot act like diplomats or assume delegates’ roles, and there is a danger that if they do, they may cause more harm than good to the immediate communication process and possibly to the long-term relations between clients, countries or cultures.
Bochner’s distinction between the mediator-as-translator and mediator-as-synthesiser helps shed light on how the terms ‘cultural mediation’ and ‘cultural mediator’ are understood by some IS researchers since some equate intercultural mediation with going beyond creating understanding or acting like delegates, thus in effect arguing that intercultural mediation
means assuming the mediator-as-synthesiser’s role. For example, the concept of ‘cultural mediator’ has been the subject of a workshop on culture, its role in interpreting and the interpreter’s role involving a number of well-known scholars in the field of conference interpreting during the Turku Conference (cf. Gambier et al. 1997). However, the discussion as reported in Kondo et al. (1997), reveals varying views on the interpreter’s role and contradictory interpretations of the real meaning of intercultural mediation, cultural mediator and the necessarily relevant concept of the interpreter’s ‘neutrality’ (5.1.5 Interpreters’ visibility; 5.2.1 Neutrality versus partisanship). The ‘general view tends to be that the interpreter should aspire to be a cultural mediator’ (Kondo et al. 1997: 150).
Based on Stenzl’s (1983) and Kirchhoff’s (1976b) works, Dam (cf. Kondo et al. 1997: 158) argues that the cultural perspective of human beings is reflected in their text production and linguistic output and expectations as text receivers. The presence of two or more different cultural systems in interpreted communication can give rise to disparities between the receiver’s textual and linguistic expectations on the one hand, and the way the sender chooses to relay his/her message on the other. Therefore, the intercultural factor is considered as a source of potential noise in the communication channel (Kirchhoff 1976b: 26, quoted in Kondo et al. 1997: 158). Zalka (cf. Kondo et al. 1997: 153f) puts forward a similar argument. If the interpreter’s ideal function is to ensure smooth communication between speaker and audience, then the interpreter’s role is to remedy the potential cultural noise by adapting the culture-bound peculiarities of the original to the receptor’s culturally determined expectations (Kirchhoff 1976b: 24, quoted in Kondo et al. 1997: 158). Thus, Dam (ibid) argues that the interpreter’s ideal role is that of a cultural mediator.
Alexieva (Kondo et al. 1997: 158), Setton (ibid: 160), Katan (ibid: 161) and Zalka (ibid: 164) all argue that the interpreter should be a cultural mediator.
However, Kondo (ibid: 161) warns about what he calls ‘dangers’ in performing intercultural mediation because the interpreter’s efforts at intercultural mediation could in some contexts involving Japanese be construed as mis-/over-translations or cases of ‘over- interpreting’ (Kondo 1990: 63) for which the interpreter may be censored and possibly sacked although he calls for creating awareness of such issues in trainees to be able to be cultural mediators (Kondo et al. 1997: 165).
Kondo seems to argue that cultural mediation as carried out by interpreters is tantamount to assuming delegates’ roles. He (1990: 63) argues that interpreters can only render what is said, but not what is left unsaid. He (ibid: 64) cites the example of a Japanese businessman negotiating a deal with someone from another business. The former wrongly assumes that the latter would use the bank of the former to handle the business but finds too late that the latter has another bank in mind. Kondo argues that if the interpreter anticipates this, he/she should not be expected to remind the delegates about the potential misunderstanding.
However, the present researcher argues that while it is true that interpreters should not and cannot assume delegates’ roles as mentioned above, intercultural mediation does not mean assuming a delegate’s role (5.1.1 The interpreter as intermediary) because as is shown further on, intercultural mediation in (conference) interpreting is the use of the interpreter’s cultural knowledge to create understanding; it does not mean imposing one’s own opinion or intervening in the discourse the way delegates do.
Moreover, it is well-known that utterances/messages consist of explicit (said) and implicit (unsaid) information (Chapter 4; Seleskovitch and Lederer 1995: 80/224f; Kondo 2003: 84f). If the interpreter is to be faithful not to the linguistic/surface structure or semantic meaning, but to the sense of the original message, then both explicit and implicit (cultural or non-cultural) information should be relayed to the TL audience; otherwise, misunderstanding is more likely to occur. Thus, Kondo’s argument that interpreters can only render what is expressed can only be right if what is assumed or left unsaid by delegates is not implied by what is actually said in the communication process. Interpreters can only include in their renditions any assumptions (cultural or otherwise) contained in what is actually said, and it is wrong to assume that interpreters could render assumptions that are not implied by what delegates say simply because delegates have many assumptions concerning many things which do not necessarily have to do with the point of discussion. What makes these assumptions directly relevant to the very point of discussion is whether they are implied at all by what delegates actually say.
In Kondo’s example, if the assumptions about the bank have been implied by what has been said, the interpreter should relay this information because it has been said in one way or another, and if these assumptions have been of a cultural nature and the interpreter has
relayed them to the TL audience, he/she will have performed intercultural mediation without assuming a delegate’s role. If the assumptions about the bank have not been implied or explicitly stated, then it is not the interpreter’s brief to relay these assumptions, and if he/she doe not relay them, this should not mean that he/she is not a cultural mediator.
5.2.1 Neutrality versus partisanship
The other problematic point in the above workshop is the juxtaposition of ‘neutral’ and ‘cultural mediator’ as two incompatible concepts: ‘One point of the debate is whether the interpreter should be a cultural mediator or a more neutral, pure language transmitter’ (Kondo et al. 1997: 150; 5.1.5 Interpreters’ visibility; 5.2 The cultural mediator). On the one hand, if ‘neutral’ is meant to be the equivalent of ‘passive’ or ‘inactive’, then the present researcher argues that the interpreter, whether assuming the linguistic- or intercultural-mediator role, is as actively present in the communication process as the other participants not least because he/she performs a highly complex task and thus communication is not possible without his/her active10 participation (see also 5.1.1 The interpreter as intermediary). On the other hand, if ‘neutral’ is taken to mean the opposite of ‘biased’ or ‘partisan’, then there is no reason why the interpreter should not be a faithful, accurate and neutral (non-biased/non-partisan/impartial) cultural mediator at once, which is what the account of the CCIr’s role as intercultural mediator proposed by the present researcher in the following part is all about.
Indeed, in his attempt to distinguish a mediator from other agents at the interface between two cultures in terms of the purpose of the actor or of the intent and effect (partisan, neutral or bipartisan), Bochner (1981c: 302f) cites translators/interpreters as neutral actors based on his distinction between the mediator-as-translator and mediator-as-synthesizer discussed above. According to Bochner (ibid), the partisan actor is chiefly interested in furthering the interests of his/her own culture, the neutral actor is disengaged or not interested in furthering the interests of either culture while still engaged in the communication process itself (which is the sense in which the concept ‘neutral’ is used in this thesis), and the bipartisan actor is concerned with furthering the interests of the two cultures. More importantly, Bochner (ibid: 304) states that ‘a mediator is not a mediator when he is being
partisan in intent and effect’ because the criterion for the distinction between mediating and non-mediating transactions depends on ‘whether there is some intent of mutuality’. Obviously, no mutuality is involved in a transaction by a partisan actor (e.g. an advocate, diplomat, representative, spokesperson, etc.). Thus, a partisan cannot be a mediator as his/hers is a ‘pseudo- or one-way mediation’ (McLeod 1981: 40f).
This does not only show that ‘neutral’ and ‘cultural mediator’ are compatible, but also complementary and interdependent. Interpreters cannot assume the cultural-mediator role without being neutral individuals. In other words, if the interpreter is a cultural mediator, he/she is a neutral individual by default and necessity, which stands in contrast to the juxtaposition made in Kondo et al. (1997:150) between ‘neutral’ and ‘cultural mediator’.
Based on Bochner’s (1981c: 302ff) definitions of the concepts of neutral and bipartisan actors, it can be argued that the interpreter as cultural mediator is a neutral actor in the sense that he/she is disengaged from the primary parties’ interests, which might be