CAPÍTULO V. CONCLUSIONES Y RECOMENDACIONES
6. BIBLIOGRAFÍA
M.V.Jhansi Ki Rani an Indian flag vessel, under the command of Mr. Shahid Hasan, was on voyage to Higashie, Harima Japan, from New Castle, Australia when it ran aground at Fredrick Reef during the watch of Chief Officer.
The marine court of enquiry found an accumulation of various factors, which caused the accident. The consequences of the accident were not serious in terms of loss of life or threat to the environment, however subsequently the vessel was declared constructive total loss.
The speed estimation was a judgmental error but the interaction and interface between Chief Officer and Chief Engineer immediately before the occurrence of this accident is highlighted for illustrating human factors at play
from relational aspect.
It shows how human relations can be significant to safe and efficient to ship
operation. Appendix B gives details of the accident.
Discussion
The human relationships connected with safety and efficiency of shipboard operations viewpoint are observed at point 3 and 4. The interaction between master, chief officer, chief engineer and lookout and interface between radar and navigational area are important.
The interactions and interface at the crucial time between 1700 to 1735 is of immediate relevance to the accident. Interface with radar provided critical information at 1715 in the form of a target on the starboard bow at about 9 miles, that is about 45 minutes before the expected time of picking up Fredrick light tower on radar.
At this juncture the presence of the chief engineer and loss of the picked up target at 9 miles on the starboard bow for a period of five minutes followed by relocation on radar at seven miles distance can well be attributed to changing weather conditions. This can be treated with a degree of doubt because such drastic changes of weather conditions may seem out of place.
At the same time the possibility of the chief engineer distracting the watch cannot be ruled out. The chief engineer was on the bridge for approximately ten minutes. The master on entering the bridge saw the chief engineer and chief officer talking; hence the possibility of distraction to the watch is further strengthened although not confirmed due to denial by the chief officer and chief engineer.
The intent of the chief engineer to come to the bridge in order to ascertain if the emergency fire pump was being tested by checking the exhaust located in the fore part of the ship is also debatable because M.V. Jhansi Ki Rani was a gearless bulk carrier, an unobstructed view from the chief engineer`s cabin provides a clear view of the exhaust of the emergency fire pump.
The visit of the chief engineer officer on the bridge at this crucial juncture most certainly was a distraction to the watch keeper, regardless of whether the chief engineer engaged in a discussion or conversation. However, the role of the chief officer in ignoring his own responsibility of watch vis a vis his relationship with the chief engineer officer such that it became detrimental to ship`s safety, is relevant. The arrival of the Master at 1725 and departure of the chief engineer officer at the same time indicates that a sense of seriousness and sanctity of watch was restored to a greater degree. The role of the chief engineer officer in interaction with chief officer and interface with radar and navigational area on closer examination would point towards a degree of laxity by keeping the vessel on automatic steering when making a landfall.
The changing colour of water itself shows, an approach of landfall and a hint of approaching danger, this aspect is compromised due to the lookout function being performed assisted by electronic navigational aids.
The chief officer perhaps compromised on his watch keeping function and also the most important function of lookout by sight and radar. If this function was properly performed it would have certainly made up for all the error of estimation of speed and position. Indeed the Master`s over dependence on speed estimation without accurate position is questionable.
Conclusion
The interference of interactions into interface compromised the safety of navigation at a crucial time. The undivided attention of the watch keeper would have ensured alertness and awareness to arrive at an exercise of the required caution and precautions. This would have in most likelihood prevented this accident from
happening. The efficient and safe operation of the vessel was compromised because of the unauthorised interaction to the compromise of interface.
3.3 summary
Most of the accidents and incidents are caused due to human failure. The attention failure, human relational failure in terms of lookout and speed estimation can be reduced by eliminating speculation and instinctual aspects. Predictive data on speed and available area vis-à-vis required area in congested waters would help watch keepers. Formulation of different collision regulations for congested and open waters and reinforcement of active mechanism in areas of high traffic density can contribute to safe and efficient operation of ships. Determination of reliability of equipment combined with higher level of training prior introduction of new equipment will be a step in raising professional standards of seafarers.