The term “valuing the environment” means different things to different people depending on which of the world-views they find acceptable. Economists have generally settled for a taxonomy of total environmental value, interpreted as ‘total
economic value’ (TEV), which distinguishes between use values, and a remainder termed non-use value (Hargrove, 1992; Gren et al, 1994; Turner, 2000). Total Economic Value has, however, been the subject of much debate among environmental economists and others, and also provides the fuzzy boundary with alternative concepts of environment value.
Non-use value covers situations in which individuals who do not make use, or intended to make use, of any given environmental asset or attribute would nevertheless feel a “loss” it were to disappear. They may just wish to see various environmental entities conserved “in their own right” (termed existence value); or conservation may be supported on the basis of retaining options and opportunities for one’s children, grand-children, and future generation beyond (termed bequest value). On closer inspection however the non-use category does not have well-defined boundaries. This is because the existence-value component can be well-defined in a variety of ways to include a range of possible motivations, some of which are
“outside” the scope of conventional utilitarian economic thought (Turner et al., 1994).
The Total Economic Value taxonomy can itself be encompassed, in principle, by a more general valuation typology, containing four separate forms of value in relation to environmental resources (see Table 4.1).
It turns out that the TEV taxonomy can itself be encompassed, in principle, by a more general valuation typology, containing four separate forms of value in relation to environmental resources, see Table 4.1. The four categories of value are distinguished in terms of their anthropocentric or non- anthropocentric basis and by their instrumental or intrinsic characteristics. Existence value (as variously defined in the literature) seems to overlap the anthropocentric instrumental value and anthropocentric intrinsic value categories. As one crosses this philosophical boundary the conventional economic notions of utility and welfare cease to always retain their “accepted” relationship, i.e. if welfare is increased, utility increases (Turner and Paavola, 2003).
Table 4.1 A General Value Typology
1. Anthropocentric Instrumental Value
Total Economic Value = use + non-use value. The non-use category is bounded by the existence value concept, which has itself been the subject of much debate.
Existence value may therefore encompass some or all of the following motivations:
i. intragenerational altruism: resource conservation to ensure availability for others;
vicarious use value linked to self-interested altruism and the “warm glow” effect of purchased moral satisfaction;
ii. intergenerational altruism (bequest motivation and value): resource conservation to ensure availability for future generations;
iii. stewardship motivation: human responsibility for resource conservation on behalf of all nature; this motivation may be based on the belief that non-human resources have rights and/or interests and as far as possible should be left undisturbed.
2. Anthropocentric Intrinsic Value
This value category is linked to stewardship in a subjectivist sense of the term “value”. It is culturally dependent. The value attribution is to entities which have a ‘sake’ or ‘good of their own’, and instrumentally use other parts of nature for their own intrinsic ends. It remains an anthropocentrically related concept because it is still a human valuer that is ascribing intrinsic value to non-human nature.
3. Non-Anthropocentric Instrumental Value
In this value category entities are assumed to have sake or good of their own independent of human interests. It also encompasses the good of collective entities, e.g. ecosystems, in a way that in not irreducible to that of its members. But this category may not demand moral considerability as far as humans are concerned.
4. Non-Anthropocentric Intrinsic Value
This value category is viewed in an objective value sense, i.e. ‘inherent worth’ in nature, the value that an object possesses independently of the valuation of valuers. It is a meta-ethical claim, and usually involves the search for strong rules or trump cards with which to constrain anthropocentric instrumental values and policy.
Source: adapted from Hargrove (1992).
So we can emphasize the finding that total environmental value is not necessarily equivalent to TEV; much depends on the specific world-view one adopts prior to the valuation exercise.
Instrumental values are relative and usually linked to individuals and their preferences or needs (category 1 in Table 4.1). The economic message is therefore that if more biodiversity conservation, for example, is chosen, then the opportunity to satisfy other preferences or needs is foreclosed. Hence all resource-allocation policy decision incur opportunity costs. Thus the instrumental value of biodiversity is not absolute; it is relative and as such can be balanced (in a cost-benefit assessment) against other ‘good’ things or ‘worthy’ causes that individuals may want to use or support.
Some environmental philosophers (bioethicists) have usually interpreted intrinsic value as ‘inherent worth’ (category 4 in Table 4.1) and as such completely separate from the human-environment valuation relationship. According to this position non-human biota, and perhaps even non-sentient things, have moral interests or rights to existence. An extreme version of bioethics would make environmental rights absolute and therefore not open to trade-offs, on the basis of a “deep ecology” meta-ethical principle (Rolston, 1988)3.
It is not, however, necessary to ascribe absolute value to environmental conservation/preservation in order to provide more safeguards against biodiversity and other environmental loss than currently exist.
3
By `nature', Rolston generally means non-human nature. He carefully distinguishes `nature' and
`culture'. Culture is an artefact made possible by human self-awareness and thoughtfulness, which are found to such an advanced degree in no other species, and which make possible the acquisition and transfer of knowledge, information, science, technology, art, and a host of other human achievements.
In contrast to `deliberative' culture, nature is `spontaneous' and `non-reflective'. Natural processes are law-like, orderly though also probabilistic, and open to historical novelty, as evidenced in the creativity in evolving ecosystems. Natural selection, combining with genetics, results in the genesis of value.
Such extra safeguards could be justified in terms of ‘altruism’ motivations (value category 2 in Table 2.1) (Randall and Stoll, 1991). Here moral principles recognizing the ‘interests’ of non-human species and their supporting habitats could be used to buttress a case for extra, but not unlimited, sacrifices incurred to better safeguard biodiversity. The values expressed are still anthropocentric but relate to intrinsic qualities in nature.
Existence value therefore derives from individuals who feel a benefit from just knowing that a particular species, habitat, or ecosystems does exist and will continue to exist somewhere on the planet. According to some analysts, the economic literature which seeks to appropriately define and measure existence value as a part of a comprehensive valuation framework has arrived at a consensus view that both use vale and non-use value can be distinguished formally using standard welfare measures from neo-classical economic theory (Larson, 1993). Other analyse highlight the differences that have emerged in the literature (Lant, 1994). It seems to us that if there is such a consensus it is only in a restricted context.
A number of writers also seem to agree that existence value can be measured by survey methods such as Contingent Valuation or Choice Modelling (Cummings and Harrison, 1992; Quiggin, 1998; Kling, 1999; Rolfe et al., 2000; Lomis, 2006).
Since existence values involve neither personal consumption of derived products nor in situ contact, economists have used a special structure of preferences to model existence value. The non-market goods cannot be identified via conventional market demand theory and analysis. Existence value of the non-market good cannot therefore be measured by indirect observation of individuals’ behaviour, and the only option is direct questioning via surveys (Lindhjem and Navrud, 2008).
From the strong–sustainability position, both existence and bequest value could be better conserved by the adoption of the principle of a safe minimum standard (a sufficient area of habitat to be conserved to ensure the continued provision of
ecological functions and services at the ecosystem landscape level) unless the social costs of doing so are unacceptably high (Bishop, 1978; Moeltner et al., 2007).
A further principle, the precautionary principle, would, if adopted, ensure the recognition of bequest motivations and value. In essence, this principle lays down that the opportunity set for the future generations can only be assured if the level of biodiversity (our case example) they inherit is no less than that available to present generations. So some sort of “inheritance” is passed intact across time. This bequest will take the form of a stock of human, physical and natural capital (Pearce, 1992).
I argue that the motivations behind non-use value are some combination of:
individuals’ perceived benefits; altruism towards friends, relatives or others who may be users (vicarious use value); altruism towards future generations of users (bequest value); altruism towards non-human nature in general (existence value).
However, several questions remain to be fully answered, including what precisely is meant by altruistic motives and behaviour and which values are instrumental and which could be intrinsic. We do not yet have anything like a full picture of the mutually exclusive set of motivations underlying individual preferences for environmental goods.
The largely philosophical debate over the need for and composition of an adequate environmental ethics has become rather sterile. In the real world of pragmatic policy-making the instrumental-intrinsic distinction is only usefully maintained if it is interpreted solely in an anthropocentric (human-centred) way. Thus a case for environmental conservation should be supported not only on the grounds of the significant amount of human instrumental value that it is at stake, but also because it allows society to set this things aside (Turner and Pearce, 1993) and exempt these from use. According to Hargrove (1992) this would reflect ‘our desire as individuals, as society, and as a historically evolved culture to value some things non-instrumentally and to set them aside and protect them from exploitation’ (Hargrove, 1992).