The end of the third essay of GM is difficult to decipher and it often gives rise to conflicting interpretations. One reading, which differs from my own interpretation, seems to follow intuitively from some of Nietzsche’s remarks. The issue concerns what Nietzsche means when he says science’s commitment to “faith in a metaphysical value, the value of truth in itself”
entails commitment to the ascetic ideal (GM III: 24). I have argued that this means modern conceptions of science value metaphysical realism. Call the Overestimation Reading the position that Nietzsche thinks science and truth have been more highly valued than they deserve to be (see Janaway 2007: 231; Nola 2005: 207).
The Overestimation Reading derives from Nietzsche’s claim that science and the ascetic ideal rest “on the same belief that truth is inestimable and cannot be criticized” (GM III: 25). On this interpretation, science is ascetic because it is a truth-seeking enterprise and the value of truth has been overestimated. Science lauds truth as the ultimate ideal of evaluation. Through the influence of science we have come to believe our systems of belief should exemplify truth. Yet, Nietzsche holds that there are systems of evaluation best guided by other values, such as
aesthetic values (see, e.g., GS 373). He also believes it may sometimes be better to holds false beliefs over true ones (see, e.g., BGE 4). In virtue of this, Nietzsche maintains that we must depreciate the value of truth in a trial manner: “the value of truth must be experimentally called into question” (GM III: 24). To depreciate the value of truth is to recognize that there are times when truth should be denied an overriding role in our evaluative practices and instead played off against other values. We must deflate faith in “the value of truth in itself,” that is, we should stop valuing truth independent of other evaluative considerations. Truth is an important criterion of evaluation, but it is not always the most important.
It is undoubtedly true that for Nietzsche truth is not the sole criterion for assessing the world (see, e.g., GS 107; BGE 1, 4). However, I suggest, the Overestimation Reading is not the most plausible interpretation of Nietzsche’s understanding of the relation between science and the ascetic ideal. Nietzsche defines the mature incarnation of the ascetic ideal as an ideal that denigrates “our world” by valorizing some “other world” (see GM III: 10, 24; GS 344). But one might overestimate the value of truth and simultaneously reject commitment to any sort of transcendental realm, or depreciate the value of truth and remain committed to such a realm.
Hence on the Overestimation Reading it is hard to see why faith in truth entails commitment to the ascetic ideal.
Chistopher Janaway has a three-part response (2007: 235-239). His main reply is that the truth-ideal of science and the ascetic ideal have “parity of structure” (ibid, 236). For example, Janaway says that on Nietzsche’s account “the priest believes in a realm of higher, divine value, the truth-idealist in the unconditional value of the pursuit and attainment of true beliefs” (ibid).
Parity of structure, though, does not imply commitment to some otherworldly ontology. And even if it did, this example fails to exemplify such parity. The priest’s belief in a realm of divine
value presupposes commitment to God or a metaphysical world, whereas the truth-idealist’s belief in the unconditional value of gaining true beliefs is consistent with a rejection of such a world. Janaway next claims that the truth-ideal and the ascetic ideal are “physiologically parallel” because they both demand an affective detachment from life (ibid, 237). Nietzsche does add this physiological point to his discussion in GM III: 25. However, he does so as a consequence of commitment to “truth in itself,” not to explain why science embraces the ascetic ideal. A proper explanation of why science embraces the ascetic ideal requires discussing what gives scientific inquiry a “right to exist,” and self-flagellation does not figure into this explanation.97 The third claim Janaway make is that the truth-ideal and the ascetic ideal both operate on a moral imperative to tell the truth. Yet, Janaway does not attempt to show why a Christian-moral conception of truthfulness leads science to affirm some metaphysical realm.
This argument is needed to explain Nietzsche’s claims that the ascetic ideal covets another world and that science is ascetic. For these reasons, then, I do not find Janaway’s reading convincing.
The Overestimation Reading lacks the resources to mount a good response to the challenge. It is primarily concerned with whether or not truth is a desired property of belief. But there is a disparity between truth as a desired property of belief and what constitutes the criterion of the truth of a belief. Nietzsche is able to claim that science is committed to the ascetic ideal only if he targets what constitutes the criterion of the truth of a belief. It is not likely that settling the issue of whether or not truth is a desired property of belief commits one to either affirming or denying the existence of something like a metaphysical realist ontology, while, on the other hand, deciding what criteria constitutes the truth of a belief likely requires such an affirmation or
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97 Janaway seems to put the most weight on this argument about the parallel forms of self-flagellation because his book explicitly concentrates on Nietzsche’s attack on selflessness in modern moral systems (see, e.g., 2007: 18-19, 40ff.). I suspect that this presupposition greatly prejudices his reading of the third essay.
denial. My reading of the third essay of GM rests in part on the issue of what delimits the truth conditions of a belief. Nietzsche’s view that an ascetic conception of science affirms metaphysical realism implicates the conception of truth itself in certain scientific and religious frameworks.
My interpretation also allows for an alternative way to understand the main passage that seems to lend intuitive support to the Overestimation Reading. According to Nietzsche science and the ascetic ideal rest on the belief that “truth is inestimable and cannot be criticized” (GM III: 25). On my reading, this makes sense because if something is true regardless of our relation to it, then its status as being true could not possibly be assessed or impugned by us. It would be in principle not estimable by any knower, and as a consequence not of this world.98 Hence commitment to the view that we cannot possibly assess truth entails commitment to some otherworldly realm.