Biografía

[A.M. NO. 88-7-1861-RTC.OCTOBER 5, 1988.]

PADILLA, J:

FACTS:

On 4 July 1988, Judge Rodolfo U. Manzano, Executive Judge, RTC, Bangui, Ilocos Norte, Branch 19, sent this Court a letter which reads:

“By Executive Order RF6-04 issued on June 21, 1988 by the Honorable Provincial Governor of Ilocos Norte, Hon. Rodolfo C. Fariñas, I was designated as a member of the Ilocos Norte Provincial Committee on Justice created pursuant to Presidential Executive Order No. 856 of 12 December 1986, as amended by Executive Order No. 326 of June 1, 1988. In consonance with Executive Order RF6-04, the Honorable Provincial Governor of Ilocos Norte issued my appointment as a member of the Committee. For your ready reference, I am enclosing herewith machine copies of Executive Order RF6-04 and the appointment.

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Before I may accept the appointment and enter in the discharge of the powers and duties of the position as member of the Ilocos (Norte) Provincial Committee on Justice, may I have the honor to request for the issuance by the Honorable Supreme Court of a Resolution, as follows:

(1) Authorizing me to accept the appointment and to assume and discharge the powers and duties attached to the said position;

(2) Considering my membership in the Committee as neither violative of the Independence of the Judiciary nor a violation of Section 12, Article VIII, or of the second paragraph of Section 7, Article IX (B), both of the Constitution, and will not in any way amount to an abandonment of my present position as Executive Judge of Branch XIX, Regional Trial Court, First Judicial Region, and as a member of the Judiciary; x x x”

ISSUE: Whether or not the designation of Judge Manzano as member of the Provincial Committeee on Justice violates the Constitution.

HELD:

Yes. Under the Constitution, the members of the Supreme Court and other courts established by law shall not be designated to any agency performing quasi-judicial or administrative functions (Section 12, Art. VIII, Constitution).

Considering that membership of Judge Manzano in the Ilocos Norte Provincial Committee on Justice, which discharges administrative functions, will be in violation of the Constitution, the Court is constrained to deny his request.

Former Chief Justice Enrique M. Fernando in his concurring opinion in the case of Garcia vs. Macaraig (39 SCRA 106) ably sets forth:

“While the doctrine of separation of powers is a relative theory not to be enforced with pedantic rigor, the practical demands of government precluding its doctrinaire application, it cannot justify a member of the judiciary being required to assume a position or perform a duty non-judicial in character. That is implicit in the principle. Otherwise there is a plain departure from its command. The essence of the trust reposed in him is to decide. Only a higher court, as was emphasized by Justice Barredo, can pass on his actuation. He is not a subordinate of an executive or legislative official, however eminent. It is indispensable that there be no exception to the rigidity of such a norm if he is, as expected, to be confined to the task of adjudication. Fidelity to his sworn responsibility no leas than the maintenance of respect for the judiciary can be satisfied with nothing less."

This declaration does not mean that RTC Judges should adopt an attitude of monastic insensibility or unbecoming indifference to Province/City Committee on Justice. As incumbent RTC Judges, they form part of the structure of government. Their integrity and performance in the adjudication of cases contribute to the solidity of such structure. As public officials, they are trustees of an orderly society. Even as non-members of Provincial/City Committees on Justice, RTC judges should render assistance to said Committees to help promote the landable purposes for which they exist, but only when such assistance may be reasonably incidental to the fulfillment of their judicial duties.

ACCORDINGLY, the aforesaid request of Judge Rodolfo U. Manzano is DENIED.

ARTICLE VIII - JUDICIAL DEPARTMENT NICOS INDUSTRIAL CORPORATION VS. COURT OF APPEALS

(G.R. NO. 88709, FEBRUARY 11, 1992) CRUZ, J.:

FACTS:

In its complaint, petitioners alleged that on January 24, 1980, NICOS Industrial Corporation obtained a P2M loan from private respondent United Coconut Planters Bank (UCPB) and to secure payment thereof, executed a real estate mortgage on two parcels of land. The mortgage was foreclosed for alleged non-payment of the loan, and the sheriff's sale was held without re-publication of the required notices after the original date for the auction was changed without the knowledge or consent of the mortgagor. UCPB was the highest and lone bidder and the mortgaged lands were sold to it.

UCPB sold all its rights to the properties to private respondent Manuel Co, who transferred them to Golden Star Industrial Corporation, another private respondent, upon whose petition a writ of possession was issued to it. NICOS and the other petitioners filed suit for

"annulment of sheriff's sale, recovery of possession, and damages, with prayer for the issuance of a preliminary prohibitory and mandatory injunction."

Golden Star and Evangelista filed a 7-page demurrer to the evidence where they argued that the action was a derivative suit that came under the jurisdiction of the Securities and Exchange Commission;

that the mortgage had been validly foreclosed; that the sheriff's sale had been held in accordance with Act 3135; that the notices had been duly published in a newspaper of general circulation; and that the opposition to the writ of possession had not been filed on time. No opposition to the demurrer having been submitted despite notice thereof to the parties, Judge Nestor F. Dantes considered it submitted for resolution and on June 6, 1986, issued the following —

O R D E R

Acting on the "Demurrer to Evidence" dated April 30, 1986 filed by defendants Victorino P. Evangelista and Golden Star Industrial Corporation to which plaintiff and other defendants did not file their comment/opposition and it appearing from the very evidence adduced by the plaintiff that the Sheriff's Auction Sale conducted on July 11, 1983 was

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in complete accord with the requirements of Section 3, Act 3135 under which the auction sale was appropriately held and conducted and it appearing from the allegations in paragraph 13 of the plaintiff's pleading and likewise from plaintiff Carlos Coquinco's own testimony that his cause is actually-against the other officers and stockholders of the plaintiff Nicos Industrial Corporation ". . . for the purpose of protecting the corporation and its stockholders, as well as their own rights and interests in the corporation, and the corporate assets, against the fraudulent ants and devices of the responsible officials of the corporation, in breach of the trust reposed upon them by the stockholders . . . " a subject matter not within the competent jurisdiction of the Court, the court finds the same to be impressed with merit.

WHEREFORE, plaintiff's complaint is hereby dismissed. The Defendants' respective counterclaims are likewise dismissed.

The Writ of Preliminary Injunction heretofore issued is dissolved and set aside.

It is this order that is now assailed by the petitioners on the principal ground that it violates the aforementioned constitutional requirement. The petitioners claim that it is not a reasoned decision and does not clearly and distinctly explain how it was reached by the trial court.

ISSUE: Whether or not there is a failure to state clearly and distinctly the facts and the law in which the order of dismissal is based.

HELD:

Yes.The questioned order is an over-simplification of the issues, and violates both the letter and spirit of Article VIII, Section 14, of the Constitution.It is a requirement of due process that the parties to a litigation be informed of how it was decided, with an explanation of the factual and legal reasons that led to the conclusions of the court. The court cannot simply say that judgment is rendered in favor of X and against Y and just leave it at that without any justification whatsoever for its action.

The losing party is entitled to know why he lost, so he may appeal to a higher court, if permitted, should he believe that the decision should be reversed. A decision that does not clearly and distinctly state the facts and the law on which it is based leaves the parties in the dark as to how it was reached and is especially prejudicial to the losing party, who is unable to pinpoint the possible errors of the court for review by a higher tribunal.

It is important to observe at this point that the constitutional provision does not apply to interlocutory orders, such as one granting a motion for postponement or quashing a subpoena, because it "refers only to decisions on the merits and not to orders of the trial court resolving incidental matters."

As for the minute resolutions of this Court, we have already observed in Borromeo v. Court of Appeals that —

The Supreme Court disposes of the bulk of its cases by minute resolutions and decrees them as final and executory, as where a case is patently without merit, where the issues raised are factual in nature, where the decision appealed from is supported by substantial evidence and is in accord with the facts of the case and the applicable laws, where it is clear from the records that the petitions were filed merely to forestall the early execution of judgment and for non-compliance with the rules. The resolution denying due course or dismissing a petition always gives the legal basis.

xxx xxx xxx

The Court is not duty bound to render signed decisions all the time. It has ample discretion to formulate decisions and/or minute resolutions, provided a legal basis is given, depending on its evaluation of a case.

The order in the case at bar does not come under either of the above exceptions. As it is settled that an order dismissing a case for insufficient evidence is a judgment on the merits, it is imperative that it be a reasoned decision clearly and distinctly stating therein the facts and the law on which it is based.

ARTICLE VIII - JUDICIAL DEPARTMENT MENDOZA VS. CFI G.R. NO. L-35612-14 JUNE 27, 1973 FERNANDO, J.

FACTS:

Petitioner filed a petition for habeas corpus, certiorari and mandamus. Said petitions were dismissed by the court for lack of merit due to the fact that petitioner failed to sustain the burden of showing that his confinement was marked by illegality or that the order cancelling the bail previously issued was tainted with grave abuse of discretion. Hence, this petition for reconsideration.

ISSUES:

WON the petitioner can invoke the habeas corpus rule.

Granted that petitioner may not be released on a habeas corpus proceeding, is he, however, entitled to bail?

HELD:

1. NO. Habeas corpus could be invoked by petitioner if he were able to show the illegality of his detention. There is aptness and accuracy in the characterization of the writ of habeas corpus as the writ of liberty.

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Rightfully it is latitudinarian in scope. It is wide-ranging and all embracing in its reach. It can dig deep into the facts to assure that there be no toleration of illegal restraint. Detention must be for a cause recognized by law. The writ imposes on the judiciary the grave responsibility of ascertaining whether a deprivation of physical freedom is warranted. This it has to discharge without loss of time. The party who is keeping a person in custody has to produce him in court as soon as possible. What is more, he must justify the action taken. Only if it can be demonstrated that there has been no violation of one's right to liberty will he be absolved from responsibility. Unless there be such a showing, the confinement must thereby cease.

The above formulation of what is settled law finds no application to the present situation. Petitioner's deprivation of liberty is in accordance with a warrant of arrest properly issued after a determination by the judge in compliance with the constitutional provision requiring the examination under oath or affirmation of the complainant and the witnesses produced. No allegation to the contrary may be entertained.

There was no question, however, as to the legality of the warrants of arrest previously issued to petitioner. Habeas corpus, under the circumstances, would not therefore lie.

2. NO. BAIL is the remedy by which, notwithstanding the absence of any flaw in one's confinement, provisional liberty may still be had. Such a remedy, as a matter of fact, was granted him in accordance with an order of the municipal court of Mulanay. Thereafter, however, the bail was revoked by the Court of First Instance in the order now challenged. Such actuation he would now condemn as a grave abuse of discretion.

Before conviction, every person is bailable except if charged with capital offense when the evidence of guilt is strong. Such a right flows from the presumption of innocence in favor of every accused who should not be subjected to the loss of freedom as thereafter he would be entitled to acquittal, unless his guilt be proved beyond reasonable doubt. Thereby a regime of liberty is honored in the observance and not in the breach. It is not beyond the realm of probability, however, that a person charged with a crime, especially so where his defense is weak, would just simply make himself scarce and thus frustrate the hearing of his cage. A bail is intended as a guarantee that such an intent would be thwarted. It is, in the language of Cooley, a mode short of confinement which would, with reasonable certainty, insure the attendance of the accused for the subsequent trial. Nor is there anything unreasonable in denying this right to one charged with a capital offense when evidence of guilt is strong, as the likelihood is, rather than await the outcome of the proceeding against him with a death sentence, an ever-present threat, temptation to flee the jurisdiction would be too great to be resisted.

The precise question however, is whether once the provisional liberty has been thus obtained, it could be terminated by the cancellation of the bail.

The two basic objections are:

One was that petitioner, when the bail was granted, was still at large. The municipal court, therefore, could not have granted bail in accordance with our ruling in Feliciano v. Pasicolan. Thus: "'The constitutional mandate that all persons shall before conviction be bailable except those charged with capital offenses when evidence of guilt is strong, is subject to the limitation that the person applying for bail should be in custody of the law, or otherwise deprived of his liberty. The purpose of bail is to secure one's release and it would be incongruous as to grant bail to one who is free.'"

Secondly, and what is worse, the prosecution was never given a chance to present its evidence. The authoritative doctrine in People v. San Diego is thus squarely in point: "Whether the motion for bail of a defendant who is in custody for a capital offense be resolved in summary proceeding or in the course of a regular trial, the prosecution must be given an opportunity to present, within a reasonable time, all the evidence that it may desire to introduce before the Court should resolve the motion for bail. If, as in the criminal case involved in the instant special civil action, the prosecution should be denied such an opportunity, there would be a violation of procedural due process, and order of the Court granting bail should be considered void."

No grave abuse of discretion to justify the grant of the writ certiorari prayed for has been shown. That is why our resolution sought to be reconsidered should stand.

ARTICLE VIII - JUDICIAL DEPARTMENT BORROMEO VS. COURT OF APPEALS

(G.R. NO. L-82273, JUNE 1, 1990) PER CURIAM

FACTS:

Petitioner Joaquin T. Borromeo charges Attys. Julieta Y.

Carreon and Alfredo P. Marasigan, Division Clerk of Court and Asst.

Division Clerk of Court, respectively, of the Third Division, and Atty. Jose I.

Ilustre, Chief of the Judicial Records Office of this Court, with usurpation of judicial functions, for allegedly "maliciously and deviously issuing biased, fake, baseless and unconstitutional 'Resolution' and 'Entry of Judgment' in G.R. No. 82273.

This is not the first time that Mr. Borromeo has filed charges/complaints against officials of the Court. In several letter-complaints filed with the courts and the Ombudsman Borromeo had repeatedly alleged that he "suffered injustices," because of the disposition of the four (4) cases he separately appealed to this Court which were resolved by minute resolutions, allegedly in violation of Sections 4 (3),13 and 14 of Article VIII of the 1987 Constitution. His invariable complaint is that the resolutions which disposed of his cases do not bear the

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signatures of the Justices who participated in the deliberations and resolutions and do not show that they voted therein. He likewise complained that the resolutions bear no certification of the Chief Justice and that they did not state the facts and the law on which they were based and were signed only by the Clerks of Court and therefore

"unconstitutional, null and void."

The Supreme Court through its Third Division disposed of Borromeo's petition in a four-page resolution which more than adequately complies with the constitutional requirements governing resolutions refusing to give due course to petitions for review. The petition and its incidents were discussed and deliberated upon by the Justices of the Third Division. The Court reminds all lower courts, lawyers, and litigants that it disposes of the bulk of its cases by minute resolutions and decrees them as final and executory, as where a case is patently without merits where the issues raised are factual in nature, where the decision appealed from is supported by: substantial evidence and, is in accord with the facts of the case and the applicable laws, where it is clear from the records that the petition is filed merely to forestall the early execution of judgment and for non-compliance with the rules.

ISSUES:

1. WON the certification of the Chief Justice is imperative in minute resolutions.

2. WON the resolution in question lacked necessary facts and law on which they are based.

HELD:

1. NO. Minute resolutions need not be signed by the members of the Court who took part in the deliberations of a case nor do they require the certification of the Chief Justice. For to require members of the court to sign all resolutions issued would not only unduly delay the issuance of its resolutions but a great amount of their time would be spent on functions more properly performed by the Clerk of court and which time could be more profitably used in the analysis of cases and the formulation of decisions and orders of important nature and character. Even with the use of this procedure, the Court is still struggling to wipe out the backlogs

1. NO. Minute resolutions need not be signed by the members of the Court who took part in the deliberations of a case nor do they require the certification of the Chief Justice. For to require members of the court to sign all resolutions issued would not only unduly delay the issuance of its resolutions but a great amount of their time would be spent on functions more properly performed by the Clerk of court and which time could be more profitably used in the analysis of cases and the formulation of decisions and orders of important nature and character. Even with the use of this procedure, the Court is still struggling to wipe out the backlogs