EVALUADORES PARES NACIONALES E INTERNACIONALES
4. RESUMEN EJECUTIVO
4.1.10. BLOQUE: CUIDADOS PALIATIVOS
RATIO
Generally, notice to counsel operates as notice to the party/parties represented
However, application in a given case should be looked into and adopted according to its surrounding circumstances, otherwise, it may foster dangerous collusions to the detriment of justice
The case at bar involves Section 1 and 2 of Rule 20 of the Rules of Court which state “In any action after the last pleading has been filed, the court shall direct the parties AND their attorneys to appear…” The Court interpreting these provisions, uniformly emphasized that the pre-trial is mandatory, that the parties as well as their counsel, who are required to appear thereat, must BOTH be notified of the same
In other proceedings presence of parties is not necessary so notice to counsel operates as notice to client but in a pre-trial, presence of parties is a must because one of the purposes of a pre-trial is to explore the possibility of an amicable settlement (which a counsel cannot compromise absent express authorization) so notice to the parties is necessary
Records show that since only the counsel for EMMANUEL VICTORIA, ET AL was notified of the pre-trial, such notification is neither adequate nor sufficient for purposes of a pre-trial
Judgment of CA affirmed NOTE
*ATTY CAPISTRANO - not mentioned but I presume he is an associate of ATTY GONZALES 116 SALONGA v CA
Facts:
Astra Realty Development Corp. (Astra) leased its property to Alelie Montojima. The latter tried to open a restaurant but it was not a success.
Montojima then entered into a Joint Venture Agreement (JVA) with Paul Geneve Entertainment Corp. (Paul Geneve) where the latter purchased the lease rights of Montojima over the property.
Paul Geneve paid Montojima but when it was about to start its business, the Bel-Air Village Homeowner’s Association filed a complaint for violation of some municipal ordinances.
Now comes George Salonga who was interested in buying the lease rights of Paul Geneve. Since Salonga had no money, he suggested that he (along with his company – Solid Intertain) and Paul Geneve enter into a joint venture enterprise. The idea was to form a new corporation to be named Solidisque Inc.
All the documents were prepared by the counsels of both parties (Atty. Garlitos for Salonga and Atty. Sadili for Paul Geneve).
Paul Geneve signed the papers but Dalonga didn’t.
Having possession of the unsigned papers, Salonga started operating Metro Disco on the subject property. No corporation under the name Solidisque Inc. was ever registered as agreed upon in the Securities and Exchange Commission. Paul Geneve was totally left out.
Paul Geneve filed a complaint for specific performance against Salonga and his company.
Salonga and his counsel failed to appear in the trial dates so he was declared in default and judgment was rendered by the RTC in favor of Paul Geneve.
Salonga was also adjudged guilty of civil contempt for his failure to appear in an earlier hearing. He was ordered arrested until he obeys the orders and judgment of the Court.
The CA affirmed.
Issue:
W/n Salonga’s allegation of extrinsic fraud and denial of due process obtain to justify annulment of the default judgment rendered by the RTC.
Held:
SC says NO.
Petitioners George Salonga and Solid Intertain Corporation allege that the "inimical and antagonistic acts" of their counsel Atty. Onofre G. Garlitos constitute extrinsic fraud (see p. 543 for list of acts). SC said that extrinsic fraud refers to any fraudulent act of the prevailing party which is committed outside the trial of the case, whereby the defeated party has been prevented from exhibiting fully his side of the case, by fraud or deception practiced on him by his opponent. The nature of extrinsic fraud, as discussed previously, necessarily requires that its cause be traceable to some fraudulent act of the prevailing party committed outside the trial of the case. The Court notes that the previously enumerated negligent acts attributed to petitioner's former counsel Garlitos were in no way shown or alleged to have been caused by private respondents. Atty. Garlitos neither connived nor sold out to the latter. On the other hand, it is well-settled that the negligence of counsel binds the client. This is based on the rule that any act performed by a lawyer within the scope of his general or implied authority is regarded as an act of his client. Consequently, the mistake or negligence of petitioners' counsel may result in the rendition of an unfavorable judgment against them. Exceptions to the foregoing have been recognized by the Court in cases where reckless or gross negligence of counsel deprives the client of due process of law, or when its application
"results in the outright deprivation of one's property through a technicality." None of these exceptions has been sufficiently shown in the present case.
Due process was never denied petitioners Salonga and Solid Intertain Corporation because the trial court had given them a reasonable opportunity to be heard and present their side in all the proceedings before it. In fact, petitioners were declared in default only on the third ex parte motion filed by private respondents.117 PEOPLE v VILLANUEVA
Facts: Villanueva was accused of raping his 11 year-old stepdaughter Nia. (The filing of the complaint was brought about by a kiss mark that Nia’s brother saw on her neck.)
It was alleged that one night, Villanueva, holding a knife against Nia’s neck, threatened to kill her if she ever told anyone of the odious act. Villanueva attempted to insert his penis, but it would not fit. (According to Nia, it was too big.) Villanueva contented himself to licking Nia’s genetalia.
In his defense, Villanueva gives an alibi that he could not have raped her and that the semen found on the victim’s vagina could not have been his (he already had vasectomy). The lower court, however, found Villanueva guilty of raping Nia and imposes the death penalty.
In this mandatory review by the SC, Villanueva alleges that he is entitled to a new trial because of his counsel’s failure to present his common-law wife (Nia’s mother).
Issue: W/N Villanueva is entitled to a new trial.
Held: Villanueva is not entitled to a new trial.
The failure of the defense to present Nia’s mother by reason of the alleged inexperience of his lawyer is not a ground for new trial. The error of his defense counsel is neither an error of law nor an irregularity that will merit a new trial. The client is bound by the action of his counsel in the conduct of his case and cannot be heard to complain that the result of the litigation might have been different had his counsel proceeded differently. If this were to be allowed, then there would be no end to suits so long as new counsel could be employed who could allege that the previous counsel had not been diligent.
Villanueva is still guilty of rape. There is no question about the credibility of the Nia as a witness. The trial judge had occasion to determine the demeanor of the witness. The alibi of Villanueva is also self-serving. It doesn’t’ matter if Villanueva’s [penis did not penetrate. What is important is that there was contract between the peis and the labia of the vagina. The fact that Nia’s hymen was intact does not negate rape, because it is not an element of rape. However, the charge cannot qualify as qualified rape, because the allegation that the accused is the stepfather (in fact he is not, he is merely a surrogate father and there exists no legal relation of step-father and step-daughter) was not averred in the complaint.
118 AGUILAR v CA Facts:
Aguilar and Salvador were charged with Estafa in an Information filed before the RTC. Both were convicted by the trial court and sentenced to an indeterminate penalty of 17 years and 4 months of reclusion temporal as
minimum to 20 years of reclusion temporal as maximum, and to indemnify the offended party the amount of P250,000.
Aguilar, thru his former counsel, Atty.Arandia, timely appealed to CA. Unfortunately, Atty. Arandia failed to file
petitioner’s brief on its due date. He neither communicated to Aguilar nor withdrew his appearance as counsel.
Aguilar’s attempts to contact his counsel were futile.
Aguilar hired Atty. Arias as his new counsel, and the latter entered his appearance in the case and asked an extension of 45 days to submit the appellant’s brief.
The motion was denied for having been filed out of time. CA subsequently denied Aguilar’s motion to dismiss and his appeal.
On the other hand, Salvador was granted an extension of time to file her brief, and the brief was admitted even though filed beyond the grace period.
Issue: W/N CA committed GAD when it dismissed Aguilar’s appeal for failure to file his appellant’s brief on time.
Held: YES.
There is no reason to treat the two appellants differently. Both allegedly conspired in committing the crime of estafa. Their cases rest on the same facts. Equal protection of the law demands that persons situated similarly be treated alike.
Aguilar faces a jail term of 17 yrs and 4 mos to 20 yrs. He cannot lose his liberty because of the gross irresponsibility of his lawyer.
Losing liberty by default of an insensitive lawyer should be frowned upon despite the fiction that a client is bound by the mistakes of his lawyer. The said rule must only be applied to advance the ends of justice, not when the circumstances of the case it becomes a hindrance to justice.
In a criminal proceeding, where certain evidence was not presented because of counsel’s error or incompetence, new trial may be granted if the defendant satisfies the court that: 1) he has a good defense, and that 2) acquittal would in all probability have followed the introduction of the omitted evidence.
CA should have considered the fact that the appellant’s brief was already filed and is already in the records of the case. This shows earnest efforts of counsel and petitioner to be heard and lack of intention to cause delay.
119 SALONGA v CA FACTS:
Astra owned a propert located at Bel-Air Village, Makati.
Montojima leased this property and opened a restaurant which did not prosper
Montojima thereafter entered into a joint venture agreement (JVA) with Paul Geneve Entertainment Corp (PGEC) with the consent of Astra under the following term: Montojima will sell all his rights over the property to PGEC for 3M.
Montojima received 1M
Bt before PGEC can open the business, the homeowners association of Bel-Air filed a complaint against PGEC for violation of some municipal ordinances
PGEC and Salonga entered into a JVA wherein the corporation of Salonga and PGEC will form a new corporation.
but the new corporation never existed and PGEC asked for specific performance from Salonga during the scheduled hearing, Salonga did not appear and was held in contempt
salonga also asked for 2 motions foe extension of time but no answer was filed
becasue of salonga's failure to file an answer, salonga was held in default and cited in contempt
Salonga is now claiming that he received a copy of the decision only on 10-7 yet a motion for reconsideration was filed on 7-28
ISSUE:
W/N the decision must be annulled on the ground of fraud on the part of Salonga's counsel HELD:
NO!
a decision can be annulle donly on 2 grounds: A. judgment is void for want of due process or jurisdiction and B. it was obtained by fraud
there is no extrinsic fraud in the case
the negligence of counsel binds the client. this is based on the rule that any acts performed by counsel within the scope of his general authority is deemed as an act of the client.
lawyer of Salonga, Garlitos, is only guilty of simple negligence. although he failed to file a timely answer, hus efforts at defending thier cause is real.
simple negligence would not amount to a deprivation of right to due process.
to see all the negligent acts of Atty Garlitos see page 543 1st paragraph.
120 LEGARDA v CA
*mahaba, di ko na sinama mga dissenting. Talo naman sila eh Facts:
New Cathay House, Inc. (Cathay) and Victoria Legarda entered into a lease agreement for a property in QC owned by Legarda.
For some reason, Legarda refused to sign the contract. Cathay made a deposit and downpayment of rentals then
filed for specific performance.
Legarda’s counsel, Dean Antonio Coronel, requested a 10-day extension to file an answer which was granted. But Dean Coronel failed to file an answer within that period.
Cathay presented evidence ex parte. Cathay won the case (Katay si Legarda). Service of decision was made on Dean Coronel but he still did not do anything.
The QC property was then levied and auctioned off to pay for the judgment debt. Cathay’s manager, Cabrera, was the highest bidder in the auction. Legarda did not redeem the property within the 1 year period.
Kahit natalo na sila dahil walang ginagawa si Dean (hindi nga niya sinabihan si Legarda kung ano na nangyari sa kaso nila, na wala na yung lupa), Legarda still did not lose faith in her counsel.
Dean Coronel then filed a petition for annulment of judgment. Petition was denied. No motion for reconsideration or appeal was made on the order of denial (ibang klase ka dean!)
So, Legarda hired a new lawyer. New lawyer asked for annulment of judgment upon the ground that the old lawyer was negligent in his duties. The petition was granted and the sale of the QC property to be set aside.
The SC said that there was unjust enrichment on the part of Cathay because of the reckless, inexcusable and gross negligence of Dean Coronel.
Hence this motion for reconsideration of SC decision.
Issue:
W/N Legarda can be bound by the gross negligence of her counsel Held:
Yes. Original decision is reinstated (Legarda=loser)
As long as a party was given the opportunity to defend her interests in due course, she cannot be said to have been denied due process of law.
If indeed Legarda is innocent, then all the more that Cathay is innocent. Between two innocent parties, the one who made it possible for the wrong to be done should be the one to bear the resulting loss.
Legarda misjudged and hired the services of Dean Coronel who in the end sort of abandoned her case.
Decision was res ipso final due to failure to appeal the decision.
121 ALBANO v COLOMA FACTS:
Angel Albano alleges that when he and his mom retained the services of Atty. Perpetua Coloma as their counsel, Atty Coloma failed to expediet the hearing and termination of the case, resulting to their having to procure another lawyer.
Atty. Coloma intervened in the case to collect her atty's fees and presented a document showing that the complainants promised to pay her a contingent fee of 33 1/3% of whatever could be recovered whether in land or damages.
Atty. Coloma likewise denied that she could have been removed for her failure to comply with her obligations as counsel as she served "faithfully, efficiently, continuously and to the best of her knowledge and capacity". Her dismissal, accdg to her, was made without cause and without her consent and when she had already won the case for them in the CFI and the CA.
The facts as found by the SolGen in so far as the services of Atty Coloma as counsel for the complainants reveal the utmost diligence and
conscientiousness on her part. The SolGen further saight that if there was anyone guilty of bad faith in
this case, it is the complainants who, after benefiting from the valuable services of atty COloma, tried to renege on their agreement for the payment of the latter's contingent atty's fees by dismissing her as their counsel after she had already won for them in the trial court and the CA, and later, by attempting to impugn the authenticity and genuineness of their written agreement for the payment of atty's fees
ISSUE: WoN Atty COloma is entitled to her atty's fees (as agreed upon in their written agreement of contigent fee) HELD: YES
RATIO:
1. Counsel is entitled to full recompense for his services He is entitled to the protection of any judicial tribunal against any attempt on the part of a client to escape payment of his fees. It is indeed ironic if after putting forth the best that is in him to secure justice for the party he represents, he himself would not get due.
2. Also, Atty COloma has good reputation.. SO his reputation as a lawyer must be protected.
122 TRADERS ROYAL BANK UNION v NLRC FACTS:
Petitioner Union and private respondent Atty Cruz entered into a retainer agreement whereby the former obligated itself to pay the latter a monthly retainer fee of P3,000 in consideration of the Atty Cruz's undertaking to render the services enumerated in their contract. Petitioner Union referred to Atty Cruz the claims of its members for Holiday, mid year and year-end bonuses against their employer Traders Royal Bank (TRB). NLRC rendered a decision in favor of the union
members. On appeal to the SC, the court modified the decision of the NLRC by deleting the award of mid year and year-end bonus. Bank complied with such decision.
Atty Cruz, thereafter, notified the union , the TRB management and the NLRC of his right to exercise and enforce his attorney's lien over the award of holiday pay. He demanded the payment of 10% of the total award. Union opposed the demand. NLRC ruled in favor of Atty Cruz.
The union insists that it is not guilty of unjust enrichment because all attorney's fees due to Atty Cruz were covered by the retainer fee of P3,000 which it has been regularly paying to Atty Cruz under their retainer agreement. To be entitiled to additional attorney's fees, it contends that there must be separate mutual agreement prior to the performance of the additional services of the counsel.
Issue:
W/n Atty Cruz is entitled to compensation other than the P3,000 retainer fee.
HELD:
YES. He is entitled to P10,000.
An attorney is entitiled to have and receive a just and reasonable compensation for services performed at the special instance and request of his client. As long as the lawyer was in good faith and honestly trying to represent and serve the interests of the client, he should have a reasonable compensation for such services. The P3,000 which the union pays monthly does not cover the services the counsel actually rendered before the labor arbiter and the NLRC. The monthly fee is intended merely as a consideration for the counsel's commitment to render the services.
The P3,000 was a general retainer. It is not payment for counsel's execution or performance of the services of the counsel.
The fact that petitioner union and counsel failed to reach a meeting of the minds with regard to the payment of
The fact that petitioner union and counsel failed to reach a meeting of the minds with regard to the payment of