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The character and consistency of preferences within the Real IRA help to explain both the durability and the behavior of the entire organization. As I mentioned, the RIRA’s strong, vocal opposition to both the PIRA’s ceasefire and the British presence in Northern Ireland made it clear what the organization hoped to achieve. As such, the organization attracted a core group of some of the most ardent hard-liners disaffected with the PIRA. These individuals lent their support to leaders like Michael McKevitt who held equally hard-line and militant views, and they were attracted by the dissident, violent narrative that motivated the RIRA’s departure. They saw the RIRA as the perfect outlet, as a group that would embrace their radical strategic vision. Many of these initial recruits “studied Irish history and would often refer to men like Padraig Pearse, the leader of the 1916 rebellion who sacrificed his own blood for his dream of a United Ireland.”75

Whereas the RIRA’s vocal disagreement to the conciliatory measures outlined in the Mitchell Accords guaranteed that hard-line militants would be drawn to the new organization, it also meant that only a very specific type of recruit was attracted. Those joining the RIRA held neither a political nor socialist agenda but rather, they joined to reignite the militant brand of republicanism they believed was key to achieving a unified Ireland. The RIRA made no mistakes about position on the utility of nonviolent means and the resulting preference alignment bolstered the survivability and the durability of the organization in several discrete ways.

First, the group was able to adopt an organizational structure with devolved au- thority and a parallel shadow council that was ready to take over in the event that

the current leadership was imprisoned or killed. As Frampton notes, “By this stage [around the year 2000], the RIRA leader claimed that a ‘shadow council’ had been set up, ‘to run things in case the main players went inside.’ They could, McKevitt contended, withstand arrests and still maintain violent activity.76_{” This was a signif-} icant move that supported the survivability of the organization. “If a group is highly institutionalized and has clear lines of succession, then the loss of a leader would pre- sumably be less likely to cause major changes in its direction.77” Furthermore, it is also less likely that the organization will descend into chaos as potential leaders vie for power in the event of significant arrest or death. This is not to say that organizations lacking clear succession plans are doomed, but rather that “a clear line of succession [facilitates] success.78_”

Furthermore, the RIRA also adopted a decentralized organizational structure that delegated significant autonomy to local units operating throughout Northern Ireland. Numerous sources suggest that the Real IRA utilized an embryonic, cell-like structure similar to that of the Provisionals. Under this setup, major decisions were made by a governing body consisting of an Army Council and an Army Executive but indi- vidual operations were planned and carried out by smaller Active Service Units79_{. As} one Independent Monitoring Commission Report notes, the “RIRA lacks an organ- ised structure so that individual units have a considerable degree of autonomy. There is little central strategy although there is input from leadership figures in terms of authorising or overseeing attacks.” This sort of compartmentalization provides im- portant benefits to militant groups largely because its helps minimize the effects of both government infiltration and operative defection—something that all Republican

76. Frampton, Legion of the rearguard, 117.

77. Lisa Langdon, Alexander J. Sarapu, and Matthew Wells, “Targeting the leadership of terrorist and insurgent movements: Historical Lessons for Contemporary Policy Makers,” Journal of Public and International Affairs 15 (2004): 68.

78.Ibid., 71.

organization have struggled with over the years.

The RIRA was able to both decentralize its operational command and create a shadow council that could take over in case of widespread arrests because of its inter- nal preference alignment. McKevitt knew that the group of militants under his control could be trusted with a certain degree of operational autonomy and he also knew that he could create the back-up council that would continue the group’s mission in his absence. Indeed, as Shapiro notes, “The more that the preferences of principals and agents in terrorist groups diverge, the worse it is for the principals to have operatives doing what they want.80_{” There was little to lose from devolving autonomy since the} organization had highly aligned internal preferences and agents could be trusted to carry out operations and even lead the organization without strict oversight. Not sur- prisingly, this type of transformation would have been unthinkable with the INLA, a group that remained largely hierarchical throughout its history and even witnessing direct, deadly feuds between competing leaders. Ultimately, that McKevitt was able to structure the RIRA in this way allowed it to withstand infiltration and arrests by the British government.

Second, the types of arguments that did arise within the RIRA were generally minor compared to those within the INLA. This had two effects: the disagreements within the RIRA tended to be about degrees of strategy and not necessarily alter- natives, and these feuds did not result in direct intragroup conflict for dominance. Consider, for example, one particular feuds that beset the RIRA at its first organiza- tional meeting:

There was deep division about how best to proceed. ‘McGuinness’ wanted to adopt a new approach and was very clear sighted about the situa- tion. As the republicans listened with placid attention, he said a mur-

derous campaign against British soldiers and pohce would be the best approach. ’McGuinness’ argued against using car bombs to destroy towns and commercial targets. Such attacks were useless and didn’t advance the cause. . . Campbell thought otherwise. Large bombs made an impact and sent a clear message to the British government; bombings made Northern Ireland ungovernable. He also argued that there was a greater chance of success with a car bomb than trying to shoot a British soldier, or shoot down a helicopter.

The matter was ultimately discussed and decided upon by the army council without issue. “Campbell was permitted to run whatever military campaign he felt was neces- sary” and ‘McGuinness’ was satisfied once there was a relentless onslaught against the British; he was content to let the matter rest.” Compared to what the IRSP/INLA experienced in its first year, including the resignation en masse of much of the IRSP governing council, this can barely be considered a division. The general internal agree- ment and preference alignment of the RIRA meant that disagreements and feuds were minimized. As was the case with the INLA, internal feuds can also breed defection and infiltration. Though to be sure, there was also infiltration and defection within the ranks of the RIRA but significantly these events were not driven by internal feuding as was the case with the INLA.

In addition, this case demonstrates how individuals with radical preferences can in- directly influence group strategy towards the extreme. McKevitt allowed both Camp- bell and McGuinness to conduct their own operations. By doing so, he appeased the more radical of two—Martin McGuinness—which helped maintain group cohesion, but as a result the group would be responsible for even more destructive acts.

81

Third, and finally, McKevitt’s strategic disagreement with the leaders of the PIRA provides insights into the organization’s trajectory.The RIRA’s initial break with the PIRA over the ceasefire virtually ensured that they would undertake violent actions. As Mooney and O’Toole note, “With no political agenda other than to collapse the on- going peace negotiations, there was no doubting the threat the RIRA represented.”83 Members of the RIRA, and especially those who initially joined the organization with McKevitt, were ready, if not anxious, to begin launching violent operations against the state to derail the negotiations that they so strongly opposed. Yet just as with the INLA, their vocal opposition to the ceasefire, and more generally to politics at all, attracted some of the most ruthless republicans. These were individuals looking for an outlet to conduct armed operations against British and loyalist targets and indeed they had found one. The RIRA ultimately attracted “battlehardened terror- ists in its ranks who are unlikely to be deterred from future violence by the Omagh tragedy”—even though Omagh, a bombing gone wrong that killed 29 and injured over 300, had even made McKevitt and other members of the Army Council rethink their violent strategy. Ultimately, as the example above shows, these members both directly and indirectly influenced group behavior towards the extreme. Consequently, it was not inevitable that the RIRA developed into the relentless militant organi-

Northern Ireland, killing 29 and injuring over 300. Although the RIRA bore the brunt of the blame it was later revealed that the bombing was actually co-conducted by members of both the RIRA and the Continuity IRA (and older PIRA splinter group). There was major backlash against the RIRA and the entire Republican movement. As a result, the RIRA announced a complete ceasefire on 7 September 1998, though still refusing to disband or disarm.82_{As the group noted in a prepared}

statement, “As a direct result of the Omagh tragedy and also in response to the appeals of Bertie Ahern [Irish prime minister] and others we are currently embracing on a process of consultation on our future directionHorgan, Divided We Stand, 34.” The Omagh bombing, combined with waning local support and increased pressure from the security forces, ultimately created tension within the organization, resulting in either an actual organizational split or some defection. Around this time a new group called Oglaigh na hEireann (ONH) was formed, though it is unclear whether the organization actually split from the RIRA, from the CIRA, or if it was merely a subgroup within the RIRA. Either way, it is important to note that there was no feuding around this new organizationIMC8; Horgan,Divided We Stand; Morrison,“To Split is Not to End: The Development

of a Process Model of Splits in Terrorist Organizations.”

zation it ultimately become. Rather, it flowed logically from the preferences of the leaders and of the individuals who joined the new dissident group after it split from the PIRA.

4

Conclusions

In this chapter I aim to show how preference divergence within the INLA con- tributed to its downfall and conversely, how the preference homogeneity of the Real IRA supported and bolstered group survival. While the Real IRA was more stead- fastly radical and determined to use violence, I show how neither group’s actions were inevitable but rather that they flowed logically from the preferences of the members attracted to each organization.

The INLA’s ability to survive was undermined by internal conflicts and an almost necessary hierarchical structure. Costello hoped that centralizing authority would bol- ster cohesion and control, though it only did so minimally and at a significant cost. Maintaining a top-down, centralized structure left the group vulnerable to arrests, infiltration, power-feuds—all of which were already more likely due to the internally divergent preferences of group members. On the other hand, the Real IRA capital- ized upon the like-mindedness and preference alignment of its members, decentralizing their operations, creating a cell-structure that was difficult to penetrate, and a shadow leadership that could take over in an emergency. This helped to ensure the contin- uation of the group even after the current leaders are gone. The RIRA was able to decentralize precisely because their operatives could be trusted and because there was minimal disagreement between them. Event though there was a much lower chance of feuds and defection, the group was more resilient to their pernicious effects precisely due to this flatter organizational structure.

held by those individuals attracted to each organization. Tactical and strategic hard- liners that drawn to both groups in response ot their anti-ceasefire, anti-compromise narrative based around the use of violence. For the INLA, their tactical behavior was a mix of highly radicalized, deadly operations like the assassination of Airey Neave, the British Secretary of State for Northern Ireland, in 1979, and more steadfastly political operations as well. The INLA pursued a political path that was lead by core members drawn to the organization predominantly due to their political and social- ist rhetoric and they had little appetite for violence. The mix of hardline and more moderate positions within the group lead them down a path that embraced a range of strategies, from extreme violence to political lobbying to uniting the work class for a potential socialist revolution.

The Real IRA’s singular focus on violence and their strict opposition to politi- cal compromise attracted a more focused core of extremists with decidely hardline preferences. Unlike many of those who joined the INLA early on, these individuals were uninterested in politics and they were united by their shared desire to reunite Ireland by force. Consequently, the RIRA’s behavior is consistently radical, and there were rarely internal debates suggesting that the group should moderate and embrace a more subtle, political approach.84 _{Not surprisingly, the Real IRA is responsible for} the deadliest attack of the Troubles, the Omagh Bombing, which left 29 dead and over 200 injured.

Ultimately, the evidence presented in this chapter lends strong support for the correlations identified in the empirical analyses. The comparison of the Real IRA and the INLA demonstrates how militant groups are strongly influenced by the preferences of their members. First, preferences determine the type of actions that groups will launch. One of the most important tasks for the leader of a militant organization

84. The only time this debate occurred was several years after some of the main leaders were arrested.

is to preserve unity, so leaders often seek to appease the dominant interests of their members. In the cases of both the INLA and the RIRA, Costello and McKevitt ramped up or merely accepted more radical violence out of concern for organizational unity. Preferences also shape group decisionmaking in more direct ways by skewing internal discourse. For instance, Real IRA discussions were dominated by disaffected hardliners since their organized lacked members who held more moderate points of view.

While preferences provide insights about how the group will act, they are also essential for understanding variation in survival. Militant groups that are comprised of members with very different views of their organizational future will find it difficult to maintain cohesion and survive. Many members of the INLA held strategic visions that starkly differed from those of their peers. Some were staunch militants, while others were opposed to violence and sought victory through more political means. These individuals had little reason to work together and their antipathy and disillu- sionment ultimately lead to feuds, defection, and other unsanctioned behavior. The RIRA was advantaged by a core group of similarly-minded militants, and they expe- rienced greater cohesion and were able to decentralize into a cell-like structure as a result. AS these cases show, internal cohesion is critical to the survival of clandestine organizations.

Overall, the INLA and the RIRA demonstrate the explanatory power of my theory. While the empirics presented in the following two chapters uncover correlations across space and time that support my theoretical intuition, I can only uncover and verify the causal mechanisms through qualitative research. This case study is therefore critical to demonstrating the significance of organizational formation, and to understanding how the character and consistency of group preferences drive variation in survival and behavior.

Chapter 5

1

Introduction

The durability and longevity of militant organizations poses a puzzle to both po- litical scientists and policymakers. Empirically, the puzzle is about why organizations survive and collapse at varying rates with some able to withstand government pres- sure and the passage of times while others, even in relatively permissive environments, are unable to maintain cohesion. This puzzle has clear policy implications as well: understanding the factors contributing to variation in group longevity can help poli- cymakers to construct initiatives that are most likely to contribute to group decline and then focus these policies on the groups most likely to pose enduring challenges. However, simply understanding these factors even if they do not provide immediate, actionable policy recommendations is nonetheless important. Such information can help identify the types of organizations that are likely to disintegrate on their own, absent direct state intervention.

Organizational longevity is an especially important topic with regards to militant splinter groups. Breakaway organizations that emerge from existing groups often have the capacity to be evolve into especially deadly, capable militants since their experi- ence and their knowledge provide an immediate advantage. For instance, the Islamic State’s evolution from Al Qaeda in Iraq into one of the deadliest and most successful militant groups with profound staying power is partly due to its preexisting knowledge base, battle-hardened and trained recruits, and existing infrastructure in northwest Iraq. They were not starting from scratch like many anti-Assad opposition groups, who certainly have been much less successful and much less cohesive, but instead they have a significant advantage stemming from their experience and their organizational history. Furthermore, many splinter organizations emerge when conflicts are winding down. Ongoing negotiations and ceasefires often provide the impetus for personal, ideological, and strategic disagreements to be raised, and militants that break away

can undermine tenuous peace agreements and extend conflict sometimes in an at- tempt to increase their own share of the post-war spoils.1 _{Understanding which of} these organizations are likely to pose durable, long-lasting challenges shed light on the conflict’s trajectory.

In this chapter I empirically examine how variation in the consistency of internal organizational preferences influences the longevity of militant splinter groups. The theory presented in Chapter Two suggests that militant splinters will experience dif- ferential rates of survival according to the mechanisms leading to their formation.