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Before addressing the issue of policy transfer, it is useful to set it within the wider context of decision making in Saudi Arabia. Here, the effects of the 1960’s oil boom are significant. As explained in Chapters 1 and 2, expanding national wealth made hundreds of millions of dollars available to the government to allow for continued development (Mubarak, 2004). Indeed, Saudi Arabia is working hard to use this oil wealth to promote its citizens’ welfare, and huge budgets continue to be spent on infrastructure projects (ADA, 2015; MOT, 2016).
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A particular hallmark of decision making in Saudi Arabia is its hierarchical nature (this is discussed in Chapter 4). Generally, the Saudi Royal Court sets the country’s strategic direction, with tactical and operational decisions flowing downwards (this is discussed in detail in Section 4.2). One benefit of a strict hierarchy is that significant national resources can be mobilised quickly, which in turn favours large-scale projects (al Dubaiki, 2007). This is in contrast with infrastructure development in other nations.
In the UK, for example, the decision to build a third runway at Heathrow Airport cannot (at least politically) be made hierarchically from the top down (Nulman, 2015). The advantage is that complex fine-grained solutions can be ‘evolved’ from the bottom up rather than imposed from the top down (Nulman, 2015). The disadvantage, of course, is that bottom-up processes of public consultation and ‘localism’ mean the project has been discussed since the 1970s, but is still not built (Nulman, 2015).
In Saudi Arabia, the expansion of much-needed services became part of the national plan (Mubarak, 2004). Part of the problem with the development of necessary public services was a lack of communication between government ministries. Public services for road construction, for example, were often uncoordinated with residential construction and so created heavy traffic and transportation problems (Murbarak, 2004).
The lack of coordination in the development of the sprawling city was so bad that in 1985 the government halted all further construction until development could be brought under control to a certain extent (Murbarak, 2004). It was felt that the lack of specialist expertise or ‘specialist elites’ had been a hindrance to coordination.
Arising from this was an interesting situation. In Riyadh, the availability of capital was less of a problem compared with other cities, but the rate and scale of change brought about by large influxes of money gave rise to new problems, in this case a disconnected planning and development process. A secondary – but still important – side effect of this was that it created a perceived need for outside expertise.
The desire for coordination is in large part responsible for the appetite for master plans (such as the Doxiadis one of 1972). Embedded in these master plans were a number of
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Western ideas about the form and structure of cities. As mentioned earlier, such huge projects, due to the lack of specialist elites, were bound to differ from indigenous ideas in terms of the demographic characteristics and that will be justified in this section (3.3).
In recent times, this has manifested itself as a need to maintain town centre viability and to reduce the impact of the car on the resource use and environmental pollution. It is only through a combination of strategies that progress can be made towards sustainable development objectives by using a combination of strategies. However, to reduce car use, it is necessary to promote cities as desirable places to live in, with a high quality of life. Good local accessibility and high-quality public transport are essential components of this.
Moreover, transport investment in urban rail infrastructure is seen as major tool in shaping urban structure and promoting economic development. Changes in accessibility resulting from a new rail infrastructure should encourage new development around stations – at least, that is what the experience of other cities suggests (Preston, 2010).
According to Baniester (2006), many cities, such as Los Angeles, Frankfurt, Portland etc., have invested in new rail systems, and some of the associated development has been privately funded. Offices, shops and commercial centres have formed an integral part of that development. As redundant land around railway stations has become available, new development has also taken place. This compact and high- density development is a direct result of changes in accessibility, and much of the recent new prestige office development in city centres has been of this structure (Baniester, 2006).
Similarly, in many historic cities not designed for the car, and other medium–sized cities, smaller-scale bus and pedestrian-oriented changes have taken place (OECD, 2014).
As mentioned in Chapter 2, Riyadh has changed from being a small pedestrianised city before the advent of the automobile in the 1940s to a capital of eight million people today. In Saudi Arabia, there is an appetite for high levels of coordination to ensure best
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use of the available funding (ADA, 2015; MOT, 2016). There is also a tendency to seek outside expertise to help achieve this (See Section 3.6.7).
As mentioned previously, there is a critical long-term risk of bringing these policies from another context and for them to prove less effective than expected. This is where the concept of policy transfer provides theoretical robustness and insight. The following section looks at the concept of policy transfer and the key issues debated in the wider literature review.