that all the other concepts (tadanyavijñapti) make up its concept-image
(nimittavijñapti), whereas the concept of mental consciousness
(manovijñānavijñapti) together with support (sāśrayam), make up its concept-vision (darśanavijñapti). The concept-images (nimittībhūtā vijñaptiḥ), being the image generating the vision (darśanotpādanimitta), appear as object (arthavad ābhāsante) and play the rôle of support of arising (utpādāśraya) in regard to vision. This is how the existence of concept-only (vijñaptimātratā) is established.
[139a11]
13. Comm. Bh 340b19-27, bh 174b2-6, U 402b15-25, u 275a7-275b4.
“If the idea of store-consciousness is considered as an objective concept: objective (artha) has the meaning of causal (hetu): if the concept of store-consciousness is considered as a causal concept, then all the other concepts, concepts of body, etc., (kayādivijñapti), make up its concept-image because they are its object (ālambananimitta) and its domain (gocara); whereas the concept of mental consciousness together with the support - i.e., the sixth consciousness and the support, or the manas just past (anantarātita) and the afflicted (kliṣṭa) manas, because these two manas are the support of arising and of the defilement (saṃkleśa) of the mental consciousness - form its concept-vision." (U)
14. How does one explain that, although it manifests, the object does not exist? - As the Bhagavat has said: When bodhisattvas have four qualities (guṇa), i.e., four knowledges, they understand (avabudh-) the non-objectivity (anarthakatva) of all concepts (vijñapti). These four knowledges are:
i) Viruddhavijñānanimittatvajñāna: knowledge that one and the same object is the cause of opposing consciousnesses. Thus hungry ghosts (preta), animals (tiryak), humans (manuṣya) and gods (deva) have differing concepts
(bhinnavijñapti) of one and the same thing (ekadravya).
ii) Anālambanavijñaptyupalabdhitvajñāna: knowledge that one can perceive concepts without object. Thus the past (atīta), the future (anāgata), dream (svapna), reflection (pratibimba) are perceived in the absence of any object.
iii) Aprayatnāviparītatvajñāna: knowledge that there would be neither effort nor error if the object were real. If the object existed, the consciousnesses bearing on this object (tadālambana vijñāna) would be made effortlessly and without error since one would be cognizing reality (tattva).
iv) Trividhajñānānukūlatvajñāna: knowledge that the object conforms to the threefold knowledge:
(a) For bodhisattvas and those in the dhyāna states (dhyāyin) who have attained mastery of mind (cetavaśita), objects appear as they want them by the power of their aspiration (adhimuktibala).
(b) For yogins who have attained tranquility (śamatha) and who practice the examinaton of dharmas (dharmavipaśyanā), objects appear at the precise moment of attention (manasikāra).
(c) For those who have attained nonconceptual wisdom (nirvikalpakajñāna) and who abide there, no more objects appear.
Thus, because of the close correspondence of the object with this threefold knowledge and for the other reasons (hetu) given above, it is proved (siddha) that the object does not exist. [139a25]
14b. Here are some verses:
(a) According to their class, hungry ghosts, animals, humans and gods have different concepts of the same object. Therefore we conclude that the object does not exist.
(b) In the past, etc., in the dream and in double reflection, there is no object of consciousness; nevertheless, they can be perceived.
(c) If the object were truly an object, the wisdom free of concept would not arise; without this wisdom, buddhahood could not be attained.
(d) For bodhisattvas possessing mastery and also for yogins, earth, etc., are transformed into whatever substance they wish by the power of their aspiration.
(e) Finally, for the sage (dhīmat) who assures for himself the possession of tranquility, objects appear in this way together with the set of their characteristics when he reflects on the dharmas.
(f) When nonconceptual wisdom is attained, no further objects appear. Thus it is known that the object does not exist. Since it does not exist, concept is not objective.
14. Comm. Bh 340c14-29, bh 174b6-175a7, U 402c11-403a22, u 275b4-276b8.
“To prove that there is no object, the author cites another āgama and another argument.
i) Viruddhajñānanimittatvajñāna: to understand that the nimitta of opposing consciousnesses is just a development of the inner mind (ādhyātmikacittapariṇāma) and that the outer object (bāhyārtha) does not exist ....” (U) - u continues: chu kluṅ gaṅ la yi dwags rnams kyis raṅ gi las kyi rnam par smin paḥi dbaṅ gis rnag la sogs pas gaṅ bar mthoṅ ba de ñid la dud ḥgro ña la sogs pas btuṅ ba daṅ gnas yin paḥi blos gnas par byed do // mi rnams ni dṅar ba daṅ daṅ ba daṅ bsal baḥi chur rtog ciṅ khrus byed do // ḥthuṅ ṅo // ḥjug go // nam mkhaḥ mthaḥ yas skye mched la sñoms par ḥjug paḥi lha rnams kyis ni nam mkhar mthoṅ ste / gzugs kyi ḥdu śes rnam par bśig paḥi phyir ro // dṅos po gcig la phan tshun mi mthun paḥi rnam par śes pa du ma ḥbyuṅ ba de ni mi ruṅ ba ste / chu kluṅ de ñid rnag daṅ gcin daṅ phyi sas gaṅ ba daṅ / dbyug pa daṅ ral gri thogs paḥi mis bsruṅs pa yin na dri €im pa daṅ bsil baḥi chu daṅ / gnas daṅ / btun ba la sogs paḥi bya baḥi ḥos daṅ nam mkhaḥi bdag ñid du ji ltar ḥgyur te / pha rol gyi don med do // brtags pas der snaṅ bar ni ruṅ ste / ji skad du
bud med lus ni gcig pu la/
/ ro daṅ ḥdod bya za ba €es/
/ kun rgyu ḥdod can khyi rnams kyi/
/ rnam par rtog pa rnam pa gsum mo/
€es bśad pa lta buḥo/: “There where, by the power of retribution (vipākabala) of their actions (svakarma), hungry ghosts (preta) see a river (nadī) filled with pus (pūyapūrṇa), animals (tiryak), fish (matsya), etc., see a drink (pāna), a home, and they settle in it.
Humans (manuṣya) see delicious water, clear and pure: they use it to bathe, quench their thirst and wash. As for the gods in concentration (samāhitadeva) in the sphere of infinite space (ākāśānantyāyatana), they see only space there because they no longer have physical sensation (rūpasaṃjñā). But it is impossible in this way to have mutually different experiences of one and the same thing if this thing were real. How could this same river, full of pus (pūya), urine (mūtra) and excrement (purāṣa), guarded by armed men with sticks and swords (daṇḍāsidharaiś ca puruṣair adhiṣṭhitā), be at the same time sweet-smelling (sugandha) fresh (śītala) water, a home and a drink? How could it be identical with space? But if it is accepted that the external object does not exist, all this is explained. Cf. Sarvadarśanasaṃgraha, (ed. by Ānandāśrama, p. 12) where it is said:
parivrāṭkāmukaśunām ekasyāṃ pramadātanau / kuṇapaḥ kāminī bhakṣya iti tisro vikalpaṇāḥ // : the monk, the lover and the dog have three different conceptions of one and the same woman: she is a carcass, a mistress or food.” (u)
ii) Anālambanavijñaptyupalabdhitvajñāna: “The Sautrāntikas have proved (cf. Kośa, V, p. 58) that the past and the future are cognized without being objects. The non-reality of the dream is well known. We have spoken (§ 7) of images perceived in concentration and we said (§ 8) that they could not be memories because they are perceived directly. We have shown above (§ 7) how the reflection of a face, etc., in a mirror, etc., is nothing but what it is (akiṃcit). It is established that consciousnesses bearing on these things have no object (ālambana).” (u)
iii) Aprayatnāviparītatvajñāna: “The text is clear and needs no explanation. If one accepts that objects are really such as they are perceived, one would understand the truth (bhūta) and beings (dehin) would be delivered (vimukta) effortlessly.” (u)
iv) Trividhajñānānukūlatvajñāna: “(a) The ecstatics, the ones who are in dhyāna, are the śrāvakas and pratyekabuddhas; dhyāna is the one-pointed fixing of the mind
(cittaikāgratā). They are called 'ecstatics' because they practice ecstasy. Who have attained mastery of the mind: who have attained aptitude of mind (cittakarmaṇyatā). By the power of their beliefs, they transform earth into water, etc. - (b) For the yogins who have attained tranquility: who have attained concentration (samādhi). Śamatha and samādhi are synonymous. Because it calms the distractions of the mind (cittavikṣepa), śamatha is tranquility.... And who practice examination of the dharmas: who, by a practice subsequent to tranquility (pṛṣṭhalabdha), practice vipaśyanā (or prajñā) of the dharmas, sūtras, etc.” (u) - bh: don gcig la yaṅ ji lta ji ltar yid la byas pa de lta de ltar rnam pa maṅ po snaṅ baḥo: "one and the same object, according to how it is considered, appears to them with its set of characteristics, impermanence, suffering, etc.” - (c) “If the object really existed, the acquisition of nonceptual knowledge would no longer be explained because the object would be seen as it is from the start.”(u)
15. i) If the dependent nature (paratantrasvabhāva) is the concept-only