BUENAS PRÁCTICAS AMBIENTALES 1 INFRAESTRUCTURA E INSTALACIONES

ANEXOS

ANEXO 4. Guía para el manejo de bifenilos policlorados (PCBs)

8. BUENAS PRÁCTICAS AMBIENTALES 1 INFRAESTRUCTURA E INSTALACIONES

This paper shows that seemingly innocuous differences in the payoff representation have powerful effects on equilibrium selection. When payoffs are represented in nominal terms, 84 percent of the subjects eventually converge to a Pareto inferior equilibrium while 98 percent of the subjects finally play the Pareto efficient equilibrium under the real payoff

representation. This constitutes clear and powerful evidence for the behavioral relevance of money illusion. In particular, our results suggest that nominal payoff dominance is an equilibrium selection principle which drives behavior in strategic settings. We also show that persistent effects of money illusion occur despite the fact that most individuals are eventually able to pierce the veil of money when they are given repeated individual learning opportunities. Thus, the argument that the impact of money illusion on aggregate outcomes will eventually vanish through learning, can be seriously misleading. In our context, it is misleading because learning in strategic environments with multiple equilibria may be difficult or impossible or, if it occurs, it may be too late to have much impact on the aggregate outcome.

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Appendix A: Instructions

[The original instructions were in German. The instructions below refer to the nominal treatment with human players (NH). The subjects received the instruction below and the nominal payoff matrix.]

Welcome to the experiment. Please read these instructions carefully. You can earn money in this experiment. During the experiment, we calculate your income in points. All points you earn during the experiment will be converted into Swiss Francs according to the exchange rate: 10 points = 0.40 Francs.

Please do not communicate with other participants during the experiment. Please ask us if you have questions.

This experiment has 30 periods. All participants are members of a group. Your monitor indicates the number of people in your group. You do not know who is in your group but the composition of the group remains stable throughout the experiment. Only the decisions in your group are relevant for your earnings. Decisions by other groups are irrelevant for you.

All group members are in the role of firms. In each period, all firms must simultaneously set a price from 1 to 30 (1 and 30 included). How much a firm earns depends on the price it chooses and on the average price all other firms in the group choose.

The income table shows your nominal point income. All firms have the same tables.

Example: Suppose you choose a price of 15 and the other firms choose prices of 16 on average. In this case your nominal point income is 48 points.

For the determination of your earnings at the end of the experiment, only the real point income is relevant. This holds for all firms. To calculate your real point income from your nominal point income, you have to divide the nominal point income by the average price of other firms. Therefore, the nominal and the real point income are related as follows:

Real point income = Nominal point income / Average price of other firms In the example above, your nominal point income is 48 points, but you real point income is 3 points (= 48 points / 16).

Here is how the experiment proceeds: At the beginning of each period, you choose a selling price (a number from 1 to 30) and indicate which average price of other firms you expect. At the end of each period you are informed about the actual average price of the other firms and about your actual real point income.

Do you have any questions?

The decisions of other firms

[This decision sheet was only given to subjects in the NC and the RC] In this experiment, the decisions of other firms will not be taken by other participants but by pre-programmed computers. These computers choose their prices depending on your choice. The table below shows how the computers respond to your pricing decision.

Your price choice Average price of other (computerized) firms

1 4 2 4 3 4 4 4 5 4 6 4 7 4 8 5 9 6 10 10 11 14 12 15 13 16 14 17 15 18 16 19 17 20 18 21 19 22 20 23 21 24 22 25 23 26 24 27 25 27 26 27 27 27 28 27 29 27 30 27

Average price of other firms

1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 29 30

selling price

1 ¹³¹¹ ¹¹ ¹⁵ ¹⁹ ¹⁵ ¹³ ¹² ¹¹ ¹⁰ ¹¹ ¹² ¹⁴ ¹⁵ ¹⁶ ¹⁷ ¹⁸ ¹⁹ ²⁰ ²¹ ²² ²³ ²⁴ ²⁵ ²⁶ ²⁷ ²⁸ ²⁹ ³⁰ ³¹

2 ²⁴²⁵ ¹⁹ ²⁵ ³² ²² ¹⁶ ¹⁴ ¹² ¹¹ ¹² ¹³ ¹⁴ ¹⁵ ¹⁶ ¹⁷ ¹⁸ ¹⁹ ²⁰ ²¹ ²² ²³ ²⁴ ²⁵ ²⁶ ²⁷ ²⁸ ²⁹ ³⁰ ³¹

3 ¹³⁴⁸ ⁴⁴ ⁵⁸ ⁷³ ³⁷ ²³ ¹⁶ ¹³ ¹¹ ¹² ¹³ ¹⁴ ¹⁵ ¹⁶ ¹⁷ ¹⁸ ¹⁹ ²⁰ ²¹ ²² ²³ ²⁴ ²⁵ ²⁶ ²⁷ ²⁸ ²⁹ ³⁰ ³¹

4 ⁶²⁵ ⁸⁴ ¹¹² ¹⁴⁰⁸⁴ ³⁹ ²² ¹⁵ ¹¹ ¹² ¹³ ¹⁴ ¹⁵ ¹⁶ ¹⁷ ¹⁸ ¹⁹ ²⁰ ²¹ ²² ²³ ²⁴ ²⁵ ²⁶ ²⁷ ²⁸ ²⁹ ³⁰ ³¹

5 ³¹¹ ⁴⁴ ⁵⁸ ⁷³ ¹⁶²⁸⁸ ³⁷ ¹⁹ ¹² ¹² ¹³ ¹⁴ ¹⁵ ¹⁶ ¹⁷ ¹⁸ ¹⁹ ²⁰ ²¹ ²² ²³ ²⁴ ²⁵ ²⁶ ²⁷ ²⁸ ²⁹ ³⁰ ³¹

6 ² ⁷ ¹⁹ ²⁵ ³² ⁸⁴ ¹⁶⁸⁸⁰ ²⁹ ¹² ¹² ¹³ ¹⁴ ¹⁵ ¹⁶ ¹⁷ ¹⁸ ¹⁹ ²⁰ ²¹ ²² ²³ ²⁴ ²⁵ ²⁶ ²⁷ ²⁸ ²⁹ ³⁰ ³¹

7 ² ⁵ ¹¹ ¹⁵ ¹⁹ ³⁷ ⁸⁸ ¹⁵²⁵⁹ ¹⁴ ¹³ ¹⁴ ¹⁵ ¹⁶ ¹⁷ ¹⁸ ¹⁹ ¹⁹ ²⁰ ²¹ ²² ²³ ²⁴ ²⁵ ²⁶ ²⁷ ²⁸ ²⁹ ³⁰ ³¹

8 ² ⁴ ⁸ ¹⁰ ¹³ ²² ³⁹ ⁸⁰ ¹⁰⁸¹⁸ ¹⁴ ¹⁵ ¹⁵ ¹⁶ ¹⁷ ¹⁸ ¹⁹ ²⁰ ²¹ ²² ²³ ²⁴ ²⁵ ²⁵ ²⁶ ²⁷ ²⁸ ³⁰ ³¹ ³²

9 ¹ ³ ⁶ ⁸ ¹⁰ ¹⁵ ²³ ³⁷ ⁵⁹ ³⁰ ¹⁷ ¹⁶ ¹⁷ ¹⁷ ¹⁸ ¹⁸ ¹⁹ ²⁰ ²¹ ²² ²³ ²⁴ ²⁵ ²⁶ ²⁷ ²⁸ ²⁹ ³⁰ ³¹ ³²

10 ¹ ³ ⁵ ⁷ ⁹ ¹² ¹⁶ ²² ²⁹ ⁵⁰ ²² ¹⁹ ¹⁸ ¹⁸ ¹⁹ ¹⁹ ²⁰ ²¹ ²¹ ²² ²³ ²⁴ ²⁵ ²⁶ ²⁷ ²⁸ ²⁹ ³⁰ ³¹ ³²

11 ¹ ³ ⁵ ⁶ ⁸ ¹⁰ ¹³ ¹⁶ ¹⁹ ³⁰ ³⁹ ²⁶ ²² ²¹ ²⁰ ²⁰ ²¹ ²¹ ²² ²³ ²⁴ ²⁴ ²⁵ ²⁶ ²⁷ ²⁸ ²⁹ ³⁰ ³¹ ³²

12 ¹ ³ ⁴ ⁶ ⁷ ⁹ ¹¹ ¹⁴ ¹⁵ ¹⁸ ⁶⁶ ⁴⁸ ³¹ ²⁵ ²³ ²² ²² ²² ²³ ²³ ²⁴ ²⁵ ²⁶ ²⁷ ²⁷ ²⁸ ²⁹ ³⁰ ³¹ ³²

13 ¹ ² ⁴ ⁵ ⁷ ⁸ ¹⁰ ¹² ¹³ ¹⁴ ³⁹ ⁸⁴ ⁵⁹ ³⁶ ²⁹ ²⁵ ²⁴ ²⁴ ²⁴ ²⁴ ²⁵ ²⁵ ²⁶ ²⁷ ²⁸ ²⁹ ³⁰ ³¹ ³² ³³

14 ¹ ² ⁴ ⁵ ⁶ ⁸ ⁹ ¹¹ ¹² ¹² ²² ⁴⁸ ¹⁰⁴⁷⁰ ⁴² ³² ²⁸ ²⁶ ²⁶ ²⁶ ²⁶ ²⁶ ²⁷ ²⁸ ²⁸ ²⁹ ³⁰ ³¹ ³² ³³

15 ¹ ² ⁴ ⁵ ⁶ ⁸ ⁹ ¹⁰ ¹¹ ¹² ¹⁷ ²⁶ ⁵⁹ ¹²⁶⁸³ ⁴⁸ ³⁶ ³¹ ²⁹ ²⁸ ²⁷ ²⁷ ²⁸ ²⁸ ²⁹ ³⁰ ³¹ ³² ³³ ³⁴

16 ¹ ² ⁴ ⁵ ⁶ ⁷ ⁹ ¹⁰ ¹¹ ¹¹ ¹⁴ ¹⁹ ³¹ ⁷⁰ ¹⁵⁰⁹⁶ ⁵⁴ ⁴⁰ ³⁴ ³¹ ³⁰ ²⁹ ²⁹ ²⁹ ³⁰ ³⁰ ³¹ ³³ ³³ ³⁴

17 ¹ ² ³ ⁵ ⁶ ⁷ ⁸ ⁹ ¹⁰ ¹¹ ¹³ ¹⁶ ²² ³⁶ ⁸³ ¹⁷⁶ ¹¹¹⁶¹ ⁴⁴ ³⁶ ³³ ³² ³¹ ³¹ ³¹ ³¹ ³² ³⁴ ³⁴ ³⁵

18 ¹ ² ³ ⁵ ⁶ ⁷ ⁸ ⁹ ¹⁰ ¹¹ ¹² ¹⁵ ¹⁸ ²⁵ ⁴² ⁹⁶ ²⁰⁴ ¹²⁶⁶⁸ ⁴⁸ ⁴⁰ ³⁶ ³⁴ ³³ ³² ³² ³⁴ ³⁵ ³⁵ ³⁶

19 ¹ ² ³ ⁴ ⁶ ⁷ ⁸ ⁹ ¹⁰ ¹⁰ ¹² ¹⁴ ¹⁷ ²¹ ²⁹ ⁴⁸ ¹¹¹ ²³⁴ ¹⁴³⁷⁶ ⁵³ ⁴³ ³⁸ ³⁶ ³⁵ ³⁴ ³⁵ ³⁷ ³⁷ ³⁷

20 ¹ ² ³ ⁴ ⁶ ⁷ ⁸ ⁹ ¹⁰ ¹⁰ ¹² ¹³ ¹⁵ ¹⁸ ²³ ³² ⁵⁴ ¹²⁶ ²⁶⁶ ¹⁶⁰⁸⁴ ⁵⁷ ⁴⁶ ⁴¹ ³⁸ ³⁶ ³⁸ ³⁹ ³⁹ ³⁸

21 ¹ ² ³ ⁴ ⁵ ⁷ ⁸ ⁹ ¹⁰ ¹⁰ ¹² ¹³ ¹⁵ ¹⁷ ²⁰ ²⁵ ³⁶ ⁶¹ ¹⁴³ ³⁰⁰ ¹⁷⁹⁹² ⁶² ⁴⁹ ⁴³ ⁴⁰ ⁴² ⁴³ ⁴² ⁴¹

22 ¹ ² ³ ⁴ ⁵ ⁷ ⁸ ⁹ ¹⁰ ¹⁰ ¹² ¹³ ¹⁴ ¹⁶ ¹⁹ ²² ²⁸ ⁴⁰ ⁶⁸ ¹⁶⁰ ³³⁶ ¹⁹⁸ ¹⁰¹⁶⁷ ⁵³ ⁴⁶ ⁴⁸ ⁵⁰ ⁴⁶ ⁴⁴

23 ¹ ² ³ ⁴ ⁵ ⁶ ⁸ ⁹ ⁹ ¹⁰ ¹¹ ¹³ ¹⁴ ¹⁶ ¹⁸ ²⁰ ²⁴ ³¹ ⁴⁴ ⁷⁶ ¹⁷⁹ ³⁷⁴ ²¹⁹ ¹¹⁰⁷³ ⁵⁷ ⁵⁹ ⁶¹ ⁵⁴ ⁴⁹

24 ¹ ² ³ ⁴ ⁵ ⁶ ⁷ ⁸ ⁹ ¹⁰ ¹¹ ¹³ ¹⁴ ¹⁵ ¹⁷ ¹⁹ ²² ²⁶ ³⁴ ⁴⁸ ⁸⁴ ¹⁹⁸ ⁴¹⁴ ²⁴⁰ ¹²⁰⁷⁸ ⁸¹ ⁸⁴ ⁶⁷ ⁵⁷

25 ¹ ² ³ ⁴ ⁵ ⁶ ⁷ ⁸ ⁹ ¹⁰ ¹¹ ¹² ¹⁴ ¹⁵ ¹⁷ ¹⁸ ²¹ ²⁴ ²⁹ ³⁶ ⁵³ ⁹² ²¹⁹ ⁴⁵⁶ ²⁶³ ¹³⁰ ¹³⁵ ¹⁴⁰⁹³ ⁷¹

26 ¹ ² ³ ⁴ ⁵ ⁶ ⁷ ⁸ ⁹ ¹⁰ ¹¹ ¹² ¹⁴ ¹⁵ ¹⁶ ¹⁸ ²⁰ ²² ²⁶ ³¹ ⁴⁰ ⁵⁷ ¹⁰¹ ²⁴⁰ ⁵⁰⁰ ²⁸⁶ ²⁹⁷ ³⁰⁸ ¹⁵⁷⁹⁹

27 ¹ ² ³ ⁴ ⁵ ⁶ ⁷ ⁸ ⁹ ¹⁰ ¹¹ ¹² ¹⁴ ¹⁵ ¹⁶ ¹⁸ ¹⁹ ²¹ ²⁴ ²⁸ ³³ ⁴³ ⁶² ¹¹⁰ ²⁶³ ⁵⁴⁶ ⁵⁶⁷ ⁵⁸⁸ ³⁴⁸ ¹⁶⁸

28 ¹ ² ³ ⁴ ⁵ ⁶ ⁷ ⁸ ⁹ ¹⁰ ¹¹ ¹² ¹³ ¹⁵ ¹⁶ ¹⁷ ¹⁹ ²¹ ²³ ²⁶ ³⁰ ³⁶ ⁴⁶ ⁶⁷ ¹²⁰ ²⁸⁶ ²⁹⁷ ³⁰⁸ ⁶⁶⁷ ³⁷⁵

29 ¹ ² ³ ⁴ ⁵ ⁶ ⁷ ⁸ ⁹ ¹⁰ ¹¹ ¹² ¹³ ¹⁵ ¹⁶ ¹⁷ ¹⁹ ²⁰ ²² ²⁴ ²⁷ ³² ³⁸ ⁴⁹ ⁷³ ¹³⁰ ¹³⁵ ¹⁴⁰ ³⁴⁸ ⁷²⁰

30 ¹ ² ³ ⁴ ⁵ ⁶ ⁷ ⁸ ⁹ ¹⁰ ¹¹ ¹² ¹³ ¹⁴ ¹⁶ ¹⁷ ¹⁸ ²⁰ ²¹ ²³ ²⁶ ²⁹ ³⁴ ⁴¹ ⁵³ ⁷⁸ ⁸¹ ⁸⁴ ¹⁵⁷ ³⁷⁵

Average price of other firms

1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 29 30

selling price

1 13 6 4 4 4 3 2 2 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1

2 24 13 6 6 6 4 2 2 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1

3 13 24 15 15 15 6 3 2 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1

4 6 13 28 28 28 14 6 3 2 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1

5 3 6 15 15 15 27 13 5 2 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1

6 2 4 6 6 6 14 24 10 3 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1

7 2 3 4 4 4 6 13 19 7 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1

8 2 2 3 3 3 4 6 10 12 2 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1

9 1 2 2 2 2 3 3 5 7 3 2 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1

10 1 2 2 2 2 2 2 3 3 5 2 2 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1

11 1 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 3 4 2 2 2 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1

12 1 2 1 2 1 2 2 2 2 2 6 4 2 2 2 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1

13 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 2 1 1 4 7 5 3 2 2 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1

14 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 2 4 8 5 3 2 2 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1

15 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 2 2 5 9 6 3 2 2 2 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1

16 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 2 2 5 10 6 3 2 2 2 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1

17 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 2 3 6 11 7 3 2 2 2 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1

18 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 2 3 6 12 7 4 2 2 2 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1

19 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 2 2 3 7 13 8 4 3 2 2 2 1 1 1 1 1 1

20 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 2 2 3 7 14 8 4 3 2 2 2 1 1 1 1 1

21 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 2 2 3 8 15 9 4 3 2 2 2 2 2 1 1

22 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 2 2 4 8 16 9 4 3 2 2 2 2 2 1

23 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 2 2 4 9 17 10 5 3 2 2 2 2 2

24 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 2 2 4 9 18 10 5 3 3 3 2 2

25 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 2 2 3 4 10 19 11 5 5 5 3 2

26 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 2 2 3 4 10 20 11 11 11 5 3

27 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 2 2 3 5 11 21 21 21 12 6

28 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 2 2 3 5 11 11 11 23 13

29 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 2 2 3 5 5 5 12 24

30 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 2 2 3 3 3 5 13

Appendix B - Functional Specification of Payoffs

The real payoff function for all players i is:

*)2

The table below shows the best reply for player i and the parameter H for every feasible average price of the other players P₋_i. Note that P_k, k ∈ {A, B, C}, is the price in equilibrium A, B, or C, respectively. π_k, k {A, B, C}, is the real profit in equilibrium A, B, or C, respectively. Recall from Table 1 that P

∈

A = 4, PB = 10, PC = 27, πA = 28, πB = 5 and πC = 21.

For example, if P₋_i is below PA – 1, player i’s best reply is given by P_−i+1 and H = π_A−5. The real payoff matrix is based on the payoff function above but all numbers in the matrix are rounded to integers.

Table B1: Real payoffs

If the average price of other firms is in the range

Table 3: Evolution of Prices and Real Payoffs over Time

Average Price Average real payoff

Human opponents Computerized

Table 4: Percentage of subjects choosing equilibrium action PA (i.e. Pareto-dominant equilibrium)

* Numbers in parentheses denote the percentage of subjects choosing the equilibrium action PC (i.e., Pareto-dominated equilibrium).

Table 5: Statistical significance of treatment differences

period RC vs. NC RC vs. RH NC vs. NH

1 0.013 0.077 0.609 2 0.001 0.018 0.401 3 0.005 0.491 0.951 4 0.009 0.123 0.950 5 0.061 0.154 0.531 6 0.104 0.248 0.192 7 0.003 0.145 0.603 8 0.018 0.641 0.295 9 0.110 0.771 0.005 10 0.363 0.038 0.019 11 0.031 0.978 0.033 12 0.014 0.754 0.006 13 0.161 0.095 0.015 14 0.114 0.348 0.006 15 0.019 0.028 0.015 16 0.221 0.042 0.002 17 0.101 0.117 0.000 18 0.601 0.244 0.000 19 0.629 0.285 0.000 20 0.339 0.084 0.000 21 0.125 0.490 0.001 22 0.313 0.028 0.000 23 0.420 0.490 0.000 24 0.290 0.346 0.000 25 0.355 0.032 0.000 26 0.376 0.490 0.000 27 0.408 0.107 0.000 28 0.945 0.063 0.000 29 0.336 0.107 0.000 30 0.838 0.064 0.000 Table 5 reports two-tailed p-values of Mann Whitney tests of the null hypothesis that average prices are equal across the corresponding treatments. Average group prices are the independent units of observation.

Figure 1: Average prices and expectations in the treatments with human opponents

Figure 2: Average prices across all treatments

Figure 3: Average group prices (treatment NH disaggregated)

1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 29 30

period

group 1 group 2 group 3 group 4 group 5 group 6

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