Buenas prácticas de manufactura

Notions of identity are fundamental to considering what it means to be human; occupying the minds of philosophers in the fourth and fifth century BC from Socrates to Plato and Aristotle, and reflected in Descartes post-renaissance departure towards a mechanistic framework with his cogito ergo sum musings ‘I think, therefore I am’ in the 17th _{Century. As Gioia (1998) observes:}

What other issue is quite so important as answering the nebulous question, Who am I? What other question so influences understanding and action so heavily? I can think of no other concept that is so central to the human experience than the notion of identity (Gioia, 1998 p.17)

Early Greek philosophers variously dealt with concepts such as the true character- based self, multiple selves and collective identity. Questions of identity were also folded

Page | 61 C. Daniels

into larger concerns of later philosophers including Kierkegaard in the 19th _{Century, and}

Sartre, Russell and Wittgenstein in the 20th _{Century. The latter’s later work moved him}

from wanting to perfect philosophy as an investigative means for understanding the objective world, to concluding that the world and what happens in it, is in fact, socially constructed and contextually bound. The work of James (1918), around multiple identities and questions about what constitutes the ‘real me’ also added to debates from a social-psychology perspective. In seeking approaches to understanding social phenomenon and questions of identity and the self, both Husserl during the first few decades of the 20th _{Century and later Schultz (1970), extended the view that identity is}

a constructed phenomenon. Many of the key theorists also writing around this time including Goffman (1959, 1971) and Erickson (1964) contributed to an emerging discourse that identity was formulated and understood though social interaction; that is through personal and social interaction with others where we have different selves, depending on the situation or environment we find, or place, ourselves in. Much of this has been located in two branches of similar ontological concern: identity theory and social identity theory.

Identity theory (IT), keenly rooted in symbolic interactionism (Cooley, 1902; Mead 1934; Blumer, 1969), is predicated on a central tenet that society affects behaviour through its influence on self. The work of Stryker in the late 1960s first established identity theory in the sociological literature and moved the debate towards considering society as differentiated, multi-faceted and often highly organised; arguing this needed to be reflected in how constructs of the self could be viewed. Rather than one self, a number of role identities are performed by individuals and these interact with wider social structures.

Later theorising by Burke (1980) and Thoits (1991) extended notions that role identities are self-definitions people apply to themselves as a consequence of the structural roles they have; this also helps locate them in a particular social category. It is through social interaction in roles such as mother, mentor, teacher that they take on meaning. In the role of teacher, an individual can distinguish their occupational role identity by the complementary and symbiotic connection to students. As a micro-sociological construct, identity theory considers the concept of identity salience; where role identities have a hierarchical structure and some roles are more highly-regarded, and engender more

Page | 62 C. Daniels

effort and commitment from individuals, than others. The ‘self’ reflects wider social structures through a collection of identities based on the role positions occupied by an individual.

A sense of identity derived from the social category one may fall into, or wants to belong to, is the distinguishing feature of Social Identity Theory (SIT). Most associated with the early work of Tajfel (1959), with later developments by Tajfel and Turner and JC Turner in the late 1970s - early 1980s, and Hogg and Abrams (1988), the basic premise was that a particular group or affiliation will be seen by its members to require a certain way of thinking, feeling and behaving. It followed that individuals were provided with a self- definition based on how belonging to the particular social category was perceived.

Hogg and Kipling (2001) argue these were often ideological constructs, not always based on reality. What it was seen to produce was stereotypical, normative self- perception and conduct for the ‘in-group’ which promoted competitiveness and discrimination against ‘out-groups’. This helped to protect and maintain the status quo of privileged positioning in the social category. Social identity theory attempted to explain group behaviour in a way that recognised primacy of society and structure over individuals.

Later self-categorisation theories (Haslam, Powell & Turner, 2000; Oakes et al, 1994; Turner et al. 1987) sought to extend understanding of how categorisation processes formed the cognitive basis of group behaviours and notions of ‘best fit’; reinforcing perceived positive similarities amongst in-group members and negative characteristics and behaviours in out-group members. The relationship between both groups is seen as particularly important: The salient out-group is central to the dynamic as it becomes the point of difference, and therefore comparison, in the social context where the groups exist. Socio-cognitive processes such as self-enhancement are powerful stimuli in social interactions, but in efforts to get as close to the salient in-groups prototypicality as possible, research by Hogg et al. (2003) suggested that individuals often depersonalise the ‘self’. In Bauman’s studies of group identities in the 1990s, he also found that in- groups were seen to create a sense of togetherness, with meaning and identity construction partly drawn as a counterforce against out-groups. It was contextually responsive. The stronger that sense of togetherness, the more effort is harnessed

Page | 63 C. Daniels

toward prototypical similarities being achieved; described by Tajfel, (1969) as the

accentuation effect.

While identity theory is generally viewed as a sociological theory and social identity theory more of a psychological perspective, in different ways, both address the structure and function of the socially constructed self and the dynamic interplay between social structure and individual social behaviour. Identity theory offers ideas about role identities and a commitment to these and what they may mean in a social category, while social identity theory suggests self-categorisation and alignment with a particular group will lead to internalisation of group norms and prototype behaviours to evaluate and reflect a view of self.

Scholars including Stets and Burke (2009) and Simon (2004) have sought to integrate these two identity perspectives arguing that to a great extent they are not inherently contradictory conceptualisations. Theorists from both traditions (and it is to be acknowledged these are wide-ranging and multi-faceted in themselves), accept that individuals will view themselves in terms of meanings and constructs that already exist in a structured society: Identity formation is theorised by how a person categorises themselves as a member of a group (social identity theory) or how they enact a role (identity theory). Simon (2004) makes the point that all self-aspects, are both cognitive and social in essence; whether construed in terms of individual, relational or collective identities, and what is largely missing from both identity theory and social identity theory, is consideration of the individual. Rooted in an essentialist perspective, Hitlin (2003) describes person identity as:

A sense of ‘self’ built up over a period of time [... it] emphasises a sense of individual autonomy, rather than communal involvement. It is experienced by individuals as core or unique to themselves, in ways that group or role identities are not. (Hitlin, 2003 p. 118)

Person identity is inwardly constructed, seen by some as an under-analysed level of self in organisational theory, regarded as too idiosyncratic and out of vogue for useful analysis (Hitlin, 2003; Prentice, 2001). Categorisation of the self as a unique individual - differentiated from others by the act of pursuing their own goals and desires, is viewed in social identity terms as the lowest level of self-categorisation. For many social identity

Page | 64 C. Daniels

theorists ( B r e w e r & C a p o r e a l , 2 0 0 6 ; Hogg et al, 2003; Reicher et al, 2005), the pull of normative fit in social groups is seen to be strong enough to override person identity to prevent subjugation of the needs and desires of a group or category by an individual. Stets and Burke (2009) contend that this is a reductive application, maintaining that person identity should be considered more seriously as it penetrates both role and group identities. They argue for more vigorous and critical integration of person identity theory into dominant theoretical frameworks to challenge embedded concepts such as the process of depersonalisation that many social identity theorists (Eidelman & Silvia 2010; Haslam et al., 2010; Hogg et al, 2003) advocate is needed for reaching salient in-group prototypicality. Equally, when identity theorists describe a need for self-verification (Swann, 2012; Thoits & Virshup, 1997) - where the self is seen and measured against identity standards for a particular role, then person identity should be valued as ‘something in the soul’ (Thomas & Linstead, 2002). Here person identity is seen to act as an ‘anchor’ in rough waters (Albert, Ashforth & Dutton, 2000) when dominant forces and discourses in society are at work trying to determine what identity in particular domains should ‘look like’.

In attempting to establish a general theory of self and identity formation, Stets and Burke (2000, 2009) seek to transcend the different epistemologies and methodological conventions that separate these perspectives. Is the group the basis for my identity? ‘Who I am’ or is the basis my role, ‘what I do’? Stets and Burke maintain that these considerations are fundamentally anchored by the idiosyncratic characteristics already extant in our person identity. Here individuals are viewed as separable from social relations and the impact of macro-discourses and institutional forces by dint of their unitary, sovereign selves. There is a pervasive view that the study of identity has begun to move away from such dualistic perspectives (Alvesson 2010; Layder, 2006; Petriglieri & Stein, 2012; Nyberg & Sveningsson, 2014; Ybema et al., 2009) towards recognition that identity work is precarious and fluid in contemporary social and organisational life. This does not suggest a choice has to be made between complete rejection of individual constituents and sovereign self at one extreme - or acceptance that people are empty vessels or dupes, completely at the mercy of structural forces at the other, it is simply a reflection that: “Individual readings of identity, need to be balanced with consideration

Page | 65 C. Daniels marginalising either self-constructs of identity, or structural contexts” (Ybema et al.,

2009, p.302).

Until relatively recently, empirical studies have tended to concentrate on either sociological or psychological based analyses, with relatively few considering a possible nexus between individual, collective and societal levels (Harrington, 2005; Hotho, 2008). The extent to which agency is privileged in identity construction continues to be a central theme in social science. It serves to delineate the continuum of perspectives from humanistic focus on the individual as meaning-maker with a fair amount of agency, to structural and discursive standpoints which tend to position structure and discourse as the dominant forces on identity formation. In advocating a duality which sought to connect elements from interpretivist and structural perspectives, theorists informed by the seminal work of Berger and Luckmann (1966) including Bourdieu (1977), Giddens, (1984), Archer (1995) and Layder (1997), began to articulate identity as a reflexive and processual endeavour by individual agents in the context of a reciprocal self-society dialectic; shaped by and through social action, and mediating structural and symbolic forces.

While Giddens’ (1984) Structuration Theory is utilised in many empirical identity studies (Trede, Macklin & Bridges, 2011), both Layder (1997, 2006) and Archer (1995; 2003) while occupying similar intellectual space, believe Giddens tends to over-privilege a generic transformative power in individual agents and enabling structures, leading to potential for diluted analytical synthesis and ontological flatness. Conversely, acute structural perspectives (Hayward, 2000; Townley, 1993; Zembylas, 2005) can decentre individuals’ influence on their identity construction to such an extent that they are entirely subordinate to a dominant discourse, determining what and how they should be; disciplining them to reproduce institutional practices from which ideal, scripted selves emerge (Alvesson, 2010).

Layder argues the development of his own Theory of Social Domains (1997) is a response to theories that, in his view, either polarise, or attempt to reductively synthesise, agency-structure concerns. He proposes a multi-dimensional model of four social domains which can account “more fully for the variegated nature of social reality” (Layder, p.273) than some of the more popular theories informing identity studies. In

Page | 66 C. Daniels

seeking to examine the agency-structure dialectic, this perspective recognises particular features in each of four domains, but also a symbiotic relatedness across and between them; representing complex inter-dependent relationships between individuals, institutional structures, social and occupational practices and discourse. The domains of Psychobiography and Situated Activity largely consider subjective and inter- subjective activity, while structural forces can be investigated through the spheres of

Social Settings and Contextual Resources. Importantly, the model does not have closed

dimensions; it views the domains as intertwined through social relations of power, stretched over time and space, for “they do not operate separately or autonomously” (Layder, 2006, p.282). Within this analysis, Layder argues strongly for the utility of a psychobiographical domain which maps and acknowledges individual experiences, critical events, and trajectories through social and occupational life. In allowing for consideration of different affective impacts - depending on how individuals experience, respond to, and act in social relations, and to institutional practices and forces, there is recognition of emotional uniqueness in the individual’s biography. While this may initially appear suggestive of an essentialist, coherent, unitary sense of self extant in person identity theory, Layder in fact makes a case for ontological insecurity. It is precisely because we experience and narrate our existences and social relationships with others differently - with our own configurations and responses forming a dynamic trajectory, that a ‘fit’ between individual and society is unstable; with threats to security and trust in social and occupational life rendering identity an endlessly unfinished project.

Taking Psychobiography seriously is compatible with the notion of identity as processual and struggle because it offers an analytic device for examining the identity work represented in individuals’ narrative as they strive to construct an image of a solid self, independent and distinctive from others. These attempts at securing a centred, robust self, conflict with notions of the decentered self, always alienated from its own history, and never discrete; remaining constituted in, and through others (Lacan, 1966). While accepting that contemporary life is often contradictory, fragmented and unstable, and that affirmation of self - or indeed selves is intimately tied to others, and subject to being undermined by forces acting upon it, narrative around critical life events and career trajectories through Psychobiography can reveal identity construction work taking place where:

Page | 67 C. Daniels

[T]he individual, backed up by or being subjected to various ‘resources’ sometimes can produce and sustain a self-image, neither independent of, nor totally victimized by these forces (Alvesson, p. 201, 2010).

Based on this understanding of an ‘in-between’ position, alignment – albeit temporal, of a positive self-image with social reality is, as Alvesson observes, in principle possible. Yet, accepting identity as in a continual process of becoming, the social and discursive contexts to which individuals relate themselves, still leaves identity a more open project than in the past: with some of the most concentrated identity work actually taking place in often fragmented and contradictory contexts (Sennett, 2006; Watson, 2008). In Layder’s (1997) inclusion of the domain of Psychobiography, which allows for a unique emotional sphere – with individually held fears, anxieties and desires, he argues that an analytic space is created in his multi-dimensional model to take account of a variability in peoples’ resources and capacity to create self-narratives in attempts to secure a positive self-image, or images in uncertain and often turbulent worlds.

Psychobiography is not treated as a fixed, static phenomenon. Its in-progress nature means that there is acceptance of ongoing endeavour and struggle, where questions of ‘who am I?’ and ‘How should I be?’ (Archer, 2003) involve complex, recursive and reflexive processes (Ybema, et al., 2009, p. 301) where, shaped by particular experiences, social interactions and the individual’s responses to, and in them: “actual

as well as possible selves based on one’s past history, or images about who one might become, could have been, would like to be, or fears becoming” (Petriglieri & Stein, 2012

p.1221) can serve as points of orientation for identity work (Ibarra, 1999). In this analysis, fears, desires and anxieties - while emotionally unique in how individuals experience and internalise them, are in movement because they shape, and are shaped by, the effects of social and discursive forces. However, serious account should be taken of active storying of the self (McAdams, 1996) as individuals are not simply at the mercy of external forces:

The significance of discourse, role and other ‘external’ forces targetting and moulding the human subject needs to be balanced with the relative inertia following from life history and capacity to reflexively and actively struggle to create a life project out of various sources and influences, including producing and editing integrative narratives over one’s self (Sveningsson & Alvesson, p.1168).

Page | 68 C. Daniels

In this conceptualisation, identity is understood as struggle, as individuals seek to construct a self-identity which may - at least fleetingly, mobilise a sense of coherence and a lessening of fragmentation and anguish often experienced in contemporary life.

This fragility in contemporary working life, where insecurity is coupled intimately to the concept of identity (Knights & Clarke 2014), dependent on the judgement and affirmation of others, played out under the discursive regimes of new-managerialist controls and disciplinary practices is increasingly becoming a focus for critical theorists (Brown & Lewis, 2011; Clarke, Knights & Jarvis, 2012; Colley & Guery, 2015; Petriglieri & Stein, 2012). In the organisational arena: “identities are multiple, precarious and as

dependent on performance as any drama” (Knights & Clarke, 2014 p. 336), and it is in

the inter-subjective dimension of Layder’s second domain - Situated Activity, when we are ‘physically in one another’s response presence’ (Goffman, 1959), that these performances and dramas take place.

Goffman’s notions of backstage and frontstage performance capture the idea that while an appearance may be being created during the encounter, there is more happening behind the scenes. For symbolic interactionists and phenomenologists, meaning is formed within the situation and between those present - backstage and frontstage, rather than by, or through, structural or social forces. Unlike Person Identity Theory or Social Identity Theory, Identity Theory (IT) draws on an understanding that roles are enacted to enable a mutually constitutive process of identity construction to take place. This involves validation and stabilisation of a socially constructed inter-personal contract (Gabarro, 1990) as individuals make their identity claim, accommodate each other and assess, revise and accept a situated identity (Markus & Nurius, 1986). Crises phases that challenge identity salience is allowed for as relationships and situations change: Identity is then renegotiated to form a newly accepted construct – an underlying