3.2. Capítulo 2 Conceptualización del Buronut
3.3.3. El Burnout y el afrontamiento
Nigeria’s obsession with African continental leadership predates its existence as a legal geo-political and geographical sovereign entity. This obsession as it were was the principal motive behind the country’s foreign policy towards Africa, especially on the issues of Anti-colonialism and the crucial issues which were of concern to the African continent. Long before its independence from Britain in 1960, Nigerians would be leaders, politicians, intellectuals, and the media had all subscribed to the concept of Nigeria’s having a predestined leadership role to play in Africa. What then could be said to have been responsible for these nationalistic ambitions? As expected, there were compelling factors that birthed this expectation.
In February 2005, Prof. Bolaji Akinyemi, Nigeria’s former external affairs minister (1985-1987), delivered a public lecture titled “Nigeria – The Blackman’s Burden.” In the text of the lecture, Akinyemi noted expressly that Nigeria’s leadership aspirations in Africa was fired, energized and influenced by the early independence of its neighbour Ghana who had obtained independence in 1957, three years before Nigeria’s political independence in 1960. This he observed
“motivated” and “spurred” the consciousness of the Nigerian elites who believed that Nigeria had an important role to play in global affairs and that their country must quickly assert itself as the leader of Africa. He said that the early independence of Ghana which was the perceived
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genuine African voice on the global stage did not go down well with Nigeria.30 According to Akinyemi, Ghana’s early independence and subsequent venturing into the anti-colonial struggle was considered within Nigeria’s domestic circle as the usurpation of the role that should be an exclusive preserve of Nigeria, as: “Nigeria felt that this was an affront to the role which should have been reserved for Nigeria because of her mega size.”31 Thus it can be inferred from the foregoing that Nigeria perceived Ghana’s early independence as a threat and challenge to its pre-independence thought of becoming Africa’s continental leader. This is the role the Nigerian state felt it could use as the launch pad in attaining the status of continental leadership. To the Nigerian leadership elites, surpassing Ghana’s effort in the decolonization race was tantamount to actualizing their country’s leadership aspirations on the continent.
The fact that independent Ghana hit the ground running on Cold War issues and on other pan-African issues such as decolonization, forced the Nigerian leaders to begin to stark out foreign policy positions even before Nigeria’s independence. It is for this reason that Akinyemi talks about “. . . the activist policy pursued by Ghana. She practically hit the ground running on Cold War issues and on Pan-Africanism. If Ghana had achieved independence and kept out of the international limelight, Nigeria would not have felt the urge to stake out foreign policy positions long before independence.”32 One critical point could be deduced from the above quote. It is the fact that Nigeria’s anti-colonial policy was strategically shaped by the country’s national interest which was the desire to lead Africa and more importantly become the continent’s voice on issues pertaining to Africa.
To drive home the point, we shall refer to some of the historic statements which were made by prominent leaders of the Nigerian state, top diplomats and politicians about the leadership role they believed Nigeria should play in Africa. Theorists of the realist school argue that states
30 See Akinyemi B. (2005), “the Blackman Burden” Text of the public lecture delivered on February 24, 2005, Lagos, Nigeria. p. 12
31Ibid
32Ibid
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actors in the international system are motivated primarily by factors such as national interest and self-interest. The question which arises is: was Nigeria’s participation in the anti-colonial struggle motivated by the country’s national interest? Is there any link between those roles played and Nigeria’s obsession with African leadership? As aforesaid, we shall briefly examine few of the statements credited to Nigerian leaders (politicians and diplomats) before and after independence in order for us to understand the thinking which guided the Nigerian state in its inter-African relations and most importantly to give answers to the questions posed above.
In March 1957, Ghana became the first black African state to obtain political independence from colonial rule. This development was a milestone not only in the history of Africa but also in global politics as it gave independent Ghana the leverage to speak for Africa in international Affairs albeit in de facto capacity. Kwame Nkrumah, the post-independence leader of the newly independent state of Ghana spoke glowingly of the “historic role” (Ghana) was to play in the liberation of other African countries from colonial subjugation.33 This he claimed was “to lead …… our brethren who are still struggling to be free.”34 Subsequently in 1958, Kwame Nkrumah made another powerful statement while addressing the country’s parliament stated amongst other things that: “whether we like it or not history has assigned to us a great responsibility, and we (must not) fail all the millions on this continent who look to us as a symbol of their hopes in Africa.”35
From the Ghanaian perspective, these statements were not just issued for the sake of it they were laden with all elements of political realism as events which followed proved. As a matter of fact, the statements were driven by the sheer desire of Ghana to assume the leadership role in Africa; a development that did not go down well with the Nigerian Leadership who at the time was into a series of negotiations with Britain geared toward the attainment of Nigeria’s
33 Cited by Aluko O. (1976), Ghana and Nigeria 1957-1970: A Study in Inter-African Discord, Rex Collings Ltd, London, pp. 73-74.
34Ibid.
35 Ibid.
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political independence in 1960. Consequently, from the Ghanaian perspective, the country, just like Nigeria, was also motivated by its nationalistic ambition which was to play a leadership role in Africa. Ghana led by an outstanding African leader in Nkrumah believed it was capable of playing a leadership role on the African continent regardless of its size or any other indices of power which Nigeria on the other hand projected and had used to lay claim to African leadership. In essence, it was these collisions of national interests of both countries (Nigeria and Ghana) that gave rise to the bitter rivalry and competition for African leadership within the period 1960 and 1970s. As Olajide Aluko argued in 1976, the Nigerian-Ghanaian rivalry for African continental leadership struggle was a function of their national interests: The struggle for leadership between Ghana and Nigeria “centred largely on the question of who should be Africa’s spokesman in international affairs on such things as anti-colonialism, anti-racism, neo-colonialism, African unity and African ideology.”36 The foregoing make true the realists argument which states that International politics is the struggle for power among states actors who pursue their national interests selfishly; and at the expense of each other.
The leadership struggle between Nigeria and Ghana for the leadership of Africa assumed a different dimension when Nigerian leaders, politicians, and the press in an apparent reaction to President Nkrumah’s claim to African leadership responded with varying degree of temperament to the Accra’s leadership claim. It is pertinent for this study to consider a few of those reactions here in order to further justify how Nigeria subscribed to political realism – the theoretical framework upon which this study is built. In 1957, Chief S.L. Akintola, the leader of the Action Group party, the main opposition party in the Nigerian House of Representatives, launched a verbal attack on the Ghanaian leadership when he declared contemptuously that the whole of Ghana was same in population as two of Nigeria’s provinces, of Kano and Kaduna.
36 Aluko O. (1976), Ghana and Nigeria 1957-1970: A Study in Inter-African Discord, Rex Collings Ltd, London, pp.
73-74.
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Hon. Akintola said: “Ghana must deal with us as elder brother” referring to Nigeria.37 In the following year, precisely in 1958, Mr R.A. Fani-Kayode, also of the Action Group party in the federal legislature echoed Nigeria’s leadership sentiments when he declared that “Nigeria is destined to lead Africa………black Africa as a whole to the total emancipation of all our peoples….”.38 Suffice to note that these nationalist sentiments continued to be trumpeted until 1960 when Nigeria eventually obtained its independence from Britain. On the attainment of Nigeria’s political independence, the country’s leaders, politicians and parliamentarians began to think on how to stop Ghana from playing that leadership role which many Nigerians such as Chief Anthony Enahoro – a federal parliamentarian considered to be Nigeria’s “birth right.”39 As Nigerian independence approached, Nigeria relished the prospect of establishing itself as the leader of Africa which the country’s elites believed could only be achieved by dislodging Ghana from the eminent leadership position it had attained on the continent through the instrumentality of the country’s role in African decolonization and other pan-African issues.
In furtherance of this objective, the leader of the Nigerian delegation to the Second Conference of Independent African States which was held in Addis Ababa the Ethiopian capital in June 1960 few months before Nigeria’s independence (Maitama Sule) spoke strongly against anyone - apparently referring to Ghana’s Nkrumah who tagged himself “a messiah”40, “with a mission to lead Africa”41, to jettison the idea. In the same vein, Sir Abubakar Balewa, Nigeria’s Prime Minister (1957-1966) had earlier in January 1960 expressed the country’s continental leadership ambitions in anticipation when he told the Nigerian parliament that Nigeria would have a “wonderful opportunity” to speak for Africa at the United Nations - the world’s most influential multilateral diplomatic platform.42
37 Ibid.
38Ibid. p. 75.
39Ibid. p. 74.
40 Ibid.
41Ibid.
42 Ibid.
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In the same year, 1960, during the debate on Pan-Africanism in the Nigerian parliament, some national parliamentarians called on the Nigerian political leadership to assert the country leadership in Africa by getting more involved in the African project. The country’s parliamentarians were of the conviction that their country - Nigeria should assert itself by playing a leadership role in pan-African affairs. For instance, Hon. E.C. Akwiwu, a member of the Nigerian parliament had during the debate proposed the setting up of Ministry of Pan-African affairs which would be independent of the Ministry of external affairs. The legislator argued that doing so was “absolutely important that something special should be done to see that our government is well advised and plays its due part in matters relating to Africa”43 Hon. Akwiwu’s views were corroborated by another member of the Nigerian House of Representatives – as it was then known. While adding his voice to the need for Nigeria to assume continental leadership, Hon. Kalu Ezera, argued that “there is a crying and urgent need for Nigeria to project her personality adequately into the scheme of things relating to the destiny of Africa…”44 Also in January 1960, Festus Okotie – Eboh, Nigeria’s finance minister spoke concerning Nigeria’s leadership ambitions thus:
Nigeria must show that by her size . . . population . . . economic potentialities and all the resources at her command, she is prepared to lead Africa so that Africa can be seen as a principal personality and a nation that will be recognized not as a second – class nation but a first class (nation) in the comity of nations.45
Doubts about Nigeria’s continental leadership quest was doused in 1961 when Jaja Wachucku, the then Foreign Affairs Minister declared: “…Nigeria….is the largest single unit in Africa….and so must lead Africa…and we not going to abdicate the leadership position in which God
43See Akinterinwa B. (2012), Overview of Nigeria’s Foreign Policy, 1960-2010: Challenges and Recommendations”
in review of Nigeria’s Foreign Policy: Issues and Perspective, E. Anyaoku ed, NIIA Publishers, Lagos, Nigeria, p.18.
44 Ibid.
45 Cited by Bassey E.A. (1987), Decolonization and Dependence: The Development of Nigerian – U.S. Relations, 1960 – 1984, Westview Press/Boulder, p. 54.
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Almighty has placed on us.”46 This particular statement suffices to say was in response to the challenge posed by Ghana to Nigeria’s leadership aspirations. The two countries perceived each other as obstacles to their desires for dominance. For instance, while Ghana’s continental leadership credentials was based on the fact that it got independence before any Black African country, Nigeria’s credentials for African leadership flew from the country’s superior numerical advantage which Jaja Wachukwu – Nigeria foreign minister 1960-1961 claimed gave Nigeria the right to lay claim to African leadership. Aluko (1976:15) captured the interests – laden leadership struggle between Nigeria and Ghana thus: “Just as Ghana viewed Nigeria as the greatest obstacle to her dominance in Africa, so also did Nigeria view Ghana.” This then leads to the conclusion that both countries typify the realist argument which states that national interests underpins the struggle for power in international politics. The fact that Nigeria’s obsession with African continental leadership was in line with the country’s national interest was unambiguously established by Jaja Wachukwu, cited in Olusanya and Akindele (1986:511).
The Nigerian minister declared that Nigeria’s foreign policy is tied to her national interests:
“…the policy of the Government for each occasion is to be selected with proper independent objectively in Nigeria’s national interest. Nigeria’s policy at all times is to be founded on Nigeria’s interest….” This statement indicates that Nigeria’s foreign policy is strategically designed to protect, advance, and project the country’s national interest.
Conclusively it can be inferred from the above discussion that Nigeria’s foreign relations were primarily and fundamentally driven by its national interests. This was overtly shown by the country during the leadership struggle with Ghana for continental leadership. Other authors have also argued that Nigeria’s foreign policy was aimed at playing a leadership role in Africa which even included some Nigerian diplomats and top politicians have made arguments that suggested that Nigeria continental leadership had hegemonic undertones. For instance, Shehu Shagari, Nigeria’s president from (1979 to 1983), once noted: “Just as President Monroe
46 Cited by Sinclair M. (1983), An Analysis of Nigeria’s Foreign Policy: The Evolution of Political Paranoia, the South African Institute of International Affairs, Braamfontein, South Africa. Pg. 1
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proclaimed the American hemisphere free from the military incursions of European empire builders and adventurers, so also do we in Nigeria and in Africa, insist that African affairs be left to Africans to settle.”47 Relatedly, a former Nigerian Defense Minister, Akanbi Oniyangi, spoke about Nigeria’s foreign policy and its objectives thus: “We . . . agreed that Nigeria should provide leadership role in Africa. . . By and large our people would want Nigeria to become and remain the dominant power in our Sub-region, and on the African continent as a whole.”48 This statement again reveals the undercurrents of Nigeria’s foreign policy. Two keys words can be extracted from the statement above. First is the resolve to provide leadership to the continent.
Second is that hegemonic aspiration of wanting to become the “dominant power” on the African continent. This justifies the realist assertion that state actors acts in pursuit of their national interests and that international relations is basically about the struggle for power.
Thus, from the foregoing, it is clear that Nigeria’s foreign policy, especially as it relates to Africa, has been guided since independence by the country’s national interest which as explained above was motivated by the desire to lead the continent and this explains Nigeria’s efforts in the anti-colonial activities between the period of its own independence in 1960 and the formal democratic transition in South-Africa in 1994. It has to be noted that even before independence, Nigeria never at any time hid its leadership aspirations in Africa. It was therefore in furtherance of this aspiration that the Nigerian state got involved in the anti-colonial struggles in Africa. There were other factors which prompted the country’s behaviour in the area of African decolonization which will be discussed extensively in this chapter and subsequent chapters. However, those factors were secondary when viewed from the foreign policy angle of the Nigerian state and the historical statements credited to Nigerian leaders and
47 Cited by Adebajo, A. (2008) “Hegemony on a Shoestring, Nigeria’s Post-Cold War Foreign Policy,” in Gulliver Troubles, Nigeria’s Foreign Policy after the Cold War, A. Adebajo and A. R. Mustapha (eds) University of KwaZulu Natal Press, Scottsville, South Africa, p. 13.
48 Cited by Akinyemi B. “Nigeria Foreign Policy in the 21st Century,” Text of a public lecture delivered to the senior executive course no 25. Of the national institute for Policy and Strategic Studies, Kuru, Nigeria, June 17, 2003.
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politicians some of which have been discussed in this chapter. Thus, from the realist political perspective, it can be deduced based on the statements discussed above that Nigeria’s endeavour regarding African decolonization revolved primarily around its national interest and leadership aspirations. The following sub sections examine other factors that shaped the making of Nigeria’s foreign policy.