Capítulo 2 Marco teórico
2.3 Dimensiones del bienestar psicológico
2.3.2 Burnout estudiantil
Mumbai City is served by three routes namely Western Railway, Central Railway and Harbour Line. Excepting for some length of the Harbour line, for most of their length all these lines are at general ground level. Most of the lengths of these lines were laid more than 100 years back and are passing through reclaimed lands. When these lines were laid about a century back there was not much development along the lines and the area around the lines was totally open with creeks, wet lands and mangroves. As the area was open with a large flood absorbing capacity, it was not felt necessary to raise higher embankments. Also a number of closely placed small culverts were sufficient to cater for the discharge coming from the higher grounds or hills on one side and vast low lying mud flats or creeks on the other side. So the general rail top levels everywhere in the city and suburbs are very marginally above the spring tide level.
8.2.2 Experience on 26th July 2005 :
On 26th July 2005 at about 15.00-15.30 water started rising in the railway yards. As the signaling system got water-logged the trains started to move at a crawling speed of less than 8 Km. per hour. After 16.00 the train movement was completely stopped. The process of accumulation of commuters had already started from 15.30 coinciding with the rush of office employees who were allowed to go home early as per usual practice on such occasions. This resulted in a large crowd of more than 2 lacs commuters piled up in the Churchgate and CST stations.
At the same time due to failure of telephones and the cell phone communication system, anxiety about the safety and whereabouts of family members started mounting and people became desperate. More than 500 extra buses were pressed into service by BEST at 16.30 hours to handle the situation. However they also quickly met with a similar fate of immobility, which will be discussed later on.
8.2.3 Lacunae in the system:
The rail lines in the city (as they are) are laid at a low level and are very vulnerable to flooding. Flooding of rails and stoppage of local trains twice or thrice in a year is a usual phenomenon in the city; however as the stoppage is for a period of only a few hours on each occasion nobody minds it much. The usual drill of allowing the employees to go home early, to come late or granting holiday etc. is followed to deal with such situations. But on 26th July 2005 the situation was quite abnormal as everything had come to a halt.
It is the Railways’ usual practice that once the water touches the electronic signaling system the trains are asked to move at a very slow speed of less than 8 km. per hour, that too very cautiously with frequent halting and stopping. Such movement is continued till the water level reaches 10 cm above rail top level. Once the water level rises more than 10 cm above the rail top level train movement is completely stopped.
Though the C.D. works under the rail lines were quite adequate in the olden days they are now proving to be insufficient even for slight spell of heavy showers. There are in all 44 Cross Drainage Works which need to be modified on Central and Western Railway routes. It is reported that 7 C.D. works have been remodeled so far and 37 C.D. works are yet to be tackled.
Blockages and silting of the drains have reduced their water way. As the situation would have it, the clearance between the sleepers and the high flood level (and also high tide level) is also very small and therefore there is hardly any safety margin left to play with.
Plastic, garbage and other litter finds its way into these waterways. Due to gush of air created by the fast moving trains large litter and dust is blown into the air and while settling it finds its way to the culverts through side channels resulting in silting.
Increasing the waterway is beset with the difficulty of getting traffic blocks and clearance from the railway safety department. MCGM and railway authorities themselves are helpless about the situation.
Hundred percent clearing of the existing water ways is also often doubted.
8.2.4 Approachability to the stations:
Excepting a few stations like Churchgate, CST, Dadar, Mumbai Central etc. the railway station areas are not very easily accessible. Access roads leading to many stations are very narrow and crowded by hawkers and encroachers. To name a few the worst affected stations are Kurla, Ghatkopar, Wadala, Byculla etc. Access roads of many of these stations also get flooded during critical hours.
8.2.5 Suggestions:
Raising the existing rail lines and simultaneously keeping the train traffic moving is not practicable. It will also involve remodeling other structures which will also be required to be raised to get necessary headway; this may further lead to traffic problems. So one is left with only one alternative and that is to improve the existing system.
Signaling: Possibility of improving the signaling system which will be independent of the rail and water levels so that the movement of the trains could be better regulated for still some more depth of flooding above rails.
Cross Drainage Structures: Remodeling of the existing culverts by providing bigger boxes with bigger spans and shallow girders can be under taken. New trench-less technique has made if possible to carry out the work without much inconvenience to the running traffic. Fortunately there are almost no utilities passing under or along the tracks and whatever utilities are crossing the tracks are well documented. So it should not pose any serious problem. Railway authorities should take up this programme on priority. They should take up these works as their own works and not as deposit works as the experience of deposit works is not very encouraging in case of Railways.
Clearing and Desilting: Clearing and desilting work should be taken up by railways on priority as their own work since their own operations get affected. Present arrangement of MCGM making payment for clearance of work system does not seen to be working properly.
Plastic and other Garbage: Sweeping and keeping their own premises is the responsibility of property owners. The same rule applies to Port Trust lands, Airport lands etc. However the lands belonging to Railways do not seem to have been kept as clear as those of other properties of similar undertakings. Railways should be asked to take the necessary steps in this regard as this litter and plastic is finding its way into the nalla system.
Sewerage connections: Some sewerage is directly let out in to the nalla system and it flows into railway property. Similarly in absence of a proper storm water drainage system for the adjoining property the storm water from these properties flows along the track. MCGM should take up necessary schemes to divert the sewerage lines and also provide separate Storm Water disposal system for the adjoining properties.
Approach roads to stations: It is the duty of MCGM to provide proper access to the Railway station. The roads should be widened; encroachments and hawkers blocking the roads should be removed.
Pumping: Considering the rail levels in the city and the frequent occurrence of flooding, Railway authorities should seriously think about pumping arrangements for chronic spots to ease the problem.
8.3 ROADS:
8.3.1 General:
Mumbai has three entry and exit points by road namely Dahisar, Mulund and Mankhurd. Main routes serving them are Western Express Highway, Eastern Express Highway and Sion-Panvel road. In the suburbs, Swami Vivekanand Road and Lal Bahadur Shastri Roads are complementary and parallel to these roads. In the island city main roads feeding these highways are Veer Savarkar, Lady Jamshetjee Road and Senapati Bapat Road on the western side, and Dr. Ambedkar Road and Rafi Ahmed Kidwai Road on the eastern side.
8.3.2 Experience on 26th July 2005:
On 26th July, 2005 fortunately the rainfall intensities recorded at Colaba gauging station were not so heavy in comparison to Santa Cruz gauging station, so there was not much problem in the island city portion except the usual chronic flooding spots mainly at Lalbaug, Parel, King Circle, Matunga, Hindmata etc. which usually get flooded during heavy showers every year. However in the suburbs the situation on most of the roads was serious. Almost all roads in the suburbs were flooded. Both the Express highways were also flooded for a substantial length. These highways had never experienced flooding in the past since their construction in the 1960s.
As the water starts rising on the road the traffic on the road start slowing down. Traffic can continue crawling through water up to a water depth of 25 to 40 cm. Once the water level rises above this level the exhaust pipes of cars get choked and even the engines of low clearance vehicles get affected. Due to that the engine stalls. Restarting of these vehicles becomes difficult. Such vehicles are then abandoned by the drivers and occupants. These vehicles remain on the road and block the passage of other vehicles. Even the bigger vehicles having more clearance also get bogged down and the whole traffic comes to a standstill. Due to bumper-to-bumper queuing of the vehicles retrieving the vehicles back also becomes impossible. This all results into a total traffic jam. Precisely the same thing happened on that frightful day. All the roads were jammed and due to failure of communication network nobody knew what really was going on. As the local trains were totally stopped, BEST authorities promptly pressed into service 500 extra buses to various stations hoping that the commuters could be sent to some nearby area around their destinations. At that point of time nobody knew the actual situation of the road on which these buses were to go. As it happened, all these buses could go some half way and they met with abnormal traffic jams. Though their engine height would have permitted them to move through that much sheet of water on the roads, as their passage was blocked these buses were unable to move further. Returning back also became impossible and the passengers were required to be seated in the bus for 6 - 7 hours. A few of them waded through knee-deep or chest- deep water and after walking for 5 - 6 hours some of them reached their homes.
8.3.3 Lacunae:
As already mentioned about the rail level, the same is applicable for road levels in the city.
Though storm water drainage system exists in the city the capacity was designed based on old norms which are now proving to be inadequate.
Cross-drainage works are also of similar design and the problem has got further aggravated because developers have covered the natural water courses. At many locations they have completely filled up the natural water courses and the cross-drainage structures are now rendered non functional. Since the passage is not available to the water it starts piling up on the road.
8.3.4 Traffic Control:
In the absence of a proper communication system in working order, nobody knew what the condition on the roads was and therefore the traffic could not be guided properly. Once the broken-down and abandoned vehicles occupied the road, traffic control became impossible till these vehicles could be towed away which was still more difficult as the access was blocked. A Central Electronic Traffic Control Room with visual aids could have reduced the chaotic conditions to some extent, and advance warnings to the commuters to stay back in their offices would have substantially reduced their suffering.
8.3.5 Flooding locations
In the city the flooding spots are well identified from the experience of last 50 years. The major flood prone spots are at Lalbaug, Parel, King Circle, Matunga, Sion, Kurla, Hindmata, Milan Subway etc. The reasons of flooding of these parts are
(i) they are low-lying, (ii) storm water drains provided at these spots are not sufficient, (iii) the down-stream system has been damaged or is in choked condition, (iv) spots are surrounded by development having higher elevation and (v) in the absence of holding ponds they themselves are serving as holding ponds.
8.3.6 Suggestions:
Raising: Possibility of raising these spots is limited to some 25 to 30 cm only and that too wherever sufficient headway below flyover and under-passes is available. In many cities in the world headway below such structures are limited to 4.5 m in urban areas as against 5.5 provided in our country. As we are discouraging heavy vehicle movements in the city the possibility of reducing the headway will be worth examining. It was experienced on 26th July that during flooding vehicles and pedestrians were hugging to the median or central divider. One can take a cue from this and lanes near the central divider can be slightly raised by suitably increasing the camber of the road without much affecting the kerb level. Thereby water accumulation on the extreme right lanes of traffic can be reduced. This will enable movement of vehicles on extreme right lanes a little more freely. Such practice is followed in other countries too. Similar such arrangement also exists near the King Circle under-pass in Mumbai.
Augmenting SWD System: Augmentation of the existing SWD system wherever it has been suggested by the Natu Committee and the BRIMSTOWAD report is very essential. Necessary works of improvements, restorations, augmentation as well as establishment of proper channel widths, at least for the system catering for these spots, should be undertaken on a priority basis without further waste of time.
Pumping: Due to typical topography of the city, the tidal variations and absence of holding ponds flooding of certain spots is inevitable in the city unless measures like pumping and provision of tidal gates are resorted to. It is not understood as to why the pumping schemes have not been executed by MCGM in spite of strong recommendations made in the BRIMSTOWAD and Natu Committee reports. Argument against the scheme put forth by some sections in the organization, that why spend money on this scheme when it will be used only for a few days in a year, has proved to be unwise. Taking into account the public inconvenience and direct as well as indirect losses to the economy the pumping schemes deserve serious considerations. It is understood that MCGM has decided to take up the work of review of BRIMSTOWAD report in the light of the developments that have taken place since 1993 and the recent occurrence of 26th July 2005 flooding. This is no doubt a very good step but it may take some time to give fresh recommendations. Till then it will be worthwhile to go ahead with the earlier recommendations as the fresh recommendations will only be supplementary to the earlier ones and can be implemented later on without wasting the work carried out until then.
Traffic Control : The chaotic traffic jam that occurred on 26th July and continued till 27th July evening due to the broken-down vehicles blocking the road and other stranded vehicles waiting in queue behind them for clearance of the roads made it impossible for the rescue and relief vehicles to reach the desired locations, resulting in tremendous suffering to the public. All this could have been minimized if
a Central Traffic control room for the city, equipped with Area Traffic Control System, had been in existence.
8.4 Air Transport System: