f.1. As Board of Canvassers in elections for Pres and V-pres (Art VII, Sec 4) f.2. Call special election for president and vp (Art VII, Sec 10)
f.3. Revoke/extend suspension of privilege of writ of habeas corpus, declaration of martial law (Art VII, Sec 18)
f.4. Approve presidential amnesties (Art VII, Sec 9 abd 16) f.5 Confirm certain appointments
EN BANC
[G.R. No. 79974. December 17, 1987.]
ULPIANO P. SARMIENTO III AND JUANITO G. ARCILLA vs. SALVADOR MISON Facts:
The petitioners questioned the appointment of Mison as Commissioner of the Bureau of Customs for being unconstitutional by reason of its not having been confirmed by the Commission on Appointments. The respondents, on the other hand, maintain the constitutionality of respondent Mison's appointment without the confirmation of the Commission on Appointments.
Issue: Whether the appointment of Mison needs concurrence of the Commission on Appointments. Held: No.
It is readily apparent that under the provisions of the 1987 Constitution, just quoted, there are four (4) groups of officers whom the President shall appoint. These four (4) groups, to which we will hereafter refer from time to time, are:
First, the heads of the executive departments, ambassadors, other public ministers and consuls, officers of the armed forces from the rank of colonel or naval captain, and other officers whose appointments are vested in him in this Constitution;
Second, all other officers of the Government whose appointments are not otherwise provided for by law;
Third, those whom the President may be authorized by law to appoint;
Fourth, officers lower in rank whose appointments the Congress may by law vest in the President alone.
The first group of officers is clearly appointed with the consent of the Commission on Appointments. Appointments of such officers are initiated by nomination and, if the nomination is confirmed by the Commission on Appointments, the President appoints.
The second, third and fourth groups of officers are the present bone of contention. Should they be appointed by the President with or without the consent (confirmation) of the Commission on Appointments? By following the accepted rule in constitutional and statutory construction that an express enumeration of subjects excludes others not enumerated, it would follow that only those appointments to positions expressly stated in the first group require the consent (confirmation) of the Commission on Appointments.
Coming now to the immediate question before the Court, it is evident that the position of Commissioner of the Bureau of Customs (a bureau head) is not one of those within the first group of appointments where the consent of the Commission on Appointments is required. As a matter of fact, as already pointed out, while the 1935 Constitution includes "heads of bureaus" among those officers whose appointments need the consent of the Commission on Appointments, the 1987 Constitution, on the other hand, deliberately excluded the position of "heads of bureaus" from appointments that need the consent (confirmation) of the Commission on Appointments.
f.6. Concur in treaties (Art VII, Sec 21)
f.7. Declare war and delegate emergency powers (Sec 23) EN BANC
[G.R. No. 171396. May 3, 2006.]
PROF. RANDOLF S. DAVID vs. GLORIA MACAPAGAL-ARROYO Facts:
Petitioners allege that in issuing Presidential Proclamation No. 1017 (PP 1017) and General Order No. 5 (G.O. No. 5), President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo committed grave abuse of discretion. On February 24, 2006, as the nation celebrated the 20th Anniversary of the Edsa People Power I, President Arroyo issued PP 1017 declaring a state of national emergency. Respondents stated that the proximate cause behind the executive issuances was the conspiracy among some military officers, leftist insurgents of the New People's Army (NPA), and some members of the political opposition in a plot to unseat or assassinate President Arroyo. They considered the aim to oust or assassinate the President and take-over the reigns of government as a clear and present danger. The mass demonstrations conducted during the commemoration of EDSA were dispersed by the anti-riot police. During the dispersal of the rallyists along EDSA, police arrested (without warrant) petitioner Randolf S. David, a professor at the University of the Philippines and newspaper columnist. Also arrested was his companion, Ronald Llamas, president of party-list Akbayan. petitioners Randolf S. David, et al. assailed PP 1017 on the grounds that (1) it encroaches on the emergency powers of Congress; (2) it is a subterfuge to avoid the constitutional requirements for the imposition of martial law; and (3) it violates the constitutional guarantees of freedom of the press, of speech and of assembly. President Arroyo also invoked in PP 1017 Section 17, Article XII which reads:
Sec. 17. In times of national emergency, when the public interest so requires, the State may, during the emergency and under reasonable terms prescribed by it, temporarily take over or direct the operation of any privately-owned public utility or business affected with public interest.
The invocation of the said constitutional provision was made the justification of the takeover of several privately-owned public utility during the effectivity of PP 1017.
Petitioners, particularly the members of the House of Representatives, claim that President Arroyo's inclusion of Section 17, Article XII in PP 1017 is an encroachment on the legislature's emergency powers.
Issue:
Whether it is within the power of the President to take over privately-owned public utility or business affected with public interest in times of national emergency.
Held:
No. A distinction must be drawn between the President's authority to declare "a state of national emergency" and to exercise emergency powers. To the first, as elucidated by the Court, Section 18, Article VII grants the President such power, hence, no legitimate constitutional objection can be raised. But to the second, manifold constitutional issues arise.
Section 23, Article VI of the Constitution reads:
SEC. 23.(1) The Congress, by a vote of two-thirds of both Houses in joint session assembled, voting separately, shall have the sole power to declare the existence of a state of war.
(2)In times of war or other national emergency, the Congress may, by law, authorize the President, for a limited period and subject to such restrictions as it may prescribe, to exercise powers necessary and proper to carry out a declared national policy. Unless sooner withdrawn by resolution of the Congress, such powers shall cease upon the next adjournment thereof.
It may be pointed out that the second paragraph of the above provision refers not only to war but also to "other national emergency." If the intention of the Framers of our Constitution was to withhold from the President the authority to declare a "state of national emergency" pursuant to Section 18, Article VII (calling-out power) and grant it to Congress (like the declaration of the existence of a state of war), then the Framers could have provided so. Clearly, they did not intend that Congress should first authorize the President before he can declare a "state of national emergency." The logical conclusion then is that President Arroyo could validly declare the existence of a state of national emergency even in the absence of a Congressional enactment.
But the exercise of emergency powers, such as the taking over of privately owned public utility or business affected with public interest, is a different matter. This requires a delegation from Congress.
Courts have often said that constitutional provisions in pari materia are to be construed together. Otherwise stated, different clauses, sections, and provisions of a constitution which relate to the same subject matter will be construed together and considered in the light of each other. Considering that Section 17 of Article XII and Section 23 of Article VI, previously quoted, relate to national emergencies, they must be read together to determine the limitation of the exercise of emergency powers.
Generally, Congress is the repository of emergency powers. This is evident in the tenor of Section 23 (2), Article VI authorizing it to delegate such powers to the President. Certainly, a body cannot delegate a power not reposed upon it. However, knowing that during grave emergencies, it may not be possible or practicable for Congress to meet and exercise its powers, the Framers of our Constitution deemed it wise to allow Congress to grant emergency powers to the President, subject to certain conditions, thus:
(1) There must be a war or other emergency. (2) The delegation must be for a limited period only.
(3) The delegation must be subject to such restrictions as the Congress may prescribe.
(4) The emergency powers must be exercised to carry out a national policy declared by Congress. Meltin Co. | F. OTHER POWERS 35
Section 17, Article XII must be understood as an aspect of the emergency powers clause. The taking over of private business affected with public interest is just another facet of the emergency powers generally reposed upon Congress. Thus, when Section 17 states that the "the State may, during the emergency and under reasonable terms prescribed by it, temporarily take over or direct the operation of any privately owned public utility or business affected with public interest," it refers to Congress, not the President. Now, whether or not the President may exercise such power is dependent on whether Congress may delegate it to him pursuant to a law prescribing the reasonable terms thereof.
Following our interpretation of Section 17, Article XII, invoked by President Arroyo in issuing PP 1017, this Court rules that such Proclamation does not authorize her during the emergency to temporarily take over or direct the operation of any privately owned public utility or business affected with public interest without authority from Congress.
Let it be emphasized that while the President alone can declare a state of national emergency, however, without legislation, he has no power to take over privately-owned public utility or business affected with public interest. The President cannot decide whether exceptional circumstances exist warranting the take over of privately-owned public utility or business affected with public interest. Nor can he determine when such exceptional circumstances have ceased. Likewise, without legislation, the President has no power to point out the types of businesses affected with public interest that should be taken over. In short, the President has no absolute authority to exercise all the powers of the State under Section 17, Article VII in the absence of an emergency powers act passed by Congress.
EN BANC
[G.R. No. 155001. January 21, 2004.] DEMOSTHENES P. AGAN, et al. vs. PIATCO Held:
Section 17, Article XII of the 1987 Constitution grants the State in times of national emergency the right to temporarily take over the operation of any business affected with public interest. This right is an exercise of police power which is one of the inherent powers of the State. Police power has been defined as the "state authority to enact legislation that may interfere with personal liberty or property in order to promote the general welfare." It consists of two essential elements. First, it is an imposition of restraint upon liberty or property. Second, the power is exercised for the benefit of the common good. Its definition in elastic terms underscores its all-encompassing and comprehensive embrace. It is and still is the "most essential, insistent, and illimitable" of the State's powers. It is familiar knowledge that unlike the power of eminent domain, police power is exercised without provision for just compensation for its paramount consideration is public welfare. It is also settled that public interest on the occasion of a national emergency is the primary consideration when the government decides to temporarily take over or direct the operation of a public utility or a business affected with public interest. The nature and extent of the emergency is the measure of the duration of the takeover as well as the terms thereof. It is the State that prescribes such reasonable terms which will guide the implementation of the temporary takeover as dictated by the exigencies of the time. As we ruled in our Decision, this power of the State can not be negated by any party nor should its exercise be a source of obligation for the State. Section 5.10 (c), Article V of the ARCA provides that respondent PIATCO "shall be entitled to reasonable compensation for the duration of the temporary takeover by GRP, which compensation shall take into account the reasonable cost for the use of the Terminal and/or Terminal Complex." It clearly obligates the government in the exercise of its police power to compensate respondent PIATCO and this obligation is offensive to the Constitution. Police power can not be diminished, let alone defeated by any contract for its paramount consideration is public welfare and interest.
f.8 Judge President’s fitness Art VII, Sec. 11, par. 4
[G.R. No. 146738. April 3, 2001.]
JOSEPH E. ESTRADA vs. GLORIA MACAPAGAL-ARROYO Facts:
Petitioner Joseph Ejercito Estrada denies he resigned as President or that he suffered from a permanent disability. He contended that the Office of the President was not vacant when respondent Gloria Macapagal Arroyo took her oath as president. Private respondents, on the other hand, claim that the threshold issue that the cases at bar posed falls within the realm of political question, and hence, are beyond the jurisdiction of the Court to decide. They stressed that respondent Arroyo ascended the presidency through people power; that she had already taken her oath as the 14th President of the Republic; that she had exercised the powers of the presidency and that she had been recognized by foreign governments.
Petitioner argues that the Court misinterpreted the meaning of section 11, Article VII, of the Constitution in that Congress can only decide the issue of inability when there is a variance of opinion between a majority of the Cabinet and the President. The situation presents itself when majority of the Cabinet determines that the President is unable to govern; later, the President informs Congress that his inability has ceased but is contradicted by a majority of the members of the Cabinet. It is also urged that the President's judgment that he is unable to govern temporarily which is thereafter communicated to the Speaker of the House and the President of the Senate is the political question which this Court cannot review.
Issue:
Whether the Congress committed an error in deciding over the fitness of Estrada to govern. Held:
No. We cannot sustain the petitioner. Lest petitioner forgets, he himself made the submission in G.R. No. 146738 that "Congress has the ultimate authority under the Constitution to determine whether the President is incapable of performing his functions in the manner provided for in section 11 of Article VII." We sustained this submission and held that by its many acts, Congress has already determined and dismissed the claim of alleged temporary inability to govern proffered by petitioner. If petitioner now feels aggrieved by the manner Congress exercised its power, it is incumbent upon him to seek redress from Congress itself. The power is conceded by the petitioner to be with Congress and its alleged erroneous exercise cannot be corrected by this Court. The recognition of respondent Arroyo as our de jure president made by Congress is unquestionably a political judgment. It is significant that House Resolution No. 176 cited as the bases of its judgment such factors as the "people's loss of confidence on the ability of former President Joseph Ejercito Estrada to effectively govern" and the "members of the international community had extended their recognition of Her Excellency, Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo as President of the Republic of the Philippines" and it has a constitutional duty "of fealty to the supreme will of the people . . .." This political judgment may be right or wrong but Congress is answerable only to the people for its judgment. Its wisdom is fit to be debated before the tribunal of the people and not before a court of justice. Needless to state, the doctrine of separation of power constitutes an insuperable bar against this Court's interposition of its power of judicial review to review the judgment
of Congress rejecting petitioner's claim that he is still the President, albeit on leave and that respondent Arroyo is merely an acting President.
On the issue of inability to govern under section 11, Article VII of the Constitution, we held that Congress has the ultimate authority to determine the question as opined by the petitioner himself and that the determination of Congress is a political judgment which this Court cannot review.
Petitioner cannot blur these specific rulings by the generalization that whether one is a de jure or de facto President is a judicial question.
Section 8 of Article VII covers the situation of the death, permanent disability, removal from office or resignation of the President. Section 11 of Article VII covers the case where the President transmits to the President of the Senate and the Speaker of the House of Representatives his written declaration that he is unable to discharge the powers and duties of his office. In each case, the Constitution specifies the body that will resolve the issues that may arise from the contingency. In case of election contest, section 4, Article VII provides that the contests shall be resolved by this Court sitting en banc. In case of resignation of the President, it is not disputed that this Court has jurisdiction to decide the issue. In case of inability to govern, section 11 of Article VII gives the Congress the power to adjudge the issue and petitioner himself submitted this thesis which was shared by this Court. I n light of these clear provisions of the Constitution, it is inappropriate, to say the least, for petitioner to make inferences that simply distort their meanings.
f.9. Power of Impeachment (Art. XI)
f.9.a. Who may be impeached (Art XI, Sec. 2)
EN BANC
[A.M. No. 88-4-5433. April 15, 1988.]
IN RE FIRST INDORSEMENT FROM HONORABLE RAUL M. GONZALEZ DATED 16 MARCH 1988