CÁLCULO DEL TIEMPO DE RECUPERACION DE LA INVERSION (TR)

Long-term finance in capital market-based systems is inherently dependent upon the existence of mechanisms to provide funding. This may partly explain why in countries where funding channels did not develop, compensating structures are normally found, such as a strong commitment on the part of private banks or close government intervention - for example, the creation of development banks and the use of a regulated selective credit mechanism.

The German universal banks provide an example of a compensating structure: it was basically the great banks which geared and sustained the fast pace of industrialisation in the last half of the eighteenth century. Schumpeter (1939: 349) describes that role undertaken by the German great banks as follows:

[the banks] took care of the necessary issues of stocks and bonds, thus helping the enterprises to redeem its short debt and providing it with

“ See Table IV.2 above for the pace of growth and accumulation in the recent experiences of development.

additional means. In order to effect this they were ready to take these stocks or bonds for their own accounts, not only if they were unable to place them, but in the ordinary course of their business routine ... When they placed the securities acquired, they again financed the private investors so that, temporarily at least, the transaction often meant no more than a shift in assets.

This was especially true after the 1870s, this feature was already clear before then (see Tilly in Cameron et al, 1967). Another interesting characteristic was the "entrepreneurial element" of the association between business and the banking system:

In some instances the bankers initially perceived new opportunities for investment and suggested methods of exploiting them. More important, however, were entrepreneurial tasks that were allied with financial ends. Frequently, interested bankers obtained government approval and support for the projects of others. Then they had to create a market for the new securities. Finally, it was essential for them to ensure that the policies, financial and otherwise, of enterprises newly created or enlarged would continue to favor, or at least not interfere with, their own banking interests (Tilly, op.cit.: 178-9).

But Germany was not the only case where the financial structure had a wider role in the process of accumulation. For example, between 1868 and World War II, Japan industrialised vigorously and developed a sophisticated, modem financial system, well structured to meet the needs of economic development. This was not coincidental but a planned policy of the government, which clearly favoured the evolution of the system as a tool for promoting economic growth.

In Japan, although the initial capital for industrial investment came primarily from stock subscriptions by industrialists (especially members of the wealthy merchant-landowner-financier group, and in some instances, notably railways, by the aristocracy), it appears that commercial banks financed most individual subscriptions to both new and existing enterprises (idem: 235). Further, banks also appear to have directed funds to specific enterprises. And not only did new enterprises benefit from this sort of financial arrangement:

Industrial enterprises relied on two main sources of funds: new capital stock issues, sold mainly to existing stockholders; and short-term and long-term loans from banks. It was not clear which was more important in the early years [of the industrialisation process], but by the turn of the century bank loans were clearly the major source (Patrick in Cameron et al, 1967: 283-4).

In fact, many big conglomerates (zaibatsu) owned their own banking institutions or at least maintained a very close relation with them. This made it relatively easy to transfer funds among affiliated enterprises and to collect private individual savings to finance zaibatsu investment. Generally speaking then, large banks were increasingly important in financing both the initial and the continued development of large-scale enterprise, based on high indebtedness and stable interest rates.

More recently, modem Japan and some of its neighbours, notably Taiwan and the Republic of Korea, appear to have inherited this kind of institutional arrangement, where government, banks and enterprise have strong links (see Foley and Lazonick, 1986 and Wade, 1989). According to Zysman’s classification, all these three East Asian countries have credit-based financial systems, with government-administered prices. The tight control of the banking system on credit supply is evident from the fact that, for instance, in Taiwan virtually the entire banking system is government- owned; and in the Republic of Korea, even after the denationalization of banks in 1980-83, the government exerts an important influence through the direct appointment of senior managers and personnel.

To sum up, the institutional mechanisms created to finance and fund investment exemplified above seem to be institutional responses to the difficult problem of financing development when the rate of growth and changes in the productive structure are too rapid. The problem of financing is as important a factor for the process of economic development now as it was in the early stages of the development of Western European countries (Wade, 1989: 137). The only difference seems to be in the circumstances of late development, with the ‘demonstration effect’ and the availability of high technology, raising both attempted growth rates and capital costs. These exacerbate the need for further institutional arrangements - to promote development by overcoming the relatively slow evolution of long-term financing mechanisms and by supplying the volume of capital required to set up modem industrial plants.

Up until now although the banking system is mostly private, it depends strongly on the central bank for access to supplementary deposits. In all these cases government sets interest rates and limits on collateral requirements (Wade, 1989: 133).