• No se han encontrado resultados

De cómo construimos categorías

Capítulo I MARCO TEÓRICO DE LA INVESTIGACIÓN MARCO TEÓRICO DE LA INVESTIGACIÓN

2. LA ALTERIDAD COMO CONSTRUCCIÓN SOCIAL: LA CONSTRUCCIÓN DE LA DIFERENCIA CONSTRUCCIÓN DE LA DIFERENCIA

2.1.1 De cómo construimos categorías

A judgment which has no entry yet cannot be executed.

General rule: Only the trial court can execute judgment.

Exception: In the case of discretionary, it can be issued by the appellate court.

A. Kinds of Execution

Execution or satisfaction of judgment may either be by motion or action. Does that apply to any kind of

execution, whether discretionary or matter of right? No.

If execution is a matter of right, execution may be by motion or by action. However, if execution is a matter of right, execution can only be by motion. Execution by action is not applicable anymore as execution by action presupposes that there is already a final judgment.

Who is a redemptioner? Rule 39, Section 27(b) – A creditor having a lien by virtue of an attachment, judgment or mortgage on the property sold, or on some part thereof, subsequent to the lien under which the property was sold.

The judge has no other choice but to issue the writ of execution.

In spite the fact that the issuance of a writ of execution is ministerial… the exercise of ministerial functions depends upon compliance with… It is only through a motion that a writ of execution may be issued.

a. Matter of right/ministerial (Section 1)

When it is already established that the judgment is executory, it must be issued as a matter of right.

Section 1. Execution upon judgments or final orders. — Execution shall issue as a matter of right, or motion, upon a judgment or order that disposes of the action or proceeding upon the expiration of the period to appeal therefrom if no appeal has been duly perfected.

If the appeal has been duly perfected and finally resolved, the execution may forthwith be applied for in the court of origin, on motion of the judgment obligee, submitting therewith certified true copies of the judgment or judgments or final order or orders sought to be enforced and of the entry thereof, with notice to the adverse party.

The appellate court may, on motion in the same case, when the interest of justice so requires, direct the court of origin to issue the writ of execution.

b. Discretionary (Section 2) (or by leave of court or execution pending appeal)

Which court has jurisdiction over discretionary execution? It depends.

Once appeal is perfected, does the court lose jurisdiction over the subject matter? No. When does the court lose jurisdiction over the subject matter? Upon expiration of the period to appeal, because there can be multiple defendants and the perfection of the appeal is only as to those who appealed. Those who did not appeal, perfection will not apply to them. “Upon perfection of the appeal as to the appellants.” But as to those who did not appeal, appeal will not be perfected.

This is the basis for the discretionary execution.

Discretionary execution means there is in fact an appeal. If there is no more appeal, it is no longer discretionary; it is a matter of right.

What kind of jurisdiction does the trial court use?

Residual jurisdiction.

What are the requirements for discretionary execution?

(1) motion; (2) good reason; and (3) special order stating the good reason.

Page 661 of Riano:

(1) there must be a motion filed by the prevailing party with notice to the adverse party;

(2) there must be a hearing of the motion for discretionary execution;

(3) the motion must be filed in the trial court while it has jurisdiction over the case and is in possession of either the original record or on the record on appeal;

(4) there must be good reasons to justify the discretionary execution; and

(5) the good reasons must be stated in a special order.

When there is execution pending appeal and the court grants the motion for execution pending appeal, the judgment is satisfied. What happens if on appeal, the judgment was reversed?

Illustration: A judgment for P1,000,000 was given. The defendant (loser, judgment obligor) appeals to the appellate court. The judgment obligee files a motion for execution pending appeal. The court grants the motion for execution pending appeal. The writ of execution is used, the sheriff uses it and satisfies the P1,000,000 of A. What happens if the judgment is reversed?

There are certain judgments which are immediately executory. Name some: support, injunction, receivership, accounting. The enumeration in the Rule is not exclusive. For example, a judgment of compromise is immediately executory. What is the rationale for the immediate execution of these? Delay will be prejudicial.

Under Rule 61, even a judgment for support never becomes final. At any point in time you can go back to court and ask for amendment. How can it be immediately executory? The judgment will be illusory.

This is exactly what good reason is.

What is good reason? Consists of circumstances that would justify the execution of the judgment. Otherwise, the same judgment would become illusory. See Stronghold Insurance.

Stronghold Insurance vs Felix: This is a collection suit.

Execution pending appeal was not allowed because the one who is sick is not a party to the case. Thus, the illness of the husband has nothing to do with the case (it doesn’t involve conjugal property). This is unlike the case of Navarro vs Escobido-bidoooo. Second reason, the appeal was meritorious. The subject matter subject to the execution was P57 million and the claimed liability of Stronghold was only P12 million. That would be injurious, not only prejudicial. Correlate with City of Iligan case as to summary judgment.

Although Stronghold describes what good reason is, it does not necessarily follow that that is always the case.

Good reason must be on a case-to-case basis.

City of Iligan vs Principal Management Group (PMGI): A MOA on a ‘turn-key’ arrangement was drawn by Mayor Quijano with Land Bank Realty Development Corporation (LBRDC) as General Contractor and PMGI as Developer - Financing Manager. The project to be undertaken was the construction of a Sports Complex which upon completion shall be turned over to Iligan City for acceptance and the issuance of Certificate of Acceptance and Authority to Pay to enable LBRDC-PMGI to call on the SLC.

The work on the project stopped due to the refusal of some of the occupants to vacate the premises claiming that they have not been paid their disturbance

compensation. By then, PMGI had already accomplished 78.27% of the contracted project equivalent to P10,957,800.00 of the total project cost of P14,000,000.

PMGI requested from petitioner for a deductive change order to enable it to collect the above-stated amount based on the 78.27% accomplishment of the project.

Petitioner claimed that PMGI’s accomplishment was only 52.89% or equivalent only to P6,958,861.59 based on the Accomplishment Report. Petitioner refused to pay since the mutually agreed price of P14,000,000 shall only be paid after the completion of the project and acceptance by it and since the project is not yet complete, no payment can be paid. The problem on the payment of the affected occupant, which was the cause of the work stoppage, was accordingly brought to the attention of the Sangguniang Panlungsod which authorized the payment of the affected occupants in the project site.

PMGI filed a complaint against petitioner for rescission of the MOA and damages. After the filing of petitioner’s Answer, a Motion for Partial Summary Judgment was filed by PMGI which claimed that there was no genuine issue as to the fact of the obligation of the petitioner since it admitted the accomplishment of 52.89% or equivalent to P6,958,861.59 of PMGI and that the petitioner had not specifically denied under oath the genuineness of the Letter of Credit and MOA. An Opposition to the Motion for Partial Summary Judgment was filed by petitioner. The trial court granted the Motion for Partial Summary Judgment and ruled in favor of PMGI. Petitioner’s MR was denied. Petitioner filed a Notice of Appeal. PMGI filed a Motion for Execution Pending Appeal which alleged that when the appeal is clearly dilatory, order for execution upon good reasons may be issued with the discretion of the court. The same was granted over the opposition of the petitioner.

CA affirmed.

SC: The Order granting execution pending appeal was proper. Executions pending appeal are governed by Section 2 of Rule 39 of the Rules of Court. There are 3 requisites for the execution of a judgment pending appeal:

a) a motion must be filed by the prevailing party with notice to the adverse party;

b) there must be good reasons for execution pending appeal; and

c) the good reasons must be stated in a special order.

Execution pending appeal is, of course, the exception to the general rule. Normally, execution cannot be obtained until and unless

(a) the judgment has become final and executory;

(b) the right of appeal has been renounced or waived;

(c) the period for appeal has lapsed without an appeal having been filed; or

(d) having been filed, the appeal has been resolved and the records of the case have been returned to the court of origin -- in which case, execution shall issue as a matter of right.

On the other hand, when the period of appeal has not yet expired, the execution of a judgment should not be allowed except if, in the court’s discretion, there are good reasons therefor. These reasons must be stated in a special order, because unless these are divulged, it will be difficult to determine on appeal whether judicial discretion has been properly exercised by the lower court. Good reasons consist of compelling circumstances that justify the immediate execution of a judgment, lest it become illusory; or the prevailing party be unable to enjoy it after the lapse of time, considering the tactics of the adverse party who may have no recourse but to delay.

The good reason relied upon by both the trial and the CA was that the partial adjudication of the case was based on petitioner’s own admission; hence, any appeal based on that point would be unmeritorious and merely dilatory. Indeed, both courts ruled that an appeal by petitioner would only serve as “a good and sufficient reason upon which to issue execution.”

The ascertainment of good reasons for execution pending appeal lies within the sound discretion of the trial court, and the appellate court will not normally disturb such finding. Intervention by the latter may be proper, if it is shown that there has been an abuse of discretion. Like the CA, we find no abuse of discretion in the trial court’s grant of execution pending appeal.

Indeed, a good and sufficient reason upon which to authorize immediate execution is when an appeal is clearly dilatory.

Santos vs COMELEC: The execution pending appeal was granted in this case. What was the good reason here?

This is a political issue. If there is no city official, the

constituents in the community will not be properly represented.

The petitioner and respondent were mayoral candidates in Balingoan, Misamis Oriental for the May 14, 2001 elections. Respondent was declared mayor by the board of canvassers. Petitioner filed an election protest, and the results were recounted. Petitioner was declared the mayor by virtue of judgment.

Petitioner filed a Motion for Execution pending appeal.

Before the RTC could act on the motion, respondent filed a petition for certiorari with the COMELEC, as well as appealed the RTC’s decision to the COMELEC.

COMELEC issued a Writ of Preliminary Injunction enjoining the RTC from acting upon the Motion for execution by the petitioner, pending the case. The COMELEC found the RTC did not err and upheld its ruling. Thus it lifted the writ of preliminary injunction, dismissed the petition by the respondent, and directed the RTC to dispatch its judgment.

RTC granted the Motion for Execution pending appeal, and subsequently issued a Writ of Execution upon petitioner’s posting of a bond.

Petitioner took his oath of office. Respondent filed MR and supplemental petition praying the RTC order be nullified, and the grant of the writ of execution be set aside.

The COMELEC granted the respondent’s petition and again enjoined petitioner from exercising duties as mayor. COMELEC issued a resolution enjoining petitioner from assuming official functions of mayor until final resolution of the election case pending appeal.

SC: The RTC should have granted the Writ of Execution upon the Motion for Execution pending appeal. It is within the RTC’s discretion to grant the motion for execution pending appeal. Shortness of period of term of office, coupled with public interest and length of time the election contest has been pending are the valid reasons for execution of judgment pending appeal.

Here, the case has been pending for almost 1 year, and the term of office was only for 3 years. To prolong the

case would be to deprive the electorate of services of their mayor.

The petition for certiorari assailed RTC’s orders for the execution of its decision pending appeal. The grant of execution pending appeal was well within the discretionary powers of the RTC. In order to obtain the annulment of said orders in a petition for certiorari, it must first be proved that the trial court gravely abused its discretion. He should show not merely a reversible error committed by the RTC, but a grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction.

We find that no grave abuse of discretion was committed by the RTC. In its order granting execution pending appeal, it held:

It is of judicial notice that for the public official elected last May 14, 2001 elections only a short period is left.

Relative to this Court’s jurisdiction over the instant case, the settled rule that the mere filing of the notice of appeal does not divest the trial court of its jurisdiction over the case and to resolve pending incidents,i.e., motion for execution pending appeal (Asmala vs.

COMELEC, 289 SCRA 745) need not be overemphasized.

However, the COMELEC set aside the order, saying that shortness of term alone is not a good reason for execution of a judgment pending appeal. We disagree.

While it was indeed held that shortness of the remaining term of office and posting a bond are not good reasons, we clearly stated in Fermo v. COMELEC that: A valid exercise of the discretion to allow execution pending appeal requires that it should be based “upon good reasons to be stated in a special order.” The following constitute “good reasons” and a combination of two or more of them will suffice to grant execution pending appeal: (1.) public interest involved or will of the electorate; (2.) the shortness of the remaining portion of the term of the contested office;

and (3.) the length of time that the election contest has been pending.

The decision of the RTC was rendered on April 2, 2002, or after almost 1 year of trial and revision of the questioned ballots. It found petitioner as the candidate with the plurality of votes. Respondent appealed the said decision to the COMELEC. In the meantime, the three-year term of the Office of the Mayor continued to

run. The will of the electorate, as determined by the RTC in the election protest, had to be respected and given meaning. The Municipality needed the services of a mayor even while the election protest was pending, and it had to be the candidate judicially determined to have been chosen by the people.

Bañes vs Bañes: The wife’s motion for execution pending appeal was not proper. This is a case of legal separation between husband and wife. Judgment was rendered in favor of the wife finding the husband guilty.

All the properties belonging to the conjugal property were awarded to the wife including the 2 cars and the conjugal home. The wife asked for execution pending appeal. There was no good reason. The husband will be turned into a pauper. Also, the husband filed an appeal.

Although he might not get a total reversal, perhaps the distribution might be unfair.

RTC decided in a Civil Case, decreeing among others the legal separation between petitioner Aida Bañez and respondent Gabriel Bañez on the ground of the latter’s sexual infidelity; xxx the surrender by respondent of the use and possession of a motor vehicle and the smaller residential house to petitioner and the common children within 15 days from receipt of the decision.

Petitioner filed an urgent ex-parte motion to modify said decision, while respondent filed a Notice of Appeal.

RTC granted petitioner’s urgent ex-parte motion to modify the decision.

In another motion to modify the decision, petitioner sought moral and exemplary damages, as well as litigation expenses. She filed a motion for execution pending appeal. Respondent filed a consolidated written opposition to the 2 motions, and also prayed for the reconsideration of the previous order.

RTC denied Aida’s motion for moral and exemplary damages and litigation expenses but gave due course to the execution pending appeal. A writ of execution was issued to enforce the decision for (1) respondent to vacate the premises of the small residential house and for (2) respondent to surrender the use and possession of said motor vehicle to petitioner.

The petitioner was ordered to post a bond of P1,500,000 to answer for all the damages that respondent may suffer arising from the issuance of said writ of execution pending appeal and to further answer for all the advances that petitioner may have received from the Special Administrator in this case pending final termination of this present case.

In a petition for certiorari, respondent elevated the case to the CA. CA set aside the RTC decision. The writ of execution and the Order granting the motion filed by the sheriff to make symbolic delivery of the house and motor vehicle to the administrator of the are SET ASIDE.

CA denied Aida’s motion for reconsideration. Hence, the petition in G.R. No. 132592, filed by herein petitioner.

Petitioner manifested that she no longer questions the CA’s decision on the vehicle because respondent repossessed it. As to the residential house, she claimed that being conjugal in nature, justice requires that she and her children be allowed to occupy and enjoy the house considering that during the entire proceedings before RTC, she did not have the chance to occupy it.

Further, she posted a bond. For these reasons, she asked for execution pending appeal.

Respondent denied petitioner’s allegation that she did not have the chance to occupy the residential house. He averred that she could have, had she chosen to.

According to him, as the inventory of the couple’s properties showed, petitioner owned 2 houses and lots and 2 motor vehicles in the U.S., where she is a permanent resident. Respondent contended that there was no compelling reason for petitioner to have the judgment executed pending appeal.

SC: The execution of judgment pending appeal was not justified. As held in Echaus vs. Court of Appeals,

SC: The execution of judgment pending appeal was not justified. As held in Echaus vs. Court of Appeals,