2. EL ÁMBITO SOCIAL DENTRO DEL CUAL SE DA LA VIOLENCIA
2.1. CÓNYUGES 30
Catherine Larrère, Melvin Richter and Michael Sonenscher interpret England’s principle
based on a narrative that traces its origins in Montesquieu’s notion of honour. This camp’s
line of interpretation is divided into two stages. Firstly, this camp reads Montesquieu’s notion
of honour in conjunction with Bernard de Mandeville’s famous notion of private vices public
benefits. Secondly, insofar as England’s principle inclines individuals to freely pursue their
ambition, this camp traces its origins in Montesquieu’s notion of honour (Larrère, 2001, p.339;
Richter, 1977, p.43; Sonenscher, 2007, p.167). In this regard, this camp conflates the principles
of England and monarchy based on the assumption that they both advance Mandeville’s
liberal motif. This section suggests that this camp’s assumptions about England’s principle
are ill-conceived. This is because the object of individual ambition in monarchy differs
significantly from its English counterpart, which means that their conceptual affinity should
not be overemphasised. In order to prove this claim, firstly, this section analyses the
commentators’ assumptions about the link between Mandeville and Montesquieu’s notion
of honour. Secondly, this section analyses the commentators’ line of interpretation in tracing
England’s principle in the notion of honour. Also, based on the relevant textual evidence, it
identifies the weaknesses in their interpretations.
Larrère deems that Montesquieu justified social inequality in monarchy based on
Mandeville’s theory of the circulation of wealth through commerce. Larrère deems that
Montesquieu studied the type of monarchy on two analytical levels: the factual and the
moral (Larrère, 2001, p.339). On the factual level, Larrère deems that Montesquieu’s
description of monarchy fosters unequal distribution of wealth that leads to inequality and
the effects of inequality by conforming monarchy to a “pattern of justice” (Ibid). However,
she says, this endeavour was problematic because the concepts of inequality and justice are
mutually exclusive (Ibid). Indeed, Montesquieu’s type of monarchy harbours inequality by
its very nature. Hence, by eradicating inequality in monarchy, its government would begin
to resemble a republican regime. Therefore, instead of eradicating inequality, Larrère claims
that Montesquieu justified it on account of its economic and social benefits. Indeed, she says
that according to Montesquieu, “inequalities require justification” (Ibid). Toward this end,
Larrère claims that Montesquieu adopted Mandeville’s line of argument in the Fable of the
Bees (Ibid). She says that Mandeville’s theme of ‘private vices, public benefits’ suggests a
“circular process” of wealth where “the expenses of the rich make up the wages of the poor”
(Ibid). Hence, by adopting Mandeville’s argument, Montesquieu suggested that inequality
in monarchy can be beneficent insofar as it encourages the constant flow of wealth among
the social strata, says Larrère (Ibid). In this regard, Montesquieu addressed the social
resentment of the lower classes while preserving monarchy’s particular nature.
Likewise, Richter supports the notion that “Montesquieu’s concept of monarchy, and its
principle, honour, was in part adapted from Mandeville’s The Fable of the Bees” (Richter,
1977, p.43). To reach this conclusion, Richter analyses the unpublished sequel of The
Troglodytes and illustrates how Mandeville’s influence led Montesquieu to revise it before
its final publication in The Persian Letters. According to Montesquieu, the Troglodytes were
a tribe that recognised no central government whose members were wholly engaged in the
pursuit of their self-interest (LP 11 p.56). For this reason, in the absence of civic spirit,
Montesquieu depicted the Troglodytes perishing due to famine and disease.
After their tribe perished, Montesquieu noted that two virtuous Troglodyte survivors
founded a benevolent anarchic state that was based on virtue. Due to its increasing size, the
community could not meet its basic needs in the absence of a central government. For this
reason, Montesquieu said that the Troglodytes decided to yield their liberty to a philosopher-
Troglodytes found virtue too demanding and decided to moderate it by enabling the free
pursuit of individual ambition and the accumulation of wealth. At the same time, they
introduced certain restrictions that moderated the social inequality stemming from the
unequal distribution of wealth. In this regard, Montesquieu deemed that a monarchy could
pursue virtue “in conjunction with wealth,” by allowing “self-interest as much scope as was
consistent with the laws,” says Richter (Richter, 1977, p.42).
Richter argues that Montesquieu revised the fable before its final publication because its
moral was inconsistent with his definition of monarchy in The Spirit of the Laws. Indeed, in
the fable of the Troglodytes, Montesquieu suggested that in monarchy, “the arts and sciences
and the accumulation of wealth were compatible with the maintenance of virtue” (Ibid, p.44).
On the other hand, in The Spirit of the Laws, Montesquieu said that in monarchy, “politics
accomplishes great things with as little virtue as it can” (EL III, 5 p.25). Richter attributes this
inconsistency to the fact that Montesquieu had not fully developed his notion of honour at
the time he wrote the sequel of the Troglodytes (Richter, 1977, p.43). He deems that
Montesquieu finalised his definition of monarchy and honour following his acquaintance
with Mandeville’s notion that “satisfactory outcomes resulting from morally indifferent or
contemptible motives” (Ibid).64
In this regard, Richter says that Montesquieu combined
“ancient aristocratic French theory of monarchy” with Mandeville’s “bourgeois account of
how private vices produce public benefits” (Ibid, p.43). Hence, instead of combining virtue
and honour in monarchy, Montesquieu made “the first the principle of republics, and the
second, that of monarchies” (Ibid, p.44).
Sonenscher deems that insofar as honour inclines individuals to pursue their private
vices in order to foster public benefits, Montesquieu’s notion of honour was influenced by
Mandeville. Sonenscher justifies this claim in relation to the development of commerce in
monarchy. He says that the combination of a monarch with subordinate powers allowed
monarchy to acquire “a range of financial instruments that had come to shield it from
political interference” (Sonenscher, 2007, p.166). Hence, he observes that by protecting
commerce with laws, monarchy enabled the free circulation of wealth and the development
of industry. Moreover, by capitalising on the individual’s selfish passions, monarchy inclined
individuals to pursue their ambition in commerce and ensure the state’s preservation.
Sonenscher says that although Montesquieu thought men’s passions incline them to be
“wicked,” honour inclines them to be “humane and virtuous” out of self-interest (Ibid, p.166).
Therefore, instead of engaging in conflict with each other, individuals in monarchy compete
in commerce and the accumulation of wealth. Thus Sonenscher links Montesquieu’s notion
of honour to Mandeville’s teaching that men’s ‘private vices’ can be ultimately transformed
into ‘public benefits’ (Ibid, p.167).
Based on these observations, Larrère, Richter and Sonenscher claim that in defining the
principle of monarchy, Montesquieu adopted Mandeville’s famous notion that socially
satisfactory outcomes can result from self-interested motives. Now it is shown that according
to this camp, Montesquieu formulated England’s principle based on the same notion
(Larrère, 2001, p.339; Richter, 1977, p.43; Sonenscher, 2007, p.167).
In order to justify the conceptual resemblance between the two principles, this camp
projects central aspects of England’s principle onto Montesquieu’s notion of honour. With
regard to England’s principle, this camp identifies its main trait with the liberal motif of the
‘invisible hand’. Indeed, Montesquieu claimed that “England has always made its political
interests give way to the interests of its commerce” (EL XX, 7 p.343). On account of this claim,
this camp deems that England’s principle fosters a free labour market where individuals
procure public benefits by pursuing freely their ambition in commerce. This reading traces
the seeds of the same motif in Montesquieu’s conception of honour. It confirms its presence
based on Montesquieu’s claim that in monarchies “each person works for the common good,
believing he works for his individual interests” (EL III, 5, 7 p.27). In this regard, this camp
Based on this conceptual resemblance, this camp traces the conceptual origins of England’s
principle within a narrative that originates in Montesquieu’s notion of honour. Moreover, it
deems that this narrative is united under the authority of Bernard de Mandeville (Spector,
2012, pp.65-9; Douglass, 2012, pp.711-5).
However, despite their attempts to interpret England’s principle, this camp’s assumptions
may be ill-conceived. Indeed, by overemphasising the conceptual resemblances between the
two principles, this camp confounds Montesquieu’s thought in two ways. Firstly, by
projecting England’s laissez-faire economy on monarchy, this camp links monarchy’s
honorific individualism to the liberal motif of the ‘invisible hand.’ In this regard, by linking
honour to acquisitiveness, this camp considers the bourgeois Englishmen and the chivalrous
subjects of monarchy under the same light. As a result, this narrative suppresses honour’s
subtleties by linking the object of its ambition to the desire for wealth. Secondly, this camp
explains the formation of England’s principle only with relation to Montesquieu’s notion of
honour. In this regard, it neglects considering the possibility that Montesquieu may have
conceived England’s principle also in connection to his notion of virtue. However, by
neglecting to consider the role of virtue toward the conception of England’s principle, this
camp exaggerates Englishmen’s individualism.
With regard to this camp’s first misconception, in The Spirit of the Laws, Montesquieu
defined the object of honour with relation to the pursuit of individual distinction and glory.
For example, he said that in monarchy “one judges men's actions here not as good but as
fine, not as just but as great; not as reasonable but as extraordinary” (EL IV, 2 p.32). Hence,
although honour prompts individuals to pursue their self-interest in monarchy, it inclines
them toward nobler ends than the mere accumulation of monetary wealth. This is why
Montesquieu said that “glory and honour are for that nobility which knows, sees, and feels
In this regard, although honour inclines individuals to pursue their selfish passions in
order to procure public benefits, their motives are substantially different from Mandeville’s
bourgeois desire for monetary wealth. In his analysis of On Education in Monarchies,
Montesquieu referred to the examples of Crillon and the Viscount of Orte. According to
Montesquieu, both men had received orders from their kings to assassinate their political
opponents. However, Montesquieu said that the two men disobeyed their kings’ orders
because their “great and generous courage regarded a cowardly action as an impossible
thing” (EL IV, 2 p.33). Through their act of disobedience, the two men rejected the king’s
favour and a generous bounty. Hence, instead of aiming for monetary wealth, their selfish
motives inclined them to protect the opinion they had about themselves. Their actions also
procured certain public benefits. By disobeying their kings’ orders, the two men prevented
the king’s abuse of power and enlarged the pursuit of liberty and security in monarchy. Using
this example, Montesquieu illustrated that the pursuit of honour is not coterminous with the
accumulation of monetary wealth. Although both principles converge insofar as they
prompt individuals to pursue their self-interest, there are important differences with regard
to the object of the ambition they inspire. Finally, as Hirschman put it, the idea of an ‘invisible
hand’ in Montesquieu’s thought “was formulated in connection with the search for glory,
rather than with the desire for money” (Hirschman, 1997, p.10).
With regard to its second misconception, this camp explains the formation of England’s
principle only in relation to Montesquieu’s notion of honour. As a result, it neglects the
possibility that Montesquieu may also have conceived England’s principle in connection to
virtue. By neglecting to consider the influence of virtue, this camp cannot account for
Montesquieu’s claim that in times of crisis, the Englishmen forgo their private pursuits in
order to secure the preservation of the state. On one hand, Montesquieu deemed that to a
great extent, the Englishmen are led by their selfish passions and ambition to increase their
wealth. Indeed, he said that in England “all the passions are free” and so, “the ardor for
the other hand, Montesquieu also pronounced certain aspects that testify against this camp’s
emphasis on the Englishmen’s extreme individualism. Indeed, Montesquieu added later that
“this nation would love its liberty prodigiously” and that “in order to defend that liberty, the
nation might sacrifice its goods, its ease, and its interests, and might burden itself with
harsher imposts than even the most absolute prince would dare make his subjects bear” (Ibid
p.327). In this regard, the textual evidence suggests that despite their individualism, in times
of crisis the Englishmen act out of “love of the homeland” (EL Author’s Foreword p.xli).
Finally, this evidence suggests that by considering honour as the sole progenitor of England’s
principle, this camp suppresses the aspects that signify virtue’s influence.
To conclude this section, this camp interprets England’s principle based on a narrative
that originates in Montesquieu’s notion of honour. This narrative suggests that both
principles capitalise on men’s selfish passions in order to procure public benefits. On this
account, this camp links both the principles of monarchy and England to the liberal motif
of the ‘invisible hand’ and Mandeville’s private vices public benefits. However, by
overemphasising Mandeville’s influence on honour, this camp misreads its intended
meaning. Examination of the relevant textual evidence has shown that Montesquieu’s notion
of honour inclines individuals toward the attainment of nobler ends than the mere
accumulation of wealth. Hence, although both principles foster public benefits by
capitalising on men’s selfish passions, this section has suggested that the object of their
ambition differs significantly. Moreover, this section has used textual evidence to suggest
that honour should not be considered as the sole conceptual progenitor of England’s
principle. Indeed, through its emphasis on honour, this camp suppresses certain aspects
about England’s principle that signify a conceptual affinity with Montesquieu’s notion of
virtue. As a result, this camp’s assumption that England’s principle originates solely in