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OBJECTIVE

1. The purpose is to ensure that all pertinent information concerning an aircraft which is being subjected to an act of unlawful interference is available to those States likely to be affected by the flight so that timely and appropriate decisions and action may be taken to safeguard the passengers and crew members, the aircraft, all other civil aircraft in its vicinity, and others likely to be affected by that aircraft’s operations.

WHAT INFORMATION IS REQUIRED

2. The pertinent information to be compiled, collated and disseminated consists of the:

a) intended or assumed route;

b) flight plan details;

c) airworthiness of the aircraft;

d) number and condition of injured persons on board;

e) numbers of crew, passengers and offenders on board;

f) number, type, and other details, of weapons, explosive and incendiary devices known or believed to be in the possession of the offenders or explosive/incendiary devices found on board the aircraft;

g) physical condition of flight crew members;

h) composition and competence of the flight crew for the intended flight;

i) number of hours previously flown by the flight crew and flight time limitations; and

j) navigation charts and associated documentation available on board for the intended route and destination.

3. The sources from which the information may be obtained and the offices or officials who might require it are tabulated in Attachment A to this appendix.

ASSIGNMENT OF RESPONSIBILITY

4. A number of variable factors will determine whether or not the required information is available from the operator, ATS units or the security services. They include:

a) when, where and under what circumstances the unlawful act first became known;

b) what, if any, communication with the flight crew and/or offenders has been possible or permitted;

c) the route and destination changes which ATS units observe or of which they are advised;

d) the feasibility of determining: injuries to persons on board; the fuel reserves, stores, including essential food and water, and airworthiness of the aircraft; status, composition and competence of crew members; the number of hostages taken on board the aircraft and the circumstances prevailing at that time;

e) the feasibility of determining the number, type, etc., of weapons, explosive and incendiary material and devices in the possession of the offenders, or explosive/incendiary devices found on board the aircraft;

and

f) the role of the operator, particularly in those cases where the operator:

• is not represented at the aerodrome of most recent landing; or

• has not participated in servicing the aircraft.

5. It is not desirable to assign responsibility for compilation and dissemination of all the information required for security purposes to a non-governmental entity such as the operator who may not always have a representative available at the airports where the aircraft has landed or is likely to land. Further, assignment to ATS units of this responsibility for compiling non-ATS information, at a time when ATS units may be carrying a maximum workload, will be undesirable. It is therefore recommended that primary responsibility for the compilation and dissemination of the information required for security purposes be assigned to a designated security service.

6. However, ATS units and the operator should be required to assist, to the extent feasible, in compilation of the required information. Assignment of responsibility at this level and in the following manner would be appropriate:

a) the operator: to provide all available pertinent details that are not contained in the flight plan;

b) ATS units: to provide all ATS information available, assisting, when possible, in obtaining from the pilot such other information as is required; and

c) the designated security service: to collect, compile and collate all of the required information, including specialist advice requested by the pilot-in-command, and to immediately transmit such information by the fastest available means to other security services likely to be affected and to the pilot-in-command when deemed necessary or desirable, at the same time informing the appropriate authority for security of the action taken.

Note.— In some cases, it will be desirable to use the operator’s communications capability as it may be the fastest means available.

Appendix 1. Compilation and dissemination of information concerning

an aircraft which is being subjected to an act of unlawful interference A1-3

DISSEMINATION OF INFORMATION

7. The urgent nature of each act of unlawful interference makes it necessary for pertinent information to be transmitted immediately as it becomes known and by the quickest means available to permit the timely implementation of plans for safeguarding the affected aircraft and all other aircraft likely to be affected by its operation. Therefore, the ATS unit which first becomes aware of an aircraft which is being subjected to an act of unlawful interference should transmit an initial alerting message containing all available pertinent information to those ATS units which might be affected having regard to the fuel endurance of the aircraft, the possibility of sudden changes in destination and other relevant factors.

8. As the flight progresses, ATS units should transmit updated information required for ATS and SAR purposes in accordance with Annex 11 and the PANS-ATM.

9. As a parallel action, the security services in the States concerned should transmit all the available pertinent information to the security services at the aircraft’s known or suspected destination and to the security services in the States expected to be overflown.

10. The requirements for ATS units to forward information relating to an aircraft which is being subjected to an act of unlawful interference are currently covered by provisions contained in Annex 11 and the PANS-ATM.

SUMMARY OF TYPICAL ACTIONS

11. To summarize the series of actions that are envisaged as a requirement to meet the objective:

a) ATS informs the designated security services and the operator immediately when it is known, observed or suspected that an aircraft has been subjected to an act of unlawful interference;

b) if the aircraft is diverted from its original route and its destination is unknown, ATS units, using the available flight plan details and all other reliable information, attempt to determine the actual or suspected route(s) and/or destination and notify the designated security services and the operator accordingly;

c) ATS transmits an alerting message to all ATS units which might be concerned with the flight giving such details as are available;

d) ATS requests supplementary flight plan data from the ATS unit at the airport of departure;

e) the operator assists in providing the required information to the designated security services;

f) the security services collect all the data required and transmit it as specified in paragraph 9;

g) these procedures are repeated as required during the flight;

h) the security services at the airport of intended or assumed landing initiate the airport emergency plan for safeguarding injured or ill persons, the passengers and crew members and the aircraft. If necessary, plans for dealing with a major disaster resulting from an accident on landing or a subsequent explosion and/or fire on board the aircraft will also be implemented by the airport security services; and

i) an arrival message, and any subsequent changes thereto, is sent by ATS to the airport of departure and to all addressees on the alerting message when the aircraft arrives at its final destination and the act of unlawful interference has been concluded, parallel action being taken by the security services.